http://www.oyez.org/issues/criminal-procedure/federal-rules/ U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/1956_430/ <p>Does the Interstate Agreement on Detainers require the dismissal of criminal charges when a prisoner serving a federal sentence is transferred for a day to be arraigned on state charges and then returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial?</p><p>Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the literal language of Article IV(e) of the Agreement bars any further criminal proceedings when a defendant is returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial. The Court rejected the argument that the one-day breach did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly for two reasons. First, "the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute," wrote Justice Breyer. Second, continued Justice Breyer, "even were we to assume for argument's sake that the Agreement exempts violations that...are de minimis...we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_492/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_822/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_73_346/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_491/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_246/ <p>Is evidence of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds alone sufficient to support a conviction for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a predicate narcotics offense under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)?</p><p>No. The proximity and accessibility test for "use" is so broad that no independent role remains for "carry." "Use" in Section 924(c)(1) requires more than proximity and accessibility that might embolden a defendant. It requires active employment of the firearm by the defendant, making the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_7448/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_5004/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_5566/ <p>Does 20 USC section 1097(a), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to misapply student loan funds insured under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, require an allegation and proof that a defendant specifically intended to injure or defraud either the United States as loan guarantor or another?</p><p>No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the specific intent to injure or defraud someone, whether the United States or another, is not an element of the misapplication of funds proscribed by section 1097(a). Justice Ginsburg wore for the Court that, "the text of [section 1097(a)] does not include an 'intent to defraud' state of mind requirement, and we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face." In contrast, Justice Ginsburg noted that 20 USC section 1097(d), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to "destroy or conceal any record relating to the provision of assistance under [Title IV] with intent to defraud the United States" contained an "intent to defraud" element.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_7185/ <p>May a person injured by an action furthering a conspiracy sue under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act even if the action itself was not an act of racketeering?</p><p>No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not give rise to a cause of action under RICO. Thus, because Prupis' scheme to remove Beck from SIG was not an act of racketeering itself, Beck had no ground to sue him under RICO. Although Prupis did engage in acts of racketeering, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "the alleged overt act (terminating) in the present case was not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of RICO."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1480/ <p>Under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), can state procedures for the restoration of the civil rights of felons restore the right of a federal felon to possess a firearm?</p><p>No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court applied the choice of law clause to the exemption clause and reasoned that no rights could be restored unless by the jurisdiction that first barred the rights. The Court ruled that though the federal government did not currently have any procedures in place to restore the civil rights of felons, only the federal government had jurisdiction over federal convictions. Therefore, Beecham's state-law restoration of civil rights was insufficient to restore his right to possess a firearm in light of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_445/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_82_5119/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_245/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1955/1955_60/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_5010/ <p>Does a fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to increase a sentence beyond the statutory standard range need to be proved by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt?</p><p>In a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an exceptional sentence increase based on the judge's determination that Blakely had acted with "deliberate cruelty" violated Blakely's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Citing its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court ruled that facts increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Dissents by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and Justice Stephen Breyer argued the ruling will diminish legislatures' ability to set uniform sentencing guidelines.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1632/ <p>(1) In order to consider the statements of a coconspirator as non-hearsay, must the court determine by evidence independent of the statements themselves that the conspiracy existed and that the defendant and declarant were members of this conspiracy? (2) What is the quantum of proof on which such determinations must be based? (3) Must the court in each case examine the circumstances of such a statement to determine its reliability?</p><p>No; preponderance of the evidence; and no. When the existence and membership of a conspiracy are disputed, the traditional standard applies: the party offering the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must prove these preliminary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 104(a) provides that, in determining preliminary questions concerning admissibility, the court "is not bound by the rules of evidence" (except those with respect to privileges). Therefore, hearsay, including the statements sought to be admitted, can be considered. Finally, since the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is rooted firmly in precedent, no independent inquiry into reliability is required by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_6725/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1972/1972_71_1304/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_5358/ <p>Is the so-called "exculpatory no" doctrine, excluding from criminal sanction false statements that merely deny one's wrongdoing, consistent with the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination?</p><p>No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the imposition of criminal liability for false statements is not limited only to those falsehoods that pervert governmental functions - it applies to statements "of whatever kind." Moreover, even if the "exculpatory no" doctrine did apply to statements that do not impede federal functions, Brogan would not benefit from it since his falsehoods were intended to prevent federal agents from uncovering the truth. The Court concluded by noting that a literal reading of federal laws which prohibit the "exculpatory no" defense is consistent with the Fifth Amendment, since th Framers never intended to confer a privilege to lie.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1579/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1972/1972_71_1011/ <p>Does the term "willfully" in 18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) require proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful and that he knew of the federal licensing requirement for dealing in firearms?</p><p>No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the term "willfully" in section 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof only that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not that he also knew of the federal licensing requirement. Justice Stevens wrote for that court that "the willfulness requirement of [section 924(a)(1)(D)] does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required." In a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that ambiguously worded criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8422/ <p>Does a de novo standard of review apply when a court of appeals reviews a trial court's sentencing guideline determination as to whether an offender's prior convictions were consolidated, and thus related, for sentencing purposes?</p><p>No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Court of Appeals properly reviewed the District Court's "''functional consolidation'" decision deferentially "[i]n light of the fact-bound nature of the legal decision, the comparatively greater expertise of the District Court, and the limited value of uniform court of appeals precedent." Rejecting Buford's arguments for de novo review, Justice Breyer wrote that "the district court is in a better position than the appellate court to decide whether a particular set of individual circumstances demonstrates 'functional consolidation.'"</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_9073/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_7260/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_6020/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_47/ <p>Does a district court have the authority to grant a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal if the motion is filed beyond the seven-day deadline prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)?</p><p>No. In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court had no authority to grant the petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside the Rule 29(c) time limit. Judges may not stretch the deadline by even one day; Justice Scalia wrote for the court that, "[t]here is simply no room...for the granting of an untimely post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, regardless of whether the motion is accompanied by a claim of actual innocence...."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_9247/ <p>Does 18 USC section 922(g)(1), which forbids felons from possessing firearms and enhances their sentences for a violation, apply to a felon who is allowed under state law to possess rifles and shotguns but not handguns?</p><p>Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Massachusetts treats [Caron] as too dangerous to trust with handguns, though it accords this right to law-abiding citizens. Federal law uses this state finding of dangerousness in forbidding [Caron] to have any guns." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "the unless clause is activated if a restoration of civil rights 'expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms.' Either the restorations forbade possession of 'firearms' and the convictions count for all purposes, or they did not and the convictions count not at all. The unless clause looks to the terms of the past restorations alone and does not refer to the weapons at issue in the present case. So if the Massachusetts convictions count for some purposes, they count for all and bar possession of all guns."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_6270/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_422/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/1956_571/ <p>May defendants charged with federal bank robbery have the jury consider whether they committed the lesser crime of federal bank larceny?</p><p>No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that federal bank larceny is not a "lesser included offense" of federal bank robbery. The "[p]etitioner is accordingly prohibited as a matter of law from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas concluded that the larceny law requires proof of three elements not included in robbery: the intent to steal, property worth more than $ 1,000, and proof that the defendant "takes and carries away" the property. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, expressed the view that the Court's decision gave "short shrift to the common-law origin and statutory evolution of [18 USC Section 2113]."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_5716/ <p>Does the provision of USC Section 924(c)(1), which imposes a stiffer penalty for using a "machinegun" in a crime of violence, state factors enhancing a sentence rather than elements of a separate offense?</p><p>No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Section 924(c)(1) uses the word "machinegun" (and similar words) to state an element of a separate, aggravated crime." Therefore, the federal law that subjects anyone who carries a machine gun during a violent crime to an additional 30 years in prison states an element of an offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury rather than determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence as are sentencing factors. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "our consideration of Section 924(c)(1)'s language, structure, context, history and such factors that typically help courts determine a statute's objectives leads us to conclude that the relevant words create a separate substantive crime."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_658/ <p>Are Don King and his corporation a distinct "person" and "enterprise," such that RICO applies?</p><p>Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision...applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner -- whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority." "The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity," wrote Justice Breyer. "A corporate employee who conducts the corporation's affairs through an unlawful RICO 'pattern...of activity,' uses that corporation as a 'vehicle' whether he is, or is not, its sole owner."