The Oyez Project: Judicial Power Issues - Jurisdiction or Authority of Federal District Courts Arguments

American National Red Cross v. S.G. and A.E. - Oral Argument

Tue, 03 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500

Plaintiffs filed two state-law tort actions in New Hampshire state courts, alleging that one of them had contracted AIDS from a transfusion of contaminated blood during surgery. The second action was brought against the Red Cross after plaintiffs discovered that it had supplied the tainted blood. Before the state court could decide a motion to consolidate the cases, the Red Cross invoked the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, to remove the second suit to federal court. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court, holding that the Red Cross' charter provision allowing it to "sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States," 36 U.S.C. Section 2, conferred original jurisdiction on the federal district court.

Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services - Oral Argument

Mon, 21 Apr 1997 12:00:00 -0500

The Tax Injunction Act provides that federal "district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." In Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act does not limit the power of federal courts if the U.S. sues to protect itself or its instrumentalities from state taxation. Four Production Credit Associations (PCA's), federally chartered corporate financial institutions organized by farmers primarily to make loans to farmers, sued, seeing a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting Arkansas from levying sales and income taxes against them. The PCA's argued that they constituted instrumentalities of the U.S. and that they were not subject to the Act's provisions. The District Court granted the PCA's summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Behrens v. Pelletier - Oral Argument

Tue, 07 Nov 1995 12:00:00 -0500

After the Federal Home Loan Bank Board recommended that Robert Pelletier be replaced because of he was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution, he was fired as the provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan Association. Pelletier then filed suit, seeking damages. John Behrens, the agent responsible for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's recommendation, asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions were taken in a governmental capacity. The District Court rejected Behrens' defense of qualified immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable "final" decision, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal, and, ultimately, affirmed the District Court's rejection of Behrens' qualified immunity. On remand, the District Court denied Behrens' motion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. On appeal from the latest denial, the Court of Appeals dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.

Bell v. Thompson - Oral Argument

Tue, 26 Apr 2005 12:00:00 -0500

A Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate.

Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson - Oral Argument

Wed, 30 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500

Several H&R Block customers, who took out loans from Beneficial National Bank in anticipation of their tax refunds, sued the bank in state court. The customers alleged that the bank charged excessive interest in violation of Alabama law. The bank asked that the case be heard in federal, rather than state, court, because the issues were covered under the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal law. The district court ruled in favor of the bank; the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NBA did not completely preempt state laws governing lending rates and that the case could therefore be heard in state court.

Board Of Governors Of The Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial, Inc. - Oral Argument

Mon, 07 Oct 1991 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Bowen v. Massachusetts - Oral Argument

Wed, 20 Apr 1988 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Breuer v. Jim's Concrete - Oral Argument

Wed, 02 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500

Philip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court "unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress." Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

California v. Deep Sea Research - Oral Argument

Mon, 01 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500

After several expeditions, Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR) located the wreck of the S.S. Brother Jonathan and its cargo which sank off the California coast in 1865. When DSR sought rights to the wreck and her cargo, under Article III, Section 2, federal admiralty jurisdiction, California challenged DSR claiming that it had title to the wreck under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA). The ASA requires the federal government to transfer title over "abandoned shipwrecks" to the states in whose submerged lands the wrecks are found. California also noted that under Section 6313 of its own public code, title to all abandoned shipwrecks found off its coast vests in the state. In light of its claims to the Brother Jonathan, California claimed that DSR's federal title action violated its rights under the Eleventh Amendment, even though it lacked possession of the wreck.

