The Oyez Project: Judicial Power Issues - Writ Improvidently Granted

Adams v. Florida Power Corp.

The Florida Power Corporation (FPC) operated as a publicly-regulated electric utility monopoly until 1992, when Congress opened the industry to competition through the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Between 1992 and 1996, FPR terminated Wanda Adams and others during a series of reorganizations the company stated were necessary to maintain its competitiveness. Members of the Adams class sued FPC, claiming that FPC discriminated against them because of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In 1996, the District Court conditionally certified a class of former FPC employees claiming age discrimination. In 1999, the court decertified the class and ruled as a matter of law that a disparate impact theory of liability is not available to plaintiffs bringing suit under the ADEA.

Adams v. Robertson

In 1992, Charlie Frank Robertson filed a class action suit in an Alabama trial court, alleging that Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encouraged its customers to exchange existing health insurance policies for new policies that, according to Robertson, provided less coverage for cancer treatment. The trial court appointed Robertson as class representative and certified the class pursuant to provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that do not give class members the right to exclude themselves from a class. The trial court then approved a settlement agreement that precluded class members from individually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy exchange program. Guy E. Adams and other petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The court's opinion only addressed state law issues and did not answer whether the certification and settlement of this class action suit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta

In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, held that strict scrutiny governs whether race-based classifications violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Adarand I). The Court then remanded the case for a determination whether the race-based components of the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program could withstand this standard of review. Ultimately, the Court remanded Adarand for a second time for a determination on the merits consistent with Adarand I. When the Court of Appeals held, that by virtue of a new regulatory framework under which the DOT's state and local DBE program now operated, that program passed constitutional muster, the Court again certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard announced in Adarand I.

Atchley v. California

No details yet.

Baldonado v. California

No details yet.

Belcher v. Stengel

No details yet.

Binks Mfg. Co. v. Ransburg Corp.

No details yet.

Bostic v. United States

No details yet.

Brotherhood, Ry. & Steamship Clerks, v. United Air Lines

No details yet.

Bruno v. Pennsylvania

No details yet.

Bullock v. South Carolina

No details yet.

Burrell v. Mcray

No details yet.

Cassius v. Arizona

No details yet.

Cavanaugh v. Roller

No details yet.

Cerbone v. Conway

No details yet.

Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel

No details yet.

Conway v. Adult Authority

No details yet.

Cook v. Hudson

No details yet.

Diamond v. Louisiana

No details yet.

District of Columbia v. Tri County Industries

Using a 1993 building permit issued by the District of Columbia, Tri County Industries, Inc. spent nearly $600,000 readying a site for a "soil remediation" facility, which would decontaminate soil tainted by hazardous wastes. After protests and a dispute over whether the company was violating its permit by storing contaminated soil on the site, the city issued a stop-work order. Tri County filed suit against the District of Columbia for suspending its building permit on the facility claiming its due process rights had been violated. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reinstated a 1998 jury's $5 million award. The appellate court rule that the District Court should have conducted a "more searching inquiry" than it had to preserve the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials in civil cases. The appellate court normally applies a "abuse of discretion" standard. Under the "more searching inquiry," the appellate court discounted the reasons the district judge had cited in ordering a new trial.

Dresner v. City Of Tallahassee

No details yet.

Drew Municipal School Dist. v. Andrews

No details yet.

EEOC v. FLRA

No details yet.

Estes v. Metropolitan Branches, Dallas NAACP

No details yet.

Finley v. Murray

No details yet.

Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley

When Ford Motor Company and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. canceled a credit card rebate program that enabled cardholders to accrue and redeem rebates towards the purchase of a new Ford, cardholders filed multiple state-based class actions. Ford and Citibank removed the cases to federal court. The cardholder plaintiffs consolidated their actions, seeking reinstitution of the program. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that each class member was asserting a separate and distinct claim and that the individual claims did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The appellate court also concluded that premising jurisdiction on the cost of complying with an injunction in favor of a single plaintiff would conflict with the principle of the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Grimmett, Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Siragusa v. Brown

