The Oyez Project: Federalism Issues - Federal Preemption of State Regulation Arguments

Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett - Oral Argument

Wed, 17 Jan 1990 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila - Oral Argument

Tue, 23 Mar 2004 12:00:00 -0500

Juan Davila sued his HMO in state court because it had refused to provide certain procedures, and the refusal led to certain injuries. He brought the suit under a Texas law that requires HMOs "to exercise ordinary care" for their patients. The HMO asked that the case be moved to federal court, arguing that the case should be governed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) rather than the Texas law, because ERISA is a federal law the takes precedence over any state laws dealing with the same subject matter. Davila objected, arguing that the case did not fall under ERISA and should be heard in state court. The federal district court sided with the HMO, finding that ERISA prohibits individuals from filing state suits against HMOs when they refuse to pay for a particular treatment. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.

Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson - Oral Argument

Tue, 04 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500

In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied-Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.

Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director Of Taxation - Oral Argument

Tue, 04 Oct 1983 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

American Airlines v. Wolens - Oral Argument

Tue, 01 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500

In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from "enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.

Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Ark. Public Ser v. Comm'n - Oral Argument

Mon, 17 Jan 1983 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc. - Oral Argument

Mon, 23 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500

Under the Communications Act of 1934, AT&T must file "tariffs" containing all its charges for interstate services and all "classifications, practices and regulations affecting such charges" with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Under section 203(c) of the Act, a common carrier, such as AT&T, may not "extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in such [tariff]."In 1989, AT&T sold Central Office Telephone, Inc. its Software Defined Network, a long-distance service. Subsequently, Central Office experienced problems with the service and withdrew from the contract. Central Office sued AT&T in Federal District Court, asserting state-law claims for breach of contract and for tortious interference with contractual relations for failure to deliver various service, provisioning, and billing options in addition to those set forth in the tariff. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's damages award.

Baker v. General Motors Corp. - Oral Argument

Wed, 02 Apr 1986 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Barnett Bank Of Marion County, N. A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner - Oral Argument

Tue, 16 Jan 1996 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Boggs v. Boggs - Oral Argument

Wed, 15 Jan 1997 12:00:00 -0500

Isaac Boggs married Sandra Boggs, the petitioner, after the death of Dorothy, his previous wife. When Isaac retired in 1985, he received various benefits from his employer's retirement plans, including a lump sum savings plan distribution, shares of stock from the company's employee stock ownership plan, and a monthly annuity payment. In 1989, following Issac's death a dispute over ownership of the benefits arose between Sandra and Issac's sons, Thomas F., Harry M., and David B. Boggs. The sons' claim is based on Dorothy's purported testamentary transfer to them, under Louisiana law, of a portion of her community property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits. Sandra contested the validity of that transfer, arguing that the sons' claim is pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The Federal District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Brown v. Hotel Employees - Oral Argument

Mon, 26 Mar 1984 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee - Oral Argument

Mon, 04 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) regulate medical devices. Under the MDA, Class III devices "present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" and thus require the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) strictest regulation. In 1985, after a previously failed attempt, the AcroMed Corporation sought approval for its orthopedic bone screw device, a Class III device, for use in spinal surgery with the assistance of Buckman Company, a regulatory consultant to medical device manufacturers. The FDA also denied the second application. On the third attempt, instead of trying to show the bone screw device was "substantially equivalent" to similar devices already on the market and thus as safe and effective, AcroMed and Buckman split the device into its component parts, renamed them, and altered the intended use of the parts. Thus, the FDA approved the component devices for long bone surgery. Subsequently, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has directed over 2,300 civil actions related to these medical devices to the Federal District Court. Many actions claim, under state tort law, that AcroMed and Buckman made fraudulent representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws and that, as a result, the devices were improperly given market clearance, which injured the plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed the fraud claims as pre-empted by the MDA. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Building & Construction Trades Council Of The Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders & Contractors Of Massachusetts/ Rhode Island, Inc. - Oral Argument

Wed, 09 Dec 1992 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Calif. Div. of Labor Standards Enf. v. Dillingham Constr. - Oral Argument

