http://www.oyez.org/issues/economic-activity/miscellaneous/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Tue, 04 Mar 1986 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) was a customer of Philadelphia Gear Corporation (PG). To provide a guarantee of payment to PG, Orion obtained a letter of credit for the benefit of PG from Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Bank). If Orion failed to pay an invoice to PG for at least 15 days, PG could draw upon that line of credit, up to $145,200. This type of credit line, meant to guarantee payment to a seller, is referred to as a standby letter of credit. To back up that line of credit, Orion executed an unsecured promissory note in favor of the Bank. This note is referred to as a backup letter of credit. Nothing was due on the backup letter of credit unless PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit. Thus the backup letter was a contingent promissory note. The Bank did not credit any account of Orion's in exchange for the note, and did not treat its own assets as increased by its acceptance of the note. In 1982, the Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed its receiver. PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit for goods delivered before the Bank's insolvency, but the FDIC returned them unpaid. PG sued the FDIC, claiming that the standby letter of credit was an insured deposit under the definition of "deposit" set forth at 12 U.S.C. Section 1813(l)(1), and that PG was therefore entitled to $100,000 in deposit insurance.</p> <p>Is a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note insured as a "deposit" under the federal deposit insurance program?</p> 84-1972_19860304-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1972/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.</p> <p>Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause?</p> 93-1260_19941108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1260/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist