The Oyez Project: First Amendment Issues - Protest Demonstrations Decisions

Adderley v. Florida

Were the petitioners denied their rights of free speech, assembly, petition, due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jail house and not because he "objected to what was being sung . . . or disagreed with the objectives of the protest," there were no First Amendment violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.

Bachellar v. Maryland

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Boos v. Barry

Did the District of Columbia Code violate the First Amendment of the Constitution?

The Court found that the Code's restriction on sign displays violated the First Amendment while the ban on congregations did not. First, Justice O'Connor argued that the prohibition on signs failed to meet the high standards that the Court uses when evaluating the content-based regulation of political speech in a public forum. The "dignity" standard that the Code used was similar to the "outrageousness" standard which the Court found unconstitutional in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988) because it was too subjective. Second, O'Connor reasoned that since the language of the ban on congregations was narrowly drawn and could only be acted upon by the police in situations where a threat to security or peace were present, it did not prohibit peaceful gatherings.

Cameron v. Johnson

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Carey v. Brown

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Clark v. C.C.N.V.

Did the National Park Service regulations violate the First Amendment by curtailing symbolic speech?

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment. The Court noted that expression is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and that the manner of the protest was at odds with the government's interest in maintaining the condition of the parks. The Court argued that the Park Service did not attempt to ban all sleeping in public parks (only in certain areas), and that the protesters had alternative means of communicating their message.

Coates v. City Of Cincinnati

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Cohen v. California

Did California's statute, prohibiting the display of offensive messages such as "Fuck the Draft," violate freedom of expression as protected by the First Amendment?

Yes. In an opinion by Justice John Marshall Harlan, the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas).

Colten v. Kentucky

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Cox v. Louisiana

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Cox v. Louisiana

Does a statutory "disturbance of the peace" conviction, for a peaceable demonstration that contains speech that may potentially incite violence, infringe on a demonstrator's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court began by noting that none of the demonstrators' activities acceded those that would be expected at any peaceable assembly. Cheering, clapping, and singing do not in themselves constitute a breach of the peace. With respect to Cox's urging the demonstrators to engage in activities which could potentially result in violence, such as demanding service at segregated lunch counters, the Court held that these could not sustain a breach of the peace conviction either. The constitutional rights of freedom of speech and assembly could not be denied because of hostility to their assertion or exercise. The Court noted that free speech protections serve perhaps their best purpose when they invite dispute, induce conditions of unrest, and even stir people to anger over prejudicial preconceptions. Any statute that is so broadly written as to stifle these freedoms shall be stuck down as repugnant to the Constitution.

Edwards v. South Carolina

Did the arrests and convictions of the marchers violate their freedom of speech, assembly, and petition for redress of their grievances as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The Court held that the arrests and convictions violated the rights of the marchers. They were convicted of an offense which the South Carolina Supreme Court, in upholding the convictions, described as "not susceptible of exact definition." The evidence used to prosecute the marchers did not even remotely prove that their actions were violent. Hence, Justice Stewart found clear constitutional violations in this case. Stewart called the marchers' actions an exercise of First Amendment rights "in their most pristine and classic form" and emphasized that a state cannot "make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views" as South Carolina attempted to do here.

Fields v. City Of Fairfield

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FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn.

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Gooding v. Wilson

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Grayned v. City Of Rockford

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Gregory v. Chicago

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Hess v. Indiana

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Houston v. Hill

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Hurley v. Irish American GLIB Association

Did a Massachusetts State Court's mandate to Boston's Veterans' Council, requiring it to include GLIB members in its parade, violate the Council's free speech rights as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. A unanimous court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say."

Jones v. Board Of Education

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Lewis v. City Of New Orleans

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NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.

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NAACP v. Overstreet

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Norwell v. City Of Cincinnati

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Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley

Does the Chicago ordinance violate the freedom of speech Clause of the First Amendment?

The exemption for labor picketing violated the equal protection clause. Government regulation of message content is presumed unconstitutional unless there are compelling justifications. And regulations that selectively exclude speakers from a public forum must undergo careful judicial examination to ensure the minimal degree of furthering an important government interest. Mosley fashions an important principle from the values of freedom and equality: equal freedom of expression.

R.A.V. v. St. Paul

Is the ordinance overly broad and impermissibly content-based in violation of the First Amendment free speech clause?

Yes. In a 9-to-0 vote, the justices held the ordinance invalid on its face because "it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." The First Amendment prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-semites are motherfuckers but not that all Jews are motherfuckers. Government has no authority "to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules."

Radich v. New York

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Schacht v. United States

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Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham

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Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham

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Smith v. Goguen

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Spence v. Washington

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Street v. New York

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Texas v. Johnson

Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

United States v. Albertini

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United States v. Eichman

Did the Act violate freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment?

In a 5-to-4 decision, coming on the heels of a similar holding in Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Court struck down the law because "its asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression and concerned with the content of such expression." Allowing the flag to be burned in a disposal ceremony but prohibiting protestors from setting it ablaze at a political protest made that clear, argued Justice Brennan in one of his final opinions.

United States v. O'Brien

Was the law an unconstitutional infringement of O'Brien's freedom of speech?

No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest. "[W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."

Virginia v. Black

Does the Commonwealth of Virginia's cross-burning statute, which prohibits the burning of a cross with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, violate the First Amendment?

Yes, but in a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, in which four other justices joined, the provision in the Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute unconstitutional in its current form, in which three other justices joined. Justice Antonin Scalia left the latter portion of the Court's conclusion to argue that the Court should vacate and remand the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court with respect to Elliott and O'Mara, so that that court could have an opportunity to construe the cross-burning statute's prima-facie-evidence provision. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concluded that the Virginia statute is unconstitutional and therefore concurred in the Court's judgment insofar as it affirmed the invalidation of Black's conviction. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.