The Oyez Project: Economic Activity Issues - Election of Remedies Decisions

Alaska Ind. Bd. v. Chugach Assn.

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Amell v. United States

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American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez

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Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.

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Archawski v. Hanioti

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Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Buell

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Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers

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Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department Of Labor

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Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

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British Transport Comm'n v. U.S.

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Burnett v. New York Central R. Co.

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Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.

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Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute

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Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Schwalb

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Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson

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Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.

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Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall

Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), does "emotional stress" resulting from employer "negligence" constitute an "injury" for which an employee can hold his employer liable?

No. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a 7-2 Court. The Court categorized FELA emotional stress claims closely with common law treatments of emotional stress claims. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's assertion that common law tests were arbitrary and could be disregarded. Instead, common law standards should be used to verify claims filed under FELA. The Court adopted the "zone of danger test" from common law, which limits relief to those employees who sustain physical injury resulting from emotional stress caused by employer negligence. The Court held that this test would best distinguish between genuine and fraudulent claims, and provide relief in the case of injury. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's holding that employers were liable for causing foreseeably stressful conditions, reasoning that this would extend to many types of everyday employment.

Crane v. Cedar Rapids & I. C. R. Co.

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Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co.

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Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud

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Director, Owcp v. Perini North River Assoc.

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Executive Jet Aviation v. City Of Cleveland

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Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson

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Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp.

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Goett, v. Union Carbide Corp.

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Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller

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Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co.

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Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis

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Hess v. United States

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Intercounty Construction Corp. v. Walter

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Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co.

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Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer

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Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale

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Kossick v. United Fruit Co.

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Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn

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Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.

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Mcallister v. Magnolia Petro. Co.

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Mcclanahan v. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc.

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Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley

May railroad workers invoke the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sue their employers for emotional distress due to asbestos, or some other disease-causing carcinogen, exposure if it has not made them ill?

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court ruled that railroad workers cannot invoke the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sue their employers for emotional distress due to asbestos, or some other disease-causing carcinogen, exposure unless, and until, they manifest symptoms of a disease. Furthermore, workers are not legally entitled to recover medical monitoring costs insofar as they are contingent upon an underlying injury.

Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo

Does the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act bar nominal compensation to a worker who is presently able to earn at least as much as before he was injured?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that nominal compensation is proper when there is a significant possibility that the worker's wage-earning capacity will fall below the level of his pre-injury wages sometime in the future. The Court reasoned that a worker is entitled to nominal compensation under the LHWCA when a work-related injury has not diminished the worker's present wage-earning capacity under current circumstances, but when there is a significant possibility that the injury will cause diminished capacity under future conditions. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.

Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo

Does the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act allow a party to seek modification of a disability award on the ground of change in conditions, when there has been no change in the employee's physical condition but rather an increase in the employee's wage-earning capacity due to the acquisition of new skills?

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a disability award may be modified under the LHWCA where there is a change in the employee's wage-earning capacity, even without any change in the employee's physical condition. The Court reasoned that, because an interpretation of the term "change in conditions" to include not only changes in physical condition but also changes in other conditions relevant to the initial entitlement to benefits, such as a change in wage-earning capacity is consistent with the purpose of the LHWCA. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the term refers to the physical condition of the person receiving compensation and should not be departed from absent any indication from Congress.

Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.

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Miree v. Dekalb County

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Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham

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Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan

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Moragne v. States Marine Lines

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Nacirema Co. v. Johnson

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Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines

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Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers

Can an employer be held liable for pain and suffering caused by a disease that has not yet been contracted? And are railroad companies liable for full damages under FELA even if the actions or negligence of other parties contributed to the damage inflicted?

Yes and yes. The court ruled that an employee who has developed asbestosis as a result of the actions or negligence of his employer has a reasonable fear of cancer and may collect damages for the emotional distress caused by this fear. Furthermore, under FELA the railroad is liable for damage caused "in whole or in part" by its negligence. It is the responsibility of the railroad to seek contribution from other parties involved in causing the damage.

Norfolk Shipbuilding v. Garris

Does a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence exist?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the general maritime cause of action for death caused by violation of maritime duties is available for the negligent breach of a maritime duty of care. "The general maritime law has recognized the tort of negligence for more than a century, and it has been clear since [Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc.] that breaches of a maritime duty are actionable when they cause death, as when they cause injury," wrote Justice Scalia for the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer.

Northbrook National Ins. Co. v. Brewer

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Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo

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Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire

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PacifiCare Health System v. Book

Can a group of physicians be compelled to arbitrate claims arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even though the parties' arbitration agreements may be construed to limit the arbitrator's authority to award damages?

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the proper course in this case was to compel arbitration. The Court reasoned that since it did not know how the arbitrator would construe the remedial limitations, given the Court's prior decisions, the questions whether they render the parties' agreement unenforceable was unusually abstract and thus it would be premature for the Court to address them. Justice Clarence Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris

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Patterson v. United States

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Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Day

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Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Owcp

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Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

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Richards v. United States

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Robertson v. Wegmann

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Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co.

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Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co.

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Romero v. International Term. Co.

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Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.

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Schilling v. Rogers

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Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet

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Sisson v. Ruby

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Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo

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Southwest Marine, Inc. v Gizoni

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Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company

Is a dredge a "vessel" under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Revised Statutes of 1873 specified that in any act passed after 1871, "vessel" included any watercraft capable of transportation. The requirement that a worker be on a vessel "in navigation," required by the LHWCA, simply meant that the vessel be capable of transportation. This included dredges which, both then and now, transported equipment and a crew over water.

Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania

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The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.

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The Monrosa v. Carbon Black, Inc.

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The Tungus v. Skovgaard

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Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.

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U.S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles

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Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price

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United States v. 93.970 Acres

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United States v. Demko

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United States v. Fausto

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United States v. Lorenzetti

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United States v. United Continental Tuna

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Vella v. Ford Motor Co.

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Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law

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Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer

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Walker v. Southern R. Co.

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Wyandotte Co. v. United States

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Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun

Do state remedies apply in maritime wrongful-death cases in which no federal statute specifies the appropriate relief and the decedent was not a seaman, longshore worker, or person otherwise engaged in a maritime trade?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that state remedies remain applicable in such cases and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375. The Court rejected Yamaha's argument that Moragne's wrongful-death action covers the waters, creating a uniform federal maritime remedy for all deaths occurring in state territorial waters, which replaces all state remedies previously available to supplement general maritime law.

Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.

May a plaintiff, in a suit brought under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention governing international air transportation, recover damages for loss of society resulting from the death of a relative in a plane crash on the high seas?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the relatives could not recover loss-of-society damages under the Warsaw Convention because Article 17 left it to the adjudicating court to specify what harm was cognizable as determined by domestic law, which is supplied by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). Justice Scalia then reasoned that, because DOHSA permits only pecuniary damages, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover loss-of-society damages. The Court, therefore, did not reach the question whether, under general maritime law, dependency is a prerequisite for loss-of-society damages. Thus, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgement insofar as it permitted Zicherman to recover loss-of-society damages if she could establish her dependency on the decedent and affirmed its decision with regards to vacating the award of loss-of-society damages to Mahalek is affirmed.