In a divorce settlement, Joanne Siragusa forfeited her entitlement to one-half of her ex-husband's ownership share in Heart Institute of Nevada (HIN) in exchange for monthly payments. In 1987, ex-husband Vincent Siragusa defaulted on the monthly payments, declared bankruptcy, and relinquished his ownership share in HIN by reorganizing HIN into Cardiology Associates of Nevada. Joanne alleged that Vincent had filed bankruptcy in order to evade monthly payments and subsequently reorganized his company in order to undo her collateral in HIN. In 1994, Joanne sought a three-fold reimbursement for damages caused by Vincent's fraudulent actions in accordance with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). Tom Grimmett, the original trustee for the divorce settlement, prosecuted on behalf of Joanne. Patricia Brown, the consultant responsible for reorganizing HIN, defended Vincent.

The District Court dismissed Joanne's suit because it was based on actions that started in 1987. (RICO claims expire after four years.) Grimmett argued that the time limit should not have begun until Joanne discovered Vincent's "pattern" of fraud in 1990. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Joanne's first court action against Vincent in 1989 signified the beginning of the time limit and thus her claim had expired. Grimmett appealed to the Supreme Court, citing disagreements among Circuit Courts as to when the four-year time limit began.

Hadley v. United States

No details yet.

Hanner v. Demarcus

No details yet.

Harbison-Walker Refractories, v. Brieck

No details yet.

Heider, Administrator v. Michigan Sugar Co.

No details yet.

Hester v. Illinois

No details yet.

Hicks v. District Of Columbia

No details yet.

Hinkle v. New England Ins. Co.

No details yet.

Holder v. Banks

No details yet.

Holt v. Alleghany Corp.

No details yet.

Howell v. Mississippi

A Mississippi court convicted Marlon Howell of capital murder - murder committed during a felony - and sentenced him to death. Howell appealed and argued the trial court was wrong to deny the jury the option of finding Howell guilty of the lesser offenses of non-capital murder or manslaughter, for which the death penalty would not have been an option. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Howell and said there was no evidence to support lesser charges.

Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA

No details yet.

Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA

No details yet.

Hunter v. Dean

No details yet.

In Re Zipkin

No details yet.

Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson

No details yet.

Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp.

No details yet.

Johnson v. Massachusetts

No details yet.

Jones v. Hildebrant

No details yet.

Joseph v. Indiana

No details yet.

Kimbrough v. United States

No details yet.

Kissinger v. Halperin

No details yet.

Lynaugh v. Petty

No details yet.

Maness v. Wainwright

No details yet.

Maryland v. Blake

Following his arrest for murder, Leeander Blake invoked his right to speak with a lawyer. Before Blake's attorney arrived, however, an officer and a detective approached Blake to give him a copy of the charges against him. The statement of the charges included "DEATH" as a possible penalty, although Blake was 17 years old and therefore too young to face the death penalty. The officer said to Blake "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" The detective then said "No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now." A half hour later Blake decided to speak to the police without his lawyer, and he proceeded to make incriminating statements about the murder. At trial, Blake argued that the incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation, and therefore inadmissible. (Under Edwards v. Arizona, police must cease interrogating a suspect after he requests an attorney, unless the suspect waives his previous request.) A county circuit court agreed with Blake, and ruled the statement inadmissible. On appeal, Maryland argued that Blake's interaction with the officer and the detective did not constitute an interrogation, because the officer's statement was a mere rhetorical question, and in any case was quickly corrected by the detective. An intermediate state appeals court agreed and allowed the statement to be admitted as evidence. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the detective's correction did not reduce the severity of the officer's inappropriate statement. Since the officer's statement was ruled an illegal interrogation in violation of Blake's Miranda rights, the incriminating statement could not be used as evidence at trial.

Massachusetts v. Meehan

No details yet.

Mcadams v. Mcsurely

No details yet.

Mcgann v. United States

No details yet.