Carden v. Arkoma Associates - Oral Argument

Tue, 07 Nov 1989 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis - Oral Argument

Tue, 12 Nov 1996 12:00:00 -0500

Asserting state law claims, Lewis, a Kentucky native, brought suit in Kentucky state court, for injuries sustained in a construction accident, against Caterpillar Inc. (Caterpillar), a Delaware corporation, and Whayne Supply Company (Whayne), a Kentucky corporation. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group (Liberty Mutual), a Massachusetts corporation, later intervened in the case as a plaintiff. Less than a year after filing his complaint Lewis entered into a settlement with Whayne. Caterpillar immediately moved to remove the action to federal court, arguing that the settlement between Lewis and Whayne meant that there was complete diversity. Lewis protested that complete diversity was not present because Liberty Mutual had not yet settled with Whayne, so that both Whayne and Lewis were still party to the lawsuit. The District Court denied Lewis' motion to remand, erroneously concluding that complete diversity was present. Five months before the trial, Liberty Mutual and Whayne reached a settlement and the District Court dismissed Whayne from the case. Complete diversity was present for the remainder of the case, including trial and judgment in favor of Caterpillar. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, holding that the lower court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal because there was not complete diversity, and should have remanded the case to state court.

Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization - Oral Argument

Mon, 18 Apr 1988 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Celotex Corp. v. Edwards Et ux. - Oral Argument

Tue, 06 Dec 1994 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Chambers v. Nasco, Inc. - Oral Argument

Wed, 27 Feb 1991 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. - Oral Argument

Mon, 18 Apr 1988 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Clinton v. Goldsmith - Oral Argument

Mon, 22 Mar 1999 12:00:00 -0500

James T. Goldsmith, an Air Force major, defied an order from a superior officer to inform his sex partners that he was infected with HIV and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual intercourse. Goldsmith was convicted by general court-martial under several counts and sentenced to six years' confinement and partial forfeiture of salary. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Goldsmith sought no review of the decision in the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and his conviction became final. Subsequently, the Air Force notified Goldsmith that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls under a newly enacted statute. Goldsmith then petitioned the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act, which authorizes courts established by Congress to "issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions," to redress the unrelated alleged interruption of his HIV medication during his incarceration, but did not immediately contest his removal from the Air Force rolls. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to act. On appeal to the CAAF from this determination, Goldsmith first asserted the claim that the Air Force's action to drop him violated the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution. He argued that the statute had been enacted after the date of his court-martial conviction and that the action would inflict successive punishment based on the same conduct underlying his first conviction. The CAAF granted his petition for extraordinary relief to redress the interruption of his HIV medication and relied on the All Writs Act in enjoining the President and other officials from dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls.

D.C. Court Of Appeals v. Feldman - Oral Argument

Wed, 08 Dec 1982 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson - Oral Argument

Wed, 22 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500

In 1997, a group of farm workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, who alleged injury from chemical exposure, filed a state-court action against Dole Food Company and others. Subsequently, Dole impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co. and Bromine Compounds, Ltd., or the Dead Sea Companies. Dole successfully removed the action to federal court, arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations provided federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court rejected the argument that the Dead Sea Companies were instrumentalities of a foreign state, Israel, as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and thus entitled to removal. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Dole could not base removal on the federal common law of foreign relations and that the Dead Sea Companies were not instrumentalities of Israel because they did not meet the FSIA's instrumentality definition.

Dow Chemical Company v. Stephenson - Oral Argument

Wed, 26 Feb 2003 12:00:00 -0500

In 1984 Dow Chemical Co. negotiated a settlement in a class action lawsuit filed by Vietnam War veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange and subsequently developed various injuries and illnesses. The settlement created a fund that would pay those who developed illnesses up until 1994. Daniel Stephenson, a Vietnam veteran, developed cancer in 1998 and could therefore not collect money from the fund. He sued, saying that he was not adequately represented in the original settlement, which made no provision for injuries that developed after 1994. Therefore, he claimed, he had the right to file a suit of his own. The district court ruled for Dow Chemical; the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, ruling for Stephenson.

