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  <title>The Oyez Project: Criminal Procedure Issues - Firearms</title>
  <link>http://www.oyez.org/issues/criminal-procedure/firearms/</link>
  <description>U.S. Supreme Court Cases, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</description>
  <language>en-us</language>
  
   <item>
    <title>Bailey v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Roland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" both "during and in relation to" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting "use" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an "accessibility and proximity" test.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_7448/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Ball v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_5004/</link>
   </item>
  
   <item>
    <title>Barrett v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_5566/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Beecham v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Lenard Ray Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. Beecham argued that according to the statute's exemption clause ("Any conviction...for which a person...has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction...") he was no longer a convicted felon because Tennessee had restored his civil rights.  Prosecutors pointed to the statute's "choice of law clause," which states that "What constitutes a conviction...shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held." They argued that because Beecham's prior conviction was under federal law, no state could restore his right to possess a firearm. 
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;The District Court ruled that a state could restore civil rights barred by a federal conviction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision. The Fourth Circuit's rule conflicted with those of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which held that the since the exemption clause applied to "any conviction," it also permitted states to undo restrictions caused by federal convictions.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_445/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Bryan v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from "willfully" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts "willfully" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8422/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Busic v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_6020/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Caron v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, "unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms." In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court found that, because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s "unless clause" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_6270/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Castillo v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1993, Jaime Castillo and other Branch-Davidians were involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents near Waco, Texas. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers. A jury determined that Castillo, by using firearms in connection with the alleged conspiracy, had violated 18 USC Section 924(c)(1), which read in relevant part: "Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... and if the firearm is a machinegun... to imprisonment for thirty years." During sentencing, the District Court found that Castillo had possessed machineguns and imposed the mandatory 30-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Courts of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether Castillo had used, rather than merely possessed, machineguns. The court also concluded that statutory terms such as "machinegun" did not state elements of a crime separate from that of using a firearm, but instead established factors enhancing a sentence and that the District Court could reimpose the 30-year sentence if it found that machineguns had been actively used. The District Court then reimposed the 30-year sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_658/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc.</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1180/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Huddleston v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_72_1076/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Lewis v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1595/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Muscarello v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his "carrying" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1654/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Scarborough v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_1344/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Small v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term "convicted in any court" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_750/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Smith v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;John Angus Smith offered to trade an automatic weapon, a MAC-10, to an undercover officer for cocaine. Subsequently, he was charged with numerous firearm and drug trafficking offenses. Federal law imposes mandatory sentence enhancement penalties, specifically 30 years for a "machinegun", if a defendant "during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm." A jury convicted Smith on all counts, which triggered the sentence enhancement. On appeal, Smith argued that the federal penalty for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense covers only situations in which the firearm is used as a weapon, not as a medium of exchange. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the plain language of the penalty does not require that a firearm be used as a weapon, but that it applies to any use of a gun that facilitates, in any fashion, the perpetration of a drug offense.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_8674/</link>
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   <item>
    <title>Staples v. United States</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1441/</link>
   </item>
  
   <item>
    <title>United States v. Bass</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_71/</link>
   </item>
  
   <item>
    <title>United States v. Batchelder</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;No details yet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_78_776/</link>
   </item>
  
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