Medellin v. Dretke

A Texas trial court sentenced Medellin, a Mexican citizen, to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two girls in 1993. A state appeals court affirmed the conviction. Medellin then filed a state habeas corpus action, claiming that Texas failed to notify him of his right to counsel under the Vienna Convention. The state trial court and the appellate court rejected this claim. Medellin then filed a federal habeas petition, raising the Vienna Convention claim. The district court denied the petition. Medellin next appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could rule, the International Court of Justice issued its decision in a case where Mexico had alleged the United States violated the Vienna Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican citizens facing the death penalty in the United States. The ICJ held that the United States had violated the individually enforceable rights guaranteed by Vienna and must reconsider the convictions. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin's appeal, citing its previous holdings that the Vienna Convention did not create an individually enforceable right. More than two months after the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, President George W. Bush issued a memo requiring the United States to follow the ICJ's ruling by having state courts review the Mexicans' cases. Citing the memo and the ICJ ruling, Medellin filed a new appeal in a Texas state court.

Missouri v. Blair

No details yet.

Mitchell v. Oregon Frozen Foods Co.

No details yet.

Montana v. Donald Glenn Imlay

No details yet.

Morris v. Weinberger

No details yet.

Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court

No details yet.

Needelman v. United States

No details yet.

New York v. Uplinger

No details yet.

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky

Beginning in 1996, a number of allegations arose that Nike was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities. Nike responded to the charges in numerous ways, such as by issuing press releases. In 1998, Marc Kasky, a California resident, sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under California's Unfair Competition Law. Kasky alleged that Nike made "false statements and/or material omissions of fact" concerning the working conditions under which its products are manufactured. Nike filed a demurrer, contending that Kasky's suit was absolutely barred by the First Amendment. The trial court dismissed the case and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. In reversing, the California Supreme Court found that Nike's messages were commercial speech, but that the suit was at such a preliminary stage that the issue whether any false representations had been made had yet to be resolved.

Ohio v. Huertas

No details yet.

Palmieri v. Florida

No details yet.

Perez v. California

No details yet.

PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rene Alberto Rodriguez

No details yet.

Phillips v. New York

No details yet.

Quinn v. Muscare

No details yet.

Ramsey v. New York

No details yet.

Reeves v. Alabama

No details yet.

Ricci v. Village of Arlington Heights

Randall Ricci owns Rudeway Enterprises, a telemarketing business. After the Arlington Heights police department determined that Ricci lacked the required business license and that one of Ricci's employees had an outstanding warrant, officers went to Rudeway Enterprises to arrest the employee. While arresting the employee, the officers also searched Ricci's business papers without a warrant. Subsequently, Ricci was arrested for violating Section 9-201 of the Village of Arlington Heights Code of Ordinances, which makes it unlawful to operate a business without a license. Ultimately, Ricci filed a claim that the officers violated his civil rights by subjecting him to a full custodial arrest for committing a fine-only offense. The District Court dismissed the claim. Finding the arrest reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court of Appeals rejected Ricci's argument that a full custodial arrest for violation of a fine-only ordinance is constitutionally permissible only if the violation involves a breach of the peace.

Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery

No details yet.

Robert E. Gibson v. Florida Bar

No details yet.

Roe v. Doe

No details yet.

Rogers v. United States

After searching his truck, Florida police arrested and charged George Rogers with knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm and a silencer. Rogers admitted during his arrest and trial that he knew he was in possession of a silencer. Nonetheless, he requested the District Court to instruct the jury to define the Government's burden of establishing "knowing possession" as proof that he deliberately possessed an item that he not only knew to be a "firearm," but that he knew such possession was illegal. Following the court's refusal of his instruction request, Rogers was convicted. On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit's decision to affirm the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court granted Rogers certiorari.

Smith v. Mississippi

No details yet.

Susser v. Carvel Corp.

No details yet.

Tennessee v. Middlebrooks

No details yet.

Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown

No details yet.

Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie

No details yet.

Triplett v. Iowa

No details yet.

U.S. Postal Service v. Letter Carriers

No details yet.

Umans v. United States

No details yet.

United States v. Guana-Sanchez

No details yet.

United States v. Jacobs

No details yet.

United States v. Merchant

No details yet.

United States v. Quinn

No details yet.

Van Drasek v. Webb

No details yet.

Vermont v. Cox

No details yet.

Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Vaughn

No details yet.

White v. United States

No details yet.