The Oyez Project: Criminal Procedure Issues - Search and Seizure Decisions

Abel v. United States

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Adams v. Williams

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Aguilar v. Texas

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Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa

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Alabama v. White

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Alderman v. United States

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Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

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Arizona v. Evans

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Arizona v. Hicks

Was the search of the stereo equipment (a search beyond the exigencies of the original entry) reasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?

No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution.

Arkansas v. Sanders

Did the warrantless search of the suitcase by the police violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments which prohibit unreasonable searches?

Yes. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile. In this case, Justice Powell applied the principle which the Court had identified in United States v. Chadwick (1977), namely, that a locked footlocker which had been loaded into a vehicle could not be opened without a warrant. Since the Little Rock police officers had exclusive control of the luggage at the time of their search, there was no danger that its contents could have been tampered with or removed before a valid warrant could have been obtained. Powell concluded that since "luggage is a common repository of one's personal effects" it is "associated with the expectation of privacy."

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender," wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment's express command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness."

Beck v. Ohio

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Bell v. Wolfish

Do certain conditions of confinement violate the individual liberty, due process, and privacy of pretrial detainees as protected by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments through the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Court found that that the conditions of confinement did not infringe upon a pretrial detainee's rights. Justice Rehnquist's opinion argued that the issue of prison management is ripe with "judgment calls" which rest outside the jurisdiction of the judiciary. As long as administrative practices are implemented in the genuine interest of "safeguarding institutional security" then they do not warrant judicial scrutiny and are consistent with the Constitution.

Benanti v. United States

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Berger v. New York

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Bond v. United States

Does a law enforcement officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on luggage violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "Agent Cantu's physical manipulation of petitioner's carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches." The Court concluded that Bond "possessed a privacy interest in his bag," and that such an expectation of privacy is reasonable. "Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, a bus passenger "does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner." Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, seeing no "reasonable expectation" that strangers would not manipulate luggage in a bus.

Breithaupt v. Abram

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Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart

What objectively reasonable level of concern is necessary to trigger the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement?

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that police may enter a building without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant is "seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Quoting from Mincey v. Arizona, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that "[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."

Brower v. Inyo County

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Brown v. Texas

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Brown v. United States

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Cady v. Dombrowski

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California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz

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California v. Acevedo

Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence?

Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.

California v. Carney

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California v. Ciraolo

Did the warrantless, aerial observation of Ciraolo's back yard from an altitude of 1,000 feet constitute an illegal search and violate the Fourth Amendment?

The divided Court found that the observation did not violate the Constitution. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protections regarding the home had never been absolute: for example, police officers are not obligated to shield their eyes when passing homes on public streets or sidewalks. Since the observations of the Santa Clara officers was "nonintrusive" and "took place within public navigable airspace," their actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. "Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed," concluded Burger. The dissenters, led by Justice Powell, argued that this decision was a significant departure from the Court's holding in Katz v. United States (1967) which established a two-part test to evaluate privacy claims.

California v. Greenwood

Did the warrantless search and seizure of Greenwood's garbage violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantee?

Voting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of the public."

California v. Hodari D.

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California v. Rooney

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Camara v. Municipal Court

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Cardwell v. Lewis

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Chambers v. Maroney

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Chapman v. United States

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Chimel v. California

Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment as "incident to that arrest?"

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse.

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond

Are highway checkpoint programs, whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the checkpoint program's primary purpose was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. "We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime," wrote Justice O'Connor. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the reasonableness of the city's roadblocks depended on whether they served a "significant state interest with minimal intrusion on motorists."

Clinton v. Virginia

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Colonnade Corp. v. United States

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Colorado v. Bertine

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Combs v. United States

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Coolidge v. New Hampshire

Did the searches of Coolidge's home and automobile violate the Fourth Amendment?

In a decision in which a number of justices chose to concur in part and dissent in part, the Court held that the searches and seizures of Coolidge's property were unconstitutional. Justice Stewart's opinion held that the warrant authorizing the seizure of Coolidge's automobile was invalid because it was not issued by a "neutral and detatched magistrate." Stewart also rejected New Hampshire's arguments in favor of making an exception to the warrant requirement. Stewart held that neither the "incident to arrest" doctrine nor the "plain view" doctrine justified the search, and that an "automobile exception" was inapplicable.

