<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" version="2.0">
 <channel>
  <title>The Oyez Project: Economic Activity Issues - Patents Arguments</title>
  <link>http://www.oyez.org/issues/economic-activity/patents/</link>
  <description>U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</description>
  <language>en-us</language>
  <itunes:image>http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg</itunes:image>
  <itunes:category text="Government &amp; Organizations"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</itunes:subtitle>
    
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, Dba Deebees - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 07 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales.  Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for "other than reproductive purposes." The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Is the quantity of protected seed that a farmer can sell under the exemptions in the Plant Variety Protection Act limited to the amount of seed the seller would need to replant his own fields?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>92-2038_19941107-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_92_2038/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_92_2038/argument/92-2038_19941107-argument.mp3" length="14402416" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Diamond v. Chakrabarty - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 17 Mar 1980 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;After genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover "any" new and useful "manufacture" or "composition of matter." On appeal from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are not patentable under Section 101. When this decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Is the creation of a live, human-made organism patentable under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>79-136_19800317-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_136/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_136/argument/79-136_19800317-argument.mp3" length="14537021" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Eli Lilly &amp; Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 26 Feb 1990 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>89-243_19900226-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_243/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_243/argument/89-243_19900226-argument.mp3" length="15074799" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 2002 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Festo Corporation owns two patents for an improved magnetic rodless cylinder, a piston-driven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system. When the patent examiner rejected the initial application for the first patent because of defects in description, the application was amended to add the new limitations that the device would contain a pair of one-way sealing rings and that its outer sleeve would be made of a magnetizable material. The second patent was also amended during a reexamination proceeding to add the sealing rings limitation. After Festo began selling its device, SMC entered the market with a similar device that uses one two-way sealing ring and a nonmagnetizable sleeve. Festo filed suit, claiming that SMC's device is so similar that it infringes Festo's patents under the doctrine of equivalents. Rejecting SMC's argument that the prosecution history, or the public record of the patent proceedings, estopped Festo from saying that SMC's device was similar, the District Court ruled in Festo's favor. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the prosecution history estoppel applied, ruling that estoppel arises from any amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act. The Court of Appeals also held that, when estoppel applies, it bars any claim of equivalence for the element that was amended.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does a patentee, by narrowing a claim to obtain a patent, surrender all equivalents to the amended claim element?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>00-1543_20020108-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1543/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1543/argument/00-1543_20020108-argument.mp3" length="14811278" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 07 Dec 1982 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>81-1661_19821207-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1661/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1661/argument/81-1661_19821207-argument.mp3" length="12860256" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>J.E.M. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 03 Oct 2001 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. holds 17 utility patents issued under 35 USC section 101 that cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of its hybrid corn seed products. Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that allows only the production of grain and/or forage. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., bought patented seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing the license agreement and then resold the bags. Subsequently, Pioneer filed a patent infringement suit. In response, Farm Advantage filed a patent invalidity counterclaim, arguing that sexually reproducing plants, such as Pioneer's corn plants, are not patentable subject matter within section 101. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive statutory means for protecting plant life. The District Court granted Pioneer summary judgment. The court held that section 101 clearly covers plant life and that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA, Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from section 101's subject matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;May utility patents be issued for plants under 35 USC section 101?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>99-1996_20011003-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_99_1996/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_99_1996/argument/99-1996_20011003-argument.mp3" length="14762589" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 20 Apr 2005 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Integra Lifesciences sued Merck for supplying an Integra patented compound to other drug companies for use in preclinical research. In response, Merck claimed its actions were allowed under the federal law that said it was not an act of patent infringement to use or import a patented invention into the United States, if the invention was used only in ways related to the development and submission of information under a federal drug law (such as the law governing submission of data to the FDA). The district court ruled against Merck and awarded Integra damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment but ordered a modification of damages.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did federal law allow the use of patented inventions in preclinical research, the results of which were not ultimately included in a submission to the FDA?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>03-1237_20050420-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1237/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1237/argument/03-1237_20050420-argument.mp3" length="14593178" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 1998 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1980, Wayne K. Pfaff developed a new type of computer chip socket for Texas Instruments (TI). In early April 1981, TI confirmed they would order and use Pfaff's socket. No actual socket was made until July 1981. Pfaff applied for a patent in April 1982. A patent was not granted on Pfaff's socket until 1985. After the patent was issued, Pfaff sued Wells Electronics, who had developed a competing socket, for patent infringement. Pfaff claimed that Wells' socket infringed upon six of his patent's claims. The District Court held that Wells' socket violated three of Pfaff's patent claims. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Pfaff had sold the socket to TI more than a year before he applied for a patent. Thus, Wells' socket did not infringe on Pfaff's under the Patent Act of 1952, which states that no one can patent an invention that has been on sale for more than one year before filing a patent application.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the confirmation of a commercial sale mark the beginning of the one year period inventors have to file for a patent, despite the fact the invention has not been produced?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>97-1130_19981006-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_1130/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_1130/argument/97-1130_19981006-argument.mp3" length="14367416" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 03 Mar 1976 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>75-110_19760303-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_75_110/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_75_110/argument/75-110_19760303-argument.mp3" length="15640138" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Warner Jenkinson Co., Inc.  v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 15 Oct 1996 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Warner Jenkinson Co. and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. both manufacture dyes from which impurities must be removed. Davis's "'746 patent," which was issued in 1985, discloses an improved purification process involving the "ultrafiltration" of dye through a porous membrane at pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0. In 1986, Jenkinson developed its own ultrafiltration process, which operated at a pH level of 5.0. Davis sued for infringement of the '746 patent. Davis's suit relied solely on the "doctrine of equivalents," under which a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is an "equivalence" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Jenkinson argued that the Patent Act of 1952 had supplanted the doctrine. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against Jenkinson after a jury had found that Jenkinson had infringed upon the '746 patent. The en banc Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist and that the jury had substantial evidence from which to conclude that petitioner's process was not substantially different from the process disclosed in the '746 patent.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Is the "doctrine of equivalents" a legitimate test for determining how similar a new invention must be to an existing patent to be deemed an illegal infringement?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>95-728_19961015-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_728/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_728/argument/95-728_19961015-argument.mp3" length="14154845" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
 </channel>
</rss>