Elder v. Holloway - Oral Argument

Mon, 10 Jan 1994 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Empire HealthChoice Assurance v. McVeigh - Oral Argument

Tue, 25 Apr 2006 12:00:00 -0500

In accordance with the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), the Office of Personnel Management has negotiated a health insurance plan for federal employees with the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association. The plan requires the administrator to make a reasonable effort to recoup amounts paid for medical care from beneficiaries if those beneficiaries receive recoveries from another source (for example, a law suit or settlement against a third party that caused injury). In New York State, the plan is administered by Empire Healthchoice Assurance (Empire).

Empire brought suit in federal district court against the estate of Joseph McVeigh, a former federal employee who was injured in an accident and eventually won a settlement with the third party allegedly responsible for his injuries. Empire sought reimbursement for the money spent on McVeigh's medical care. Denise McVeigh, the administrator of Joseph McVeigh's estate, argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case under FEHBA and that it should be heard instead by the state court. The district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries - Oral Argument

Wed, 23 Feb 2005 12:00:00 -0500

Two subsidiaries of ExxonMobil formed joint ventures with Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute arose over the royalties SABIC had charged, SABIC sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seeking a ruling that the royalties were proper. ExxonMobil countersued in federal district court, alleging SABIC had overcharged. Before the state-court trial, the district court denied SABIC's motion to dismiss the federal suit. As SABIC appealed, the Delaware court ruled for ExxonMobil. The Third Circuit held that as a result of of the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit. That doctrine was an offshoot of the federal law giving the U.S. Supreme Court sole authority to modify and prohibiting a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction.

Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. - Oral Argument

Wed, 20 Jan 1982 12:00:00 -0500

Immediately after Treasure Salvors, Inc. ("Treasure") located a 17th-century Spanish wreck of its coast, Florida claimed ownership of the remains. Treasure contracted with the Florida Division of Archives ("Archives") to salvage the wreck in exchange for 75% of the recovered artifacts' appraised value. Meanwhile, in the unrelated proceedings of United States v. Florida, the United States won a judgment granting it ownership of the lands, minerals, and other natural resources in the area of the Spanish wreck's discovery. Upon learning of this ruling, Treasure sought a declaration of title to the wreck. Following a second favorable appellate decision, Treasure sought and received a warrant to seize all artifacts from the Archives. Florida challenged the warrant and its issuing district court's jurisdiction, but lost on both counts. On appeal from an unfavorable appellate ruling, the Supreme Court granted Florida certiorari.

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust - Oral Argument

Tue, 19 Apr 1983 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Fslic v. Ticktin - Oral Argument

Mon, 27 Feb 1989 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc. - Oral Argument

Tue, 16 Apr 1996 12:00:00 -0500

William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer, loaned 300 original slide transparencies to the Center for Humanities, Inc. When the Center lost the transparencies, Gasperini commenced suit in the District Court. The Center conceded liability. A jury awarded Gasperini $1,500 per transparency, the asserted "industry standard" of compensation for a lost transparency. The Center moved for a new trial contending that the verdict was excessive. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals observed that New York law governed the controversy in this diversity case. Under New York law appellate courts are empowered to review the size of jury verdicts and to order new trials when the jury's award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." Contrarily, under the Seventh Amendment, "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Guided by New York Appellate Division decisions reviewing damage awards for lost transparencies, the court held that the $450,000 verdict "materially deviates from what is reasonable compensation." The court vacated the judgment entered on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial, unless Gasperini agreed to an award of $100,000.

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P. - Oral Argument

Wed, 03 Mar 2004 12:00:00 -0500

Atlas Global Group was a limited partnership company created under Texas law. They filed a suit in federal court against Grupo Dataflux, a Mexican corporation. The suit dealt with a state law, but Atlas filed the case in federal court because, it claimed, the court had "diversity jurisdiction" (when a case involves citizens of two different states, or an American citizen and a foreign citizen, it is heard in federal court). However, at the time the case was filed, two of Atlas's partners were Mexican citizens (they left the partnership before the trial began). After the case was decided, but before the judgment was announced, Grupo Dataflux filed a motion to dismiss the case because the court did not have diversity jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion, finding that Atlas was a Mexican "citizen" at the time of filing because of the citizenship of its partners, and that the federal courts therefore did not have jurisdiction. On appeal, Atlas argued that even if the necessary diversity had not been present at the time of filing, it was present before the trial began and the court should therefore ignore the error under an exception for cases that have already been decided. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed, reversing the decision.

