The Oyez Project: Economic Activity Issues - Antitrust

324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy

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Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists

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Albrecht v. Herald Co.

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Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.

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American Medical Assn. v. Ftc

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American Soc. Of M. E.'s v. Hydrolevel Corp.

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Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society

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Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.

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Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters

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Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.

Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) is an integrated oil company that sells gasoline to consumers through its own retail stations as well as independent ARCO-brand stations. USA Petroleum (USA), a competitor of ARCO, is an independent retail marketer that purchases gasoline from major petroleum companies and resells it under its own brand name. USA sued ARCO under the Clayton Act in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that ARCO had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with the independent ARCO-brand stations to sell gasoline at below-market prices (the Clayton Act allows private parties to bring suit when they have been harmed by anticompetitive practices that violate the Sherman Act).

The District Court ruled for ARCO, finding that even if USA could prove the conspiracy, it would not be an "antitrust injury" to USA under the Clayton Act unless it could also prove that the pricing was predatory (that is, that it was intended to drive USA and other competitors out of business). It would be impossible to prove this, the District Court concluded, because ARCO was not dominant enough in the market to exert that sort of power.

A divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that it was not necessary to show predatory intent to prove an "antitrust inquiry." All that was necessary was a showing that the party bringing the suit had been harmed by price fixing carried out by the party being sued.

Bankamerica Corp. v. United States

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Black v. Magnolia Liquor Co.

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Blue Shield Of Virginia v. Mccready

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Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Cbs

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Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.

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Brown v. Pro Football Inc.

After their collective-bargaining agreement expired, the National Football League (NFL) -- a group of football clubs -- and the NFL Players Association -- a labor union -- began to negotiate a new contract. The NFL presented a plan that would permit each club to establish a "developmental squad" of substitute players, each of whom would be paid the same $1,000 weekly salary. The union disagreed. When the negotiations reached an impasse, the NFL unilaterally implemented the plan. A number of squad players brought an antitrust suit, claiming that the employers' plan unfairly restrained trade. The District Court awarded damages to the players, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision.

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.

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Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics

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California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission

The California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit association of local dental societies, provides its members with insurance and financing arrangements, and engages in lobbying, litigation, marketing, and public relations for members' benefit. Members agree to abide by the CDA's Code of Ethics, which prohibits false or misleading advertising. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought a complaint against the CDA, alleging that the CDA's guidelines restricted two types of truthful, non-deceptive advertising: price advertising and advertising relating to the quality of dental services and therefore had violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the FTC had jurisdiction over the CDA and found a violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC adopted most of the ALJ's factual findings and held that the price advertising, as well as the non-price, restrictions were violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts under an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis. In affirming, the Court of Appeals sustain the FTC's jurisdiction and concluded that an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was proper in this case.

California Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum

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California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited

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Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.

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Carnation Co. v. Pacific Conference

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Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers

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Citizen Publishing Co. v. U.S.

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Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.

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Community Communications Co., v. Boulder

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Continental Co. v. Union Carbide

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Continental T. V., Inc. v. Gte Sylvania Inc.

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Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.

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Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. U.S.

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Denver Stock Yard v. Livestock Assn.

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Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors

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Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.

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F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.

Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), the Sherman Act (which regulates monopolies and attempts to unfairly raise prices) does not apply to foreign commerce unless that commerce significantly harms domestic commerce, American imports, or American exporters. In this case, several companies that purchase and resell vitamins sued several vitamin manufacturers for illegal attempts to raise prices, both within the United States and in foreign countries. The manufacturers asked the district judge to dismiss several of the vitamin purchasers from the case because they only did business in other countries and, the manufacturers argued, could therefore not bring claims under the Sherman Act. The purchasers countered that the foreign price-fixing attempts were linked to the domestic attempts and could therefore be heard under the exception to the FTAIA. The district court sided with the manufacturers. On appeal, a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the price fixing schemes were independent of each other but that Congress' intent had been to prevent price-fixing both at home and abroad, and that even the foreign claims could therefore be brought under the exception to the FTAIA.

F. T. C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

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F. T. C. v. Mandel Brothers

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F. T. C. v. National Lead Co.

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F. T. C. v. Simplicity Pattern Co.

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F. T. C. v. Standard Oil Co.

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Fall City Industries v. Vanco Beverage

From 1972 through 1978, Falls City Industries, Inc. sold beer to Vanco Beverage, Inc., the sole wholesale distributor for Falls City in Indiana at a higher price than Falls City charged its only wholesale distributor in Kentucky. Under Indiana law, brewers were required to sell to all Indiana wholesalers at a single price, Indiana wholesalers were prohibited from selling to out-of-state retailers, and Indiana retailers were not permitted to purchase beer from out-of-state wholesalers. Vanco filed suit, alleging that Falls City's price discrimination violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. The Federal Court found that Vanco had established a prima facie case of price discrimination. The court rejected Falls City's "meeting-competition" defense under section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, which provides that a defendant may rebut a prima facie showing of illegal price discrimination by establishing that its lower price to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Federal Trade Comm'n v. Broch & Co.

