http://www.oyez.org/issues/judicial-power/improvident-writ/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Wed, 20 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Florida Power Corporation (FPC) operated as a publicly-regulated electric utility monopoly until 1992, when Congress opened the industry to competition through the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Between 1992 and 1996, FPR terminated Wanda Adams and others during a series of reorganizations the company stated were necessary to maintain its competitiveness. Members of the Adams class sued FPC, claiming that FPC discriminated against them because of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In 1996, the District Court conditionally certified a class of former FPC employees claiming age discrimination. In 1999, the court decertified the class and ruled as a matter of law that a disparate impact theory of liability is not available to plaintiffs bringing suit under the ADEA.</p> <p>May disparate impact claims be brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967?</p> 01-584_20020320-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_584/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 14 Jan 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1992, Charlie Frank Robertson filed a class action suit in an Alabama trial court, alleging that Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encouraged its customers to exchange existing health insurance policies for new policies that, according to Robertson, provided less coverage for cancer treatment. The trial court appointed Robertson as class representative and certified the class pursuant to provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that do not give class members the right to exclude themselves from a class. The trial court then approved a settlement agreement that precluded class members from individually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy exchange program. Guy E. Adams and other petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The court's opinion only addressed state law issues and did not answer whether the certification and settlement of this class action suit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement.</p> <p>Does the Supreme Court of Alabama's approval of the certification and settlement of a class action lawsuit, whose class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?</p> 95-1873_19970114-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1873/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 31 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, held that strict scrutiny governs whether race-based classifications violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Adarand I). The Court then remanded the case for a determination whether the race-based components of the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program could withstand this standard of review. Ultimately, the Court remanded Adarand for a second time for a determination on the merits consistent with Adarand I. When the Court of Appeals held, that by virtue of a new regulatory framework under which the DOT's state and local DBE program now operated, that program passed constitutional muster, the Court again certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard announced in Adarand I.</p> <p>Did the Court of Appeals misapply the strict scrutiny standard in determining if Congress had a compelling interest to enact legislation designed to remedy the effects of racial discrimination? Is the U.S. Department of Transportation's current Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest?</p> 00-730_20011031-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_730/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 02 Nov 1976 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 75-823_19761102-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_823/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 Apr 1976 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 75-44_19760427-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_75_44/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Nov 1993 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 92-1510_19931108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1510/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Nov 1986 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-1947_19861105-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_84_1947/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Nov 1976 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 75-503_19761101-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_503/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 10 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Using a 1993 building permit issued by the District of Columbia, Tri County Industries, Inc. spent nearly $600,000 readying a site for a "soil remediation" facility, which would decontaminate soil tainted by hazardous wastes. After protests and a dispute over whether the company was violating its permit by storing contaminated soil on the site, the city issued a stop-work order. Tri County filed suit against the District of Columbia for suspending its building permit on the facility claiming its due process rights had been violated. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reinstated a 1998 jury's $5 million award. The appellate court rule that the District Court should have conducted a "more searching inquiry" than it had to preserve the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials in civil cases. The appellate court normally applies a "abuse of discretion" standard. Under the "more searching inquiry," the appellate court discounted the reasons the district judge had cited in ordering a new trial.</p> <p>Must federal appellate courts conduct a "more searching inquiry" than "abuse of discretion" when reviewing a federal trial court's decision to grant a new trial?</p> 99-1953_20010110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1953/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 03 Mar 1976 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 74-1318_19760303-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1318/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Jan 1986 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-1728_19860122-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1728/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 07 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>When Ford Motor Company and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. canceled a credit card rebate program that enabled cardholders to accrue and redeem rebates towards the purchase of a new Ford, cardholders filed multiple state-based class actions. Ford and Citibank removed the cases to federal court. The cardholder plaintiffs consolidated their actions, seeking reinstitution of the program. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that each class member was asserting a separate and distinct claim and that the individual claims did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The appellate court also concluded that premising jurisdiction on the cost of complying with an injunction in favor of a single plaintiff would conflict with the principle of the amount-in-controversy requirement.</p> <p>Is the amount-in-controversy requirement of the federal diversity statute satisfied where a class representative seeks an injunction that would cost the defendant more than $75,000 to implement whether the injunction applies to one plaintiff or all class members?