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_549/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_5744/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_658/ <p>Do state video poker licenses qualify as property for purposes of the federal mail fraud statute?</p><p>No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that State and municipal licenses in general, and Louisiana's video poker licenses in particular, do not rank as "property," for purposes of federal law, in the hands of the official licensor. Thus, Cleveland's conviction for making false statements to obtain state video poker license was vacated. "Equating issuance of licenses or permits with deprivation of property would subject to federal mail fraud prosecution a wide range of conduct traditionally regulated by state and local authorities," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_804/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1965/1965_695/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_31/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_6194/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_5209/ <p>May a federal defendant, who has been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, challenge his federal sentence through a motion on the ground that his prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained?</p><p>No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the nonexistent or unsuccessful pursuit of available challenges to the constitutionality of prior state convictions, which were used to enhance a federal sentence, precluded such challenge to collaterally attack a federal sentence. "[Daniels] could have pursued his claims while he was in custody on those convictions," wrote Justice O'Connor for the majority. "As his counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no indication that [Daniels] did so or that he was prevented from doing so by some external force."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_9136/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1972/1972_71_6481/ <p>Does a criminal's second through sixth convictions under section 924(c)(1) in a single proceeding arise "in the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1)?</p><p>Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Deal's second through sixth convictions in a single proceeding arose "in the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1), finding that the statute was not ambiguous. The Court rejected that the rule of lenity applied because Deal's "105-year sentence 'is so glaringly unjust.'" Writing for the court, Justice Scalia said the 105 years sentence for the gun offenses was not unjust "simply because [Deal] managed to evade detection, prosecution and conviction for the first five offenses and was ultimately tried for all six in a single proceeding." Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Harry A. Blackmun joined.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_8199/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961_21/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1180/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_589/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_77_6949/ <p>May federal judges sentence someone convicted of taking part in a drug conspiracy based on a finding that two illegal drugs were involved, even if the jury might have convicted based on one drug?</p><p>Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the judge was authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the offense-related activities." Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "[t]he Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the amount and the kind of 'controlled substances' for which a defendant should be held accountable -- and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. Consequently, regardless of the jury's actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the 'controlled substances' at issue -- and how much of those substances -- consisted of cocaine, crack, or both."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8732/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1972/1972_71_839/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_210/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_7873/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_6061/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961_478/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_7370/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_70/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1955/1955_460/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_453/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/1956_183/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1252/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_20/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_137/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961_68/ <p>Does the federal carjacking law apply to crimes committed with the "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands?</p><p>Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law applies to carjacking crimes committed with "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands. "The intent requirement...is satisfied when the government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car," wrote Justice Stevens.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_7164/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_172/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_87_6/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_72_1076/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_5691/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1974/1974_73_64/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_925/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_457/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1964/1964_347/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_63/ <p>May a district court, under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, impose an additional term of supervised release following the reimprisonment of those who violate the conditions of an initial term of supervised release, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause?</p><p>Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that 18 USC section 3583(h) is not retroactively applicable; however, its prior version, 18 USC section 3583(e)(3), authorizes a Federal District Court to impose additional term of supervised release after revocation of initial term and reimprisonment. Thus, Johnson's judgment was affirmed because the federal sentencing statute, which was in effect at the time of his original offense, permitted the imposition of supervised release following recommitment. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that "[p]re-Guidelines practice, linguistic continuity from the old scheme to the current one, and the obvious thrust of congressional sentencing policy confirm that, in applying the law as before the enactment of subsection (h), district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment." Justice Antonin Scalia dissented.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_5153/ <p>Must criminal convictions for perjury be reversed when a trial judge fails to let the jury rule on whether the underlying statements were material?</p><p>No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William J. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's action in this case was not "plain error" of the sort which an appellate court may notice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The Court reasoned that there was no basis, on the record, for concluding that the materiality error had seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, in that the evidence supporting materiality was overwhelming. "No 'miscarriage of justice' will result here if we do not notice the error and we decline to do so," concluded Chief Justice Rehnquist.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_96_203/ <p>Does the federal arson statute apply to the arson of a private residence?</p><p>No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_5739/ <p>Does the federal carjacking law define a single crime with three penalty options dependent on sentencing factors?</p><p>No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law established three separate offenses by the specification of elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_6203/ <p>Did the Court of Appeals use the wrong standard in deciding whether a federal trial judge had erred in departing from the federal Sentencing Guidelines and giving lighter sentences to two ex-policemen convicted in the beating of Rodney King?</p><p>Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Court of Appeals should not review de novo a decision to depart from the Guideline sentencing range, but instead should ask whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. Furthermore, because the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting certain of the downward departure factors relied upon by the District Judge, wrote Justice Kennedy, significant parts of the appellate court's rulings require reversal.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1664/ <p>May a state prisoner use a federal habeas petition to challenge a current sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an unconstitutional prior conviction for which the sentence has fully expired?</p><p>No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a [federal habeas petition] on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." Justice David H. Souter filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1884/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1957/1957_2/ <p>Does the federal Assimilative Crimes Act make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute applicable on a federal Army base located in Louisiana?</p><p>No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, because the ACA does not make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute part of federal law, the federal second-degree murder statute governs Lewis' crime. Because the federal second-degree murder statute does not mandate a life sentence, but rather provides for a sentence of "any term of years or life," Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Lewis was also entitled to resentencing. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_7151/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1595/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_7427/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_5108/ <p>Does the Bureau of Prisons have the authority to categorically deny consideration for eligibility for early release to inmates convicted of non-violent offenses after they have completed substance abuse programs?</p><p>Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the categorically denial of early release to a prisoner who committed felony using firearm is a permissible exercise of the BOP's discretion, even if the prisoner has successfully completed a substance abuse program. "The Bureau reasonably concluded that an inmate's prior involvement with firearms, in connection with the commission of a felony, suggests his readiness to resort to life-endangering violence and therefore appropriately determines the early release decision," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the majority. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_7504/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_236/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_238/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_912/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961_159/ <p>Did the questioning of Mallory prior to his appearance before a commissioner violate Due Process and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure?</p><p>In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the arraignment of Mallory was not accomplished "without unnecessary delay," violating the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court noted that Mallory was not told of his rights to counsel or to a preliminary examination before a magistrate, nor of his right to remain silent. "Not until he had confessed, when any judicial caution had lost its purpose, did the police arraign him." The Court held that it was not the function of the police to arrest people at large and interrogate them at police headquarters in order to determine whom they should charge before approaching a commissioner.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/1956_521/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_80_6680/ <p>Is an unloaded handgun a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute?</p><p>Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an unloaded handgun is a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC section 2113(d). The Court articulated three reasons supporting the conclusion that such a gun is a dangerous weapon: First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous. Second, the display of a gun instills fear in the average citizen. Finally, a gun can cause harm when used as a bludgeon.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_85_5189/ <p>Does a federal prosecutor's plea agreement that a cooperating defendant be given the minimum sentence authorize a judge to depart below a statutory minimum?</p><p>No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, in the absence of a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to "impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence," a prison sentence must not violate the statutory sentencing minimum.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_95_5661/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_79/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_964/ <p>Does the fact that guns were found in a locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car, preclude the application of 18 U section 924(c)(1), which imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime"?</p><p>No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the phrase "carries a firearm" applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Exploring the meaning of "carry," Justice Breyer concluded, among other things, that the statute's basic purpose to combat the dangerous combination of drugs and guns does not support limiting "carry" to an "on the person" application. In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that "carries a firearm" means bearing a firearm in a manner as to be ready to use it as a weapon.