Cooper v. California

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Cupp v. Murphy

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Dalia v. United States

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Davis v. Mississippi

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Delaware v. Prouse

Did the officer's search of Prouse's automobile constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment?

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the privacy interests of travelers outweighed the state interests in discretionary spot checks of automobiles. The Court found that random checks made only marginal contributions to roadway safety and compliance with registration requirements; less intrusive means could have been used to serve the same ends. Officers must be held to a "probable cause" standard for searches, otherwise individuals would be subject to "unfettered governmental intrusion" each time they entered an automobile.

Devenpeck v. Alford

(1) Does an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to make an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense articulated by the officer at the time of the arrest? (2) For the purposes of qualified immunity, was "closely related offense doctrine" clearly established given that different circuit courts disagreed on its application?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that police had probable cause to arrest Alford for impersonating a police officer, despite the fact that this was not closely related to the offense police identified during the arrest. A warrantless arrest by a police officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. The offense establishing probable cause need not be closely related to the offense the arresting officer identifies at the time of arrest. An arresting officer's state of mind, except for facts he knows, is irrelevant to probable cause.

Donovan v. Dewey

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Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc.

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Dow Chemical Co. v. United States

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Draper v. United States

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Eaton v. Price

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Elkins v. United States

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Fahy v. Connecticut

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Ferguson v. City of Charleston

Is a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the patient has not consented to the procedure?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the diagnostic tests constituted an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. The interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. Examining the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens wrote that a special need is "divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement," and that under the city's view "virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate...purpose."

Flippo v. West Virginia

Does the judgment of a West Virginia Circuit Court, which denied a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the police were entitled to make a thorough search of any crime scene and the objects found there, conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mincey v. Arizona?

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Circuit Court's "position squarely conflicts with Mincey v. Arizona (437 U.S. 385) where we rejected the contention that there is a 'murder scene exception' to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment." "We noted that police may make warrantless entries onto premises if they reasonably believe a person is in need of immediate aid and may make prompt warrantless searches of a homicide scene for possible other victims or a killer on the premises, but we rejected any general 'murder scene exception' as 'inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments -- . . . the warrantless search of Mincey's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there,'" stated the opinion.

Florida v. Bostick

Is the acquisition of evidence during random bus searches, conducted pursuant to passengers' consent, a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unconstitutional search and seizure?

No. The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at whether a party felt "free to leave," but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, Bostick could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence.

Florida v. J. L.

Is an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun sufficient under the Fourth Amendment to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "[a]n anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person." The Court concluded that the officers' suspicion that J. L. was carrying a weapon arose not from their own observations but from an anonymous tip, that the tip lacked reliability, and that the tip "provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." "An officer, for the protection of himself and others, may conduct a carefully limited search for weapons in the outer clothing of persons engaged in unusual conduct where... the officer reasonably concludes in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons in question may be armed and presently dangerous," Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court.

Florida v. Jimeno

Does a suspect's consent to a search of his vehicle extend to closed containers found inside?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," wrote Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in the majority opinion. "We think it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container."

Florida v. Meyers

Was the Court's summary disposition of the case constitutionally legitimate?

In a per curiam opinion, a majority of the Court held that the Florida court had misapplied the law and that a warrantless search of the automobile was permissible since the vehicle was already in police custody. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Stevens, argued that the Supreme Court's decision to bypass the Florida Supreme Court judgment and to consider the case was ill-advised. Justice Stevens maintained that summarily disposing of such cases unduly enlarged the Supreme Court's responsibilities and deemed state judges incompetent to decide Fourth Amendment questions.

Florida v. Riley

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Florida v. Royer

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Florida v. Wells

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Florida v. White

Does the Fourth Amendment require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. Thomas wrote: "Although the police here lacked probable cause to believe that [White's] car contained contraband, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law. ... [T]he need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away...is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure." In dissenting, Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded that the seizure was not reasonable without a warrant.

Frank v. Maryland

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Franks v. Delaware

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G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States

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Gelbard v. United States

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Georgia v. Randolph

Can police search a home when one physically present resident consents and the other physically present resident objects?