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund - Oral Argument

Wed, 31 Mar 1999 12:00:00 -0500

Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., an investment fund, purchased approximately $75 million in unsecured notes (Notes) from Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A., (GMD) a Mexican holding company involved in a tool road construction program sponsored by the Government of Mexico. Four GMD subsidiaries guaranteed the Notes. After GMD fell into financial trouble and missed an interest payment on the Notes, Alliance accelerated the Notes' principal amount and filed suit for the amount due in Federal District Court. Alliance requested a preliminary injunction restraining GMD from transferring its assets alleging that GMD was at risk of insolvency, or already insolvent, that it was preferring its Mexican creditors by its planned allocation to them of its most valuable assets, and that these actions would frustrate any judgment that Alliance could obtain. Alliance sought monetary damages and no lien or equitable interest was claimed. The District Court issued the preliminary injunction and ordered GMD to post a $50,000 bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Guam v. Olsen - Oral Argument

Tue, 29 Mar 1977 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Hoffmann-LaRoche Inc. v. Sperling - Oral Argument

Mon, 02 Oct 1989 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation System - Oral Argument

Tue, 19 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., is a manufacturer of patented fans and heaters. In 1992, Vornado sued Duracraft Corp., claiming that Duracraft's use of a spiral grill design in its fans infringed Vornado's trade dress. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Vornado had no protectible trade-dress rights in the grill design. Later, Vornado filed a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission, claiming that Holmes Group, Inc.'s sale of fans and heaters with a spiral grill design infringed Vornado's trade dress. Subsequently, Holmes filed a federal-court action, seeking a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade dress and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing it of such infringement. In response, Vornado asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in Holmes's favor. Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding Holmes's challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case.

Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington - Oral Argument

Tue, 25 Feb 1986 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Jean v. Nelson - Oral Argument

Mon, 25 Mar 1985 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Jerome B. Grubart Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock - Oral Argument

Wed, 12 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust - Oral Argument

Mon, 24 Apr 2006 12:00:00 -0500

The Security Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) states that class action lawsuits involving more than 50 plaintiffs alleging untruth or manipulation "in connection with the purchase or sale" of certain securities may be moved from state court to federal district court. In this case, several class action suits, each involving more than 50 investors in covered securities, were brought in various state courts over the devaluation of the plaintiffs' investments by Putnam Funds Trust and other mutual funds. The mutual funds asked to have the cases heard in federal court, and the state courts agreed. The federal district court sent the cases back to the state courts, however, finding that SLUSA does not cover suits over devaluation, only those related to purchases or sales. When the mutual funds appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs objected to the appeal because 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) prohibits appeals court review of federal district court decisions to remand cases to state court for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court, however, found that the district court's decision had been substantive, not jurisdictional, and was therefore not covered by 1447(d). The appeals court then ruled that the plaintiff's claims could not be brought under SLUSA.

