The Oyez Project: First Amendment Issues - Establishment of Religion Decisions

Abington School District v. Schempp

Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment since the readings and recitations were essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Furthermore, argued Justice Clark, the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the school's actions from violating the Establishment Clause.

Allegheny v. ACLU

Did the public displays violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the crèche inside the courthouse unmistakably endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. By prominently displaying the words "Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ," the county sent a clear message that it supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy. The Court also held, however, that not all religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally legitimate given its "particular physical setting."

Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky

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Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist.

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Board Of Trustees Of Scarsdale v. Mccreary

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Bowen v. Kendrick

Do AFLA's provisions, requiring its beneficiaries to involve both religious and governmental organizations in addressing the problems of teenage sexual relations, violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "advancement of religion" was not AFLA's primary effect. Although it funded religious and other institutions without expressly prohibiting the use of such funds for religious purposes, AFLA required potential recipients to reveal what services they intended to provide and how they would provide them. Thus, the government could protect against the misuse of its funds. At the same time, however, such oversight did not create an "excessive entanglement" between church and state because AFLA merely authorized funding of religiously affiliated, rather than pervasively sectarian, organizations. Finally, the Court remanded the matter to the district court for further determination of whether AFLA violated the establishment clause "as applied."

Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette

Did the Board's denial of a permit to the Ku Klux Klan violate free speech under the First Amendment?

Yes. The display was private religious speech that "is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression." Because Capitol Square is designated as a traditional public forum, any group may express their views there, and the Board may regulate the content of the Klan's expression on the plaza only if a restriction is necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.

Chamberlin v. Public Instruction Bd.

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Corporation Of Presiding Bishop v. Amos

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Cutter v. Wilkinson

Did a federal law prohibiting government from burdening prisoners' religious exercise violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, on its face, RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. Nor did section three discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream religions. The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.

Engel v. Vitale

Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment?

Yes. Neither the prayer's nondenominational character nor its voluntary character saves it from unconstitutionality. By providing the prayer, New York officially approved religion. This was the first in a series of cases in which the Court used the establishment clause to eliminate religious activities of all sorts, which had traditionally been a part of public ceremonies. Despite the passage of time, the decision is still unpopular with a majority of Americans.

Epperson v. Arkansas

Does a law forbidding the teaching of evolution violate either the free speech rights of teachers or the Establishment clause of the First Amendment?

Yes. Seven members of the Court held that the statute violated the Establishment clause. Writing for the Court, Justice Abe Fortas stated that the law had been based solely on the beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, who felt that evolutionary theories directly contradicted the biblical account of Creation. This use of state power to prohibit the teaching of material objectionable to a particular sect ammounted to an unconstitutional Establishment of religion. Justice Fortas wrote, "The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment." The two other members of the Court concurred in the result, writing that it violated either the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (because it was unconstitutionally vague) or the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor

Does the Connecticut statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Yes. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court held 8-to-1 that the Connecticut Sabbath observance statute was void, saying its "unyielding weighing in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests" results in an unconstitutional mingling of church and state. In his opinion, Burger wrote that the Connecticut law "provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath." Burger said the state law "thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath."

Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.

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Larson v. Valente

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Lee v. Weisman

Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.

Lynch v. Donnelly

Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the crèche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."

Marsh v. Chambers

Does the chaplaincy practice of the Nebraska legislature violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court upheld the chaplaincy practice. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger abandoned the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which had been the touchstone for cases involving the Establishment Clause. In its place, Burger rested the Court's opinion on historical custom. Prayers by tax-supported legislative chaplains could be traced to the First Continental Congress and to the First Congress that framed the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, the chaplaincy practice had become "part of the fabric of our society." In such circumstances, an invocation for Divine guidance is not an establishment of religion. "It is," wrote Burger, "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."

McCreary County v. ACLU

1. Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?

Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."

McGowan v. Maryland

Do Maryland's blue laws violate the Free Exercise and Religious Establishment clauses of the First Amendment?

No. The Court found that the blue laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the employees allege only economic injury and not infringement on their own religious practices. The Court also found that the blue laws did not violate the division between church and state. Sunday closing laws started out to facilitate church attendance in colonial America; however, the present Maryland laws are based on secular rather than religious state interests. The laws are to improve the "health, safety, recreation, and general well-being" of citizens. The present purpose of the laws is to provide a uniform day of rest for all. The fact that this day is of particular significance for various Christian sects does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals.

Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe

Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."

Stone v. Graham

Did the Kentucky statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

In a 5-to-4 per curiam decision, the Court ruled that the Kentucky law violated the first part of the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and thus violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The Court found that the requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted "had no secular legislative purpose" and was "plainly religious in nature." The Court noted that the Commandments did not confine themselves to arguably secular matters (such as murder, stealing, etc.), but rather concerned matters such as the worship of God and the observance of the Sabbath Day.

Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock

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Two Guys v. Mcginley

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Van Orden v. Perry

Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"

No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York

Did the property tax exemptions violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the exemptions did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that the purpose of the exemptions was to neither advance nor inhibit religion; no one particular church or religious group had been singled out to receive tax exempt status. Unlike direct subsidies, which would have unduly entangled the state with religion, tax exemptions created only "minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches." The Court noted that "benevolent neutrality" toward churches and religions was "deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life."

Widmar v. Vincent

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