The Oyez Project: Economic Activity Issues - Liability, Governmental Decisions

Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States

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Anderson v. Creighton

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Berkovitz v. United States

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Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents

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Blatchford v. Native Village Of Noatak

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Block v. Neal

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Bogan and Roderick v. Scott-Harris

Are actions by local officials introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance outside the scope of legislative activities because of the motives of the government actors?

No. Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute immunity from civil liability under Section 1983 for their legislative activities as are federal, state and regional legislators. Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act itself, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The acts at issue here were clearly legislative, and the ordinance itself bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.

Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.

Are state tort laws, holding independent military contractors liable for injuries caused by their design flaws, valid?

No. In a 5-to4 decision, the Court held that despite the absence of specific legislation immunizing government contractors from liability for design flaws, questions of their liability are of unique federal concern. As such, to the extent that it holds military contractors liable for design flaws, state law may significantly conflict with federal interests thereby requiring its displacement. The Court added that in the instant case, such displacement is appropriate since the United States approved the helicopter's specifications, the equipment met those specifications, and Sikorsky warned the government of possible dangers in the helicopter's use. Finally, since the Court of Appeals' use of the "military contractor defense" failed to specify if a reasonable jury could have found for Boyle, the Court vacated its judgment and remanded.

Brosseau v. Haugen

Was a police officer who shot a fleeing suspect entitled to qualified immunity?

Yes. In an 8-1 per curiam decision, the Court held that Brosseau was entitled to qualified immunity because the Court's previous cases did not clearly establish that shooting the fleeing Hogan would have violated his constitutional rights.

Bush v. Lucas

Can a federal employee sue for damages for the violation of his First Amendment rights by his superior where Congress has provided a comprehensive remedial scheme, although one which does not fully compensate the employee for the harm suffered?

No; not under the CSC regulations. The federal judiciary, pursuant to its common law authority, has the power to recognize new causes of action in absence of, or to supplement, statutory remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated its relief is to be exclusive. In determining whether judicial relief should be granted, federal courts are (1) to pay particular attention to special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, and (2) to ascertain whether the purpose and comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme precludes judicial remedies where statutory relief is available. The administrative scheme in this case reflected Congress_ attempt to balance the competing interests of protecting the First Amendment rights of federal employees and maintaining a disciplined and effective workforce. Congress, not the judiciary, is in the best position to regulate the employee relations. Grant of supplementary judicial relief would disrupt this balance and is therefore inappropriate.

Butz v. Economou

Are federal administrators entitled to absolute or qualified immunity in the face of challenges to their conduct of public business?

In a 4-to-5 opinion, the Court began by noting that absent exceptional circumstances federal executive officials are only entitled to qualified immunity, since such officials must abide by constitutional and statutory scope-of-power limitations. Federal officials who perform adjudicatory, or other similar prosecutorial functions, cannot, however, be held liable for mere "good faith" judgment errors. The Court reasoned that the risk of making unconstitutional determinations is outweighed by the need to preserve independent judgement, through grants of absolute immunity to judges and other similarly situated decision makers. The Court concluded that the similarity between the type of decision-making required of federal prosecutors and other administrative agents is sufficiently strong to warrant an extension of absolute immunity to the latter for decisions made in the course of their official conduct.

Carlson, v. Green

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Central Green Co. v. United States

Do the words "floods or flood waters" encompass all the water that flows through federal facilities, such that the Federal Government has immunity under the Flood Control Act of 1928 for damages such water may cause?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that in determining whether, under the Flood Control Act of 1928, immunity attaches, courts should consider the character of the waters that caused the relevant damage and the purposes behind their release rather than the relation between that damage and a flood control project. Thus, the Federal Government's immunity from liability for flood damage required a determination of whether actual flows through the Federal Government's canal constituted flood waters, regardless of the canal's flood control purpose.

