The Oyez Project: Federalism Issues - Federal Preemption of State Regulation Decisions

Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett

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Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 prohibit individuals from suing their HMOs in state court when the HMOs refuse to provide a recommended treatment?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Congress intended ERISA to provide a uniform system for regulating retirement schemes and benefits. If a state law conflicts with ERISA, therefore, ERISA must be used in its place. Justice Thomas wrote, "[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted."

Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson

Should the Federal Arbitration Act, making an arbitration provision enforceable in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce," be applied broadly?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act applied to all disputes involving commerce, and thus the arbitration clause was valid and enforceable. The Court reasoned that the word "involving" in section 2 of the Act signaled an intent to exercise Congress' commerce clause power to the full and that section 2 is to be read requiring only that the "transaction" in fact "involve" interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions.

Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director Of Taxation

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American Airlines v. Wolens

Does the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempt a state-court suit, brought by participants in an airline's frequent flyer program, challenging the airline's retroactive changes in terms and conditions of the program?

Yes. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADA bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers, thus claims brought under a state's consumer fraud act are preempted; but that the ADA allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves, which permits breach of contract claims to proceed. "A remedy confined to a contract's terms simply holds parties to their agreements -- in this instance, to business judgments an airline made public about its rates and services," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justice Thomas Clarence. Justice Antonin Scalia took no part in the decision of the case.

Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Ark. Public Ser v. Comm'n

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Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.

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AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.

Do the federally filed tariff requirements of section 203 of the Communications Act of 1934 pre-empt state-law claims?

Yes. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Communications Act's filed-tariff requirements pre-empt Central Office Telephone, Inc.'s state-law claims. Invoking the "filed-rate" doctrine, under which the rate a carrier duly files is the only lawful charge, the Court denied Central Office's claims of AT&T's failure to fulfill promised preferences not specified in its tariff filed with the FCC. "Because [Central Office Telephone, Inc.] asks for privileges not included in the tariff," wrote Justice Scalia, "its state-law claims are barred in either case." Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Baker v. General Motors Corp.

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Barnett Bank Of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner

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Beasley v. Food Fair Of North Carolina

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Boggs v. Boggs

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 pre-empt state community-property law allowing a non-participant spouse to transfer by a testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits?

Yes. In a opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state community-property law allowing a non-participant spouse to transfer by a testamentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits. Justice Kennedy said "ERISA's solicitude for the economic security of surviving spouses would be undermined" by allowing a previous spouse's heirs to claim a share of such benefits."

Brown v. Hotel Employees

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Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee

Does the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, pre-empt civil actions related to the alleged fraudulent approval of orthopedic bone screw devices?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the plaintiffs' state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflicted with, and were therefore pre-empted by, the FDCA, as amended by the MDA. "The conflict," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist for the Court, "stems from the fact that the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Agency, and that this authority is used by the Agency to achieve a somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives. The balance sought by the Agency can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law." Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the "FDA...has at its disposal a variety of enforcement options that allow it to make a measured response to suspected fraud upon the Agency." Justices John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas concurred.

Building & Construction Trades Council Of The Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders & Contractors Of Massachusetts/ Rhode Island, Inc.

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Calif. Div. of Labor Standards Enf. v. Dillingham Constr.

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt California's prevailing wage law to the extent that the law prohibits payment of an apprentice wage to an apprentice trained in an unapproved program?

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that California's prevailing wage law does not "relate to" employee benefit plans, and thus is not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

California v. Arc America Corp.

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California v. FERC

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Campbell v. Hussey

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Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp

Did Oklahoma's ban against retransmitting out-of-state cable signals containing alcoholic beverage commercials violate the Supremacy or Commerce Clauses?

The Court held unanimously that Oklahoma's ban on local cable transmissions of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials violated both the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. While Oklahoma can regulate local cable aspects, such as franchise formation and construction, it cannot tamper with the flow of information from other states. Such tampering violates the Federal Communication Commission's guidelines prohibiting the censorship or alteration of interstate broadcast signals. As such, in the interest of maintaining diverse program offerings and encouraging competition among cable providers, the FCC's guidelines supercede Oklahoma's local regulatory authority. Moreover, despite its broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor, the Court held that the federal government retains final authority under the commerce clause to regulate all aspects of interstate liquor commerce. Therefore, Oklahoma's continued ban on interstate alcoholic advertising violated the Commerce Clause.

Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines

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City Of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal

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City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service

May the state power reserved in 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A) be delegated to municipalities, permitting them to exercise safety regulatory authority over local tow-truck operations?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 14501(c) does not bar a State from delegating to municipalities and other local units the State's authority to establish safety regulations governing motor carriers of property, including tow trucks. "A locality, as section 14501(c) recognizes, is a 'political subdivision' of the State," wrote Justice Ginsburg. "Ordinarily, a political subdivision may exercise whatever portion of state power the State...chooses to delegate to the subdivision. Absent a clear statement to the contrary, Congress' reference to the 'regulatory authority of a State' should be read to preserve, not preempt, the traditional prerogative of the States to delegate their authority to their constituent parts." Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined.

City Of New York v. Fcc

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De Veau v. Braisted

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DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clin. Service Fund

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act preclude New York's Health Facility Assessment from imposing a gross-receipts tax on the income of medical centers operated by ERISA funds?

No. In a 7-2 decision, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not preclude New York from imposing a gross receipts tax on ERISA funded medical centers. Justice Stevens wrote, "Any state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees" will affect the benefit plan, "but that simply cannot mean that every state law with such an effect is pre-empted.

District Of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board Of Trade

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Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto

Does the Federal Arbitration Act preempt Montana's first-page notice of arbitration requirement?

Yes. In a 8-1 decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that Montana's first-page notice requirement, 27-5-114(4), which governs not "any contract," but specifically and solely contracts "subject to arbitration," conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and is therefore displaced by the federal measure. Justice Ginsburg wrote that Congress "precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status" when it passed the FAA.

Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.

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Egelhoff v. Egelhoff

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 pre-empt a Washington statute provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset is revoked automatically upon divorce?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that the Washington statute has a "connection with" ERISA plans and is therefore pre-empted. "Differing state regulations affecting an ERISA plan's 'system for processing claims and paying benefits' impose 'precisely the burden that ERISA pre-emption was intended to avoid,'" wrote Justice Thomas. He continued: "The statute at issue here directly conflicts with ERISA's requirements that plans be administered, and benefits be paid, in accordance with plan documents." Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined.

El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng

Does the Warsaw Convention preclude international passengers from pursuing personal injury suits under local law?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention. In her opinion, Justice Bader wrote, "[w]e would be hard put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject air carriers to the distinct, non-uniform liability rules of the individual signatory nations."

Engine Mfrs. Assoc. v. South Coast Air Quality

Does the Clean Air Act preempt local government regulations prohibiting the purchase of new motor vehicles with specified emission characteristics?

Probably. In an 8-to-1 opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that distinguishing between rules governing the standards to which engines must be made and the standards at which they may be sold was unreasonable. Justice Scalia wrote, "A command ... that certain purchasers may buy only vehicles with particular emission characteristics is as much an 'attempt to enforce' a 'standard' as a command ... that a certain percentage of a manufacturer's sales volume must consist of such vehicles." Justice Scalia reserved judgment on the specific regulations at issue in the case, however, sending the case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the holding that regulating the standards engines must meet to be sold is no different from regulating the standards at which they must be manufactured.

English v. General Electric Co.

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Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm.

Does a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved tariff that delegates discretion to the regulated entity to determine the precise cost allocation similarly preempt a state order that adjudges those costs imprudent?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the LPSC's order was preempted by the filed rate doctrine articulated in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, and Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354. Applying Nantahala and MP&L, the Court reasoned that the LPSC's order impermissibly "traps" costs that have been allocated in a FERC tariff. The Court noted that it did not matter whether the FERC has spoken to the precise classification of ERS units, but only whether the FERC tariff dictates how and by whom that classification should be made. "The amended system agreement clearly does so, and therefore the LPSC's second-guessing of the classification of ERS units is pre-empted," wrote Justice Thomas.

Exxon Corp. v. Hunt

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Felder v. Casey

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Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De La Cuesta

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First National Bank v. Dickinson

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FMC Corp. v. Holliday

Does ERISA preempt the Pennsylvania law precluding employee welfare benefit plans from exercising subrogation rights on a claimant's tort recovery?

