The Oyez Project: Economic Activity Issues - Natural Resources

Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Scrap

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Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States

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Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conserv. v. EPA

Under the Clean Air Act, state agencies must determine the best way to prevent air pollution in areas that have met national clean air standards. In part, they must require that polluting companies use the "best available control technology" to limit pollution whenever they construct new facilities. In 1998, Teck Cominco Alaska, a mining company, requested a permit to build an additional generator at one of its mines. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) issued the permit, which called for Cominco to use "Low NOx" technology on all its generators, not just the new one. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, stepped in, arguing that a better technology was available. ADEC appealed the EPA's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the EPA did not have the right to interfere with the state agency's decision. The Ninth Circuit sided with the EPA.

Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell

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Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe

Land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 (the Acts) reserve all rights to the coal contained in the subject properties to the United States. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe has equitable title to coal within its reservation lands. These lands contain large quantities of coalbed methane gas (CBM gas), now considered a valuable energy source, within the coal formations. In 1981, the Department of the Interior issued an opinion that concluded that the reservation of coal under the Acts did not encompass CBM gas. Energy companies then entered into leases with landowners holding title under the Acts to produce CBM gas. The Tribe field suit against the Amoco Production Company and others, royalty owners and producers under the oil and gas leases covering that land, and various federal entities, seeking a declaration stating CBM gas to be coal reserved by the Acts and therefore belonging to the Tribe. The District Court disagreed and concluded that the plain meaning of the term "coal" was limited to the solid rock substance and did not include the CBM gas. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Acts' use of the term "coal" was ambiguous, and ambiguities in land grants must be resolved in favor of the sovereign. Therefore, the Acts' reservation of coal included the CBM gas.

Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co.

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Andrus v. Idaho

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Andrus v. Shell Oil Co.

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Andrus v. Sierra Club

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Andrus v. Utah

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Arizona v. California

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Arkansas v. Oklahoma

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Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.

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Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior v. Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon

The Endangered Species Act requires that no person "take" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as "harass, harm, pursue," "wound," or "kill." The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes "harm" as including "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.

The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, "harm" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.

Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Nrdc

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Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner

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Bedroc Limited v. United States

BedRoc Ltd. and Western Elite, Inc., own property in Nevada patented under the federal Pittman Act (1919). (The act was repealed in 1964.) The act authorized the issuance of patents to desert lands in Nevada to individuals who successfully developed underground water resources. However, the act specified that patents reserve to the United States "all the coal and other valuable minerals" in the patented lands. When the previous owner of BedRoc and Western Elite's land extracted and sold commercially valuable sand and gravel from the lands without a federal mineral contract, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) gave notification that the mining was illegal under federal law. The owner lost an appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). Once BedRoc and Western Elite owned the land, they filed suit in U.S. district court, arguing that the Pittman Act's "valuable minerals" provision did not include valuable sand and gravel. The district court rejected the companies' argument and sided with the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Boesche v. Udall

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Borden Ranch v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

In 1993, Angelo Tsakopoulos purchased the Borden Ranch, an 8348-acre ranch in California. Tsakopoulos planned to subdivide the land into parcels for cultivation as vineyards and orchards. Because a dense layer of material prevented water from reaching the depths necessary to cultivate vineyards or orchards, Tsakopoulos intended to "deep rip" the soil. Deep ripping has a dramatic effect on the character of a wetland area. The Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency informed Tsakopoulos that he was not to deep rip protected waters without a permit. Ultimately, the District Court found that Tsakopoulos had violated the Clean Water Act multiple times and imposed a substantial fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.

Bryant v. Yellen

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California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co.

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California v. United States

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Cappaert v. United States

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Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Nrdc

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Chevron U.S. A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council

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Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe

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City Of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund

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City Of Fresno v. California

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Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.

Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs.

Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation

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Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle

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Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen

In 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to lift a temporary ban on Mexican trucking companies in the United States once new regulations were prepared by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to regulate safety inspections and applications to transport materials. Congress specified certain standards that those regulations would have to meet before it would appropriate money to register the new carriers.