Chappell v. Wallace

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Christopher v. Harbury

Does the charge that an official deception denied a plaintiff access to the courts by leaving her without information or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit, state an actionable claim?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Harbury had not stated a claim for denial of judicial access. The Court reasoned that Harbury's complaint failed to identify the underlying cause of action for relief that she would have raised had it not been for the alleged deception. Moreover, the Court noted that Harbury's informal amendment accepted by the Court of Appeals failed to seek any relief presently available for denial of access to courts that would be unavailable otherwise. "It is true that [Harbury] cannot obtain in any present tort action the order she would have sought before her husband's death, the order that might have saved her husband's life. But neither can she obtain any such order on her access claim, which therefore cannot recompense Harbury for the unique loss she claims as a consequence of her inability to bring an intentional-infliction action earlier," wrote Justice Souter. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment.

Cleavinger v. Saxner

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Clinton v. Jones

Is a serving President, for separation of powers reasons, entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of events which transpired prior to his taking office?

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the Chief Executive.

Conn and Najera v. Gabbert

Does a prosecutor violate the opposing attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession when the prosecutor causes the attorney to be searched at the same time his client is testifying before a grand jury?

No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "[a] prosecutor does not violate an attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession by executing a search warrant while the attorney's client is testifying before a grand jury." Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[w]e hold that the 14th Amendment right to practice one's calling is not violated by the execution of a search warrant, whether calculated to annoy or even to prevent consultation with a grand jury witness." Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment.

Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler

Are local governments "persons" subject to qui tam actions under the False Claims Act?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the term "person" includes local governments. The Court noted that the County, as a recipient of federal funding, was clearly able to abuse federal spending and was thus subject to the FCA remedy that applied to prevent such abuse. Rejecting the Country's argument that is was not subject to punitive damages, the Court responded that the federal government amended the FCA to make it a more effective tool against fraud. "It is simply not plausible that Congress intended to repeal municipal liability sub silentio by the very Act it passed to strengthen the Government's hand in fighting false claims," wrote Justice Souter.

Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.

Can subcontractors on federal projects force the government to pay when prime contractors fail to do so?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that "unless waived by Congress, sovereign immunity bars subcontractors and other creditors from enforcing liens on government property or funds to recoup their losses." The APA prohibits people and companies with grievances from suing the government for monetary damages. Blue Fox's lien was ruled "merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money."

Doe v. Mcmillan

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Dolan v. United States Postal Service

Does the exception of "negligent transmission of letters or postal matter" from the general waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act cover the negligent placement of mail at its final destination, when that placement causes injury?

No. In a 7-1 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy (Justice Alito not participating), the Court ruled that the "negligent transmission" exception was inapplicable to Dolan's case, and therefore sovereign immunity had been waived and her case could proceed. The Court accepted Dolan's argument that the exception was only meant to encompass cases of late, missing, or incorrectly delivered mail. To rule otherwise, the Court found, would be to ignore the context of the exception and risk subverting the main purpose of the statute. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent arguing that cases arising out of ambiguity in sovereign immunity waivers should be resolved in the Government's favor.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Meyer

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Finley v. United States

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General Box Co. v. United States

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Groh v. Ramirez

If law enforcement officers use a search warrant that does not describe the items sought but is approved by a magistrate judge (and the items sought are described in the application for the warrant), does the search violate the Fourth's Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures? If such a search is unconstitutional, can law enforcement officers be sued for executing the warrants, despite the fact that no court had previously held such a search unconstitutional?

Yes and yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 5-4 opinion holding that the search was "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Groh's warrant was invalid because it did not meet the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant particularly describe the persons or things to be seized. True, the magistrate judge approved a complete warrant - but what matters is that the Ramirezes did not know what the search was after. Because the particularity requirement is stated in the Fourth Amendment's text, "no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that did not comply with that requirement was valid." Groh therefore did not have "qualified immunity" from suit.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald

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Hatahley v. United States

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Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States

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Hercules Inc. v. United States

May the chemical manufacturers of Agent Orange recover costs incurred from defending and settling third-party tort claims arising out of their performance of Government contracts from the Government on alternative theories of contractual indemnification or warranty of specifications provided by the Government?

No. In a 6-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the manufacturers may not recover on their warranty-of-specifications and contractual-indemnification claims. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that the manufactures could not recover from the government because the contracts did not contain warranties or indemnification provisions for costs in defending and settling third-party tort claims resulting from chemical manufacture and use. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the context in which the government compelled the manufacturer to manufacture Agent Orange did not give rise to an implied-in-fact indemnity agreement. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent that was joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Justice John Paul Stevens did not participate in the case.

Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation

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Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission

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Kosak v. United States

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Laird v. Nelms

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Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agcy.

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Lane v. Pena

Did Congress waive the federal government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages with respect to section 504(a) of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act?

No. Although the related provisions of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and the 1991 Civil Rights Act might in combination be read as waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity, absent an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity, the court cannot permit damages to be awarded.

Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States

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Logue v. United States

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Maryland v. United States

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Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. U.S.

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Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co.

Does the fact that a plaintiff's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence, together with the existence of a genuine dispute over liability, justify a District Court's departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases?

No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that neither a good-faith dispute over liability nor the existence of mutual fault justifies the denial of prejudgment interest in an admiralty collision case. In calculating the amount of the loss for which the relatively innocent party is responsible, the Court found that a denial of prejudgment interest on the basis of mutual fault would unfairly penalize a party twice for the same mistake. "The existence of a legitimate difference of opinion on the issue of liability is merely a characteristic of most ordinary lawsuits. It is not an extraordinary circumstance that can justify denying prejudgment interest," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision.

Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi

Is the property of a foreign state excepted from immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 if the state is "engaged in commercial activity in the United States?

No. In an anonymous, unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and ruled that the exception only applies to "agenc[ies] and instrumentalit[ies]" of foreign states, not to the states themselves. The Court faulted the Ninth Circuit for ignoring this "critical" distinction. Although the Court's ruling was confined to the narrow legal question presented, the Court also hinted strongly that the Ministry of Defense of Iran should be considered an integral part of the state of Iran, not an "agency or instrumentality" of the state. The Ninth Circuit's judgment was reversed and the case was sent back for further consideration consistent with the Court's opinion.

Mitchell v. Forsyth

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Molzof, Personal Representative Of The Estate Of Molzof v. United States

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Morales v. City Of Galveston

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Nevada v. Hall

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Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Was the President immune from prosecution in a civil suit?

Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." This sweeping immunity, argued Justice Powell, was a function of the "President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history."

Northern Insurance Company of New York v. Chatham County, GA

May a county claim sovereign immunity under common law, even if the county is not acting as an "arm of the state"?

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that Chatham County was not entitled to immunity from suit. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that since the county was not acting as an "arm of the state," it could not claim 11th Amendment immunity. The Court also refused to recognize a less expansive form of "residual" immunity for counties under common law.

Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond

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Parden v. Terminal R. Co.

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Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Comm'n.

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Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney

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Rayonier, Inc., v. United States

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Regents of the University of California v. Doe

Does the Eleventh Amendment shield state-run schools from being sued unwillingly in federal court even though any award of monetary damages would not come from the state?

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the California university could not be sued by Doe regardless of his claim that the job offer was illegally withdrawn and despite the fact the federal government would be responsible for the judgment. Stevens declared that the Eleventh Amendment shields the state from "the risk of adverse judgments even though the state may be indemnified by a third party."

Roper v. United States

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Sacramento v. Lewis

Are the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protection, or the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal seizure, violated by a police officer who, in the course of pursuing a subject, causes their death through deliberate or reckless indifference?

No. In a unanimous decision the Court first ruled that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standards prevented its illegal seizure protections from applying to high-speed police chases. Such incidents are merely pursuits and do not constitute actual seizures, especially if they fail due to the death of the subject. Moreover, addressing the Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Court held that Smith's actions, while perhaps unwise, were not intended to injure or kill those pursued. As such, the negligent infliction of harm during a police chase does not violate due process since it is not an unexpectedly shocking or egregious result under the circumstances.

