The Oyez Project: First Amendment Issues - Campaign Spending Decisions

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce

Did the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

No. In making its case, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce argued that it should have been excluded from the act's restrictions since the Chamber was a "nonprofit ideological corporation" which was more analogous to a political association than a business firm. The Court disagreed and upheld the Michigan law. Justice Marshall found that the Chamber was akin to a business group given its activities, linkages with community business leaders, and high degree of members (over seventy-five percent) which were business corporations. Furthermore, Marshall found that the statute was narrowly crafted and implemented to achieve the important goal of maintaining integrity in the political process.

Bread Political Action Committee v. Fec

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Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm.

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Buckley v. Valeo

Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses?

In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.

California Medical Assn. v. Fec

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Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley

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Colorado Rep Fed Campaign Comm v. FEC

Do the federal campaign-financing limits on the amount of money political parties may spend on congressional races, as established by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, violate First Amendment rights when applied to expenditures a political party has made independently of any candidate's campaign?

Yes. In a plurality decision, Justice Stephen G. Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and authored an opinion, in which the Court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) to the kind of expenditure at issue here-an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate. Justices O'Connor and Souter joined Justice Breyer. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, concluded that, on its face, FECA violates the First Amendment when it restricts as a "contribution" a political party's spending "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with_a candidate." Justice Thomas concluded that the Provision is unconstitutional not only as applied to the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, but also on its face. Dissenting, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg agreed with the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Cort v. Ash

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FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Cmte.

Are congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits." Justice Souter noted that "'there is little evidence to suggest that coordinated party spending limits adopted by Congress have frustrated the ability of political parties to exercise their First Amendment rights to support their candidates.'" Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy. Justice Thomas argued that the spending limit "sweeps too broadly, interferes with the party-candidate relationship, and has not been proved necessary to combat corruption."

Fec v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.

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Fec v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc.

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Fec v. National Right To Work Committee

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Federal Election Commission v. NCPAC

Did the law violate the NCPAC's First Amendment rights of free speech and association?

Yes. The Court held that the expenditures prohibited by the Federal Election Campaign Act were "at the core of the First Amendment" and could not be restricted by the government. The Court rejected the notion that the PACs' form of organization diminished their entitlement to First Amendment protection. The Court drew a distinction between contributions to candidates--which were open to corruption--and contributions to independent organizations in support of candidates.

Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont

Does the Federal Election Campaign Act's ban on corporate political donations violate the freedom of speech for incorporated, non-profit advocacy groups?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that applying the direct contribution prohibition to nonprofit advocacy corporations is consistent with the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that it could not hold for NCRL "without recasting our understanding of the risks of harm posed by corporate political contributions, of the expressive significance of contributions, and of the consequent deference owed to legislative judgments on what to do about them." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, arguing that section 441b should have been subject to strict scrutiny and, under this standard, it could not stand.

First National Bank Of Boston v. Bellotti

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McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

1. Does the "soft money" ban of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or violate the First Amendment's protection of the freedom to speak?

2. Do regulations of the source, content, or timing of political advertising in the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's free speech clause?

With a few exceptions, the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions.

In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits.

The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC

Does Buckley v. Valeo govern state regulations on contributions to state political candidates? Do the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, define the scope of permissible state limitations? Is Missouri's statutory limit on campaign contributions unconstitutional?

Yes, no, and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulation and, but that the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, do not define the scope of permissible state limitations. The Court held the Missouri statute not to violate the First Amendment. "Even without the authority of Buckley, there would be no serious question about the legitimacy of the interests claimed, wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, voting to overturn Buckley as a violation of First Amendment speech rights.

Randall v. Sorrell

(1) Do expenditure limits for political candidates violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech? (2) Are Vermont's contribution limits of $200-$400 per candidate for individuals, political groups, and political parties unconstitutionally low under the First Amendment?

Yes and yes. The Court reversed the Circuit Court and invalidated Vermont's Act 64 by a 6-3 vote. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the Court should let stand the Buckley decision and its invalidation of expenditure limits. Vermont's argument that such limits prevent candidates from spending too much time fund-raising was deemed irrelevant because it was "perfectly obvious" and would not have changed the result in Buckley. The Court affirmed that some limits on political contributions are constitutional, but perceived "danger signs" indicating that Vermont's exceptionally low limits could prevent candidates from campaigning effectively. Applying a 5-part test, the Court held that Vermont's contribution limits were "disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance." Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, in which he argued that the contribution limits should be upheld and the expenditure limits should be referred to the lower courts for a determination of whether they were the "least restrictive means" of accomplishing Vermont's goals. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that Buckley should be overruled as it pertains to expenditure limits.

United States v. Auto. Workers

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Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)

Does McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) allow "as-applied" challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's prohibitions on corporate funding of political advertisements?

Yes. The unanimous per curiam opinion reversed the District Court's judgment, allowing WRTL to proceed with its as-applied challenge. The opinion explained that the District Court had misinterpreted a footnote in McConnell that seemed to foreclose such challenges. The Justices instructed the lower court to consider the larger question of whether the BCRA is constitutional as applied to WRTL's ads.