Yes. Three provisions of ERISA speak to the question of preemption: the preemption clause, the saving clause, and the deemer clause. The preemption clause establishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every state law that "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. The saving clause returns to the states the power to enforce those state laws that "regulat[e] insurance." The deemer clause dictates that an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be deemed an insurance matter. The Pennsylvania law is covered by the preemption clause since it relates to an employee benefit plan. It also falls within the saving clause because it invalidates certain insurance subrogation provisions. The deemer clause, however, exempts self-funded ERISA plans from being governed by state laws regulating insurance within the meaning of the saving clause. As a result, Section 1720 is preempted insofar as it prohibits FMC's self funded Plan from exercising its subrogation rights.

Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne

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Franchise Tax Board Of California v. Usps

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Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick

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Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles

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Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Tr. Co.

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Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs.

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Humana Inc. v. Forsyth

May plaintiffs use the federal anti-racketeering law to sue their health insurers over alleged fraud?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announce by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that because RICO advances states' interests in preventing insurance fraud, and since RICO does not encroach on Nevada law, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not block Forsyth's recourse to RICO in this case.

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Mcclendon

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International Paper Co. v. Ouellette

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Johnson v. Fankell

Do defendants in an action brought under 42 USC section 1983 in state court have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity?

No. In unanimous opinion delivered by John Paul Stevens, the Court held that defendants in a state-court section 1983 action do not have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. The Court reasoned that in construing state rules allowing appeals from final judgments, state courts did not need to accept the federal definition of a "final decision" within the meaning of federal law. The right to an interlocutory appeal of a denial of immunity "is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a non-federal forum," Justice Stevens wrote for the court.

Jones v. Rath Packing Co.

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Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt any of Kentucky's "Any Willing Provider" statutes?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Kentucky's AWP statutes are "laws...which regulate insurance" under ERISA. The Court reasoned that the statutes were specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, regardless of the fact that the statutes also had the effect of prohibiting providers from entering into limited network contracts with the HMOs. Moreover, the Court concluded that, by expanding the number of providers from whom an insured may receive health services, AWP laws alter the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds thus affecting the type of risk pooling arrangements that the HMOs could offer, thereby constituting regulation of the business of insurance.

Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents

Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the ADEA contains a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeds Congress' authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. "States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest," wrote Justice O'Connor for the Court. Justice O'Connor noted that, "[o]ld age also does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it." Justice O'Connor concluded that "[i]n contrast, when a State discriminates on the basis of race or gender, we require a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve." Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer dissented.

Kolovrat v. Oregon

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Leslie Miller, Inc., v. Arkansas

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Livadas v. Bradshaw, California Labor Commissioner

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Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

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Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Ser

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Malone v. White Motor Corp.

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Mansell v. Mansell

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Massachusetts v. Westcott

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Merrill Lynch v. Dabit

Are class action securities fraud suits brought under state law pre-empted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 if the suits allege that misleading statements or omissions induced brokers to hold, not sell or purchase, securities?

Yes. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that "holder" class actions such as Dabit's are "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security and therefore are pre-empted by SLUSA. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned that Congress must have been aware of the broad interpretation the Court had given that phrase when it passed SLUSA, and that a broad interpretation of SLUSA is more consistent with the law's stated purpose. "For purposes of SLUSA pre-emption, that distinction [between sellers/purchasers and holders] is irrelevant," Justice Stevens wrote.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts

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Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Bd.

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Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n

Did federal law establishing for trucks the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempt a separate Michigan registration fee?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that "reference to text, historical context, and purpose" proved that the words "state registration requirement" in the federal law applied only to state requirements concerning SSRS registration. The Michigan statute, the majority reasoned, had nothing to do with SSRS.

Morales, Attorney General Of Texas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

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Nantahala Power & Light v. Thornburg

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New York State Conference Of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.

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New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dept.

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Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, are states permitted to regulate the provision of telecommunications services by municipal governments?

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that the act allows states to prevent municipalities from providing telecommunications services. The act only allows federal preemption of state and local efforts to prevent "any private entity" from providing telecommunications services. The Court concluded it would be "unlikely" and "strange" if Congress intended to free municipal governments from state regulations because municipal governments rely on state governments for authority to regulate.