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1654/ <p>Does U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual's revised system for determining LSD amounts take precedence over 21 U.S.C. 841 in determining sentencing?</p><p>No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Section 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual requires a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_9088/ <p>Does a defendant waive her right to appeal a ruling granting the government's motion to introduce evidence of a prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), if she introduces the prior conviction while testifying on direct examination?</p><p>Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error." Thus, federal defendants, who choose to acknowledge their prior convictions, waive the right to appeal the evidence's admissibility. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice David H. Souter argued, [t]here is no reason to discourage the defendant from introducing the conviction herself, as the majority's waiver rule necessarily does."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_9828/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_391/ <p>Did a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violate the federal wire fraud statute?</p><p>Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the law's plain language criminalized the smuggling scheme in this case. The common-law revenue rule did not bar the prosecution of the scheme, because no common-law case as of 1952 clearly established that the rule barred the U.S. from prosecuting a fraudulent scheme to evade foreign taxes.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_725/ <p>Does a District Court's failure to advise a defendant of his right to appeal, as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provide ground for habeas relief when the defendant was aware of his right and elected not to appeal?</p><p>No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that "a district court's failure to advise the defendant of his right to appeal does not entitle him to habeas relief if he knew of his right and hence suffered no prejudice from the omission." Noting the importance of the rule and acknowledging that the omission was an error, Justice Kennedy stated "[t]rial judges must be meticulous and precise in following each of the requirements of Rule 32 in every case." The Court concluded that Rule 32 violations do not entitle defendants to relief in all circumstances, rather only when the defendant is prejudiced by the court's error.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_9217/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_959/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_903/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/1956_132/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1196/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1955/1955_30/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1970/1970_5342/ <p>Does the "continuing criminal enterprise" statute require juror unanimity as to each specific violation of federal law for conviction?</p><p>Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a jury in a "continuing criminal enterprise" case is required to agree unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also which specific violations made up the continuing series. Looking to the language of the statute, Justice Breyer concluded that in the law "each 'violation' amounts to a separate element" and that combined with a "tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law," calls for juror unanimity. In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the view that the Court's decision "rewards those drug kingpins whose operations are so vast that the individual violations cannot be recalled or charged with specificity."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_8629/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_1013/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_435/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_472/ <p>Can a criminal be given concurrent life sentences for conspiring to distribute drugs and operating a continuing criminal enterprise?</p><p>No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled one of the two sentences must be dropped. Both of the offenses were based on the same criminal act. Justice Stevens wrote, "A guilty verdict on a (continuing criminal enterprise) charge necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_8769/ <p>Is the federal bribery statute, 18 USC section 666, limited to cases in which the bribe has a demonstrated effect upon federal funds? Does the conspiracy prohibition contained in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act apply only when the conspirator agrees to commit two of the predicate acts that RICO forbids?</p><p>No and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the Government to prove the bribe in question had a demonstrated effect upon federal funds. Additionally, the Court held that, to be convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO under section 1962(d), the conspirator need not himself have committed or agreed to commit the two or more predicate acts, such as bribery, requisite for a substantive RICO offense under section 1962(c). Justice Kennedy reasoned that section 666(a)(1)(B)'s "expansive, unqualified language, both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered" did not support the position that federal funds must be affected for a violation to occur.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_738/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_1344/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_111/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_6431/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_648/ <p>May a court sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act look to police reports or complaint applications to determine whether an earlier guilty plea necessarily admitted, and supported a conviction for, generic burglary?</p><p>No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that while a guilty plea could qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA, courts may only look to the following when determining if that plea admitted to generic burglary: the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement, or a judicial record in which the defendant confirmed the factual basis for the plea (such as conversation between defendant and judge).</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9168/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_5796/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1964/1964_42/ <p>Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. Does "convicted in any court" include convictions in foreign courts?</p><p>No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the federal law's phrase, "convicted in any court," encompassed only domestic, not foreign, convictions. The majority reasoned that in determining the scope of the phrase, it was appropriate to assume Congress had domestic concerns in mind. Moreover, the statute's overall language suggested no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_750/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_90/ <p>Does trading a gun for drugs make a convicted defendant eligible for sentence enhancement under a federal law, which requires such treatment if the defendant "during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm?"</p><p>Yes. In a 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that a criminal who trades his or her firearm for drugs "uses" it "during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime," which is within the bounds of the sentence enhancement. Justice O'Connor wrote that Congress intended to make the word "use" as broad as possible when it wrote the law. The law does not require proof that a defendant used the gun as a weapon.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_8674/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_383/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1441/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_8685/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_177/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_7194/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_6892/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_6282/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_92/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_781/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_935/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_270/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1938/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_990/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_71/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_78_776/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_86/ <p>1.) Does an enhanced sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on the judge's determination of a fact violate the Sixth Amendment? 2.) If so, are the Sentencing Guidelines altogether unconstitutional?</p><p>Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines, where they allow judges to enhance sentences using facts not reviewed by juries, violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The sentences of Booker and Fanfan, based partly on facts determined only by judges, were therefore unconstitutional. In a separate 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court said the guidelines would now be advisory and invalidated the provisions that made them mandatory.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_104/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_506/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_46/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1965/1965_256/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1957/1957_455/ <p>Does the omission from a federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence justify a Court of Appeals' vacating the enhanced sentence, even though the defendant did not object in the trial court?</p><p>No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the omission from a federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence does not justify a Court of Appeals' vacating the enhanced sentence, even though the defendant did not object in the trial court. The Court reasoned that, even if the error affected the defendants' substantive rights, it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The Court noted that the evidence that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_687/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_77_142/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_14/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1972/1972_71_1193/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_47/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1974/1974_73_1123/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1141/ <p>Can the federal mandatory five-year prison term for carrying a gun while committing a crime be served concurrently with a separate state sentence?</p><p>No. In a 7-to-2 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court announced "[t]he plain language of (the law) forbids a district court to direct that a term of imprisonment under the statute run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1605/ <p>United States Code section 3565 says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, "the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence." Does "original sentence" refer to the original imprisonment sentence range set by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, or to the term of probation?</p><p>In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held 7-2 that the U.S. Code's section 3565 refers to the original sentence range set by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the minimum revocation sentence for drug possession while on probation is one third the maximum of the Guidelines range of imprisonment; the maximum revocation sentence is the Guidelines maximum. The Court pointed out that the statute differentiates between "sentence of probation" and "original sentence." Moreover, the history of the language shows that Congress may not have given it careful attention and that it "may have been composed with an obsolete federal sentencing regime in the drafter's mind." In "circumstances, where the text, structure, and statutory history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct, the rule of lenity... resolve[s] the statutory ambiguity in Granderson's favor."</p> <p>Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy concurred separately. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, argued that "original sentence" should be interpreted as the term of probation.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1662/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1955/1955_54/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1967/1967_107/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_64/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1957/1957_92/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_96_667/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1613/ <p>May a federal criminal defendant's excess prison time be credited towards this supervised release term, reducing its length?</p><p>No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the length of a supervised release term cannot be reduced by reason of excess time served in prison. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[t]he objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release." The Court found that Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life and that supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1696/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/1956_596/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_2000/ <p>Did Congress intend by "maximum term authorized" in 28 USC section 994(h) the maximum term available for the offense of conviction including any applicable statutory sentencing enhancements?