Tue, 05 Nov 1996 12:00:00 -0500

California requires public works project contractors to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project's locale, but allows payment of a lower wage to participants in state approved apprenticeship programs. Dillingham Construction subcontracted some of the work on its state contract to respondent Arceo, doing business as Sound Systems Media (SSM). SSM entered a collective bargaining agreement with Dillingham that included an apprenticeship wage scale and provided for affiliation with an apprenticeship committee that ran an unapproved program. SSM used that committee for its apprentices, to whom it paid the apprentice wage. The California Division of Apprenticeship Standards (the Division) issued a notice of noncompliance to both Dillingham and SSM, charging that paying the apprentice wage, rather than the prevailing journeyman wage, to apprentices from an unapproved program violated the state's prevailing wage law. Dillingham sued to prevent the Division from interfering with payment under the subcontract. Dillingham alleged that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted enforcement of the state law. The District Court ruled in favor of the Division. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship program was an "employee welfare benefit plan" under the ERISA, and that the state law "relate[d] to" the plan and was therefore superseded by it.

California v. Arc America Corp. - Oral Argument

Mon, 27 Feb 1989 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

California v. FERC - Oral Argument

Tue, 20 Mar 1990 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp - Oral Argument

Tue, 21 Feb 1984 12:00:00 -0500

In 1980, Oklahoma's Attorney General determined that the re-broadcasting of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by Oklahoma cable television stations violated the State's ban against advertising alcoholic beverages. Richard Crisp, the Director of Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, warned the offending cable operators that their continued transmission of banned beverage commercials would result in criminal prosecution. In response, and on behalf of other cable operators, Capital Cities Cable challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising ban. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision favoring Capital Cities Cable, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service - Oral Argument

Tue, 23 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Pursuant to 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A), federal preemption prescriptions relating to motor carriers "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles." Columbus, Ohio, extensively regulates the operation of tow trucks seeking to pick up vehicles within city limits. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., a tow-truck operator and a trade association of such operators, sought to enjoin enforcement of the City's tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were preempted. The District Court granted Ours Garage summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent that section 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule explicitly applies to "a State [or] political subdivision of a State," while the exception for safety regulations, section 14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the "authority of a State." The appellate court also noted that precedent determined that the contrast in statutory language indicated that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States alone.

City Of New York v. Fcc - Oral Argument

Tue, 29 Mar 1988 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clin. Service Fund - Oral Argument

Mon, 24 Feb 1997 12:00:00 -0500

New York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA) imposes a tax on gross receipts for patient services at diagnostic and treatment centers. The NYSA ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, which administers a plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), owns and operates New York treatment centers for longshore workers, retirees and their dependents. The Fund's trustees discontinued paying the New York tax and filed to enjoin the state from making future assessments and to obtain a refund. Lawyers for the Fund alleged that the HFA is preempted by the ERISA, as it applies to hospitals run by it. The District Court ruled that the HFA is not preempted because it is a tax of general application having only an incidental impact on benefit plans. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the HFA directly reduces the amount of Fund assets that would otherwise be available to provide plan members with benefits, and could cause the plan to limit its benefits or to charge plan members higher fees; therefore, the HFA was preempted by the ERISA.

District Of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board Of Trade - Oral Argument

Tue, 03 Nov 1992 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto - Oral Argument

Tue, 16 Apr 1996 12:00:00 -0500

Paul Casarotto, a Subway sandwich shop franchisee, sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court when a dispute arose between the parties with regard to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of the shop. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. In reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement, 27-5-114(4), that "[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration" be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract." DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that the state-law requirement was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." The Montana Supreme Court focused on the question of whether the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement would undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether.

Egelhoff v. Egelhoff - Oral Argument

Wed, 08 Nov 2000 12:00:00 -0500

David A. Egelhoff designated his wife, Donna Rae Egelhoff, as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy and a pension plan provided by his employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Two months after the Egelhoffs divorced, Mr. Egelhoff died. His children then sued Donna Rae to recover the insurance proceeds and the pension plan benefits. The children relied on a Washington state statue that provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset - defined to include a life insurance policy or employee benefit plan - is revoked automatically upon divorce. Subsequently, the proceeds would pass to the children as Mr. Egelhoff's statutory heirs under state law. Under ERISA, the state trial courts granted Donna Rae summary judgment. In reversing, the Washington Court of Appeals found that the statute was not pre-empted by ERISA. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute does not "refer to" ERISA plans to an extent that would require pre-emption.

El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng - Oral Argument

Tue, 10 Nov 1998 12:00:00 -0500

In a New York State court, Tsui Yuan Tseng alleged El Al Israel Airlines subjected her to an intrusive security search resulting in assault and false imprisonment before a flight from New York to Tel Aviv. Tseng alleged that psychic or psychosomatic personal injuries followed the incident, but no bodily injury occurred. El Al moved the case to federal court. The District Court dismissed the case due to the Warsaw Convention treaty. Convention provisions describe air carrier liability for international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods. Bodily injury, baggage or goods destruction, loss, or damage, and damage caused by delay are compensable under the Convention. Psychic or psychosomatic injury is not covered. Thus, Tseng's claim was not justicible. Moreover, New York tort law prevents El Al from liability suits covered under the Convention. The Court of Appeals held, in reversing, that the Convention drafters did not intend to remove all liability from an airline carrier, that the Convention does not shield routine operating procedures from the laws of signatory nations, and that the Convention precludes recourse to local law only when an incident is not exclusively covered. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Convention would create uniformity because doing so would supplant applicable laws.

Engine Mfrs. Assoc. v. South Coast Air Quality - Oral Argument

Wed, 14 Jan 2004 12:00:00 -0500

The Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) sued the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) - established under the California Health and Safety Code - in federal district court. The EMA alleged that the Clean Air Act (CAA) preempted SCAQMD's "fleet rules" - rules that required new commercial vehicles to meet specific emissions standards - and that the rules were therefore illegal. The EMA pointed to section 209 of the act, which prohibits states from enforcing "any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles." Reasoning that the regulations affected the standards at which engines could be sold, not the standards to which they must be manufactured, and finding that Congress's purpose was to protect manufactures from "having to build engines in compliance with a multiplicity of standards," the district court ruled that the CAA did not preempt California's fleet rules. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

English v. General Electric Co. - Oral Argument

Wed, 25 Apr 1990 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm. - Oral Argument

Mon, 28 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500

Several Louisiana cotton gins sued Entergy, an electric utility company, because it had over-billed them for electricity between 1988 and 1994. The gins claimed that Entergy had failed to notify them of a lower rate that would have saved them more than $2 million over the six-year period. Louisiana law requires that utility companies notify customers when they are eligible for a lower rate. Furthermore, the gins claimed that Entergy had discriminated against them by notifying several other gins in the state of the lower rate. Deferring to the decision of the Louisiana Public Service Commission, the state's utility regulatory agency, a state district court ruled against Entergy. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the decision on appeal.

Exxon Corp. v. Hunt - Oral Argument

Mon, 09 Dec 1985 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Felder v. Casey - Oral Argument

Mon, 28 Mar 1988 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

FMC Corp. v. Holliday - Oral Argument

Tue, 02 Oct 1990 12:00:00 -0500

FMC Corporation (FMC) provided its employees with a self-funded health benefit plan (Plan). The daughter of an FMC employee, Gerald Holliday (Holliday), was seriously injured in a car accident and the Plan paid for a portion of her medical expenses. Holliday also received, in settlement of a negligence action he brought on behalf of his daughter, payment from the driver of the automobile in which his daughter was injured. FMC sought reimbursement under the terms of the Plan. Holliday obtained a declaratory judgment that Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law - which precludes reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a program, group contract, or other arrangement - prohibited FMC's exercise of subrogation rights. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which applies to employee welfare benefit plans such as FMC's Plan, did not preempt Section 1720.

Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne - Oral Argument

Tue, 24 Mar 1987 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Franchise Tax Board Of California v. Usps - Oral Argument

Tue, 17 Apr 1984 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick - Oral Argument

Wed, 22 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles - Oral Argument

Wed, 04 Dec 1985 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Tr. Co. - Oral Argument

Tue, 21 Feb 1984 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Humana Inc. v. Forsyth - Oral Argument

Mon, 30 Nov 1998 12:00:00 -0500

Mary Forsyth, the beneficiary of a group health insurance policy issued by Humana Health Insurance of Nevada, Inc., received medical care at a hospital owned by Humana Inc. Humana Insurance agreed to pay 80 percent of Forsyth's hospital charges over a designated deductible. Forsyth bore responsibility for the remaining 20 percent of the charges. Forsyth complained that the hospital gave Human Insurance large discounts on their portion of the hospital charges. Thus, Humana Insurance paid the hospital significantly less than the actual 80 percent of the original bill and, in turn, Forsyth paid significantly more than her 20 percent of the hospital charges. Forsyth alleged that Humana Insurance and Humana Inc. had violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through fraudulent activity. The District Court ruled in favor of Humana, citing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which prevents acts of Congress from encroaching on state insurance law unless the act specifically relates to insurance. The Court of Appeals reversed and adopted a "direct conflict" test for determining when a federal law "invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]" a state insurance law. Under such a test, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar Forsyth's suit because the Act does not preclude application of a federal statute prohibiting acts that are also prohibited under state insurance laws. The Act and Nevada law only provided for different damages to be collected.

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Mcclendon - Oral Argument

Tue, 09 Oct 1990 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette - Oral Argument

Tue, 04 Nov 1986 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Johnson v. Fankell - Oral Argument

Wed, 26 Feb 1997 12:00:00 -0500

Kristine L. Fankell filed an action for damages in Idaho State Court, alleging that the termination of her state employment by Marian Johnson, and other officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary, deprived her of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court dismissed Johnson and others' motion to dismiss, which asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed their appeal from that ruling, explaining that the denial was neither an appealable final order under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) nor appealable as a matter of federal right.

Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller - Oral Argument

Tue, 14 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500

Kentucky's two "Any Willing Provider" (AWP) statutes prohibit "[a] health insurer [from] discriminating against any provider who is...willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the?insurer," and require a "health benefit plan that includes chiropractic benefits [to]...permit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms [and] conditions?of the?plan to serve as a participating primary chiropractic provider." Certain health maintenance organizations (HMOs) filed suit asserting that Kentucky's AWP laws are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which preempts all state laws "insofar as they?relate to any employee benefit plan," but saves from preemption state "laws...which regulate insurance." The District Court concluded that although both AWP statutes "relate to" employee benefit plans each law "regulates insurance" and is therefore saved from preemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents - Oral Argument

Wed, 13 Oct 1999 12:00:00 -0500

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) makes it unlawful for a private employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual...because of such individual's age." In 1974, Congress extended the ADEA's substantive requirements to the states. First, in 1994, employees of the University of Montevallo filed suit against the university, a branch of the State of Alabama, alleging that the university had discriminated against them on the basis of their age. The federal District Court dismissed the case based on the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court determined that, although the ADEA shows Congress' intent to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress did not enact or extend the ADEA under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. The court, therefore, held that the ADEA did not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, in 1995, a group of faculty and librarians of Florida State University filed suit against the Board of Regents, alleging that the university's fiscal actions had violated the ADEA because the actions had a disparate impact on the pay of older employees. When the Florida Board of Regents moved to dismiss the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the District Court denied the motion, holding that Congress expressed its intent to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADEA, and that the ADEA is a proper exercise of congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, in 1996, a third case, involving an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections, was similarly decided. The Court of Appeals, in deciding all three cases, held that the ADEA does not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Livadas v. Bradshaw, California Labor Commissioner - Oral Argument

Tue, 26 Apr 1994 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) - Oral Argument

Mon, 13 Jan 1986 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Ser - Oral Argument

Tue, 19 Apr 1988 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Malone v. White Motor Corp. - Oral Argument

Tue, 10 Jan 1978 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Mansell v. Mansell - Oral Argument

Tue, 10 Jan 1989 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Massachusetts v. Westcott - Oral Argument

Mon, 17 Jan 1977 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Merrill Lynch v. Dabit - Oral Argument

Wed, 18 Jan 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Shadi Dabit, formerly a stockbroker at Merrill Lynch, brought a class action suit against his former employer alleging that the company had defrauded brokers by deceptively inflating stock prices, causing the brokers to hold onto stocks they would otherwise have sold. Dabit's class action was filed in the U.S. District Court based on federal diversity jurisdiction, but was based on Oklahoma state law.

