The Oyez Project: Economic Activity Issues - Natural Resources Decisions

Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Scrap

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Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States

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Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conserv. v. EPA

Under the Clean Air Act, does the Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to overrule a state agency's decision that a company is using the "best available controlling technology" to prevent pollution?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Clean Air Act authorized the EPA to bar the construction of the polluting facility in Alaska. Though Alaska determined the facility's use of "Low NOx" met the act's requirement that facilities use "best available control technology," the EPA was reasonable to reject this claim. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered a dissent joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.

Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell

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Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe

Does the reservation of coal under the land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 include the coal-bed methane gas found within the coal formation?

No. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that, "[t]he term 'coal' as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not encompass CBM gas;" therefore, CBM gas is not included in the reserved coal rights. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "[t]he common understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not have encompassed CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a solid mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as part of the coal itself." Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that Congress, at the time the Acts were passed, would have assumed that the coal owner had dominion over and responsibility for the CBM gas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.

Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co.

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Andrus v. Idaho

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Andrus v. Shell Oil Co.

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Andrus v. Sierra Club

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Andrus v. Utah

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Arizona v. California

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Arkansas v. Oklahoma

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Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.

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Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior v. Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon

Does the definition of "harm" as an expansion of the word "take" in the Endangered Species Act include habitat modification that kills or injures wildlife?

Yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that habitat modification is a legitimate application of the word "harm." First, the Court found that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in assuming that the words in the definition of "take" only apply to actions involving direct contact with endangered animals. Then, based on the Act itself, the Court determined that the ordinary meaning of harm would in fact include changes in habitat that hurt the endangered animals. Also, the Court held that the intent of the Act to give broad protection to endangered species must include even actions that may have minimal or unforeseeable effects.

Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Nrdc

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Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner

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Bedroc Limited v. United States

Does the reservation to the United States of all "coal and other valuable minerals" in patents issued under the Pittman Act (1919) include commercially valuable sand and gravel?

No. In an plurality opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and joined by three other Justices, the Court ruled that because sand and gravel were not commercially valuable in 1919 when the Pittman Act was passed, they were not "valuable minerals" covered under the Act. Although the Court had interpreted "minerals" expansively in the past, the Court held that the adjective "valuable" limited the term sufficiently to exclude sand and gravel. The Court emphasized that since the plain text of the statute was clear, there was no need to delve into the legislative history of the Act. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he agreed that sand and gravel were not "valuable minerals" under the Act, but disputed the plurality's reliance on the word "valuable." Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent argued that the legislative history of the Pittman Act indicated that "valuable minerals" should be interpreted broadly to include sand and gravel.

Boesche v. Udall

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Borden Ranch v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

Does deep plowing ranchland to plant deep-rooted crops constitute the "addition" of a "pollutant" from a "point source" so as to fall within the regulation of the Clean Water Act? Is deep plowing ranchland which is farmable in its natural state to plant deep-rooted crops statutorily exempt from regulation under the Act's exemption for any discharge from "normal farming...activities such as plowing?" Does the Act's civil penalty section authorize assessing the maximum daily penalty for each time a plow crosses a seasonal drainage feature, without regard to the number of days when such activity occurred?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals court by an equally divided vote. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Bryant v. Yellen

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California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co.

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California v. United States

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Cappaert v. United States

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Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Nrdc

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Chevron U.S. A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council

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Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe

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City Of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund

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City Of Fresno v. California

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Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.

Does the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) require that a party liable for pollution be sued under CERCLA before seeking clean up funds from other liable parties?

In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a private party, who, like Aviall, had not been sued under CERCLA could not obtain cleanup contributions from other liable parties. The Court reasoned that CERCLA's language made clear that parties could seek cleanup contribution only during or following a civil action.

Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation

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Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle

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Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen

Should the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, knowing that its passage of certain regulations would cause Congress and the President to lift a ban on Mexican motor carriers, have considered the environmental impact of the motor carriers when determining whether to perform an Environmental Impact Study of its regulations?

No. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FMCSA had no control of the trucks once the regulations were passed, and would therefore be unable to act on the findings of an EIS even if it did conduct one. Further, the Court found that the passage of the regulations was not sufficiently responsible for the increased pollution caused by the trucks to warrant an EIS.

Dugan v. Rank

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E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train

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Epa v. National Crushed Stone Assn.

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Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn.

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Gade, Director, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency v. National Solid Wastes Management Association

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General Motors Corp. v. United States

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Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation

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Hallstrom v. Tillamook County

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Harrison v. Ppg Industries, Inc.

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Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp.

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Hodel v. Indiana

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Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn.

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Illinois v. City Of Milwaukee

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Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc.

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Kake Village v. Egan

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Key Tronic Corp. v. United States

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Kleppe v. New Mexico

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Kleppe v. Sierra Club

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Lake Carriers' Assn. v. Macmullan

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Lowe v. SEC

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Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council

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Metropolitan Edison v. People Vs. Nuclear Energy

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Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers

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Milwaukee v. Illinois

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Nevada v. United States

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Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance

Does section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act authorize federal courts to review the management of public lands under statutory standards and the land use plans of the Bureau of Land Management?

Yes, but only to a limited extent. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the APA only allows courts to examine government agencies' failures to meet specific statutory requirements. A general complaint based on policy differences - like SUWA's view that the off-road vehicles made the Wilderness Study Areas unsuitable for preservation as wilderness - could not be heard under the APA. Justice Scalia wrote, "If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates ... it would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather than the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day agency management."

Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.

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Orff v. United States

Did the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 waive the United States' sovereign immunity from breach of contract suits?

In this case, no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the act merely permitted parties to join the United States in an action between other parties when the action required interpretation of a contract and joining the U.S. was necessary. The farmers suit was not an attempt to join the U.S. as a necessary party defendant.

Philadelphia v. New Jersey

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Public Lands Council v. Babbitt

Do the Secretary of the Interior's amendments governing grazing preferences, permit issuance, and ownership of range improvements to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 exceed the authority that this statute grants the Secretary and violate the Act?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "[t]he regulatory changes do not exceed the Secretary's Taylor Grazing Act authority." "Congress itself has directed development of land-use plans, and their use in the allocation process in order to preserve, improve and develop the public rangelands," wrote Justice Stephen G. Breyer. "And the secretary [of the Interior] has always had the statutory authority...to reclassify and withdraw range land from grazing use."

PUD No. 1 Of Jefferson County v. Washington Department Of Ecology

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Rapanos v. United States

Does the phrase "waters of the United States" in the Clean Water Act include a wetland that at least occasionally empties into a tributary of a traditionally navigable water?

Unanswered. The closely-divided Court split 4-1-4, with Justice Anthony Kennedy providing the crucial fifth vote to reject the Sixth Circuit's decision.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by three other Justices. The plurality rejected the argument that only actually-navigable waters can be regulated by the Clean Water Act, but also held that the word "navigable" in the Act cannot be divested of all meaning. The plurality held that the definitional term "waters of the United States" can only refer to "relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water," not "occasional," "intermittent," or "ephemeral" flows. Furthermore, A mere "hydrological connection" is not sufficient to qualify a wetland as covered by the CWA; it must have a "continuous surface connection" with a "water of the United States" that makes it "difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins."

Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, which disagreed with much of the plurality's reasoning. In Justice Kennedy's view, wetlands need not have a continuous surface connection to a continuously flowing body of water to be covered under the CWA, but mere adjacency to a tributary of a navigable water is not sufficient. Instead, Wetlands that are not adjacent to a traditionally navigable water must have a "significant nexus" with a one. This requirement is satisfied if the wetland has a significant effect on the water quality of navigable waters. Justice Kennedy suggested that Rapanos's wetlands may be covered under the CWA if more evidence of a significant nexus were presented.

Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent argued that the Corps's regulations should be upheld as a reasonable interpretation of the Act. The inclusion of all wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters was most consistent with the CWA's purpose of eliminating pollution in the nation's waters.

Though the Court failed to obtain a majority on most of the legal issues presented by the case, the plurality and Justice Kennedy agreed to send the case back to the Sixth Circuit for a new decision based on a different analysis.

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council

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Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service v. Seattle Audubon Society

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S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection

Do hydroelectric dams result in "discharge" under the meaning of Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the term "discharge" in section 401 had historically been given a broad meaning by FERC, the Environmental Protection Agency, and even the Supreme Court. Justice David Souter, in the Opinion of the Court, wrote that "[w]hen it applies to water, 'discharge' commonly means a 'flowing or issuing out.' ... In fact, this understanding of the word was accepted by all Members of the Court sitting in our only other case focused on Section 401 of the Clean Water Act." The discharge from hydroelectric dams fit this definition perfectly, and Section 401 therefore mandated state approval.

Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.

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Secretary Of Interior v. California

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Sierra Club v. Morton

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Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers

May the provisions of the Clean Water Act be extended to intrastate waters? Does Congress have the authority under the Commerce Clause to exercise such power?

No and unanswered. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the provision of the CWA, which requires those discharging fill material into navigable waters to obtain a permit from the Corps, does not extend to isolated, abandoned sand and gravel pits with seasonal ponds, which provide migratory bird habitats. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that "[t]he term 'navigable' has...the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made." In answering the first question no, the Court did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.

South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe

Does pumping water into a water conservation area - where the water being pumped contains a pollutant but the pumping station itself adds no pollutants to the water - violate the Clean Water Act's prohibition of adding pollutants from a point source?

In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court sent the case back to the district court to consider whether the water conservation area and the canal used to transport the water are distinct. If the district court decides the two are not distinct, then the water district will not need a permit under the Clean Water Act. The Court rejected the water district's argument that the act covers a point source only when pollutants originate from that source, not when pollutants originating elsewhere pass through the point source. A point source need only convey the pollutant to navigable waters. The Court was unanimous in sending the case back to district court. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented from part of the Court's reasoning.

Train v. Campaign Clean Water

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Train v. City Of New York

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Train v. Colorado Pub. Int. Research Group

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Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council

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Tva v. Hill

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U.S. v. District Court For Eagle County

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U.S. v. District Court For Water Di v. No. 5

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Union Electric Co. v. Epa

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United States v. Bestfoods

May a parent corporation that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a subsidiary, without more, be held liable under CERCLA Section 107(a)(2) as an operator of a polluting facility owned or operated by the subsidiary?

No, unless the corporate veil may be pierced. But a corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility.

United States v. Coleman

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United States v. Howard

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United States v. New Mexico

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United States v. Pennsylvania Chem. Corp.

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United States v. Republic Steel Corp.

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United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.

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United States v. Scrap

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United States v. Standard Oil Co.

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United States v. Union Pacific R. Co.

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Washington v. General Motors Corp.

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Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.

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Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo

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Whitman v. American Trucking Associations

Does section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency? May the Administrator of the EPA consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards under section 109(b)(1)? Does the Court of Appeals have the jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS?

No, no, and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the CAA properly delegated legislative power to the EPA, but that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting primary and secondary NAAQS. Moreover, the Court held that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA related to the implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS; however, the EPA's interpretation of Part D was unreasonable.