North Dakota v. United States

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Northern Gas Co. v. Kansas Comm'n

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Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County Of Kent, Michigan

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O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver For American Diversified Savings Bank

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P. R. Consumer Affairs Dept. v. Isla Petroleum

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Pacific G & E Co. v. State Energy Res. C & D Com.

Did the California law unconstitutionally intrude into areas of federal authority as defined by the Atomic Energy Act?

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the California law did not impinge upon congressional authority. The Court found that because the rationale for enacting the law was an economic one, it did not interfere with federal regulations governing nuclear safety. The Court held that Congress had left "sufficient authority in the states to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons" and that the courts should not rework the division of regulatory authority created by Congress.

Pennsylvania v. Nelson

Did the Smith Act supersede enforcement of Pennsylvania's sedition law?

Yes. The Court held that Pennsylvania's law was unenforceable and was superseded by the federal act. Chief Justice Warren argued that the scheme of federal regulation of seditious activities was "pervasive" and "left no room for the states to supplement it." Furthermore, the federal act dealt with an issue of primary importance to the national government which made any enforcement of similar state laws potentially harmful to the smooth execution of national statutes.

Perry v. Thomas

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Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket

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Public Service Comm'n v. C. & P. Tel. Co.

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Ridgway v. Ridgway

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Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran

Is the Illinois Health Maintenance Organization Act, as applied to health benefits provided by a health maintenance organization under contract with an employee welfare benefit plan, preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that ERISA does not preempt the Illinois HMO Act. Under its common-sense view of the matter, the Court reasoned that, because HMOs are risk-bearing organizations subject to state insurance regulation and almost universally regulated as insurers under state law, "the Illinois HMO Act is a law 'directed toward' the insurance industry and an 'insurance regulation'" and is, thus, saved from preemption under ERISA's saving clause. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that ERISA's civil enforcement provision provides the exclusive means for actions asserting a claim for benefits under health plans governed by ERISA and therefore state laws that create additional remedies are preempted.

Schneidewind v. Anr Pipeline Co.

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Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

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Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. Of Revenue

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Teamsters Union v. Morton

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Teamsters Union v. Oliver

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Transcontinental Pipe Line v. State Oil & Gas Bd.

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United States Department Of Treasury v. Fabe, Superintendent Of Insurance Of Ohio

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United States v. Idaho, Ex Rel. Director, Idaho Dept of Water Resources

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United States v. Locke

Are the State of Washington's maritime regulations on tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements pre-empted by federal law?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Washington's regulations regarding general navigation watch procedures, crew English-language skills and training, and maritime casualty reporting are pre-empted by the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers. "The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now well established," wrote Justice Kennedy for the Court. Justice Kennedy also noted that States may regulate their own ports and waterways so long as the rules are based on "the peculiarities of local waters" and do not conflict with federal regulation.

UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempt California's common-law agency rule, under which a California employer administering an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the insurance company's agent? Does ERISA preempt California's "notice-prejudice" rule?

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that California's agency rule is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that California's common-law agency rule "would have a marked effect on plan administration," adding that it would force employers to take on a role for which they had not volunteered. Further, the Court held that California's notice-prejudice rule is not preempted by ERISA because it is a "law ... which regulates insurance." Thus, Ward's insurance claim may go forward even though he filed for benefits after the deadline because UNUM did not suffer any prejudice from the delay. "By allowing a longer period to file than the minimum filing terms mandated by federal law, the [California] rule complements rather than contradicts ERISA and the regulations," wrote Justice Ginsburg.

Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U.

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Wallis v. Pan American Pet. Corp.

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Wardair Canada v. Florida Dept. Of Revenue

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Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer

Is the income-first method of determining whether a community spouse is entitled to a higher community spouse resource allowance consistent with the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the income-first method qualified as a permissible interpretation of the MCCA. The Court reasoned that neither the text not the structure of the MCCA barred Wisconsin's use of the income-first method. Among the Court's findings were that that income-first method did not render meaningless the MCCA's key prohibition against deeming income of the community spouse available to the institutionalized spouse and that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who possessed the authority to prescribe standards relevant to the issue at hand, had declared in a proposed rule that the Federal Government ought to leave to states the decision whether to use the income-first method or the resources-first method. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, dissented.

Wisconsin Dept. Of Industry v. Gould Inc.

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Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier

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