When the FMCSA formulated its regulations, it performed an Environmental Assessment (EA) to examine their effects on the environment. Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), federal agencies must perform an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of policies that are likely to have significant environmental effects. If an agency feels that its policies will not have significant effects, however, it may perform a more limited Environmental Assessment (EA) - which is what FMCSA chose to do. Public Citizen, a watchdog group that monitors government actions, challenged this decision in federal court. It argued that, because FMCSA knew that a large number of Mexican trucks would be admitted into the United States once it issued its regulations, it should have considered the environmental impact of the increased number of trucks in addition to the more limited impact of the safety inspections. The impact of the trucks would have been significant enough to warrant an EIS, so Public Citizen argued that FMCSA had violated NEPA by not conducting the more stringent study. The district court side with the FMCSA, holding that, while the passage of the regulations was necessary before the trucks could be admitted, the FMCSA nevertheless did not have control of those trucks and therefore did not have to account for them in its Environmental Assessment; a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.

Dugan v. Rank

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E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train

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Epa v. National Crushed Stone Assn.

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Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn.

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Gade, Director, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency v. National Solid Wastes Management Association

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General Motors Corp. v. United States

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Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation

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Hallstrom v. Tillamook County

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Harrison v. Ppg Industries, Inc.

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Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp.

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Hodel v. Indiana

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Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn.

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Illinois v. City Of Milwaukee

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Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc.

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Kake Village v. Egan

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Key Tronic Corp. v. United States

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Kleppe v. New Mexico

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Kleppe v. Sierra Club

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Lake Carriers' Assn. v. Macmullan

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Lowe v. SEC

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Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council

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Metropolitan Edison v. People Vs. Nuclear Energy

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Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers

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Milwaukee v. Illinois

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Nevada v. United States

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Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance

The federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) designated 2.5 million acres of land in Utah as "Wilderness Study Areas" under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Under the Act, the BLM is required to manage this land "so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness."

The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) and several other environmentalist groups brought suit in federal district court under section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows federal courts to compel government action when an agency has failed to meet its legal duties. SUWA claimed that the BLM had failed to take a "hard look," as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, at the effects of off-road vehicles on the Wilderness Study Areas. It also claimed that the permitted off-road vehicle use was in fact damaging the study areas in violation of the agency's FLPMA obligations.

The district court dismissed the case, holding that SUWA's charge that the bureau had failed to adequately protect the study areas was not specific enough for the court to hear under the Administrative Procedure Act. On appeal, a divided panel of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that the bureau's discretion was limited to deciding how to implement the act, not if to implement it, and that SUWA could therefore bring suit to force it at least to take a "hard look" at the effects of the off-road vehicle policy.

Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.

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Orff v. United States

The Westlands Water District received water from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under a 1963 contract. In 1993 Westlands sued the district for reducing their water supply. California farmers who had bought water from Westlands also sued the bureau, intervening as plaintiffs. After negotiations Westlands agreed to dismiss their suit. But the farmers refused to drop theirs, accusing the bureau of breach of contract. The farmers claimed that as third-party beneficiaries they could enforce the contract and that the United States had waived its sovereing immunity from such suits in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. That act allowed parties "to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit" over rights under a federal reclamation contract. The district court held that the farmers were not contracting parties or third-party beneficiaries and thus could not invoke the waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision.

Philadelphia v. New Jersey

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Public Lands Council v. Babbitt

The Taylor Grazing Act grants the Secretary of the Interior authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, and to issue grazing leases or permits to "settlers, residents, and other stock owners." When Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt announced new regulations governing the administration of livestock on 170 million acres of public range, the Public Lands Council (Council), a group of nonprofit ranching-related organizations, objected. The Council's members who held grazing permits brought an action against Secretary Babbitt challenging 10 of the new federal grazing regulations issued by the Secretary in 1995. The Council claimed that the Secretary acted beyond his power in regulating the grazing patterns. The District Court found 4 of the 10 regulations unlawful. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals upheld three previously overturned regulations, which changed the definition of "grazing preference," permitted those who were not "engaged in the livestock business" to qualify for grazing permits; and granted the United States title to all future range improvements.

PUD No. 1 Of Jefferson County v. Washington Department Of Ecology

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Rapanos v. United States

John Rapanos sought to fill in three wetland areas on his property in order to build a shopping center. Rapanos ignored warnings from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality that the area was protected wetlands under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into "navigable waters," which the Act defines as "the waters of the United States." Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. After Rapanos also ignored cease-and-desist orders from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the government brought a civil suit against him. Rapanos argued before the District Court that the CWA gives the government jurisdiction to regulate only traditionally navigable waters. The government countered that Rapanos's lands were covered by the CWA as "adjacent wetlands" under the Corps's interpretation of the Act; the sites drained into man-made drains which eventually emptied into navigable rivers and lakes. The District Court rejected Rapanos's argument and upheld the Corps's regulations including the wetlands as "waters of the United States." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the "hydrological connection" of the wetlands to the navigable waters qualifies them as "waters of the United States" under the Act.