No. In a 5 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court held that when two co-occupants are present and one consents to a search while the other refuses, the search is not constitutional. Justice David Souter, in the majority opinion, compared the reasonableness of such a search to a more casual interaction. Souter wrote, "it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, 'stay out.' Without some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions." A police search in such circumstances, Souter wrote, would therefore not meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

Gerstein v. Pugh

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Giordenello v. United States

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Gooding v. United States

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Griffin v. Wisconsin

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Gustafson v. Florida

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Hanlon v. Berger

Do federal agents violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when they let representatives of the news media accompany and observe their conduct in the execution of a search warrant?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that, although the agents did violate the Fourth Amendment, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The opinion stated that "police violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners when they allow members of the media to accompany them during the execution of a warrant in their home. We also hold there that because the law on this question before today's decision was not clearly established, the police in that case were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity." Justice John Paul Stevens, concurring and dissenting in part, argued that the constitutional rule recognized had been clearly established long before 1992.

Harris v. United States

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Hayes v. Florida

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Henry v. United States

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Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County

Did Hiibel's arrest and conviction for not telling a police officer his name violate his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search?

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was based on reasonable suspicion (the police officer was investigating the assault, and Hiibel was nearby) and involved only a minimally intrusive question (his name). It also did not violate the Fifth Amendment because Hiibel never argued that telling the officer his name would actually incriminate him of any crime. Justice Kennedy wrote, "While we recognize petitioner's strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature's judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him."

Hoffa v. United States

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Horton v. California

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Hudson v. Michigan

Does the general rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment apply to the "knock-and-announce" rule?

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that evidence need not be excluded when police violate the "knock-and-announce" rule. The opinion by Justice Scalia reaffirmed the validity of both the knock-and-announce rule and the "exclusionary rule" for evidence obtained by police in most cases of Fourth Amendment violation. However, the majority held that the exclusionary rule could not be invoked for evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation, because the interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police "have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence." Justice Scalia wrote that the knock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence, property-damage, and impositions on privacy, not to prevent police from conducting a search for which they have a valid warrant. The Court also found that the social costs of the exclusionary rule as applied to the knock-and-announce rule outweighed any possible "deterrence benefits," and that alternative measures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequately deter violations. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissent noted the Court's long history of upholding the exclusionary rule and doubted that the majority's cited precedents supported its conclusion. The dissent also expressed doubt that knock-and-announce violations could be deterred without excluding the evidence obtained from the searches.

Hudson v. Palmer

Did the search of Palmer's locker and cell violate the Fourth Amendment? Did prison officials deprive Hudson of his property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?

The Court held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches did not apply "within the confines of the prison cell." Noting that privacy was fundamentally incompatible with the maintenance of prison security and surveillance, the Court found that "the paramount interest in institutional security" outweighed all privacy concerns. The Court further held that "random and unauthorized" deprivations of property did not violate the Due Process Clause, so long as postdeprivation remedies were available.

Illinois v. Andreas

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Illinois v. Caballes

Does the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause require a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop?

Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an illegal drug.

Illinois v. Gates

Did the search of the Gates's home violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. United States (1969). Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause, but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied. He argued that the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the correct one to glean from Spinelli, and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant abided by it in this case.

Illinois v. Krull

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Illinois v. Lafayette

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Illinois v. Lidster

Does Indianapolis v. Edmond, which dealt with the Fourth and 14th Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures, prohibit checkpoints organized to question motorists about a previous offense and arrest motorists for drunk driving?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held 6-3 that the Illinois checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and was constitutional. It ruled that the checkpoint was reasonable because it advanced a "grave" public interest - "investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death" - and interfered minimally with Fourth Amendment liberty. The Court distinguished Illinois's "information-seeking" checkpoint from the "crime control" checkpoint struck down in Edmond. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg - while agreeing that Edmond does not invalidate the Illinois checkpoint - dissented from the majority's decision granting constitutional approval to the checkpoint. They argued that the case should have been remanded to the Illinois courts.

Illinois v. McArthur

Do officers, with probable cause to believe that a man had hidden marijuana in his home, who subsequently prevent that man from entering the home for about two hours while they obtain a search warrant, violate the Fourth Amendment?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizure of the premises was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. "We have found no case in which this Court has held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period of time," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens noted he would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Illinois v. Rodriguez

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Illinois v. Wardlow

Is a person's sudden and unprovoked flight from identifiable police officers, patrolling a high crime area, sufficiently suspicious to justify the officers' stop of that person?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 5 to 4, that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Wardlow, because the officer was justified in suspecting that the accused was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that, "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" to justify a stop. The Chief Justice noted that "flight is the consummate act of evasion." Stevens, joined by three other justices, concurred in avoiding a per se rule but dissented from the majority holding.

