The Oyez Project: First Amendment Issues - Libel, Defamation Decisions

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.

Can a court, in the context of a summary judgment request, award summary judgment in a libel action if the moving party had no evidence that a reasonable jury might disbelieve its opponent's claim?

No. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court held that the purpose of summary judgments is to determine if the evidence is so one-sided that a party should prevail as a matter of law. Summary judgments will not lie if there is a sufficient likelihood that a reasonable jury would return a verdict favorable to the nonmoving party. In libel cases involving public entities, trial courts faced with summary judgment motions must decide whether a reasonable jury could conclude with convincing clarity that actual malice existed. The mere assertion by a plaintiff that a defendant's summary judgment motion is deficient because a reasonable jury might disbelieve the defendant's denial of actual malice is insufficient to warrant a grant of summary judgment without any offer of evidentiary proof to that effect. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded for reconsideration of its summary judgment ruling.

Ashton v. Kentucky

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Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts

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Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders

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Farmers Union v. Wday

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Garrison v. Louisiana

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Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.

Does the First Amendment allow a newspaper or broadcaster to assert defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure?

The Court reversed the lower court decision and held that Gertz's rights had been violated. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. However, continued Powell, the actual malice standard did not lose all significance in cases involving ordinary citizens as he advised states to use it in assessing claims for punitive damages by citizens suing for libel.

Greenbelt Pub. Assn. v. Bresler

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Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton

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Herbert v. Lando

In an accusation of libel, do the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect members of the press from inquiries into their thoughts, opinions, and conclusions that go into the editorial process?

The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the privilege not to answer editorial inquiries is not absolute. Justice White argued that shielding editorial decision-making from inquiry would "substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice," a burden which was already substantial in the Court's view. White was confident that investigations into this process for falsehood or libelous reporting would not lead to self-censorship of stories that are documented and true; "only reckless error will be discouraged," which would not threaten the constitutionally protected freedom of the press.

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell

Does the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection extend to the making of patently offensive statements about public figures, resulting perhaps in their suffering emotional distress?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion the Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject.

Hutchinson v. Proxmire

Were Proxmire's activities and statements against Hutchinson's research protected by the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution?

No. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that Proxmire's statements in his newsletters and press releases were not protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. However, in upholding this ruling, the Court also found that Proxmire's statements were not made with "actual malice" and thus, were not libelous. Chief Justice Burger, relying on the Court's finding in Doe v. McMillan (1973), concluded that while speeches in Congress and discussions with staff were protected by Section 6, statements in newsletters and press releases were not because they were not "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" nor were they part of the legislature's "deliberative process."

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.

Was Hustler's circulation of magazines within the forum state of New Hampshire alone sufficient, without regard to the depth of plaintiff's contacts or the amount of plaintiff's damages caused in New Hampshire, to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction in a libel action based upon the contents of the magazine?

Yes. Hustler's regular circulation of magazines in New Hampshire is sufficient to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. In analyzing whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to permit personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court should focus on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Hustler has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market and therefore it must reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there. Keeton did not need to have minimum contacts with the forum state in order for that state to have asserted personal jurisdiction over Hustler. New Hampshire had a sufficient interest in adjudicating the dispute. Moreover, even though most of the harm done to Keeton occurred outside New Hampshire, the same would be true in most libel cases brought anywhere other than plaintiff's state of domicile.

Letter Carriers v. Austin

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Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

Does the First Amendment give the New Yorker a right to publish fabricated quotations attributed to a public figure?

No. In a 9-0 vote, the Court ruled that the First Amendment_s free expression clause could not protect the distortions in Malcolm_s article. Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion also explained when a direct quotation can be considered false, and therefore potentially libelous. The First Amendment limits libel suits by public figures. A report about a public figure cannot be considered "false" unless it is a gross distortion of the truth. Justice Kennedy's opinion explained that a direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said. Malcolm_s fabrication qualified as a "gross distortion," and the Court granted Masson standing to sue.

Mcdonald v. Smith

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Milkovich v. Lorain Journal

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Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy

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New York Times v. Sullivan

Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections?

The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed.

Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron

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Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps

Did the state supreme court's decision violate the First Amendment?

Yes. Relying on its reasoning in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. (1974), the Court reversed the state court's decision. The Gertz standard for evaluating potentially libelous speech required that "the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages."

Pickering v. Board Of Education

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Rosenblatt v. Baer

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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia

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St. Amant v. Thompson

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Time, Inc. v. Firestone

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Time, Inc. v. Pape

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Tory v. Cochran

Did a judge's order that someone stop making defaming statements about a public figure, even after that figure's death, violate the First Amendment right to free speech?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Cochran's death diminished the grounds for the judge's order and that the order therefore amounted to an overly broad prior restraint on speech. Tory could no longer try to force Cochran to pay him in exchange for desisting, the Court reasoned, ending the order's underlying justification.

Watts v. Seward School Board

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Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc.

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