The Oyez Project: First Amendment Issues - Obscenity, Federal Decisions

Alexander v. United States

1. Does property forfeiture under RICO as punishment for the distribution of obscene materials constitute 'prior restraint' on speech in violation of the First Amendment?

2. Does the forfeiture of a business as punishment for the sale of obscene media constitute an 'excessive fine'?

No and undecided. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for a 5-4 majority that the application of RICO in Alexander's case was neither a 'prior restraint' on speech, nor a criminalization of speech typically protected under the Constitution. His sentence established no conditions on his behavior after its completion; once he paid the fine, surrendered his business and went to prison, he could theoretically distribute adult media without prejudice from the government. "To accept petitioner's argument," Rehnquist wrote, "would virtually obliterate the distinction [...] between prior restraints and subsequent punishments."

In a separate and unanimous vote, the Court ruled that the forfeiture did in fact merit Eighth Amendment review. The case was returned to the Eighth Circuit for an analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause.

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union

Does the Child Online Protection Act's use of "community standards" to identify "material that is harmful to minors" violate the First Amendment?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that COPA's reliance on community standards to identify what material is harmful to minors does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes. The Court expressed no view as to whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons or was unconstitutionally vague and did not vacate the preliminary injunction because it could not do so without addressing matters yet to be considered. "In its original form, the community standard provided a shield for communications that are offensive only to the least tolerant members of society," argued Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent. "In the context of the Internet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield. If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web."

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union

Is the Child Online Protection Act's requirement that online publishers prevent children from accessing "material that is harmful to minors" likely to violate the First Amendment by restricting too much protected speech and using a method that is not the least restrictive one available?

Yes. In an interesting 5-to-4 vote, with Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg on one side and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Breyer and O'Connor on the other, the Court found that Congress had not yet met its burden to show that the COPA requirements were more effective than other methods of preventing minors. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in the majority opinion, wrote that the district court's injunction "was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute." The majority also emphasized that barring the statute's enforcement during the trial would be less harmful than allowing it, because allowing it would be likely to prevent online publishers from publishing certain material.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

Does the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 abridge freedom of speech where it where it proscribes a significant universe of speech that is neither obscene under Miller v. California nor child pornography under New York v. Ferber?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the two prohibitions described above are overbroad and unconstitutional. The Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with Miller insofar as the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the obscenity definition. Moreover, the Court found the CPPA to have no support in Ferber since the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Provisions of the CPPA cover "materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller, and the reasons the Government offers in support of limiting the freedom of speech have no justification in our precedents or in the law of the First Amendment" and abridge "the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Blount v. Rizzi

No details yet.

Ginzburg v. United States

Does conviction under the federal obscenity statute, for pandering advertisements for sexually explicit publications, violate of the First Amendment's free speech protections if the advertisements are not themselves obscene?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that although circulars themselves may not be obscene, their public mailing offends the federal obscenity statute if they advertise obscene materials. The Court reasoned that where the sole emphasis of an advertisement is the commercial exploitation of erotica for prurient appeal, it shall be deemed "pornographic" communication that lies beyond the scope of First Amendment speech protections. The Court cautioned, however, that the distribution of materials containing sexuality in the context of art, literature, or science is not per se prohibited under the obscenity statute if it can be shown to advance human knowledge or understanding.

Hamling v. United States

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Manual Enterprises v. Day

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Marks v. United States

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Pinkus v. United States

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Reno v. ACLU

Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized?

Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact on adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.

Roth v. United States

Did either the federal or California's obscenity restrictions, prohibiting the sale or transfer of obscene materials through the mail, impinge upon the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment?

In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973).

Rowan v. U. S. Post Office Dept.

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Sable Communications of California v. FCC

Did the amended Communications Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Court upheld the District Court's ruling. Since the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, as the Court found in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton (1973), the ban on obscene speech was legitimate. However, sexual expression that is simply indecent is protected. Thus, banning adult access to indecent messages "far exceeds that which is necessary" to shield minors from dial-a-porn services.

Smith v. United States

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United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels Of Film

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United States v. American Library Association

Does Congress have the authority to require libraries to censor internet content in order to receive federal funding?

Yes. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, because public libraries' use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons' First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution and is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Both noted that CIPA imposed a comparatively small burden on library Internet users that was not disproportionate to any potential speech-related harm, especially in light of the libraries' ability to unblock sites. Justices John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter dissented. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.

United States v. Orito

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United States v. Reidel

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United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs

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United States v. X-Citement Video

Did the Act's use of the term "knowingly" violate the First Amendment's Free Speech clause by not mandating a showing that the alleged offender knew which materials contained under-age performances?

No. The Court relied on an awkward grammatical construction as it held that the term "knowingly" applied to the entire passage of the law. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated that other interpretations failed to make sense since Congress obviously did not envision people accidentally mailing underage pornographic materials. All the law required was a showing that alleged violators intentionally distributed illegal pornography, regardless of whether they knew it depicted underage performances.