Ins v. Delgado

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James v. Illinois

Could James's statements be used against him even though they were obtained illegally?

The Court held that the statements could not be used. Justice Brennan argued that prosecutors are allowed to introduce illegally obtained evidence when using it to impeach a defendant's own testimony. However, in this case, the Illinois Supreme Court wrongly expanded that practice making it applicable to all defense witnesses. Brennan concluded that this expansion "would frustrate rather than further the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule."

Jones v. United States

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Jones v. United States

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Katz v. United States

Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone?

Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.

Ker v. California

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Knowles v. Iowa

Can a search of a stopped vehicle, that occurs prior to the driver's arrest, be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception that permits officers to search stopped vehicles without first obtaining a search warrant?

No. In a unanimous opinion that Court held that full stopped-car searches can only be conducted when the safety of the officers is at risk. One significant indication of such danger is when an officer arrests the subject as a reaction to possible or actual threat. In the present case, no serious danger accompanied the stop of Knowles car as evidenced by the officer's initial decision not to arrest Knowles or even issue him a ticket. As such, regardless of its uncovered contents, the subsequent search violated the "search incident to arrest" power and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition again unlawful search and seizures.

Kremen v. United States

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Kyllo v. United States

Does the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat emanating from a private home constitute an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the "observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the outside of [Kyllo's] home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy," and were, thus, "information in the public domain."

Lee v. Florida

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Lewis v. United States

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Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York

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Mancusi v. Deforte

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Mapp v. Ohio

Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?)

The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.

Marcus v. Search Warrant

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Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.

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Maryland v. Buie

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Maryland v. Dyson

Does the Fourth Amendment require police to obtain a search warrant before searching a vehicle which they have probable cause to believe contains illegal drugs?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rested upon an incorrect interpretation of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that, because the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement and where there is probable cause to search an automobile, a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant is not actually obtained. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented.

Maryland v. Garrison

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Maryland v. Macon

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Maryland v. Pringle

Does an arrest of a front-seat passenger in a car driven by its owner, after police find cocaine in the car's back armrest, lack probable cause and violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court ruled that because the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle, the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that "a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine."

Maryland v. Wilson

Did Maryland's state trooper violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantees by ordering Wilson, a mere passenger in the suspect vehicle, to exit the car during a traffic stop?

No. The Court held that after lawfully stopping a speeding vehicle, an officer may order its passengers to step out. While burdening their personal liberty somewhat, officers must be permitted such authority over passengers if the overriding government's interest in officer safety is to be protected.

Massachusetts v. Painten

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Massachusetts v. Sheppard

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Massachusetts v. White

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Mccray v. Illinois

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Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz

Did the drunk driving checkpoints violate motorists' privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment?

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that "no one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it." The Court then found that "the weight bearing on the other scale--the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints--is slight." The Court also found that empirical evidence supported the effectiveness of the program.

Michigan v. Chesternut

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Michigan v. Clifford

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Michigan v. Defillippo

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Michigan v. Doran

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Michigan v. Summers

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Michigan v. Tyler

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Miller v. California

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Miller v. United States

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Mincey v. Arizona

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Minnesota v. Carter

In accordance with the Fourth Amendment, do household visitors have the same protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as do residents or overnight social guests?

No. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, that people who visit someone's home for a short time do not have the same protection against unreasonable police searches and seizures as do the residents or their overnight guests. Short-term visits for commercial transactions are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that nothing in the case served to show that Carter was accepted into the household.

Minnesota v. Dickerson

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Minnesota v. Olson

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Muehler v. Mena

(1) Did police violate the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure by detaining Mena in handcuffs for 2-3 they executed a search warrant for contraband on the premises she occupied? (2) Did police violate the Fourth Amendment by questioning Mena about her immigration status during the detention?

No and no. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Mena's detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Officers with a search warrant for contraband had authority to detain occupants of the premisses during the search, in order to minimize any risk to officers. Handcuffing Mena while police searched for weapons and a wanted gang member was also justified by officer safety concerns and because officers had to deal with detaining multiple occupants. The Court further held that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status during her detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officers did not need to have reasonable suspicion to question Mena. Moreover, the Court had held repeatedly that mere police questioning did not constitute a seizure.