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Federal Trade Comm'n v. Broch & Co.

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Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sun Oil Co.

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Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.

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First Nat. Bank v. Cities Service

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Fisher v. Berkeley

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Flood v. Kuhn

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Fortner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel

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Ftc v. Borden Co.

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Ftc v. Brown Shoe Co.

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Ftc v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.

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Ftc v. Consolidated Foods

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Ftc v. Fred Meyer, Inc.

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Ftc v. Indiana Federation Of Dentists

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Ftc v. Jantzen, Inc.

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Ftc v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.

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Ftc v. Texaco

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Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar

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Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange

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Great A & P Tea Co. v. Ftc

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Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc.

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Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.

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Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.

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Hallie v. Eau Claire

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Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach.

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Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California

Nineteen States and many private plaintiffs filed complaints alleging that the defendants -- domestic primary insurers, trade associations, and a reinsurance broker, along with London-based as well as domestic reinsurers -- violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, by engaging in various conspiracies aimed at forcing certain other primary insurers to change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability insurance policies. After the actions were consolidated for litigation, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the conduct alleged fell within the grant of antitrust immunity contained in Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1012(b), and that none of the conduct amounted to a "boycott" within the meaning of the Section 3(b), 15 U.S.C. Section 1013(b), exemption to that grant of immunity. The court of appeals reversed.

Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.

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Hoover v. Ronwin

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Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees

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Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines

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Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois

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Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink

Independent Ink manufactured printing ink that was compatible with the printheads manufactured by (and patented by) Trident, a company owned by Illinois Tool Works. Trident, however, required that anyone who used their printheads also use their ink, which was not patented. Independent Ink brought suit in federal district court under the Sherman Act, which forbids companies from tying a license to use one product (in this case Trident's printheads) to a customer's agreement to use another product (Trident's ink). The district court ruled in favor of Trident, finding that Independent Ink had failed to show that Trident's control of the printhead allowed them to raise prices above the competitive market rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, however, finding that when the product for which a license is granted is under patent, the ability to raise prices of that product above market rates must be assumed, and the burden is on the defendant to show that such power did not exist.

J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.

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Jefferson County Pharm. Assn. v. Abbott Labs.

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Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde

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Kansas v. Utilicorp United Inc.

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Kelly v. Kosuga

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Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores

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Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.

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Leh v. General Petroleum Corp.

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Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc. v. United States

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Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio

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Mclain v. Real Estate Bd. Of New Orleans

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Melrose Distillers v. United States

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Michigan Citizens for Independent Press v. Thornburgh

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Minnesota Mining v. N. J. Wood Co.

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Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.

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Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co.

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National Broiler Marketing Assn. v. U.S.

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National Gerimedical Hospital v. Blue Cross

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National Soc. Of Professional Engineers v. U.S.

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Ncaa v. Board Of Regents Of Uni v. Of Okla.

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Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States

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Northwest Stationers v. Pacific Stationery

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Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc.

Discon Incorporated sold services to remove obsolete telephone equipment to Material Enterprises Company, a subsidiary of NYNEX Corporation. When Material Enterprises started to buy removal services from AT&T Technologies instead, Discon filed suit alleging NYNEX had engaged in unfair and anticompetitive practices. Discon claimed that Material Enterprises paid AT&T more than Discon would have received. Material Enterprises passed on the extra cost to the customers of NYNEX. Material Enterprises then received a rebate from AT&T and shared it with NYNEX. Discon alleged these practices were intended to them and to benefit their competitor, AT&T, because Discon refused to participate in the scheme. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but held Discon's claims were founded under the Sherman Act. Discon had a valid claim in antitrust rules that prohibit group boycotts because the practices were anticompetitive. Moreover, the complaint stated a valid conspiracy to monopolize. NYNEX argued that this case did not constitute a group boycott and therefore it could not proceed.

Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States

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Patrick v. Burget

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Perkins v. Standard Oil Co.

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Perma Mufflers v. Int'l Parts Corp.

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Pfizer Inc. v. India

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Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting

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Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.

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Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Co.

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Radovich v. Nat. Football League

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Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.

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Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange

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Safeway Stores, Inc., v. Vance

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Silver v. New York Stock Exchange

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Simpson v. Union Oil Co.

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Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. U.S.

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Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. Mcquillan Et Vir, Dba Sorboturf Enterprises

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Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bur.

