The Oyez Project: Federalism Issues - Natural Resources Decisions

Alden v. Maine

May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts?

No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.

Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co.

May a state impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government when the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a "State generally may impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government, regardless of whether the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "[a]bsent a constitutional immunity or congressional exemption, federal law does not shield Blaze (a federal contractor) from Arizona's transaction privilege tax."

Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon

No details yet.

Bennett v. Arkansas

No details yet.

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc.

Did a law which required a specific type of rear mudguard on trucks and trailers operated on Illinois's state highways conflict with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?

Yes. The Court held that the Illinois requirement did place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. While arguing that safety measures "carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged," Justice Douglas nevertheless affirmed that if the effect of such measures are "slight or problematical" then the interests of commerce should prevail. Since the Illinois law was unlike the requirements of almost all of the other states in the nation, the Court found that it did place a great burden on the interstate transport of goods.

Board of Trustees v. Garrett

May an individual sue a state for damages in federal court under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Chief Justice wrote for the majority that "in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." Rehnquist added that none of these requirements had been met. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Stephen G. Breyer's dissent.

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.

No details yet.

Bus Employees v. Missouri

No details yet.

Central VA Comm. College v. Katz

Does the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I Section 8), waive the states' sovereign immunity?

Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that states cannot invoke sovereign immunity as a defense in bankruptcy proceedings. Rather than ruling on the power of Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause to waive states' immunity, as the bankruptcy court did, the Court held that ratification of the Clause itself involved a subordination of state sovereign immunity. The Court relied on the history and intent of the Bankruptcy Clause, which indicated that "the power to enact bankruptcy legislation was understood to carry with it the power to subordinate state sovereignty, albeit within a limited sphere." Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy and Chief Justice John Roberts.

Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.

No details yet.

City Of Tacoma v. Taxpayers

No details yet.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid

Does the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by providing a constitutionally permissible abrogation of state sovereign immunity? Does the TRCA permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by operating as a waiver of sovereign immunity when a state engages in activities regulated by the Lanham Act?

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "the federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain this suit against an arm of the State of Florida." Justice Scalia concluded that "the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Stephen G. Breyer expressed the view that Congress possesses the authority to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity where necessary and proper to the exercise of a congressional power under the Constitution's Article I. Justice John Paul Stevens filed his own dissenting opinion and joined that of Justice Breyer.

Colorado Comm'n v. Continental

No details yet.

Commissioner v. Estate Of Bosch

No details yet.

Davis v. Michigan Dept. Of Treasury

No details yet.

Dept. Of Revenue v. James Beam Co.

No details yet.

Donovan v. City Of Dallas

No details yet.

Epa v. State Water Resources Control Board

No details yet.

Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority

Does a State's sovereign immunity preclude the Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a private party's complaint that a state-run port has violated the Shipping Act of 1984?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from adjudicating a private party's complaint against a nonconsenting State. Historically, the Court noted, states were not subject to private suits in administrative adjudications when the Constitution was adopted, and states were thus presumptively immune from such actions. Moreover, the Court pointed to the similarities between the FMC's proceedings and civil litigation to conclude that there was no basis for distinguishing between the actions for purposes of sovereign immunity. "Although the Framers likely did not envision the intrusion on state sovereignty at issue in today's case, we are nonetheless confident that it is contrary to their constitutional design," wrote Justice Thomas.

Ferc v. Mississippi

No details yet.

Firemen v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.

No details yet.

Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank

Did nullification of state sovereign immunity, under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, constitute valid legislation?

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court began by noting that there was no doubt that the Act intended to abrogate states' immunity from patent infringement. The Court then added that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause give Congress the power to curtail state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims. The Court reasoned that although the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to pass "appropriate legislation" to protect parties from being deprived of property without due process, this in itself does not permit the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Only a showing of a consistent pattern of state patent violations, and a lack of adequate legal remedies to address such violations, would justify a limited effort to suspend a state's sovereign immunity. Since College made no such showing, and since the Act's language was overly broad in its scope, the Court dismissed College's suit and declared unconstitutional corresponding segments of the Act.

Frew v. Hawkins

Do states forfeit 11th Amendment protection when they enter into a consent decree under federal law in federal court? And must states violate federal law, not just the consent agreement, in order to be subject to suit in federal court?

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that enforcement of the consent decree does not violate the 11th Amendment. The state officials waived 11th Amendment immunity when they asked the court to approve the consent decree. The Court rejected the argument that a federal court cannot enforce a consent decree unless it finds a violation of federal law. "The decree here is a federal court order that springs from a federal dispute and furthers the objectives of federal law," Justice Kennedy wrote.

Fry v. United States

No details yet.

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.

Hancock v. Train

No details yet.

Head v. New Mexico Board

No details yet.

Hibbs v. Winn

Do the federal Tax Injunction Act and comity principles require federal district courts to dismiss (for lack of jurisdiction) constitutional challenges to state tax credits that directly affect a state's tax system?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the intention of the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) was to prevent taxpayers from trying to avoid their state taxes through federal litigation. TIA was not intended, however, to prevent all federal interference with state taxation. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "Third-party suits not seeking to stop the collection of a tax imposed on plaintiffs were outside Congress' purview. ... Nowhere does the [legislative] history announce a sweeping congressional direction to prevent federal-court interference with all aspects of state tax administration." (emphasis original) Establishment clause challenges to state tax exemptions for religious eduction could therefore be challenged without violating TIA.