Murray v. United States

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Nat. Treas. Employees Union v. Von Raab

Did the regulations violate the Fourth Amendment?

No. The Court held that the "substantial interests" of the government in stifling the drug trade justified "departure from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements" associated with searches. The fact that customs personnel are the country's "first line of defense" against drug smugglers and they are exposed to a sometimes aggressive criminal element, places them in a unique and important position in which they have a "diminished expectation of privacy."

New Jersey v. T.L.O.

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New York v. Belton

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New York v. Burger

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New York v. Class

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New York v. Harris

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O'Connor v. Ortega

Did the supervisor's search of the office violate Dr. Ortega's "reasonable expectation of privacy" guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that "the realities of the workplace" made some expectations of privacy among public employees unreasonable when the intrusion was by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Work-related searches, the Court found, were "merely incident to the primary business of the agency," and a warrant requirement would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business." The Court thus held that a standard of "reasonableness" was sufficient for work-related intrusions by public employers.

Ohio v. Robinette

Does the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizures require that a lawfully detained defendant be told that he is "free to go" before he can be said to have voluntarily agreed to any subsequent search?

No. After establishing its federal jurisdiction, despite a claim that the matter involved aspects of Ohio's Constitution, the Court held that when looking at the totality of the circumstances it may be reasonably concluded that if a defendant consents to be searched, even if not first advised that he is "free to go," the ensuing search will be recognized as voluntary. The Court also added that Robinette's arrest on drug possession charges was lawful, even though the arresting officer did not stop him on an initial suspicion of drug possession nor intend to even issue him a speeding ticket.

Oklahoma v. Castleberry

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Oliver v. United States

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Ornelas v. United States

Should courts use a de novo standard in determining if a police search conducted without a warrant was based on reasonable suspicion and probable cause?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held "[t]he ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo." The principle details in such a review should be an analysis of events leading up to the search and the objective review of the search.

Osborn v. United States

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Payton v. New York

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Penn. Board of Probation v. Scott

Does the federal exclusionary rule, prohibiting the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable search and seizure, apply to parole revocation hearings?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation hearings. Noting that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, the Court explained that it applies only in situations where its deterrent benefits outweigh the utilities that accompany the consideration of reliable, probative evidence. Since officers are unaware of whether their search subjects are parolees or not, the danger of their deliberately conducting illegal searches is small. By comparison, the deleterious impact that an application of the exclusionary rule would have on traditionally flexible state parole revocation proceedings is great. State parole authorities must have greater legal latitude since they deal with individuals who, in light of past criminal activities, are more likely than average citizens to offend again.

Pennsylvania v. Labron

Does the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth, require police to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile unless exigent circumstances are present?

No. In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that if a vehicle is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle and contraband seized from such a search should not be suppressed. The Court noted that early cases establishing the automobile exception were based on the automobile's ready mobility, an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear. Justice John Paul Stevens, who was joined by Justine Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.

Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania

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Pugach v. Dollinger

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Rakas v. Illinois

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Rathbun v. United States

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Rawlings v. Kentucky

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Richards v. Wisconsin

Did the officers' use of deception and force, in order to gain entry into Richards' hotel room, violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizures?

No. After noting the general importance of following conventional "knock-and-announce" procedures, the Court held that in those circumstances when police have good reason to suspect that announcing their presence and intentions may be dangerous, futile, or result in the destruction of evidence, a "no-knock" entry is justified. The Court added that by immediately closing the door after witnessing the officers outside it, Richards gave police sufficient justification for breaking into his room - especially considering the disposable nature of the substances they were seeking.

Rios v. United States

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Riverside County v. McLaughlin

Did Riverside violate the Court's holding in Gerstein v. Pugh (420 U.S. 103), which required prompt probable cause determinations?

The Court held that Riverside's actions did not comply with the Gerstein precedent. Justice O'Connor argued that it was the state's burden to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances when delaying probable cause determinations beyond 48 hours. The lower court in this case had placed that responsibility on the accused. Intervening weekends or complicated pretrial proceedings were not legitimate reasons for delay.

Robbins v. California

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Rugendorf v. United States

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Sabbath v. United States

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Samson v. California

Did the Fourth Amendment prohibit police from conducting a warrantless search of a person who was subject to a parole search condition, where there was no suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and the sole reason for the search was because the person was on parole?

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Samson "did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate." Parole allows convicted criminals out of prison before their sentence is completed. An inmate who chooses to complete his sentence outside of direct physical custody, however, remains in the Department of Correction's legal custody until the conclusion of his sentence, and therefore has significantly reduced privacy rights. In this case, Samson had also been required, as a condition of his parole, to sign an agreement that he would be "subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer..., with or without a search warrant and with or without cause." This written consent to suspicionless searches, along with his already reduced privacy interests as a parolee, combined to make the search constitutional. Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented, arguing that parolees have an expectation of privacy greater than that of prisoners, which was violated by the search at issue in this case.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

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Scott v. United States

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See v. City Of Seattle

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Segura v. United States

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Shadwick v. City Of Tampa

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Silverman v. United States

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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc.

Did the regulations violate the Fourth Amendment?

No. The Court held that the government's interest in assuring safety on the nation's railroads constituted a "special need" which justified a departure from standard warrant and probable-cause requirements in searches. Preventing accidents, the goal of most railroad regulations including the one in this case, argued Justice Kennedy, was such a significant concern that it warranted reduced "expectations of privacy" for railroad employees.

Smith v. Maryland

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Soldal Et Ux. v. Cook County, Illinois

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South Dakota v. Opperman

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Spinelli v. United States

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Stanford v. Texas

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Steagald v. United States

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Stoner v. California

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Tennessee v. Garner

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Terry v. Ohio

Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.

Texas v. Brown

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Texas v. White

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Thornton v. United States

Under the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment, may police search the vehicle of a person they have arrested if they did not make contact with him until after he left the vehicle?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court ruled that forcing officers to decide whether a suspect had noticed them before exiting the car (with the understanding that only if he had could the car be searched) would be too subjective and leave officers uncertain of whether they could perform searches. Further, it found that weapons or contraband inside a vehicle could still be easily accessed by someone who had just exited it, providing the same reason for searching the vehicle that was present in cases where suspects were arrested while still inside it (that is, the possibility that illegal material would be destroyed or officers attacked with concealed weapons). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, wrote, "Once an officer determines there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment."

Torres v. Puerto Rico

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United States v. Arvizu

Did a border agent have reasonable suspicion to believe that Ralph Arvizu was engaged in illegal activity based on a number of factors?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Court of Appeals' methodology was contrary to its prior decisions and that it reached the wrong result in this case. The Court concluded that Stoddard had reasonable suspicion to believe that Arvizu was engaged in illegal activity, having considered the totality of the circumstances and given due weight to the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer and District Court Judge. The Court reasoned that, although each factor alone could have appeared innocent, when taken together they sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for Stoddard's stopping the vehicle, making the stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion.

United States v. Banks

How long must officers wait after knocking on a door before they can use force to break it down in order to execute a warrant?

The Court unanimously held that 15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable period for police to wait before entering by force when they were investigating drug charges because waiting any longer was likely to result in the destruction of evidence. Justice David Souter, writing for the court, stated that "while we agree... that this call is a close one, we think that after 15 to 20 seconds without a response, police could fairly suspect that cocaine would be gone if they were reticent any longer."

United States v. Biswell

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United States v. Brignoni-Ponce

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United States v. Caceres

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United States v. Calandra

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United States v. Ceccolini

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United States v. Chadwick

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United States v. Chavez

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United States v. Cortez

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United States v. Dionisio

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United States v. Donovan

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United States v. Drayton

Must police officers, while searching buses at random to ask questions and to request passengers' consent to searches, advise passengers of their right not to cooperate?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches. The Court reasoned that, although the officer did not inform the defendants of their right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search and gave no indication consent was required. Moreover, the Court noted, the totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent was voluntary. Justice David H. Souter, with whom Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, dissented. "The issue we took to review is whether the police's examination of the bus passengers ... amounted to a suspicionless seizure under the Fourth Amendment. If it did, any consent to search was plainly invalid as a product of the illegal seizure," argued Justice Souter.

United States v. Dunn

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United States v. Edwards

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United States v. Flores-Montano

Does the Fourth Amendment require customs officers at the international border to have reasonable suspicion in order to remove, disassemble, and search a vehicle's gas tank for illegal material?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the government had authority to inspect a vehicle's fuel tank at the border without suspicion. Though the Fourth Amendment "'protects property as well as privacy,'" interference with a vehicle owner's gas tank "is justified by the Government's paramount interest in protecting the border." The Court rejected the argument that the requirement of suspicion for highly intrusive searches of people be carried over to cars (especially at the border): "Complex balancing tests...have no place in border searches of vehicles."

United States v. Giordano

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United States v. Grubbs

Did the Fourth Amendment require suppression of evidence seized during a search that had been authorized by an anticipatory warrant, when the warrant's triggering events were not shown to the person searched?

No. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement a warrant need not set out the conditions that trigger it, only the place to be searched and the persons or things to be searched for. The fact that the triggering conditions were included in the affidavit, even if they were never showed to Grubbs, was therefore sufficient.

United States v. Harris

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United States v. Hensley

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United States v. Jacobsen

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United States v. Janis

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United States v. Johns

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United States v. Kahn

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United States v. Karo

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United States v. Knights

Does a search pursuant to a common California probation condition, supported by reasonable suspicion, satisfy the Fourth Amendment?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the warrantless search of Knights, which was supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Noting that nothing in Knight's probation condition limits searches to those with a "probationary" purpose, the Court examined whether the Fourth Amendment imposed such a limitation. The Court then concluded that, based on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis, reasonable suspicion is constitutionally sufficient to render a warrant requirement unnecessary. Justice David H. Souter filed a concurring opinion.

United States v. Knotts

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United States v. Leon

Is there a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule?

Yes, there is such an exception. The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. The exclusionary rule, argued the majority, is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. In Leon, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon, where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.

United States v. Mara

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United States v. Martinez-Fuerte

Do such stops violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures?

No, because if there is a reasonable collective suspicion, then individuals can be searched in the interest of public safety. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for the 7-to-2 majority, said: "The defendants note correctly that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.... But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."

Prepared by Michael Brandow.

United States v. Matlock

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United States v. Mendenhall

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United States v. Miller

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United States v. Montoya De Hernandez

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United States v. New York Telephone Co.

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United States v. Ojeda Rios

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United States v. Ortiz

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United States v. Padilla

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United States v. Payner

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United States v. Place

Was the ninety minute seizure of the traveler's luggage a valid investigative stop under Terry? Did the "sniff test" by the dog constitute a search?

No and no. Seizures pursuant to investigative detentions are lawful only if they are limited in scope, as described in Terry, and evidence resulting from such unlawful seizures must be suppressed. The "sniff" of a properly trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Ramirez

Does the Fourth Amendment require that police officers have more than a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would be dangerous, futile, or inhibit the effective investigation of a crime when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction of property?

No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not hold police officers to a higher standard than the test articulated in Richards v. Wisconsin. In Richards, the Court held that a no-knock entry was justified if police had a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous, futile, or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime, when a no-knock entry resulted in the destruction of property. "Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression," noted the Chief Justice.

United States v. Ramsey

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United States v. Robinson

Did the officer's search violate the Fourth Amendment?

The Court upheld the search. Distinguishing between searches done to discover concealed weapons and those conducted coextensive with an arrest, Justice Rehnquist argued since the officer did not conduct the search in an abusive or extreme manner, and because he acted consistent with the authority vested in a police officer when making an arrest, his actions were legitimate.

United States v. Ross

Did the police violate the Fourth Amendment?

The Court held that since the search was done with probable cause and extended into the realm (Ross's car) of which a magistrate issuing a warrant would have approved, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens defended the search of the vehicle's trunk, arguing that if probable cause justifies a vehicle search, then every part of the vehicle is open to inspection.

United States v. Salvucci

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United States v. Santana

Did the search violate the Fourth Amendment?

The Court upheld the search. Relying on the the Court's decision in United States v. Watson (1976), Justice Rehnquist argued that by standing on her porch when the officers arrived, Santana was "not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy." Since the police had probable cause to arrest and search her at that point, their behavior was consistent with the Court's Watson precedent.

United States v. Sharpe

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United States v. Sokolow

Did the search violate the Fourth Amendment?

The Court upheld the search and reasoned that the agents had a "reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in wrongdoing." Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the validity of such a stop should be based on the "totality of the circumstances," (United States v. Cortez, 1981), which, in this case, gave agents a clear reason to suspect Sokolow of drug trafficking.

United States v. U.S. District Court

Did the wiretapping violate the Fourth Amendment?

