The Oyez Project: Criminal Procedure Issues - Jurors and Death Penalty Decisions

Adams v. Texas

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Buchanan v. Kentucky

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Bumper v. North Carolina

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Gray v. Mississippi

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Lockhart v. McCree

During a capital trial does the Constitution prohibit the removal of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties at the sentencing phase of the trial?

The Court found that excluding people who are unwilling under any circumstances to impose the death penalty during sentencing did not violate a defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justice Rehnquist argued that the state has a legitimate interest to impanel jurors who "can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial." As long as a jury is selected from a fair cross-section of the community, is impartial, and can properly apply the law to a case's circumstances, then a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is protected.

Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida, Dept of Corrections v. Johnny Paul Witt

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Maxwell v. Bishop

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Mcgautha v. California

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Morgan v. Illinois

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Ross v. Oklahoma

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Witherspoon v. Illinois

Does a state statue that provides grounds for the dismissal of any juror with "conscientious scruples" against capital punishment violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an "impartial jury" and the 14th Amendment's guarantee of due process?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held 6-3 that Witherspoon's death sentence was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that a jury composed after the dismissal of all who oppose the death sentence was biased in favor the death sentence; such a jury was not impartial and thus violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that while jurors who say they will not impose the death sentence can be dismissed, jurors who simply oppose the death sentence as a personal belief may not. Justice William Douglas, concurring, argued that it also unconstitutional to dismiss prospective jurors who say they will never impose the death sentence.

Justice Hugo Black, with whom Justices John Harlan and Byron White joined, dissented. Douglas argued that the Constitution allows the dismissal of all jurors who oppose the death penalty personally, because they will be necessarily biased against the death penalty. In a separate dissent, White argued that the Illinois legislature was allowed to exclude "those with doubts" about "one of the punishments among which the legislature sought to have them choose...."