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  <title>The Oyez Project: First Amendment Issues - Free Exercise of Religion Decisions</title>
  <link>http://www.oyez.org/issues/first-amendment/free-exercise/</link>
  <description>U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</description>
  <language>en-us</language>
  
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    <title>Bowen v. Roy</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_780/</link>
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    <title>Braunfeld v. Brown</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did the Pennsylvania blue law violate the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religious beliefs?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute; however, the freedom to act (even in accordance with religious convictions) is not totally free from government restrictions. The Court found that the Sunday Closing Law had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. The blue law is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state can accomplish its secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all through other means. That an indirect burden, such as economic sacrifice, may be a result of the statute, does not make the blue law unconstitutional.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_67/</link>
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    <title>Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict strutiny.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_948/</link>
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    <title>City of Boerne v. Flores</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Court held that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, is precisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_2074/</link>
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    <title>Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1970/1970_835/</link>
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    <title>Employment Division v. Smith</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_946/</link>
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    <title>Employment Division v. Smith</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Does the state law violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;No. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1213/</link>
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    <title>Frazee v. Illinois Employment Security Dept.</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1945/</link>
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    <title>Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_11/</link>
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    <title>Goldman v. Weinberger</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did the Air Force Regulation violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Since allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat and conservative" manner.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1097/</link>
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    <title>Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 require the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession and use of an otherwise illegal drug by a religious organization when Congress has found that the drug has a high potential for abuse, is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and violates an international treaty when imported or distributed?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yes. In a unanimous 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that the government had failed to prove a compelling interest in regulating the UDV's use of drugs for religious purposes. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the government's argument that the Controlled Substances Act could accommodate no exceptions. On the contrary, Justice Roberts wrote, the Court is required by the RFRA to examine individual religious freedom claims and grant exceptions to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Court also rejected the argument that an exception for UDV was precluded by international treaty. The government failed to submit "evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV," instead citing "the general importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in the international war on drugs." The Court held that such general government interests were not sufficient to satisfy the compelling interest standard.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_1084/</link>
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    <title>Heffron v. Int. Society for Krishna Consciousness</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;May a state, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, confine religious organizations wishing to sell and distribute religious literature at a state fair to an assigned location within the fairgrounds?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Using the "valid time, manner, and place" criteria which the Court employs to assess government restrictions of First Amendment activities, the Court held that Rule 6.05 did not violate the Constitution. Since the rule was applied equally to all groups wanting to solicit at the fairgrounds, not making restrictions based on the content of a group's message, and because the state had an important interest in "protecting the safety and convenience" of the fair's patrons, Justice White argued that the rule's restrictions were legitimate. Allowing all religious, nonreligious, and commercial groups to move about the grounds distributing literature and soliciting funds would result in "widespread disorder" which would be potentially dangerous to the fair's visitors.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_80_795/</link>
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    <title>Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n Of Fla.</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_993/</link>
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    <title>Jensen, v. Quaring</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1944/</link>
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    <title>Jones v. Wolf</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_78_91/</link>
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    <title>Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did the District violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech when it denied Lamb's Chapel the use of school premises to show religious-oriented films?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yes, by a unaminous vote. The Supreme Court's holding consisted of two parts. First, the District violated freedom of speech by refusing the Chapel's request to show movies on school premises solely because such movies were religiously oriented. While non-public schools are permitted under New York law to restrict access to their premises based on subject matter or speaker identity, such restrictions must be reasonable and "viewpoint neutral." In this case, the District's restriction was neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the presentation of all other views about family values and child rearing - except those which were presented from a religious perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the Chapel to use the District's premises would not have amounted to an establishment of religion. This is because the showing of the films would neither be school-sponsored during school hours nor closed to the public.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_2024/</link>
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    <title>Lyng v. Northwest Indian CPA</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause prohibit the government from harvesting or developing the Chimney Rock area?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Forest Service was free to harvest the lands. Though the government's actions would have severe adverse effects on the Indians' practice oftheir religion, those effects were only incidental and did not constitute an attempt to coerce Native Americans to act in violation of their beliefs. The Court reasoned that government could not operate "if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires," and that the First Amendment did not give any one group veto power over public programs that did not actually prohibit the free exercise of religion.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_1013/</link>
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    <title>Mcdaniel v. Paty</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_1427/</link>
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    <title>O'lone v. Estate Of Shabazz</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1722/</link>
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    <title>Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_478/</link>
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    <title>Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_71/</link>
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    <title>Rosenberger v. University of Virginia</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furtheremore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_329/</link>
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    <title>Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_75_292/</link>
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    <title>Sherbert v. Verner</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did the denial of unemployment compensation violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yes. The Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_526/</link>
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    <title>Swaggart Ministries v. California Board of Equalization</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did California's imposition of a sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials violate the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;No. Basing its unanimous decision on the fact that California's sales and use tax was not a flat tax, affected only a small portion of retail sales, and was neutrally applied, the Court found the taxes constitutional. Moreover, since the taxes were not imposed as a precondition to spreading any given message and were due regardless of registration, the Court rejected Swaggart's claim that California's no-fee registration requirement acted as a prior restraint on his religious organization. Finally, the Court held that any administrative burdens associated with the payment of taxes did not give rise to an establishment conflict since they did not cause excessive entanglement between the government and Swaggart's organization.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1374/</link>
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    <title>Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Di</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_952/</link>
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    <title>Torcaso v. Watkins</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_373/</link>
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    <title>United States v. Lee</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_80_767/</link>
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    <title>Watchtower Bible &amp; Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Does a municipal ordinance that requires a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which contains one's name, violate the First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. The Court reasoned that the village's interest in preventing fraud could not support the ordinance's application to the religious organizations, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the Court decision deprived Stratton residents of the degree of accountability and safety that the permit requirement provides.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1737/</link>
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    <title>Wisconsin v. Yoder</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious reasons?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In a unamimous decision, the Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade. In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion," and that an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law.Justice William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the majority regarding Yoder.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_110/</link>
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