http://www.oyez.org/issues/criminal-procedure/narcotics/ U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_5010/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1972/1972_71_1304/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_5744/ <p>May federal judges sentence someone convicted of taking part in a drug conspiracy based on a finding that two illegal drugs were involved, even if the jury might have convicted based on one drug?</p><p>Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the judge was authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the offense-related activities." Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "[t]he Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the amount and the kind of 'controlled substances' for which a defendant should be held accountable -- and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. Consequently, regardless of the jury's actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the 'controlled substances' at issue -- and how much of those substances -- consisted of cocaine, crack, or both."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8732/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_7370/ <p>Does U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual's revised system for determining LSD amounts take precedence over 21 U.S.C. 841 in determining sentencing?</p><p>No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Section 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual requires a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_9088/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_903/ <p>Does the "continuing criminal enterprise" statute require juror unanimity as to each specific violation of federal law for conviction?</p><p>Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a jury in a "continuing criminal enterprise" case is required to agree unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also which specific violations made up the continuing series. Looking to the language of the statute, Justice Breyer concluded that in the law "each 'violation' amounts to a separate element" and that combined with a "tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law," calls for juror unanimity. In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the view that the Court's decision "rewards those drug kingpins whose operations are so vast that the individual violations cannot be recalled or charged with specificity."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_8629/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_6282/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_781/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_759/ <p>Does a medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including marijuana, exist?</p><p>No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. "The statute reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception, " wrote Justice Thomas, therefore, "medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana." Justice John Paul Stevens' concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that "[b]ecause necessity was raised in this case as a defense to distribution, the Court need not venture an opinion on whether the defense is available to anyone other than distributors." Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_151/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_251/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_80_808/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_73_831/