The Oyez Project: Due Process Issues - Hearing or Notice Decisions

Armstrong v. Manzo

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Barry v. Barchi

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Bell v. Burson

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Board Of Curators, Univ. Of Mo. v. Horowitz

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Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.

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City of West Covina v. Perkins

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require officers who seize someone's property lawfully to provide the owner with state procedures for the property's return?

No. In a decision authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause does not require police officers to provide property owners with information on how to recover their property in a lawful seizure. The Due Process clause only requires that officers inform property owners that something they own has been seized. Justice Kennedy said the property owner could turn to public sources to learn about the procedures available.

Commissioner v. Shapiro

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Covey v. Town Of Somers

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Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n

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Dixon v. Love

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Dusenbery v. United States

Does the FBI's notice of intended forfeiture by sending certified letters to inmates while incarcerated satisfy due process?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the FBI's notice of the cash forfeiture satisfied due process. The Court reasoned that the means employed to provide notice to the prisoner were reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the prisoner of the forfeiture. The prisoner did not actually have to receive the notice, noted Chief Justice Rehnquist. "The Government could, for example, have allowed [Dusenbery] to make an escorted visit to the post office himself in order to sign for his letter. But the Due Process Clause does not require such heroic efforts by the Government; it requires only that the Government's effort be 'reasonably calculated' to apprise a party of the pendency of the action." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the Court was condoning a procedure that was too lax to reliably insure that a prisoner would receive a legal notice.

Fdic v. Mallen

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Goss v. Lopez

Did the imposition of the suspensions without preliminary hearings violate the students' Due Process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that because Ohio had chosen to extend the right to an education to its citizens, it could not withdraw that right "on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct ha[d] occurred." The Court held that Ohio was constrained to recognize students' entitlements to education as property interests protected by the Due Process Clause that could not be taken away without minimum procedures required by the Clause. The Court found that students facing suspension should at a minimum be given notice and afforded some kind of hearing.

Greene v. Lindsey

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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an Executive Branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"?

Yes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Souter and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately.

In Re Green

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Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.

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Jones v. Flowers

When mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require the government to make any additional effort to locate the owner before taking the property?

Yes. In a 5-3 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court overruled the Arkansas Supreme Court, ruling that "additional reasonable steps" are required after a mailed notice is returned undelivered. The Court noted that the Due Process Clause does not require that every property owner receive actual notice, but the government must make a sincere effort. In this case, the government knew that its first effort to notify Jones had failed. Therefore, the Court ruled that the government should have taken additional steps, such as remailing the notice or posting a notice on the house's door. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Alito took no part in the decision.

Laing v. United States

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Lambert v. California

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Leis v. Flynt

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Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.

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Lujan v. G&G Fire Sprinklers

Must states provide contractors and subcontractors a hearing to challenge a decision to withhold wage payments from contractors and subcontractors who fail to pay prevailing wages to satisfy due process?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because California state law affords G & G sufficient opportunity to pursue its claim for payment under its contracts in state court, the statutory scheme does not deprive it of due process. A contractor's claim for payment is "an interest...that can be fully protected by an ordinary breach-of-contract suit," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. The Chief Justice continued that "if California makes ordinary judicial process available to [G & G] for resolving its contractual dispute, that process is due process."

Mackey v. Montrym

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Mennonite Board Of Missions v. Adams

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Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.

May a party, who has been made a party to a civil action, be simultaneously made personally liable?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the District Court erred in amending the judgment immediately upon permitting the amendment of the pleading. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[d]ue process, as reflected in Rule 15 as well as Rule 12, required that Nelson be given an opportunity to respond and contest his personal liability for the award after he was made a party and before the entry of judgment against him." Thus, the District Court's granting of Adams' motion to simultaneously make Nelson a party and personally liable violated due process.

New Motor Vehicle Bd. Of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.

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O'bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center

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Oyler v. Boles

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Pate v. Robinson

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Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc.

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Regents Of University Of Michigan v. Ewing

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Richards v. Jefferson County

May the Alabama residents, who claim that the Jefferson County occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions, proceed with their class action suit in court in light of a prior, similar adjudication?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that because Richards and others received neither notice of, nor sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that adjudication, as a matter of federal due process, may not bind them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of their property.

Rogers v. Tennessee

Did the Supreme Court of Tennessee deny a defendant due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when it retroactively applied a decision to abolish the state's common law "year-and-a-day rule?"

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive application to a defendant of its decision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule did not deny Rogers due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The Tennessee court's abolition of the year and a day rule was not unexpected and indefensible," wrote Justice O'Connor. "Far from a marked and unpredictable departure from prior precedent, the court's decision was a routine exercise of common law decisionmaking in which the court brought the law into conformity with reason and common sense," continued O'Connor. Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia and Stephen G. Breyer wrote separate dissents. Justices Clarence Thomas, Stevens and Breyer joined Justice Scalia's dissent.

Schroeder v. City Of New York

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Smith v. Organization Of Foster Families

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Thorpe v. Housing Authority

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Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope

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United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property

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Walker v. Hutchinson City

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Willner v. Committee On Character

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Wisconsin v. Constantineau

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