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company Of America - Oral Argument

Tue, 01 Mar 1994 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine - Oral Argument

Wed, 29 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500

In 1998, James F. Lewis, a deckhand aboard the M/V Karen Michelle owned by Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., claimed that he was injured when he tripped over a wire on the boat. Lewis then sued Lewis & Clark in Illinois County Court, for personal injuries claiming negligence under the Jones Act. Lewis & Clark had already filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the District Court under the Limitation of Liability Act (Act). Subsequently, the court approved a surety bond of $450,000, representing Lewis & Clark's interest in the vessel, ordered that any claim related to the incident be filed with the court within a specified period, and enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits related to the incident. The injunction prevented Lewis from litigating his personal injury claims in state court and he moved to dissolve it. The District Court noted that federal courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited liability, but also recognized that the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits to federal courts saves to suitors "all other remedies to which they are other wise entitled." Ultimately, the court dissolved the injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach - Oral Argument

Mon, 10 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500

Lexecon Inc. was a defendant in a class action lawsuit. Under 28 USC section 1407(a), the lawsuit was transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District of Arizona. Section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact "to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings," but provides that the Panel "shall" remand any such action to the original district "at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings." After claims against it were dismissed, Lexecon brought suit against Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach and others (Milberg) in the class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois. Ultimately, the Panel, under section 1407(a), ordered the case transferred to the District of Arizona. Afterwards, Lexecon moved for the Arizona District Court to remand the case to Illinois. Milberg filed a countermotion requesting the Arizona District Court to invoke section 1404(a) to "transfer" the case to itself for trial.Ultimately, the court assigned the case to itself and the Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment.

Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel - Oral Argument

Mon, 19 Jan 1976 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche - Oral Argument

Tue, 11 Oct 2005 12:00:00 -0500

Christophe and Juanita Roche leased an apartment in Virginia managed by Lincoln Property Company. The Roches sued Lincoln, which they identified as a Texas company, and other defendants in state court, alleging a variety of problems that arose from their exposure to toxic mold in their apartment. Lincoln moved the litigation to a federal district court, citing diversity of citizenship, which arises when opposing parties are from different states. The Roches then asked that the case be sent back to state court because there was no diversity of citizenship. Rather, one of the partners in the Lincoln-owned subsidiary partnership resided in Virgina. The court denied the motion and held that Lincoln was a Texas citizen. The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Lincoln failed to show complete diversity of citizenship, because it did not disprove the exsistence of an affiliated Virginia entity that was a real party in interest.

Marshall v. Marshall - Oral Argument

Tue, 28 Feb 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Vickie Lynn Marshall (a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith) was involved in a dispute in Texas Probate Court over the estate of her late husband, J. Howard Marshall. While the state-court proceedings were ongoing, Ms. Marshall filed for bankruptcy in federal court. E. Pierce Marshall, J. Howard's son, filed a claim alleging that Ms. Marshall had defamed him, and she filed a counterclaim alleging that E. Pierce had interfered with a gift she expected from her late husband's estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Ms. Marshall and awarded her a large monetary award. Later, the probate court found J. Howard's will valid and ruled for his son. Under the judicially-created "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction, federal courts do not interfere with state-court judgments concerning wills and estates. E. Pierce Marshall appealed the bankruptcy court decision (awarding Ms. Marshall a large monetary award) to federal district court, invoking the probate exception to argue that the court had no jurisdiction. The district court disagreed and ruled for Ms. Marshall, holding that since her claim did not require invalidating the will, the probate exception did not apply. The Ninth Circuit reversed, broadly interpreting the probate exception as covering any question that would normally be handled in probate court.

Mathews v. Weber - Oral Argument

Tue, 04 Nov 1975 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Missouri v. Jenkins - Oral Argument

Mon, 30 Oct 1989 12:00:00 -0500

In order to combat segregation in public schools in compliance with court directives, the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) sought to enhance the quality of schools and to attract more white students from the suburbs. The KCMSD's ability to raise taxes, however, was limited by state law. After determining that the District did not have alternative means of raising revenue for the program, federal district judge Russell G. Clark ordered an increase of local property taxes for the 1991-92 fiscal year. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, but ruled that the courts should enjoin state tax laws that prevented the District from raising the necessary funds and allow the state to set tax rates.

Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain - Oral Argument

Mon, 24 Apr 1989 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Nguyen v. United States - Oral Argument

Mon, 24 Mar 2003 12:00:00 -0500

Khanh Phuong Nguyen and Tuyet Mai Thi Phan were tried, convicted, and sentenced on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam, a territorial court with subject-matter jurisdiction over both federal-law and local-law causes. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel that convened to hear their appeals included two judges from that court, both of whom are life-tenured Article III judges, and the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article IV territorial-court judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 10-year term. Neither Nguyen nor Phan objected to the panel's composition before the cases were submitted for decision and neither sought rehearing to challenge the panel's authority to decide their appeals immediately after it affirmed their convictions.

Pa. Bureau Of Correction v. U.S. Marshals - Oral Argument

Tue, 15 Oct 1985 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Pasadena City Bd. Of Education v. Spangler - Oral Argument, Part 1

Tue, 27 Apr 1976 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Pasadena City Bd. Of Education v. Spangler - Oral Argument, Part 2

Tue, 27 Apr 1976 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Plumbers & Pipefitters - Oral Argument

Wed, 29 Apr 1981 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. - Oral Argument

Wed, 01 Apr 1992 12:00:00 -0500

In 1981, Argentina instituted a foreign exchange insurance contract program (FEIC), under which it effectively assumed the risk of currency depreciation in cross-border transactions. When Argentina could not cover the FEIC contracts, it issued "Bonods," which provided for repayment in U.S. dollars through transfer on the market in one of several locations. Subsequently, when Argentina concluded that it lacked sufficient foreign exchange to retire the Bonods, it unilaterally extended the time for payment and offered bondholders substitute instruments as a means of rescheduling the debts. Ultimately, two Panamanian corporations and a Swiss bank brought a breach-of-contract action in Federal District Court. The court denied Argentina's motion to dismiss. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which subjects foreign states to suit in American courts for acts taken "in connection with a commercial activity" that have "a direct effect in the United States."

Roell v. Withrow - Oral Argument

Wed, 26 Feb 2003 12:00:00 -0500

The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 authorizes magistrate judges to conduct "any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case" with "the consent of the parties." When Jon Withrow, a state prisoner, brought suit against members of the prison's medical staff, he gave written consent for the magistrate judge to preside over the entire case. Only one of the three staff members gave written consent. The other two members voluntarily participated. When the medical staff won, Withrow appealed and the Court of Appeals sua sponte remanded the case to determine whether the parties had consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. Ultimately, the magistrate judge reported that she had lacked jurisdiction because such consent had to be expressly given. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that consent must be express and that the staffs' postjudgment consent was inadequate.

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. - Oral Argument

Mon, 22 Mar 1999 12:00:00 -0500

In 1976, Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge) and Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN). Following the acquisition, Norge assigned its license to produce gas from the North Sea's Heimdal Field to MPCN, which then contracted to sell 70 percent of its share of the Heimdal gas production to a group of European buyers, including Ruhrgas AG. MPCN's sales agreement with Ruhrgas and the other European buyers provided that disputes would be settled by arbitration in Sweden. In 1995, Marathon Oil Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge sued Ruhrgas in Texas state court, asserting state-law claims of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. Ruhrgas removed the case to the District Court, asserting three bases for federal jurisdiction. Ruhrgas then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the parties. Marathon moved to remand the case to the state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the category of claim in the suit. The District Court granted Ruhrgas' motion. Noting that Texas' long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the court addressed the constitutional question and concluded that Ruhrgas' contacts with Texas were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that, in removed cases, district courts must decide issues of subject-matter jurisdiction first, reaching issues of personal jurisdiction only if subject-matter jurisdiction is found to exist.

Salve Regina College v. Russell - Oral Argument

Tue, 27 Nov 1990 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Spallone v. United States - Oral Argument

Mon, 02 Oct 1989 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Swint v. Chambers County Commission - Oral Argument

Tue, 10 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson - Oral Argument

Tue, 15 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state-court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state-court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of the state-court action.