The Court held government officials were obligated to obtain a warrant before beginning electronic surveillance even if domestic security issues were involved. The "inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept" and the potential for abusing it to quell political dissent made the Fourth Amendment protections especially important when the government engaged in spying on its own citizens.

United States v. Van Leeuwen

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United States v. Ventresca

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United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez

Does the Fourth Amendment apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country?

No. The text of the Fourth Amendment concerns "the people," suggesting a concern with persons who are part of the national community, as contrasted with aliens without any substantial connection to the U.S. Moreover, extraterritorial aliens are not even entitled to rights under the Fifth Amendment, which speaks in the relatively more universal term of "person." And non-"fundamental" rights are not even guaranteed to inhabitants of unincorporated territories under U.S sovereign control, much less aliens. Therefore, any restrictions on searches and seizures of nonresident aliens and their foreign property must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty or legislation.

United States v. Villamonte-Marquez

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United States v. Watson

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United States v. White

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Vale v. Louisiana

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Wainwright v. City of New Orleans

Must a person who is unconstitutionally arrested submit to a search of his person? May he offer token resistance?

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Walter v. United States

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Warden v. Hayden

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Washington v. Chrisman

Did the officer's seizure of the drugs violate Chrisman's "reasonable expectation of privacy" guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment?

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permitted law enforcement officers to seize clearly incriminating evidence discovered "in a place where the officer has a right to be." The Court held that the officer had a right to remain at the initial suspect's elbow at all times, and did not waive his right to custodial control because he hesitated briefly in the doorway of the dormitory room before entering. In short, the officer had obtained lawful access to an individual's area of privacy and was free to seize incriminating evidence.

Welsh v. Wisconsin

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Whiteley v. Warden

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Whren v. United States

Did the officers conduct an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

No. The unanimous Court held that as long as officers have a reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they may stop any vehicle. In the present case, the officers had reasonable cause to stop the petitioners for a traffic violation since they sped away from a stop sign at an 'unreasonable speed' and without using their turn signal. Thus, since an actual traffic violation occurred, the ensuing search and seizure of the offending vehicle was reasonable, regardless of what other personal motivations the officers might have had for stopping the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the anxiety, confusion, and haste which the petitioners experienced from the stop-and-search outweighed the government's interest in traffic safety. While the Fourth Amendment does require a balancing test between a search-and-seizure's benefits and the harm it might cause to the individual, such a test only applies to unusually harmful searches and seizures. There was nothing unusually harmful about this traffic stop.

Wilson v. Arkansas

Does the Fourth Amendment's reasonable search and seizure clause require police officers to knock and announce their presence before entering a private residence?

Yes. A unanimous Court held that the common-law "knock-and announce" principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. "Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, and the wealth of founding-era commentaries, constitutional provisions, statutes, and cases espousing or supporting the knock-and-announce principle,...the Amendment's Framers thought that whether officers announced their presence and authority before entering a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing a search's reasonableness." Countervailing law enforcement interests, such as officer safety, may, however, establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.

Wilson v. Layne

Is the accompaniment of law enforcement authorities by media personnel, during the execution of an arrest warrant in a home, a violation of the homeowner's Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the presence of media during the execution of an arrest warrant in a home was in no way related to the officers' task at hand. Reporters neither assist officers nor do they have anything to do with the warrant's execution. Moreover, the connection between their presence and furthering positive publicity for law enforcement is unclear at best. The Court added, however, that in this case the officers had no reason to believe that permitting media to accompany them would be illegal, since no prior rule existed in this matter. Accordingly, the officers in question were granted qualified immunity.

Wilson v. Schnettler

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Winston v. Lee

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Wong Sun v. United States

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Wyman v. James

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Wyoming v. Houghton

May police officers, with probable cause to search a car, inspect personal items belonging to its passengers without violating the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court held that so long as there is probable cause to search a stopped vehicle, all subsequent searches of its contents are legal as well. The Court added that such searches are especially warranted if aimed at looking into objects or personal belongings capable of concealing items that are the object of the search.

Ybarra v. Illinois

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Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily

Did the search of The Daily's newsroom violate the First and Fourth Amendments?

In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "third party" search of the newsroom did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that such searches, accompanied by warrants, were legitimate when it had been "satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises." The Court also found that the Framers of the Constitution "did not forbid warrants where the press was involved."