</p><p>Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Commission's interpretation was inconsistent with section 994(h)'s plain language, and therefore "maximum term authorized" must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. "Congress surely did not establish enhanced penalties for repeat offenders only to have the Commission render them a virtual nullity," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer in a dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, argued that the words "maximum term authorized" in section 994(h) were ambiguous, thus the Court should defer to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1726/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_744/ <p>Did the Court of Appeals use a too demanding standard when it ruled that freedom from sexual assault, as included under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process right to liberty, has never been recognized as a federally protected constitutional right and therefore cannot be the basis for a federal prosecution?</p><p>es. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the standard of notice that the Court of Appeals employed was higher than the Constitution requires and too demanding. Justice Souter wrote that the Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded that it takes a Supreme Court decision in a "fundamentally similar" case to make a constitutional right specific enough that its violation can be prosecuted. Law makes it a crime to deprive anyone of rights "secured . . . by the Constitution."</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1717/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_72_1168/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1640/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1340/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_163/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_759/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_51/ <p>Does a medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including marijuana, exist?</p><p>No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. "The statute reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception, " wrote Justice Thomas, therefore, "medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana." Justice John Paul Stevens' concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that "[b]ecause necessity was raised in this case as a defense to distribution, the Court need not venture an opinion on whether the defense is available to anyone other than distributors." Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_151/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_1306/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_251/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_16/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_620/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_69/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1032/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_981/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_78_744/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_80_808/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/1956_289/ <p>Does a criminal defendant who lets a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 error pass without objection in the trial court bear the burden of showing plain error under Rule 52? May a court reviewing Rule 11 error examine the entire record begun at the defendant's first appearance in the matter leading to his eventual plea when considering the effect of any error on the defendant's substantial rights?</p><p>Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held 8-1 that silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plain-error rule and unanimously that a reviewing court may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on substantial rights. The Court reasoned that to hold that Rule 11(h)'s terms imply that the latter half of Rule 52 has no application to Rule 11 errors would amount to finding a partial repeal of Rule 52(b) by implication, a disfavored result that Vonn had not establish enough support for. "The value of finality requires defense counsel to be on his toes, not just the judge, and the defendant who just sits there when a mistake can be fixed cannot just sit there when he speaks up later on," wrote Justice Souter.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_973/ <p>May sentencing courts consider the conduct of a defendant's underlying charges of which she or he has been acquitted?</p><p>Yes. In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent a sentencing court from considering a defendant's conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen G. Breyer concurred. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the additional offense should have been required to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt for sentencing purposes, where a defendant's sentence was lengthened. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, also dissenting, expressed the view that the cases should have been set for full briefing and consideration.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1906/ <p>Is the materiality of falsehood an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank?</p><p>No. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the materiality of falsehood is not an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank. Justice Souter wrote for the court that prosecutors need not prove that a lie was relevant enough to affect the outcome of a bank's decision because the law does not require such materiality.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1228/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_346/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_469/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_5771/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_73_831/ <p>Can a violation of <em>Blakely v. Washington</em>'s rule that all factors used in sentencing enhancements must be found by a jury, not a judge, be found legally harmless?</p><p>Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that <em>Blakely</em> violations do not "necessarily render[] a criminal trial unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence." (quoting <em>Neder v. United States</em>, 527 U.S. 1) As such, the defendant is not entitled to an automatic reversal and the prosecution may attempt to argue that the jury would have returned the same result if the error had not occurred.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_83/ <p><p>Did a conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), require proof of an overt act furthering the conspiracy?</p></p><p><p>No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous ruling that because the federal money laundering law's text did not expressly make committing an overt act an element of the conspiracy offense, the government did not need to prove such an act.</p></p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1293/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_80_2116/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_6297/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_5256/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_119/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_6824/