In response to perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in securities litigation, Congress had passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which placed restrictions on federal securities fraud class actions. When plaintiffs began avoiding the law by bringing the suits in state courts instead of federal courts, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which pre-empts federal class action securities fraud claims brought under state law that allege misrepresentation "in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security."

Merrill Lynch argued that Dabit's suit was pre-empted by SLUSA and therefore could not be brought under state law. Dabit countered that the suit alleged misrepresentation concerning only the holding of stocks, and therefore was beyond the scope of SLUSA. The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Merrill Lynch, finding the language of SLUSA broad enough to include suits such as Dabit's. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that suits by holders of stocks are distinct from suits by sellers and purchasers and that SLUSA was meant to pre-empt only the latter.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts - Oral Argument

Tue, 26 Feb 1985 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Bd. - Oral Argument

Mon, 19 Mar 1984 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n - Oral Argument

Tue, 26 Apr 2005 12:00:00 -0500

A Michigan law imposed an annual $100 fee on each Michigan license-plated truck that operated entirely in interstate commerce. A group of interstate trucking companies sought unsuccesfully to have Michigan courts invalidate the law. The companies claimed that the federal law that had created the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempted and prohibited such state fees. Under the federal law a trucking company could obtain a permit applicable in every state by registering once in a single state. While the initial state could demand a fee equal to the sum of its individual state fee, the law prohibited a state from imposing an additional "state registration requirement."

Morales, Attorney General Of Texas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. - Oral Argument

Tue, 03 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Nantahala Power & Light v. Thornburg - Oral Argument

Mon, 21 Apr 1986 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

New York State Conference Of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. - Oral Argument

Wed, 18 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League - Oral Argument

Mon, 12 Jan 2004 12:00:00 -0500

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed federal preemption of state and local regulations "prohibiting the ability of any entity" to provide telecommunications services. Based on this act, a group of local governments in Missouri (the Missouri Municipal League) asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to nullify a state law that prevented municipalities from providing telecommunications services. Missouri argued that municipal governments were not separate entities but merely subsections of the state government and that the state could therefore restrict their authority. The FCC agreed with the state, refusing to nullify the law.

The Municipal League appealed, and an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision. The panel held the words "any entity" were intentionally broad and that a proper understanding of them would include municipal governments. The state could therefore not regulate attempts by municipalities to provide telecommunications services. The FCC, along with the state of Missouri and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

North Dakota v. United States - Oral Argument

Tue, 02 Nov 1982 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County Of Kent, Michigan - Oral Argument

Mon, 29 Nov 1993 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, As Receiver For American Diversified Savings Bank - Oral Argument

Mon, 21 Mar 1994 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

P. R. Consumer Affairs Dept. v. Isla Petroleum - Oral Argument

Mon, 29 Feb 1988 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Pacific G & E Co. v. State Energy Res. C & D Com. - Oral Argument

Mon, 17 Jan 1983 12:00:00 -0500

A California law dictated that before additional nuclear power plants could be built, the state energy commission had to determine that there would be adequate storage capacity for spent fuel rods. Two utility companies challenged the law, arguing that its provisions had been preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Pennsylvania v. Nelson - Oral Argument, Part 1

Tue, 15 Nov 1955 12:00:00 -0500

Nelson, a member of the Communist Party, was convicted of violating the Pennsylvania Sedition Act. This Act was implemented prior to Congress's adoption of the Smith Act of 1940 (amended in 1948) which prohibited the same conduct as Pennsylvania's law.