Howlett v. Rose

No details yet.

Hughes v. Oklahoma

No details yet.

Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Waggonner

No details yet.

Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit

No details yet.

Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho

May Indian Tribes proceed with suits against state officials in light of the sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment?

No. In an 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's suit against the state officials may not proceed in federal court because States enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits filed by Indian tribes. Justice Kennedy concluded, "the present suit is barred unless it falls within the exception this Court has recognized for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers in their individual capacities."

James M. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia

No details yet.

Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia

Does a State's act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waive the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court. The Court concluded that that the university officials' voluntary removal of the action expressly invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts and thus constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to state law claims for which immunity was waived in state court. Under the general principle that a State's voluntary appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court reasoned that Georgia was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in state court, but it then voluntarily removed the case to federal court, thus voluntarily invoking that court's jurisdiction.

Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist.

No details yet.

Michigan Nat. Bank v. Michigan

No details yet.

Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n

No details yet.

National League of Cities v. Usery

May Congress, acting under its commerce power, regulate the labor market of state employees, which the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states?

Congress may not regulate the labor market of state employees. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting legislation which operates "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." While the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is "plenary," that power has constitutional limits. In this case, the exercise of the commerce power ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment which protects the states' traditional activities.

Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs

May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, who was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia, filed dissents.

New York v. United States

Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee clause" of Article Four?

In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. "Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments." This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman

No details yet.

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.

No details yet.

Phillips Co. v. Dumas School Dist.

No details yet.

Printz v. United States

Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks?

No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

No details yet.

Reno v. Condon

Does the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 violate the constitutional principles of federalism?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and doesn't run afoul of federalism principles. The law "does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. "It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals," the Chief Justice added.

Sabri v. United States

May Congress make it a federal crime to bribe officials of non-federal organizations that distribute some federal funds without requiring prosecutors to prove that the bribe actually affected federal funds?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice David Souter, the Court held that Article I of the Constitution allows Congress to prohibit bribery of organizations that distribute federal funds. The Justices found that the Spending Clause authorizes Congress to spend money for the general welfare, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes it to take any reasonable steps to prevent such money from being misspent. These reasonable steps include prohibiting bribery. The Court rejected Sabri's argument that the law was unconstitutional because it applied to all bribes, not just those made in connection with actual federal funds. The Court held that to require proof of a connection between the bribes and federal funds would unreasonable and impractical; it was within Congress's power to prohibit all bribes to all federally-funded organizations. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which he questioned whether the Court had been correct to interpret the Necessary and Proper Clause so expansively.

Seminole Tribe v. Florida

Does the Eleventh Amendment provide Florida with immunity from the Tribe lawsuit?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, The Court held that Congress did intend to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the IGRA but that the Indian Commerce Clause (and by implication the Commerce Clause) did not give Congress that power. Under the Eleventh Amendment, all states are regarded as sovereign entities. Such sovereignty inherently implies that states may not be sued by parties without their consent, even if they are given authority to regulate those parties' activities through receipt of federal funds. Finally, Ex Parte Young's ruling does not justify the Tribe's suit against Florida's governor in light of certain IGRA provisions which specifically prohibit such an action.

South Dakota v. Dole

Did Congress exceed its spending powers, or violate the Twenty-first Amendment, by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the states' adoption of a uniform minimum drinking age?

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "the general welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive.

South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke

No details yet.

Sporhase v. Nebraska Ex Rel. Douglas

No details yet.

Sullivan v. United States

No details yet.

Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood

Does the Bankruptcy Clause (Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution) give Congress the power to waive a state's sovereign immunity in matters pertaining a federal bankruptcy court's forgiveness of debt owed to the state?

In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court declined to reach the question of whether the Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power to waive a state's sovereign immunity. Instead, the Court ruled that discharging a debt owed to a state in a bankruptcy procedure is different from a suit and therefore not barred by sovereign immunity. "A bankruptcy court is able to provide the debtor a fresh start in this manner ... because the court's jurisdiction is premised on the debtor and his estate, and not on the creditors," wrote the Court. That is, the discharge of debt by a bankruptcy court is not a personal suit against a state (which would violate sovereign immunity) but instead merely a modification of a debtor's estate that incidentally affects a state. As such, it is permissible even without Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity.

U.S. v. Grand River Dam Authority

No details yet.

United States v. County Of Fresno

No details yet.

United States v. Georgia

Did Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for suits by prisoners with disabilities challenging discrimination by state prisons? Was Title II a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the administration of prison systems?

Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity in cases where violations of the 8th Amendment are alleged. The 14th Amendment incorporates the 8th Amendment (that is, applies it to the states). Congress can enforce the 14th Amendment against the states "by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations" of its provisions, which can involve abrogating state sovereign immunity. However, the Court did not address the question of whether Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity when the 8th Amendment is not involved.

United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n

No details yet.

United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n

No details yet.

Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland

Do federal district courts have jurisdiction over a telecommunication carrier's claim that the order of a state utility commission requiring reciprocal compensation for telephone calls to Internet Service Providers violates the Telecommunications Act of 1996?

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the district court had jurisdiction, so as to review the Commission's order for compliance with federal law, to entertain the suit because resolution of the LEC's claim turned on whether the Act, or an FCC ruling issued thereunder, precluded the state commission from ordering payment of reciprocal compensation. Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Court also reasoned that Verizon's request for injunctive relief to restrain state officials from enforcing an order allegedly in contravention of controlling federal law avoided an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.