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  <title>The Oyez Project: Criminal Procedure Issues - Fugitive From Justice Decisions</title>
  <link>http://www.oyez.org/issues/criminal-procedure/fugitive/</link>
  <description>U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</description>
  <language>en-us</language>
  
   <item>
    <title>California v. Superior Court Of California</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_381/</link>
   </item>
  
   <item>
    <title>Degen v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Should the fugitive disentitlement doctrine be extended to allow a court in a civil forfeiture suit to enter judgment against a claimant, without any opportunity to be heard, because the claimant is a fugitive from, or otherwise is resisting, a related criminal prosecution?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;No. Principles of deference to the other branches of government require a court to invoke its inherent power only as a reasonable response to the problems and needs that provoke it. No sufficient reason justifies disentitlement here. Since the court's jurisdiction over the property is secure despite Degen's absence, there is no risk of delay or frustration in determining the merits of the government's forfeiture claims or in enforcing the resulting judgment. Also, the court has alternatives, other than disentitlement, to keep Degen from using liberal civil discovery rules to gain an improper advantage in the criminal prosecution, where discovery is more limited. Finally, disentitlement is an excessive response to the court's interests in redressing the indignity visited upon it by Degen's absence from the criminal proceeding, and in deterring flight from criminal prosecution in general; it is a response that erodes rather than enhances the dignity of the court.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_95_173/</link>
   </item>
  
   <item>
    <title>New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Did the Supreme Court of New Mexico err in upholding grant of state habeas corpus relief to parolee whom state of Ohio sought to extradite as alleged fugitive from justice by going beyond the scope of permissible inquiry?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "the Supreme Court of New Mexico went beyond the permissible inquiry in an extradition case, and permitted the litigation of issues not open in the asylum State." The opinion stated, "this is simply not the kind of issue that may be tried in the asylum State. In case after case we have held that claims relating to what actually happened in the demanding State, the law of the demanding State, and what may be expected to happen in the demanding State when the fugitive returns, are issues that must be tried in the courts of that State, and not in those of the asylum State."&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_1217/</link>
   </item>
  
   <item>
    <title>Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_7749/</link>
   </item>
  
   <item>
    <title>Puerto Rico v. Branstad</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Do federal courts have the power to order governors to fulfill obligations under the Constitution's Extradition Clause in Article IV, Section 2?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Yes. The Court overturned its decision in Kentucky v. Dennison (1861) which had rendered federal courts powerless to enforce the Extradition Clause. The unanimous Court concluded that the precedent in Kentucky was "the product of another age" and "fundamentally incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development."&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_2116/</link>
   </item>
  
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