</p> 01-896_20021007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_896/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Jan 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In a divorce settlement, Joanne Siragusa forfeited her entitlement to one-half of her ex-husband's ownership share in Heart Institute of Nevada (HIN) in exchange for monthly payments. In 1987, ex-husband Vincent Siragusa defaulted on the monthly payments, declared bankruptcy, and relinquished his ownership share in HIN by reorganizing HIN into Cardiology Associates of Nevada. Joanne alleged that Vincent had filed bankruptcy in order to evade monthly payments and subsequently reorganized his company in order to undo her collateral in HIN. In 1994, Joanne sought a three-fold reimbursement for damages caused by Vincent's fraudulent actions in accordance with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). Tom Grimmett, the original trustee for the divorce settlement, prosecuted on behalf of Joanne. Patricia Brown, the consultant responsible for reorganizing HIN, defended Vincent. <br /> <br />The District Court dismissed Joanne's suit because it was based on actions that started in 1987. (RICO claims expire after four years.) Grimmett argued that the time limit should not have begun until Joanne discovered Vincent's "pattern" of fraud in 1990. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Joanne's first court action against Vincent in 1989 signified the beginning of the time limit and thus her claim had expired. Grimmett appealed to the Supreme Court, citing disagreements among Circuit Courts as to when the four-year time limit began.</p> <p>Does the four-year time limit on a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 begin after a pattern of racketeering activity has been discovered by the plaintiff?</p> 95-1723_19970106-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1723/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Nov 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-6646_19921104-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_6646/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 31 Oct 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 87-271_19881031-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_271/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 29 Nov 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A Mississippi court convicted Marlon Howell of capital murder - murder committed during a felony - and sentenced him to death. Howell appealed and argued the trial court was wrong to deny the jury the option of finding Howell guilty of the lesser offenses of non-capital murder or manslaughter, for which the death penalty would not have been an option. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Howell and said there was no evidence to support lesser charges.</p> <p>1.) In death penalty cases can a state court refuse to give a jury the option of finding a defendant guilty of at least one lesser offense if it is recognized by state law and supported by evidence? 2.) Was Howell's federal constitutional claim properly raised before the Mississippi Supreme Court?</p> 03-9560_20041129-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9560/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 12 Oct 1993 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 92-1123_19931012-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1123/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 26 Apr 1977 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 76-5416_19770426-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_76_5416/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Dec 1980 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 79-880_19801208-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_880/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Mar 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 85-1656_19870303-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1656/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 22 Mar 1977 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 75-6909_19770322-argument-1 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_6909/argument-1/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 22 Mar 1977 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 75-6909_19770323-argument-2 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_6909/argument-2/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 01 Nov 2005 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Following his arrest for murder, Leeander Blake invoked his right to speak with a lawyer. Before Blake's attorney arrived, however, an officer and a detective approached Blake to give him a copy of the charges against him. The statement of the charges included "DEATH" as a possible penalty, although Blake was 17 years old and therefore too young to face the death penalty. The officer said to Blake "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" The detective then said "No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now." A half hour later Blake decided to speak to the police without his lawyer, and he proceeded to make incriminating statements about the murder. At trial, Blake argued that the incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation, and therefore inadmissible. (Under <i>Edwards v. Arizona</i>, police must cease interrogating a suspect after he requests an attorney, unless the suspect waives his previous request.) A county circuit court agreed with Blake, and ruled the statement inadmissible. On appeal, Maryland argued that Blake's interaction with the officer and the detective did not constitute an interrogation, because the officer's statement was a mere rhetorical question, and in any case was quickly corrected by the detective. An intermediate state appeals court agreed and allowed the statement to be admitted as evidence. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the detective's correction did not reduce the severity of the officer's inappropriate statement. Since the officer's statement was ruled an illegal interrogation in violation of Blake's Miranda rights, the incriminating statement could not be used as evidence at trial.</p> <p>When a police officer improperly communicates with a suspect after the suspect has invoked his right to an attorney, does <i>Edwards v. Arizona</i> permit consideration of curative measures by the police (such as the detective's quick correction of the officer's improper statement) to conclude that a suspect later initiated communication with the police?</p> 04-373_20051101-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_373/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 01 Mar 1978 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 76-1621_19780301-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_1621/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 28 Mar 2005 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A Texas trial court sentenced Medellin, a Mexican citizen, to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two girls in 1993. A state appeals court affirmed the conviction. Medellin then filed a state habeas corpus action, claiming that Texas failed to notify him of his right to counsel under the Vienna Convention. The state trial court and the appellate court rejected this claim. Medellin then filed a federal habeas petition, raising the Vienna Convention claim. The district court denied the petition. Medellin next appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could rule, the International Court of Justice issued its decision in a case where Mexico had alleged the United States violated the Vienna Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican citizens facing the death penalty in the United States. The ICJ held that the United States had violated the individually enforceable rights guaranteed by Vienna and must reconsider the convictions. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin's appeal, citing its previous holdings that the Vienna Convention did not create an individually enforceable right. More than two months after the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, President George W. Bush issued a memo requiring the United States to follow the ICJ's ruling by having state courts review the Mexicans' cases. Citing the memo and the ICJ ruling, Medellin filed a new appeal in a Texas state court.</p> <p>1. Is a federal court bound by the International Court of Justice's ruling that U.S. courts must reconsider a Mexican citizen's claim for relief under the Vienna Convention? 2. Should a federal court enforce an ICJ ruling?</p> 04-5928_20050328-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_5928/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 12 Nov 1986 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 85-303_19861112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_303/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 07 Oct 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-687_19921007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_687/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Jan 1984 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 82-1724_19840118-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1724/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 23 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Beginning in 1996, a number of allegations arose that Nike was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities. Nike responded to the charges in numerous ways, such as by issuing press releases. In 1998, Marc Kasky, a California resident, sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under California's Unfair Competition Law. Kasky alleged that Nike made "false statements and/or material omissions of fact" concerning the working conditions under which its products are manufactured. Nike filed a demurrer, contending that Kasky's suit was absolutely barred by the First Amendment. The trial court dismissed the case and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. In reversing, the California Supreme Court found that Nike's messages were commercial speech, but that the suit was at such a preliminary stage that the issue whether any false representations had been made had yet to be resolved.</p> <p>May a corporation participating in a public debate be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are commercial speech because they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions?</p> 02-575_20030423-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_575/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 16 Jan 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-1944_19910116-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_1944/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 26 Feb 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-122_19920226-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_122/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 30 Mar 1976 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 75-130_19760330-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_75_130/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Randall Ricci owns Rudeway Enterprises, a telemarketing business. After the Arlington Heights police department determined that Ricci lacked the required business license and that one of Ricci's employees had an outstanding warrant, officers went to Rudeway Enterprises to arrest the employee. While arresting the employee, the officers also searched Ricci's business papers without a warrant. Subsequently, Ricci was arrested for violating Section 9-201 of the Village of Arlington Heights Code of Ordinances, which makes it unlawful to operate a business without a license. Ultimately, Ricci filed a claim that the officers violated his civil rights by subjecting him to a full custodial arrest for committing a fine-only offense. The District Court dismissed the claim. Finding the arrest reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court of Appeals rejected Ricci's argument that a full custodial arrest for violation of a fine-only ordinance is constitutionally permissible only if the violation involves a breach of the peace.</p> <p>May police officers who do not have a warrant arrest someone for a violation of a fine-only ordinance?</p> 97-501_19980421-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_501/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 06 Nov 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-1102_19911106-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_1102/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After searching his truck, Florida police arrested and charged George Rogers with knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm and a silencer. Rogers admitted during his arrest and trial that he knew he was in possession of a silencer. Nonetheless, he requested the District Court to instruct the jury to define the Government's burden of establishing "knowing possession" as proof that he deliberately possessed an item that he not only knew to be a "firearm," but that he knew such possession was illegal. Following the court's refusal of his instruction request, Rogers was convicted. On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit's decision to affirm the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court granted Rogers certiorari.</p> <p>Does a lower court's refusal to grant a jury instruction, the substance of which is confessed to and acknowledged by the defendant, grounds for a grant of certiorari to the Supreme Court?</p> 96-1279_19971105-lq-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1279/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Nov 1993 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 92-989_19931101-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_989/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 01 Mar 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 92-1988_19940301-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1988/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 20 Apr 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 87-59_19880420-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_87_59/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 07 Dec 1977 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 76-1193_19771207-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_1193/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Mar 1978 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 76-1193_19780320-reargument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_1193/reargument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Mar 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 85-1672_19870304-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1672/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Mar 1986 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-1717_19860305-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1717/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 29 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-319_19870429-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_319/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Nov 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-1108_19871103-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_1108/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Oct 1989 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 88-928_19891003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_928/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist