The Oyez Project: First Amendment Issues - Miscellaneous Decisions

Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus

Did the Los Angeles ordinance violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution?

Yes. Using the "First Amendment overbreadth doctrine," which allows an individual to challenge a statute on its face which is potentially threatening to others, the Court found that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Justice O'Connor argued that the rule was vague, overly broad, and would have effectively prohibited activities such as reading, talking, or wearing expressive shirts or political buttons in the LAX terminal. Allowing such an ordinance, which touched "the universe of expressive activity" in its totality, would have caused LAX to become a "First Amendment Free Zone," according to O'Connor.

Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.

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Arkansas Ed. Television Comm. v. Forbes

Is the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate from a debate sponsored by a state-owned public television broadcaster a violation of the candidate's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that public broadcasters could selectively exclude participants from their sponsored debates, so long as these were not designed as "public forums." The Court found that by reserving participation rights only to candidates for a particular congressional district, rather then hosting an open-microphone format, and selecting among those which were eligible to participate, based on objective indications of their popular support rather then their view points, AETC's debate was a "nonpublic forum." As such, AETC could decide who should and should not participate in its sponsored event.

Bates v. Little Rock

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Beard v. Banks

Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to the worst-behaved prisoners violate the First Amendment?

No. In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the prison's policy. The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer held that Banks had failed to present sufficient evidence that the prison had acted unreasonably in denying newspapers, magazines, and photographs to its most troublesome inmates. The Court found that the policy met the four-part test established in Turner v. Safley: (1) it was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of motivating good behavior; (2) though prisoners had no alternate means of exercising their rights, they could potentially graduate to the less-restrictive level 1; (3) accommodating prisoners' rights could result in negative consequences (worse behavior); and (4) there was no alternate means of accomplishing the prison's goals without restricting the prisoners' rights. Justice Thomas concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that "This case reveals the shortcomings of the Turner framework." Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both wrote dissents. Justice Stevens called the policy "perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control," while Justice Ginsburg criticized the high evidentiary burden the plurality placed on the prisoners. Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser

Does the First Amendment prevent a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a high school assembly?

No. The Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the "fundamental values of public school education."

Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr

Did the Board's termination of Umbehr's contract, presumably as a result of his criticisms, constitute a violation of his First Amendment freedom of speech?

Yes. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech shielded Umbehr, as a government employee, from termination due to things he might have said about the Board. Umbehr successfully proved that his criticisms of the Board preceded his termination and were the primary motivating factor behind its retaliatory termination of his contract. The Court added that, in balancing an employee's interest in commenting on public concerns against an employer's interest in promoting efficient performance by its employees, it could not find any countervailing county interest justifying its infringement of Umbehr's freedom of speech.

Board Of Ed. v. National Gay Task Force

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Board Of Education v. Pico

Did the Board of Education's decision to ban certain books from its junior high and high school libraries, based on their content, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Yes. Although school boards have a vested interest in promoting respect for social, moral, and political community values, their discretionary power is secondary to the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that as centers for voluntary inquiry and the dissemination of information and ideas, school libraries enjoy a special affinity with the rights of free speech and press. Therefore, the Board could not restrict the availability of books in its libraries simply because its members disagreed with their idea content.

Board of Regents Univ. Wisc. v. Southworth

May public universities and colleges subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the First Amendment rights of students who find some campus groups objectionable?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the "First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others." Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.

Bond v. Floyd

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Brandenburg v. Ohio

Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.

Branti v. Finkel

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Branzburg v. Hayes

Is the requirement that news reporters appear and testify before state or federal grand juries an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and press as guaranteed by the First Amendment?

No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court.

Broadrick v. Oklahoma

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Brown v. Glines

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Brown v. Hartlage

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Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.

Did the State of Colorado's imposition of name, badge, and financial disclosure requirements, on initiative-petition proponents and their circulators, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court found the name, badge, and disclosure requirements to be unconstitutional. Weighing Colorado's need to protect the integrity of the initiative-petition process against the burdens that its guidelines placed on political expression, the Court found that the latter outweighed the former. Noting that the appellate court upheld a requirement that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out, among several particulars, his or her name and address, the Court explained that the vital information sought by the three additional restrictions at issue was already being secured either directly or indirectly.

Burson v. Freeman

Did Tennessee's 100-foot limit violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech?

No. After subjecting Tennessee's statute to exacting scrutiny, since it constituted a facial content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the Court held that the statute was narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest. By creating a safe zone around polling sites, the statute served the state's interest in protecting its citizen's right to vote freely and effectively. Moreover, the 100-foot zone was acceptable since it was not so large as to completely block out the presence of political messages.

Butterworth v. Smith

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Cameron v. Johnson

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Carroll v. Princess Anne

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City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent

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City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing

Did Lakewood's city ordinance violate freedom of speech rights as protected by the First Amendment?

Yes. The Court held that the licensing ordinance was facially invalid since it gave Lakewood's mayor unbridled discretion to discriminate against permit seekers, based on the content of their publications and viewpoints. This, in turn, promoted self-censorship by publishers and other speakers who sought to curry favor with the mayor's officer in order to secure the approval of their licensing requests. The Court added that while cities may require the periodic licensing of newsracks on public property, even subjecting such procedures to reasonable restrictions, they may not use language which is so open-ended as to give city officials unlimited subjective discretion over permit approvals.

Clingman v. Beaver

Do state election laws that restrict the voters a party may invite to vote in its primary election violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system did not violate the right to freedom of association and that any burden it imposed was minor and justified by legitimate state interests. The Court noted that not every electoral law burdening associational rights was subject to strict scrutiny. Requiring voters to register with a party before participating in its primary minimally burdened voters' associational rights. Moreover, Oklahoma's primary advanced a number of state interests, including the preservation of parties as viable and identifiable interest groups.

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

Does the First Amendment bar a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the press. The Court first affirmed that such a cause of action, though private, triggered the First Amendment's protection. But the Court went on to rule that the state's promissory estoppel law was generally applicable and did not target the press. The law's enforcement against the press thus did not require stricter scrutiny than would its enforcement against other individuals or institutions.

Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic Comm.

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Connick v. Myers

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Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Ser v. Comm'n

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Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund

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Csc v. Letter Carriers

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Dallas v. Stanglin

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Dawson v. Delaware

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Democratic Party Of U.S. v. Wisconsin

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Denver Area Consortium v. FCC

Do the Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act's empowerments and restrictions violate the petitioner's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

No and yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, The Court held that the Act's grant of authority to leased channel cable operators under 10(a) - allowing them to restrict the transmission of "patently offensive" or indecent programming - is consistent with the First Amendment. The authority's discretionary nature and ultimate objective of protecting young viewers from offensive programming, is a constitutionally permissible method of restoring editorial authority to cable operators. By contrast, the Court found provision 10(c), permitting cable operators to ban offensive or indecent programming on public access channels, to be unconstitutional. Public access channels are already supervised by both private and public elements and have never been edited by cable operators in the past. Furthermore, a "cable operator's veto" is likely to ban many programs that should have been aired, and the volume of "patently offensive" programming on public access channels has never been so high as to warrant severe restrictions on its content. Finally, with respect to Section 10(b), the Court held that its "segregate and block" requirements for public access channels is also unconstitutional. Section 10(b), by enabling cable operators to take as many as 30 days to respond to a consumer's request to unlock their restricted channel, is overly restrictive. Also, by blocking out an entire channel, 10(b) does not permit viewers or operators to discern between offensive and "patently offensive" programming.

Dombrowski v. Pfister

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Elrod v. Burns

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Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm.

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FCC v. League of Women Voters of California

Did the ban on editorializing violate the First Amendment?

Yes. Even though the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the broadcast medium, "since broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity," Congress must use the First Amendment to "inform and give shape" to its regulation. Justice Brennan argued that no legitimate government interest was served by the law which broadly banned all editorializing, a form of speech which "lies at the heart of First Amendment protection."

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation

Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances?

No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."

Flower v. United States

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Food Employees v. Logan Plaza

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Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement

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Freedman v. Maryland

Did the the Maryland law violate the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment?

The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger of "unduly suppressing protected expression." The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial participation in the the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the "undue inhibition of protected expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time period."

Frisby v. Schultz

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FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas

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Garcetti v. Ceballos

Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, be protected by the First Amendment simply because it touched on a matter of public concern, or must the speech also be engaged in "as a citizen?"

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that speech by a public official is only protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen, not if it is expressed as part of the official's public duties. Ceballos's employers were justified in taking action against him based on his testimony and cooperation with the defense, therefore, because it happened as part of his official duties. "The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write," Justice Kennedy wrote, "does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance." Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.

Gentile v. State Bar Of Nevada

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Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist.

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Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court

Did the Massachusetts law violate the First Amendment's freedom of press guarantee as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?

The Court held that the Massachusetts law violated the First Amendment. Recalling the Court's holding in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980), Justice Brennan reviewed important historical and judicial reasons why access to criminal trials is "properly afforded" First Amendment protection. When the court denies access, argued Brennan, the only justification is to serve a compelling state interest. The Court found no such interest here. First, protecting the psychological well-being of a minor, arguably a compelling interest, conceded Brennan, "does not justify a mandatory closure rule" as circumstances can vary greatly in this type of case. Second, there was no convincing empirical or logical evidence to prove that victims would be more likely to come forward if the press and public were excluded from trials of this nature.

Good News Club v. Milford Central School

Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?

Yes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.

Gravel v. United States

Did the subpoena of Senator Gravel's aide violate the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I of the Constitution?

Yes. The Court held that because the work of aides was critical to the performance of legislative tasks and duties, they were nothing less than legislators' "alter egos" and thus immune from subpoenas by the Speech and Debate Clause. Aides were exempted from grand jury questioning so long as Senators invoked the privilege on their behalf. Moreover, the Court held that the protections of the Speech and Debate Clause did not extend beyond the legislative sphere, ruling that Senator Gravel's arrangements with the Beacon Press were not constitutionally protected.

Greer v. Spock

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Hartman v. Moore

Are law enforcement agents liable for retaliatory prosecution in violation of a defendant's First Amendment free speech rights when the prosecution was supported by probable cause?

No. In a 5-2 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the postal inspectors, overruling the Court of Appeals. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that plaintiffs alleging retaliatory prosecution must prove that the law enforcement agents lacked probable cause. Probable cause, the Court ruled, is a crucial component of the "chain of causation" needed to evaluate retaliatory prosecution charges. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Breyer joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took no part in the decision.

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

Did the principal's deletion of the articles violate the students' rights under the First Amendment?

No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.

Healy v. James

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Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates

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Houchins v. KQED Inc.

Did the First Amendment guarantee news media a right of access to jails over and above that of other persons?

No. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the First Amendment granted no special right of access to the press to government-controlled sources of information. The Court reasoned that the importance of acceptable prison conditions and the media's role of providing information afforded "no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to enter these institutions. . .and take moving and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes."

Hudgens v. NLRB

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Hynes v. Mayor Of Oradell

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In re Pappas

Did the First Amendment's freedom of the press protect Pappas from appearing and testifying before the grand jury?

No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the cases involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no constitutional violation. Because reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court. Pappas must appear and give testimony.

In Re Sawyer

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Int. Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee

Does the regulation violate the First Amendment free speech clause?

No. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.

Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union

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Keller v. State Bar of California

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Kelley v. Johnson

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Ladue v. Gilleo

Does the Ladue ordinance violate Gilleo's right to free speech as protected by the First Amendment?

Yes. Although acknowledging Ladue's police power to minimize visual clutter associated with signs, the Court ruled that the law "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important." The Court held a "special respect" for an individual's right to convey messages from her home.

Laird v. Tatum

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Lamont v. Postmaster General

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Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia

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Lathrop v. Donohue

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Leathers v. Medlock

Does differential taxation of different media violate the First and 14th Amendments? Does differential taxation of members of the same medium violate the First and 14th Amendments?

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held 7-2 that without the intent or effect of suppressing expression, the First Amendment allows differential taxation of different media and differential taxation of some members of the same medium. Specifically, the Court held that the GRA was a generally applicable sales tax, and that its burden on cable television, while exempting the print media, was content-neutral, not directed at a select few, and not intended to interfere with expression. The Court went on to rule that the First Amendment allows a differential tax burden on some members of pay television services (that is, a tax on cable but not satellite services), if the tax is not intended to suppress expression. The Court ordered the State Supreme Court to address the 14th Amendment claim on remand. Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, argued that the First Amendment non-discrimination principle prohibits a heavier tax burden on one medium and not other media.

Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

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Lee v. Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness

Does the regulation banning the distribution of literature at airports violate the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment?

In a short per curiam opinion, the court held 5 to 4 that the ban on literature distribution violated the Free Speech Clause. (A related case, also Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, addressed a ban on the solicitation of funds.)

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez

Does the funding restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, which prevents attorneys from representing clients in an attempt to amend or challenge existing welfare law, violate the First Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the funding provision that limited arguments legal services attorneys were allowed to make on behalf of indigent welfare claimants violated the First Amendment by regulating private speech and insulating federal law from legitimate judicial challenge. Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that, "the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message." Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, arguing that the Appropriations Act "does not directly regulate speech, and it neither establishes a public forum nor discriminates on the basis of viewpoint."

Lehman v. City Of Shaker Heights

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Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner

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Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.

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Louisiana v. N. A. A. C. P.

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Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates

Does the First Amendment permit a State to maintain fraud actions alleging that fundraisers made false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, consistent with the Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Court reasoned that, while bare failure to disclose that information directly to potential donors does not suffice to establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, the First Amendment does not preclude a fraud claim. Because the state's action was on misrepresentations that were not protected by freedom of speech, rather than the high percentage of donations retained, the Court concluded that the allegations against the telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.

Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n

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Marchioro v. Chaney

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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission

Does the prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.

Meese v. Keene

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Meyer v. Grant

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Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo

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Mills v. Alabama

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Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn.

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Minnesota Bd. For Community Colleges v. Knight

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Mt. Healthy City Board Of Ed. v. Doyle

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NAACP v. Alabama

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NAACP v. Button

Did the law, as applied to the NAACP's activities, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The unanimous Court held that the activities of the NAACP amounted to "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit." NAACP initiated litigation was "a form of political expression" and not "a technique of resolving private differences," argued Brennan.

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley

Are the statutory funding guidelines requiring the NEA to consider artistic excellence, merit, and general standards of "decency and respect," overly vague and conducive of viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantees?

No. In an 8-to-1 opinion the Court held that, unlike direct sovereign regulation of speech, Congress enjoys wide latitude when setting spending priorities which may indirectly affect certain forms of expression. The funding of one activity believed to be in the public interest, to the exclusion of another, does not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, the statutory funding guidelines were not impermissibly vague since they involved selective subsidies rather than criminal or regulatory prohibitions. The Court noted that while the amended regulations may add some measure of imprecision to the existing guidelines, they do so to an already highly subjective selection process, made so by the inevitable nature of the subject matter with which it deals.

National Socialist Party v. Skokie

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Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart

Did the judge's order violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity." However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that"a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it."

New York Times v. United States

Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment?

Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.

O'Hare Truck Service v. Northlake

Did O'Hare Truck Service's removal from Northlake's employment list, as a result of its support for an opposition mayoral candidate, violate O'Hare Truck Services freedom of speech?

Yes. The Court held, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, that independent contractors, such as O'Hare Truck Service, are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as those afforded to government employees. Accordingly, Northlake could not condition the towing company's employment on its political affiliations or beliefs unless Northlake could demonstrate that O'Hare's political affiliations had a reasonable and appreciable effect on its job performance. The Court held that Northlake neither attempted nor would it have been able to make such a demonstration. Therefore, Northlake's removal of O'Hare Truck Service from its employment list was unconstitutional.

Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe

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Overton v. Bazzetta

Did the Department of Corrections ban on visits by minors violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the freedom of association of the First Amendment?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the MDOC's regulations were valid. The Court reasoned that the fact that the regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The Court also concluded that the visitation restriction for inmates with two substance-abuse violations is not a cruel and unusual confinement condition violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that withdrawing visitation privileges for a limited period is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Pell v. Procunier

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Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.

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Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court

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Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court Of Cal.

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Procunier v. Martinez

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Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar

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Rankin v. McPherson

Did the Constable's action infringe upon McPherson's freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Rankin's interest in discharging McPherson was outweighed by her rights under the First Amendment. The Court held that McPherson's statement, when considered in context, "plainly dealt with a matter of public concern." The Court found that there was no evidence that McPherson's speech interfered with "the efficient functioning of the office" and that her private comment had not discredited the office. The Court also noted that McPherson did not serve a "confidential, policymaking, or public contact" role, diminishing the impact of her speech on the agency's proper functioning.

Regan v. Taxation With Representation Of Wash.

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Regan v. Time, Inc.

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Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

Does the First Amendment permit the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the announce clause violates the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the announce clause prohibits speech based on its content and burdens a category of speech that is at the core of First Amendment freedoms - speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office. Moreover, the Court concluded that the clause did not serve to preserve the state judiciary's impartiality, its argued compelling state interest. "There is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly approved Constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's announce clause which places most subjects of interest to the voters off limits," wrote Justice Scalia.

Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia

Did the closure of the trial to the press and public violate the First Amendment or the Sixth Amendment?

In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."

Riley v. National Federation Of Blind

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Rotary Int. v. Rotary Club

Did a law which required California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violate Rotary International's First Amendment rights of association?

No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's members was not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in ending sexual discrimination.

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR)

Does the Solomon Amendment, which witholds certain federal funds from colleges and universities that restrict the access of military recruiters to students, violate the First Amendment?

No. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds."

Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois

Did Governor Thompson's practices in Illinois infringe upon the First Amendment rights of potential and current state employees?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Governor Thompson's practices amounted to an unconstitutional patronage system. The Court found that employees would feel "a significant obligation to support political positions held by their superiors" in lieu of their true beliefs in order to progress up the career ladder. The Court thus held that "promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliations or support" were impermissible infringements on the right to free expression of public employees. The Court noted that while the First Amendment was not "a tenure provision" protecting employees from "constructive discharge," it nevertheless prevented the government from interfering with its employees' freedom "to believe and associate."

San Diego v. Roe

San Diego fired John Roe from the city police force after he made and sold online a video showing him engaging in sexually explicit acts. Did this violate John Roe's First Amendment right to free speech?

No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that firing Roe for his behavior and "speech" did not violate the First Amendment. Government employers, the Court wrote, could restrict their employees' speech in ways that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public. But government employees had the right to speak on matters of public concern, such as on government policies of interest to the public. In this case, however, Roe's activities did not inform the public about the police department and were also detrimental to the force.

San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. US Olympic Committee

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Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.

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Schaumburg v. Citizens For Better Environ.

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Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart

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Secretary Of Navy v. Huff

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Secretary Of State Of Md. v. J. H. Munson Co.

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Shaw v. Murphy

Do prison inmates have a constitutional right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that inmates do not possess a special First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates that enhances the protections otherwise available. "Augmenting First Amendment protection for inmate legal advice would undermine prison officials' ability to address the 'complex and intractable' problems of prison administration," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas added that "[p]risoners have used legal correspondence as a means for passing contraband and communicating instructions on how to manufacture drugs or weapons." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a concurring opinion.

Shelton v. Tucker

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Simon & Schuster v. NY Crime Victims Board

Did the Son of Sam law violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment?

Yes. The Court concluded that "New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income." This discrimination could only be justified if the state could show "that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end" (Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)). The Board failed to explain why victims' compensation had to come from the criminals' storytelling rather than other assets.

Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees

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Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.

Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that governmental attempts to restrict the publication of truthful information "seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." As long as the information is lawfully obtained, as it was in this case involving a shooting at a junior high school, the state cannot restrict a newspaper from publishing a juvenile offender's name unless the restriction serves a substantial state interest. No such interest was present in this case.

Snepp v. United States

Were Snepp's First Amendment rights violated?

No. The Court upheld the lower court's ruling and agreed that Snepp had breached the "constructive trust" between him and the government. That was especially significant in this case since this type of violation by a former agent "impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties" and potentially jeopardizes the safety of current government operatives and Snepp himself. The Court reached this decision without hearing oral argument by the parties.

Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad

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Staub v. City Of Baxley

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Talley v. California

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Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc.

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Thomas v. Chicago Park District

Must a municipal park ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events must, consistent with the First Amendment, contain certain procedural safeguards?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the First Amendment free speech guarantee does not require the Park District to initiate litigation every time the agency denied a permit for an event or specify a deadline for judicial review of a challenge to the denial of a permit. The Court reasoned that the licensing scheme was not based on subject-matter censorship, but rather content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum thus making the ordinance constitutional. "On balance, we think the permissive nature of the ordinance furthers, rather than constricts, free speech," wrote Justice Scalia for the Court.

Thornburgh v. Abbott

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Times Film Corp. v. Chicago

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Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. School Dist.

Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

The wearing of armbands was "closely akin to 'pure speech'" and protected by the First Amendment. School environments imply limitations on free expression, but here the principals lacked justification for imposing any such limits.The principals had failed to show that the forbidden conduct would substantially interfere with appropriate school discipline.

Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC

Is the 1992 "must carry" law an unconstitutional intrusion on cable operators' editorial autonomy, a form of Government-compelled speech that violates the First Amendment?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Congress "has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters." The outcome supported Congress's right to judge what approach would best insure a competitive communications marketplace.

Turner Broadcasting v. FCC

Are the must-carry rules content-based and thus a violation of the cable companies' First Amendment right to free speech?

No. The Court held that the must-carry provisions were content neutral, thus not a violation of the First Amendment. The rules were not determined by the programming content, but by broadcast method. The rules promote fair competition in television programming. Congress recognized that the public television stations had an intrinsic value to the American public and were in economic peril of disappearing due to the cable television industry's monopoly. The rules do not force the cable companies to alter their message.

Turner v. Safley

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U.S. Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns.

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United States v. Grace

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United States v. Kokinda

Is a sidewalk that is entirely contained by Postal Service property and intended only for traffic to and from Postal Service buildings a public forum? If it is a public forum, does a prohibition of solicitation pass strict scrutiny? If it is not a public forum, does it pass a "reasonableness" test?

In a divided opinion, the Court ruled that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a four-member plurality, wrote that the sidewalk was not a public forum. "Regulation of speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, such as public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny. ... But regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness." The need to prevent solicitors from interrupting postal business satisfied this "reasonableness" test, so the convictions were constitutional. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing separately, held that it was unnecessary to determine whether the sidewalk was a public forum because the regulation met the traditional standard applied to time, place, and manner restrictions of protected expression.

United States v. National Treasury Employees Union

Does the honoraria ban abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment?

Yes. In a 6 to 3 decision delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court declared that a flat ban violated free-speech rights. Concerns about impropriety do not apply if there is no link between a government employee's job and "the subject matter of the expression or the character of the payor."

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.

Is section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 the least restrictive means to block the transmission of cable television channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming, such that it does not violate the First Amendment?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because the Federal Government failed to show that section 505 was the least restrictive means to further its interests, requiring cable television operators to fully scramble or limit time when sexually-oriented programming was transmitted violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In finding section 505 a content-based regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative." In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer maintained that the majority had not made a "realistic assessment of the alternatives."

University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC

Does requiring a university to disclose confidential peer review materials in an investigation violate the First Amendment?

A unanimous Court held that the need to ferret out invidious discrimination served a compelling government interest which justified inspection of confidential files. Since the EEOC was not interested in forcing the University to accept specific standards for promotion and it did not attempt to control the content of speech on campus, Justice Blackmun dismissed Pennsylvania's argument that the EEOC's actions violated academic freedom.

Virginia v. Hicks

Is the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority's trespass policy, which provides for arrest after being served notice for being on the premises without "a legitimate business or social purpose," facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the RRHA's trespass policy is not facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine. Noting that he was not in Whitcomb Court to engage in constitutionally protected speech, the Court reasoned that Hicks had not shown that the RRHA policy prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications. Justice Scalia wrote, "both the notice-barment rule and the 'legitimate business or social purpose' rule apply to all persons who enter the streets of Whitcomb Court, not just to those who seek to engage in expression."

Ward v. Rock Against Racism

Does the New York ordinance substituting a city-employed technician and mixing board for a performer's mixer and equipment violate the First Amendment?

No. The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest "could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative."

Waters v. Churchill

Was Churchill's firing impermissible under the First Amendment?

Yes, but the Court was unable to forge a majority opinion. A four-justice plurality held that government workers cannot be dismissed or otherwise punished for their words unless the employer has a reasonable basis for believing that the speech either was disruptive or involved a matter of purely private concern, outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection. The hospital need not conduct a full-scale investigation, but it must have some reasonable, factual basis for its actions.

Watts v. United States

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Wisconsin v. Mitchell

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Wood v. Georgia

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