Saucier v. Katz

Is the reasonableness inquiry into claims of qualified immunity by a police officer accused of using excessive force in an arrest the same as the reasonableness inquiry on the merits of the excessive-force claim?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "the ruling on qualified immunity requires an analysis not susceptible of fusion with the question whether unreasonable force was used in making the arrest." "The approach the Court of Appeals adopted -- to deny summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the excessive force claim -- could undermine the goal of qualified immunity to 'avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment,'" wrote Justice Kennedy. The majority then concluded that the military policeman was entitled to qualified immunity.

Saudi Arabia v. Nelson Et ux.

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Scheuer v. Rhodes

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Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services v. Whitecotton

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Sheridan v. United States

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Siegert v. Gilley

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Smith v. United States

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Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. U.S.

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Tenet v. Doe

Does Totten v. U.S. prevent a district court from considering Jane and John Does' due process and tort claims that the CIA refused to keep its alleged promise to provide them with life-time financial assistance in exchange for their alleged espionage services to the CIA?

Yes. In a 9-0 decision delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Totten barred the Does' suit. Totten, the Court ruled, prohibited judicial review in any case where success depended on the existence of a secret espionage relationship with the government. To risk revealing that relationship would endanger the essence of a spy's contract with the government - secrecy.

United States Department Of Energy v. Ohio

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United States v. Bergh

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United States v. Gaubert

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United States v. Hopkins

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United States v. Isthmian S. S. Co.

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United States v. James

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United States v. Johnson

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United States v. Kubrick

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United States v. Mason

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United States v. Mitchell

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United States v. Mitchell

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United States v. Morton

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United States v. Muniz

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United States v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co.

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United States v. Neustadt

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United States v. Orleans

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United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.

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United States v. Seckinger

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United States v. Shearer

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United States v. Smith

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United States v. Stanley

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United States v. Varig Airlines

Can the U.S. be held liable under the FTCA for the FAA's decision to use the "spot-check" program to monitor compliance with airworthiness certification standards?

No. Government liability under the FTCA is limited by the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides that the federal government may not be held liable for "[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function . . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused." The FAA's decision to institute the "spot-check" program to monitor compliance with its minimum safety standards was clearly discretionary and protected by Section 2680(a). It was a calculated decision which took into account the objectives of the certification process in light of practical considerations such as funding and staffing. Judicial intervention in such a decision would be precisely what the discretionary function exception was designed to prevent.

United States v. Winstar

Can the federal government be sued by thrifts that were sent into financial trouble when Congress changed the computation of required reserves after the Federal Home Loan Bank Board encouraged actions based on premise that the rules would not change?

Yes. In a 7-2 plurality opinion delivered Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the terms assigning the risk of regulatory change to the Government are enforceable and that the Government is therefore liable in damages for breach, although Congress changed the relevant law, and thereby barred the Government from specifically honoring its agreements. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer joined all of the plurality opinion, and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined in part. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the unmistakability doctrine was not intended to displace the rules of contract interpretation applicable to the government. In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the contracts at issue gave rise to an obligation on the part of the government to afford the three thrifts favorable accounting treatment and the contracts were broken by the government's discontinuation of that favorable treatment. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented in an opinion joined in part by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Velde v. National Black Police Assn.

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Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens

May a private individual bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States against a state or state agency under the False Claims Act?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, but that the False Claims Act does not subject a state or state agency to liability in such actions. The Court concluded that the False Claims Act does not include states as "persons" who can be sued under the law. Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter dissented.

Welch v. Texas Highways & Public Transp. Dept.

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West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, Commissioner Of Massachusetts Depart Ment Of Food And Agriculture

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West v. United States

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Westfall v. Erwin

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Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. U.S.

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Wiener v. United States

Did President Eisenhower have the authority to terminate Wiener's membership on the Commission?

In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to remove individuals from the War Claims Commission at will. The Court found that Congress had intended to create a body that was "'entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,' of either the Executive or the Congress." The "intrinsic judicial character" of the Commission's duties required that it be able to adjudicate claims solely on the merits of each claim free of external Executive pressure." Congress did not wish to have hand over the Commission the Damocles' sword of removal by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men of his own choosing."