Pennsylvania v. Nelson - Oral Argument, Part 2

Tue, 15 Nov 1955 12:00:00 -0500

Perry v. Thomas - Oral Argument

Tue, 28 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket - Oral Argument

Wed, 20 Apr 1983 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Public Service Comm'n v. C. & P. Tel. Co. - Oral Argument

Mon, 13 Jan 1986 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran - Oral Argument

Wed, 16 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500

Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., a health maintenance organization that provides medical services for employee welfare benefits plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), denied Debra Moran's request to have surgery by an unaffiliated specialist. Under the Illinois HMO Act (Act), which provides that "in the event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary," the HMO "shall provide" the service, Moran made a written demand for an independent medical review of her claim. After Rush refused her demand, Moran sued in state court to compel compliance with the Act. The court ordered the review, which found the treatment necessary. While the suit was pending, Moran had the surgery and amended her complaint to seek reimbursement. Rush removed the case to federal court, arguing that the amended complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found Moran's reimbursement claim preempted by ERISA so as to place the case in federal court, but it concluded that the Act was not preempted as a state law that "relates to" an employee benefit plan because it also "regulates insurance" under ERISA's saving clause.

Schneidewind v. Anr Pipeline Co. - Oral Argument

Mon, 02 Nov 1987 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. - Oral Argument

Mon, 10 Jan 1983 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. Of Revenue - Oral Argument

Tue, 04 Oct 1988 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Transcontinental Pipe Line v. State Oil & Gas Bd. - Oral Argument

Tue, 08 Oct 1985 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

United States Department Of Treasury v. Fabe, Superintendent Of Insurance Of Ohio - Oral Argument

Tue, 08 Dec 1992 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

United States v. Idaho, Ex Rel. Director, Idaho Dept of Water Resources - Oral Argument

Mon, 29 Mar 1993 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

United States v. Locke - Oral Argument

Tue, 07 Dec 1999 12:00:00 -0500

In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the State of Washington created the Office of Marine Safety, which was directed to establish standards to provide the "best achievable protection" (BAP) from oil spill damage. The agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, filed suit against the state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Intertanko argued that Washington's BAP standards had entered an area occupied by the federal government and imposed unique requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Further, Intertanko argued that if every political subdivision were to promulgate such maritime regulations, the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental and safety would be undermined. The District Court upheld Washington's regulations. Thereafter, the Federal Government intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward - Oral Argument

Wed, 24 Feb 1999 12:00:00 -0500

UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (UNUM) issued a long-term group disability policy to Management Analysis Company (MAC) as an insured welfare benefit plan governed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The policy provides that proof of claims must be furnished to UNUM within one year and 180 days after the onset of disability. John E. Ward, a California MAC employee, became permanently disabled in May 1992. Ward informed MAC of his disability in late February or early March 1993. UNUM received proof of Ward's claim on April 11, 1994. Ward was notified that his claim was denied as untimely because his notice was late under the terms of the policy. Ward then filed suit under ERISA's civil enforcement provision to recover the disability benefits provided by the plan. Ward argued that, under California's common-law agency rule, an employer administering an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the insurance company's agent; therefore, his notice of permanent disability to MAC, in late February or early March 1993, sufficed to supply timely notice to UNUM. The District Court rejected Ward's argument and ruled in favor of UNUM, citing ERISA's preemption clause, which states that ERISA provisions "shall supersede ... State laws" to the extent that those laws "relate to any employee benefit plan." In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that Ward might prevail under California's "notice-prejudice" rule, under which an insurer cannot avoid liability although the proof of claim is untimely, unless the insurer shows it suffered actual prejudice from the delay.

Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U. - Oral Argument

Wed, 30 Nov 1988 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Wardair Canada v. Florida Dept. Of Revenue - Oral Argument

Mon, 31 Mar 1986 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer - Oral Argument

Mon, 03 Dec 2001 12:00:00 -0500

The spousal impoverishment provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) permit a spouse living at home to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The MCCA's resource allocation rules provide that, in determining the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple's resources, called the "community spouse resource allowance" (CSRA), shall be reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. The MCCA allows an increase in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In 1996, after entering a Wisconsin nursing home, Irene Blumer applied for Medicaid through her husband Burnett and ultimately sought a higher CSRA. Under the "income-first" method for determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, which Wisconsin uses, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. Subsequently, an examiner denied Blumer's request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State's income-first statute conflicted with the MCCA, which, the appeals court held, unambiguously mandates the resources-first method.

Wisconsin Dept. Of Industry v. Gould Inc. - Oral Argument

Mon, 09 Dec 1985 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.

Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier - Oral Argument

Wed, 24 Apr 1991 12:00:00 -0500

No details yet.