The Oyez Project: Economic Activity Issues - Copyright Decisions

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music

May 2 Live Crew's commercial parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman" be a fair use within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a parody's commercial character is only one element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry and that insufficient consideration was given to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of copying. The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the presumption that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair, as no such evidentiary presumption was available to address either the character and purpose of the use or the market harm. Justice Souter wrote that the appellate court "erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had necessarily copied excessively from the Orbison original, considering the parodic purpose of the use." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc.

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Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid

Is the making of a sculpture for an organization, by someone who contracts with the organization but is not its employee, a "work made for hire" as defined by the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. Section 101?

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the statue's preparation was not a "work for hire" as defined by the Act because Reid was not a CCNV employee. Instead, CCNV hired Reid as an independent contractor. Reid's independent status was evident because he supplied his own tools, worked in his own studio in another city, was retained for less than two months, decided his own work schedule, received salary that was contingent on the sculpture's completion, and had sole discretion over hiring and paying assistants. Moreover, CCNV did not pay social security taxes for Reid nor did it provide him any employee benefits.

De Sylva v. Ballentine

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Eldred v. Ashcroft

Does the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act's extension of existing copyrights exceed Congress's power under the Copyright Clause? Does the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights violate the First Amendment?

No and no. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations in placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA. Disagreeing with the argument that a copyright once set is fixed, the majority found that the CTEA "continues the unbroken congressional practice of treating future and existing copyrights in parity for term extension purposes," and is a permissible exercise of Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. Moreover, the Court held that the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights does not violate the First Amendment. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the CTEA amounted to a grant of perpetual copyright that undermined public interests.

Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.

Does the copyright in a telephone company's directory protect the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by another telephone directory company?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural's combined white and yellow pages directory. The Court reasoned that Rural's white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection because the information they contained lacked the requisite originality, as Rural had not selected, coordinated, or arranged the uncopyrightable facts in any original way. "Because Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute infringement," wrote Justice O'Connor.

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.

Does section 504(c) of the Copyright Act or the Seventh Amendment grant a right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, despite section 504(c) of the Copyright Act's silence, the Seventh Amendment provides the right to a jury trial, which includes a right to a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages. Applying a historical Seventh Amendment analysis, Justice Thomas concluded that "there is clear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff." "As a result, if a party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of statutory damages under [section 504(c)] in order 'to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury,'" wrote Justice Thomas.

Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists

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Goldstein v. California

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Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises

Did the Copyright Revision Act of 1976's fair use doctrine sanction The Nation's unauthorized use of quotations from former President Gerald Ford's unpublished manuscript?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that The Nation's use of verbatim excerpts from the unpublished manuscript was not a fair use. The Court reasoned that the unpublished nature of a work is a key, though not necessarily determinative, factor tending to negate a defense of fair use. "Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use," wrote Justice O'Connor. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the four statutory factors relevant to determining whether the use was fair were not satisfied. In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., argued that the Court was advancing the protection of the copyright owner's economic interest "through an exceedingly narrow definition of the scope of fair use."

MGM Studios v. Grokster

Were companies that distributed file-sharing software, and encouraged and profited from direct copyright infringement using such software, liable for the infringement?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that companies that distributed software, and promoted that software to infringe copyrights, were liable for the resulting acts of infringement. The Court argued that although the Copyright Act did not expressly make anyone liable for another's infringement, secondary liability doctrines applied here. The software in this case was used so widely to infringe copyrights that it would have been immensely difficult to deal with each individual infringer. The "only practical alternative" was to go against the software distributor for secondary liability. Here the software companies were liable for encouraging and profiting from direct infringement.

Miller Music Corp. v. Daniels, Inc.

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Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder

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New York Times v. Tasini

Do print and electronic publishers violate the copyrights of freelance authors when they include the freelancers' already-published articles in computer databases without the author's permission?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that section 201(c) does not authorize the copying at issue. "The publishers are not sheltered by [section 201(c)], we conclude, because the databases reproduce and distribute articles standing alone and not in context, not 'as part of that particular collective work' to which the author contributed, 'as part of...any revision' thereof, or 'as part of...any later collective work in the same series.' Both the print publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule, have infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, argued that "[e]ach individual file still reminds the reader that he is viewing 'part of' a particular collective work. And the entire editorial content of that work still exists at the reader's fingertips."

Public Affairs Press v. Rickover

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Quality King Distrib. v. L'anza Research Int.

Is section 602(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which gives the copyright owner the right to prohibit the unauthorized importation of copies, limited by the "first sale" doctrine?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the "first sale" doctrine endorsed in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 is applicable to imported copies. Accordingly, Quality King's unauthorized importation and resale of copyrighted labels from L'anza's foreign distributor was not prohibited by the Act because L'anza's distribution right did not encompass Quality King's reselling, as lawful owners, under first sale doctrine. "The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion.

Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios

Does Sony's sale of "Betamax" video tape recorders to the general public constitute contributory infringement of copyrighted public broadcasts under the Copyright Act?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that "[t]he sale of the VTR's to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of [Universal's] copyrights." The Court concluded that there was a significant likelihood that a substantial number of copyright holders who license their works for free public broadcasts would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers and that Universal failed to show that time-shifting would cause non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that "[t]he sale of copying equipment...does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses." For the dissenting minority, Justice Blackmun expressed the views that taping a copyrighted television program is infringement and that the recorder manufacturers were guilty of inducing and materially contributing to the infringement.

Stewart v. Abend

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Teleprompter Corp. v. Cbs

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TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc.

Is Marketing Displays, Inc.'s trade dress infringement claim precluded because its dual-spring design is a functional feature for which there is no trade dress protection?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because MDI's dual-spring design is a functional feature for which there is no trade dress protection, MDI's claim is barred. "A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional, " wrote Justice Kennedy. Focusing on the dual-spring design, Justice Kennedy continued that "[w]here the expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device." "MDI did not, and cannot, carry the burden," concluded the Court.

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken

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