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St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry

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State Oil Co. v. Khan

Barkat U. Khan and his corporation contracted with State Oil to lease and run a gas station. Under the agreement, State Oil set a maximum profit margin for gasoline and required Khan to return any excess profits to State Oil. Khan fell behind in lease payments and was evicted. Khan then sued State Oil claiming that State Oil had engaged in price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which disallows restrictions on trade. State Oil claimed that in setting profit margins, they had not prevented Kahn from setting prices and therefore were not guilty of price fixing.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of Kahn based on the logic of Albrecht v. Herald Co. in which the Supreme Court ruled that some restrictions on trade, such as price-fixing, always have such negative effects coupled with such little competitive benefit that these restrictions are always unlawful.

Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas

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Sunkist v. Winckler & Smith Co.

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Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Co.

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Texaco Inc. v. Dagher

In 1998, Texaco and Shell Oil agreed to stop competing for the U.S. oil market. The two companies formed a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, which would manage the refining and marketing of gasoline in the western United States. The joint venture was charged with setting prices for Texaco and Shell gasoline, which would be sold under the original brand names. When Equilon set the same price for both brands, Dagher and other service station owners sued under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that Equilon was engaging in illegal price-fixing. The dispute turned on whether Equilon's actions fell under the Sherman Act's per se rule against price-fixing, under which all such instances of price-fixing by joint ventures would be illegal without regard to the specific harm caused in any particular case. The District Court granted summary judgment for Texaco, holding that the per se rule did not apply to the price-setting engaged in by Equilon. The District Judge reasoned that all enterprises, including joint ventures, must eventually set prices for their products. Therefore Equilon was merely engaged in a normal business practice, not the type of unreasonable, anticompetitive price-fixing that would run afoul of the Supreme Court's non-literal interpretation of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Equilon's actions constituted price-fixing under the Sherman Act's per se rule and therefore could not be legal.

Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck

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Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.

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Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount

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U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat. Gypsum Co.

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U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises

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U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.

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U.S. v. National Assn. Securities Dealers

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U.S. v. Phosphate Export Assn.

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Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno

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United States v. Atlantic Rfg. Co.

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United States v. Borden Co.

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United States v. Boston & M. R. Co.

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United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc.

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United States v. Container Corp.

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United States v. Du Pont & Co.

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United States v. du Pont & Co.

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United States v. General Motors

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United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.

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United States v. Grinnell Corp.

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United States v. Loew's Inc.

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United States v. Mckesson & Robbins

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United States v. National Dairy Corp.

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United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.

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United States v. R. C. A.

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United States v. Sealy, Inc.

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United States v. Singer Mfg. Co.

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United States v. Topco Associates

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United States v. United Shoe Corp.

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United States v. United States Gypsum Co.

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United States v. Ward Baking Co.

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United States v. Wise

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USPS v. Flamingo Industries

When the U.S. Postal Service ended its mail-sack contract with Flamingo Industries, Flamingo sued in U.S. district court. Flamingo claimed the Postal Service declared a "fake emergency in the supply of mail sacks" so it could give no-bid contracts to cheaper foreign manufacturers without allowing U.S. companies to compete for them. Flamingo claimed this violated federal antitrust laws (among other charges). The district court dismissed the antitrust claim reasoning that the federal government is protected by sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the antitrust immunity count. It ruled that the 1970 Postal Reorganization Act waived the Postal Service's sovereign immunity and that it could be sued under federal antitrust laws as a "person."

Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking

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Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.

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Verizon v. Trinko, LLP

Curtis Trinko was an AT&T customer but received service on lines owned by Verizon, which AT&T was permitted to use for a fee under the anti-monopoly 1996 Telecommunications Act. Trinko claimed that Verizon discriminated against AT&T customers by providing them worse service than it provided to its own customers. He claimed that this violated both the Telecommunications Act and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, which prohibits monopolies from aggressively defending their monopoly position in the market. A federal district court ruled that Trinko had no grounds to sue because he was not a direct customer of Verizon. A 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, reinstated the charges leveled under the Sherman Act.

Viking Theatre v. Paramount Film

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Volvo Trucks North America v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.

Reeder, a Volvo truck dealership, sued Volvo for violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits forms of discriminatory pricing that reduce competition. When retail customers take bids from dealers such as Reeder, the dealers ask manufacturers for price concessions, which dealers factor into their bids. Reeder accused Volvo of offering better price concessions to other Volvo dealers bidding for different customers. Reeder cited four instances in which it had received a comparatively low concession from Volvo, but it claimed that its losses due to discriminatory pricing went beyond those four instances. District Court allowed the case to go to a jury, and the jury awarded damages to Reeder. On appeal, Volvo argued that no competition was present, as would be required by the RPA, because Reeder was not actually bidding against the other Volvo dealers that allegedly got favorable concessions. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the Volvo dealers - though they did not bid against each other - "competed at the same functional level." Volvo's price discrimination would therefore fall under the RPA.

Walker, Inc. v. Food Machinery

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White Motor Co. v. United States

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Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research

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