Textron Lycoming v. United Automobile Workers - Oral Argument

Mon, 23 Feb 1998 12:00:00 -0500

Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 187 are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that required Textron to notify the Union before entering into any agreement to "subcontract out" work that would otherwise be performed by Union members. In 1994, Textron announced plans to subcontract out work that would have caused approximately one-half of the Union members to lose their jobs. Subsequently, the Union filed suit, alleging that Textron had fraudulently induced the Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint invoked section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over "suits for violation of contracts" between an employer and a labor organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the cause of action alleged did not come within section 301(a). The Court of Appeals reversed.

Thermtron Products, Inc., v. Hermansdorfer - Oral Argument

Tue, 07 Oct 1975 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca - Oral Argument

Mon, 02 Oct 1995 12:00:00 -0500

Anthony Petrarca commenced an action in Ohio state court to collect rent allegedly owed by Child World, Inc. under two commercial leases and to enforce Cole National Corporation's guarantee of Child World's performance under the leases. After Child World filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Cole's successor in interest, Things Remembered, Inc., removed the action to federal court under the bankruptcy removal statute and the general federal removal statute. The Bankruptcy Court held that the removal was timely and proper and that it had jurisdiction. The District Court reversed and remanded the case to state court, holding that the removal was untimely and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed Things Remembered's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, Secretary Of Labor - Oral Argument

Tue, 05 Oct 1993 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

United States v. Beggerly - Oral Argument

Mon, 27 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500

In 1979, the United States sued Chris W. Beggerly and the Beggerly family to quiet title to Horn Island, located within the state of Mississippi, for a federal park. The Government argued that Beggerly did not have clear title because the Government had never patented the disputed land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1982, a settlement quieted title in the Government's favor. However, in 1994, with new evidence, Beggerly sued, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as an "independent action." The appellate court then vacated the settlement agreement and instructed the District Court to quiet title in Beggerly's favor.

Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt - Oral Argument

Mon, 28 Nov 2005 12:00:00 -0500

Schmidt, a South Carolina citizen, sued Wachovia Bank in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing him to participate in an illegal tax shelter. Wachovia is a national bank with its main office in North Carolina and branch offices in several other states, including South Carolina. Under federal diversity jurisdiction, federal courts can hear cases in which the parties are citizens of different states. Wachovia filed a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. After the petition was denied on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1348, national banks are "deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." The Circuit Court interpreted "located" to mean any state where the bank has a branch location. Noting that the statute uses both "located" and "established" to refer to the presence of a bank, the Circuit Court determined that a national bank is "established" in the state where its main office is located, and "located" in every state where it has a branch office. Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, Wachovia was "located" in, and a citizen of, South Carolina (as well as several other states with branch offices). Since both parties, Schmidt and Wachovia, had South Carolina citizenship, the Circuit Court dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction.

Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. - Oral Argument

Wed, 19 Apr 1978 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. - Oral Argument

Mon, 27 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500

London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group, which was involved in litigation over the ownership and operation of Texas oil and gas properties, under several commercial liability insurance policies. After a verdict was entered against the Hill Group, the underwriters sought a federal declaratory judgment that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability. The Hill Group filed a state court suit and moved to dismiss or to stay the underwriter's action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the appellate court did not require application of the exceptional circumstances test. The appellate court also reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion and found none.

Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht - Oral Argument

Mon, 20 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500

In 1996, Keith Schacht filed a state-court suit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and several of its employees (defendants), in their "personal" and in their "official" capacity, alleging that his dismissal violated the Federal Constitution and federal civil rights laws. After removing the case to federal court, the defendants asserted that the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claims against the Department and its employees in their official capacity. The District Court granted the individual defendants summary judgment on the "personal capacity" claims and dismissed the claims against the Department and the individual defendants in their "official capacity." On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the removal had been improper because the presence of even one claim subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar deprives the federal courts of removal jurisdiction over the entire case.