The Carabells sought to fill in a wetland on their property in order to build a condominium, but were denied a permit because the wetland was protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into "navigable waters," which the Act defines as "the waters of the United States." Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. Carabell's site is separated from a nearby ditch by a 4-foot-wide berm (earthen barrier), but the Corps's regulations specify that the wetland is nevertheless adjacent to the waterway. The ditch empties into another ditch, which in turn empties into a creek and ultimately into Lake St. Clair, a navigable water. After exhausting administrative appeals, Carabell sued in District Court. Carabell argued that the government lacked jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate the relatively isolated wetland as part of the "waters of the United States." The District Court disagreed, and upheld the Corps's expansive interpretation of the CWA. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled for the Corps, holding that as long as wetlands are "adjacent" to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and share a "significant nexus" with such waters, the wetlands qualify as "waters of the United States" for purposes of the CWA.

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council

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Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service v. Seattle Audubon Society

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S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection

S.D. Warren Company (Warren) operates several hydroelectric dams in Maine. Under Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, companies must obtain state approval of "any activity" "which may result in any discharge into the [Nation's] navigable waters." When Warren sought to renew the federal licenses for its dams, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required that it first get approval from the Maine Board of Environmental Protection because, FERC ruled, the dams resulted in a "discharge." Warren disagreed, arguing that the water which moved through the hydroelectric dams was not actually a "discharge" because it was water from the same river which had just been temporarily re-routed. After Warren's administrative appeals and state court suit (which went to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court) failed, it appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.

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Secretary Of Interior v. California

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Sierra Club v. Morton

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Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers

The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid waste disposal site. Excavation trenches on the site had previously become ponds for migrating birds. Because some trenches would have to be filled in, the SWANCC contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine if a landfill permit was required under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the Corps to issue permits allowing the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable waters." Under the CWA, "navigable waters" are defined as "the waters of the United States" and the Corps regulations define such waters to include intrastate waters, of which damage could affect interstate commerce. Subsequently, the Corps denied the SWANCC a permit. The District Court ruled in SWANCC's favor. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate waters.

South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe

The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Everglades sued the South Florida Water Management District under the Clean Water Act (CWA) in federal district court. The suit alleged that the water district violated the Clean Water Act by releasing pollutants from a pump system without a discharge elimination system permit. The Clean Water Act prohibits the "addition of any pollutant... from any point source" without a specific permit. The water district defended its action by claiming that it was not actually adding pollutants to the water, but merely transporting polluted water from one body of water to another, less polluted, body.

The district court ruled against the water district and found that it had violated the CWA by using the pump. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on this point, "conclud[ing] that the release of water caused by the... pump station's operation constitutes an addition of pollutants from a point source."

Train v. Campaign Clean Water

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Train v. City Of New York

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Train v. Colorado Pub. Int. Research Group

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Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council

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Tva v. Hill

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U.S. v. District Court For Eagle County

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U.S. v. District Court For Water Di v. No. 5

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Union Electric Co. v. Epa

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United States v. Bestfoods

The site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet-General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the U.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the U.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility." The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had "owned or operated" the facility.

United States v. Coleman

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United States v. Howard

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United States v. New Mexico

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United States v. Pennsylvania Chem. Corp.

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United States v. Republic Steel Corp.

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United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.

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United States v. Scrap

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United States v. Standard Oil Co.

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United States v. Union Pacific R. Co.

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Washington v. General Motors Corp.

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Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.

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Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo

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Whitman v. American Trucking Associations

Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which "air quality criteria" have been issued under section 108. In 1997, Christine Todd Whitman, the Administrator of the EPA, revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Afterwards, her revised NAAQS were challenged in court. The District of Columbia Circuit found that section 109(b)(1), which instructs the EPA to set standards, delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution because the court found that the EPA had interpreted the statute to provide no "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The courts also held to its rule that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. Additionally, the court rejected the EPA's position that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA, were so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard.