http://www.oyez.org/issues/criminal-procedure/federal-rules/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Tue, 17 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Interstate Agreement on Detainers creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, a legal order that requires a state to hold a currently imprisoned individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime. In 1997, Michael Bozeman was serving a federal prison sentence at a federal prison in Florida. In January, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama sought temporary custody of Bozeman to arraign him on state firearm charges for which an earlier detainer had been filed. The Agreement provides that a state that obtains a prisoner for purposes of trial must try him within 120 days of his arrival, and if it returns him to his "original place of imprisonment" prior to that trial, charges shall be dismissed. After appearing in Alabama court, Bozeman was returned to federal prison in Florida. When Bozeman returned to Alabama court, his local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that Bozeman had been "returned to the original place of imprisonment" (the federal prison) "prior to" "trial" on state charges being "had." Ultimately, Bozeman was convicted and an appellate court affirmed. In reversing, the Alabama State Supreme Court held that the literal language of the Agreement required dismissal of the state charges.</p> <p>Does the Interstate Agreement on Detainers require the dismissal of criminal charges when a prisoner serving a federal sentence is transferred for a day to be arraigned on state charges and then returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial?</p> 00-492_20010417-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_492/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Oct 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Roland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" both "during and in relation to" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting "use" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an "accessibility and proximity" test.</p> <p>Is evidence of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds alone sufficient to support a conviction for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a predicate narcotics offense under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)?</p> 94-7448_19951030-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_7448/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Jan 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-5004_19850109-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_5004/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 04 Nov 1975 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 74-5566_19751104-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_5566/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1986, Garrit Bates was appointed to serve as the Acme Institute of Technology's treasurer. In 1987, James Jackson, as Acme's president, signed a program participation agreement with the Department of Education that authorized the school to receive student loan checks through the Title IV Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program. Under the GSL program, governing regulations required Acme to return a portion of a loan if the student withdrew from Acme before the term ended. In 1987, Jackson and Bates began a practice of not making GSL refunds. Ultimately, in 1994, Bates was indicted on of "knowingly and willfully misapplying" federally insured student loan funds, in violation of 20 USC section 1097(a). The District Court dismissed Bates's indictment because it lacked an allegation of his "intent to injure or defraud the United States." Reinstating the prosecution, the Court of Appeals concluded that section 1097(a) required the Government to prove only that Bates knowingly and willfully misapplied Title IV funds.</p> <p>Does 20 USC section 1097(a), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to misapply student loan funds insured under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, require an allegation and proof that a defendant specifically intended to injure or defraud either the United States as loan guarantor or another?</p> 96-7185_19971007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_7185/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 03 Nov 1999 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Robert A. Beck, II, of Southeastern Insurance Group (SIG), alleged that after he discovered former senior officer and director Ronald M. Prupis' unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, Prupis enacted a scheme to remove him from SIG. Beck sued Prupis under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Beck alleged that his injury, the loss of his employment, served to further Prupis' conspiracy and therefore provided a cause of action under RICO. The District Court dismissed Beck's RICO conspiracy claim. The court agreed with Prupis that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the act causing Beck's injury was not an act of racketeering, it could not support a RICO cause of action.</p> <p>May a person injured by an action furthering a conspiracy sue under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act even if the action itself was not an act of racketeering?</p> 98-1480_19991103-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1480/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 25 Apr 1983 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 82-5119_19830425-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_82_5119/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 23 Mar 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Blakely pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife and the facts admitted in his plea supported a maximum sentence of 53 months. Washington state law allows a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds "substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so that were not computed into the standard range sentence. The judge in this case imposed an "exceptional" sentence of 90 months after determining Blakely had acted with "deliberate cruelty."</p> <p>Blakely appealed, arguing that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. A state appellate court affirmed the sentence and the state supreme court denied review.</p> <p>Does a fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to increase a sentence beyond the statutory standard range need to be proved by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt?</p> 02-1632_20040323-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1632/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 01 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 <p>William Bourjaily was arrested after receiving a quantity of cocaine in a parking lot from Angelo Lonardo. At Bourjaily's trial, the government introduced statements Lonardo made in a telephone conversation with an informant regarding a "friend" who had questions about the cocaine. The district court, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, found that the government had established that a conspiracy existed between Bourjaily and Lonardo, and that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay.</p> <p>(1) In order to consider the statements of a coconspirator as non-hearsay, must the court determine by evidence independent of the statements themselves that the conspiracy existed and that the defendant and declarant were members of this conspiracy? (2) What is the quantum of proof on which such determinations must be based? (3) Must the court in each case examine the circumstances of such a statement to determine its reliability?</p> 85-6725_19870401-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_6725/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 18 Mar 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-5358_19910318-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_5358/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 02 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>When questioned by federal agents as to the receipt of gifts or money from a company whose employees were members of the union in which he was an officer, James Brogan falsely answered "no." Brogan was subsequently indicted on federal bribery charges and the making of false statements within a federal agency's jurisdiction. Brogan challenged his conviction, arguing that false statements which merely deny wrongdoing, and do not impede federal functions, are protected under the Fifth Amendment. On appeal from an appeals court judgment upholding an adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Brogan certiorari.</p> <p>Is the so-called "exculpatory no" doctrine, excluding from criminal sanction false statements that merely deny one's wrongdoing, consistent with the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination?</p> 96-1579_19971202-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1579/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 31 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from "willfully" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts "willfully" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.</p> <p>Does the term "willfully" in 18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) require proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful and that he knew of the federal licensing requirement for dealing in firearms?</p> 96-8422_19980331-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8422/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court.</p> <p>Does a de novo standard of review apply when a court of appeals reviews a trial court's sentencing guideline determination as to whether an offender's prior convictions were consolidated, and thus related, for sentencing purposes?</p> 99-9073_20010108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_9073/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Dec 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-7260_19901203-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_7260/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 16 Jan 1996 12:00:00 -0500 <p>At his trial on a federal marijuana charge, Charles Carlisle filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court granted the motion even though it was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c), which provides that "[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty..., a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period." In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the verdict and for sentencing, the Court of Appeals held that under Rule 29(c) a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment after submission of the case to the jury.</p> <p>Does a district court have the authority to grant a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal if the motion is filed beyond the seven-day deadline prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)?</p> 94-9247_19960116-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_9247/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, "unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms." In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court found that, because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s "unless clause" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Does 18 USC section 922(g)(1), which forbids felons from possessing firearms and enhances their sentences for a violation, apply to a felon who is allowed under state law to possess rifles and shotguns but not handguns?</p> 97-6270_19980421-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_6270/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 07 Oct 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-422_19871007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_422/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 19 Apr 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1997, Floyd J. Carter donned a ski mask and entered the Collective Federal Savings Bank unarmed. In the process, Carter pushed an exiting customer back into the bank and startled customers already inside. Carter removed almost $16,000 from the bank and fled. After his apprehension, Carter was charged with federal bank robbery, 18 USC Section 2113(a), which punishes "[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes... any... thing of value [from a] bank." Carter pleaded not guilty, claiming that he had not taken the bank's money by force, violence, or intimidation as required of robbery. Carter moved that the District Court instruct the jury that they could consider whether he committed federal bank larceny, USC Section 2113(b), as a lesser included offense in the broader crime of robbery, in which case, Carter could be guilty of larceny without being guilty of robbery. The larceny law punishes "[w]hoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any... thing of value exceeding $1,000 [from a]... bank," with a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, as opposed to robbery's 20-year maximum. The District Court denied the motion. The jury, instructed on robbery alone, returned a guilty verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>May defendants charged with federal bank robbery have the jury consider whether they committed the lesser crime of federal bank larceny?</p> 99-5716_20000419-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_5716/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Apr 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1993, Jaime Castillo and other Branch-Davidians were involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents near Waco, Texas. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers. A jury determined that Castillo, by using firearms in connection with the alleged conspiracy, had violated 18 USC Section 924(c)(1), which read in relevant part: "Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... and if the firearm is a machinegun... to imprisonment for thirty years." During sentencing, the District Court found that Castillo had possessed machineguns and imposed the mandatory 30-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Courts of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether Castillo had used, rather than merely possessed, machineguns. The court also concluded that statutory terms such as "machinegun" did not state elements of a crime separate from that of using a firearm, but instead established factors enhancing a sentence and that the District Court could reimpose the 30-year sentence if it found that machineguns had been actively used. The District Court then reimposed the 30-year sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does the provision of USC Section 924(c)(1), which imposes a stiffer penalty for using a "machinegun" in a crime of violence, state factors enhancing a sentence rather than elements of a separate offense?</p> 99-658_20000424-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_658/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., a corporate promoter of boxing matches, sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of a rival corporation, alleging that King had conducted his corporation's affairs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise...to conduct or participate...in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The District Court dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that RICO applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a "person" and a distinct "enterprise," the affairs of which that "person" improperly conducts. The court concluded that King was part of the corporation, not a "person," distinct from the "enterprise," who allegedly improperly conducted the "enterprise's affairs."</p> <p>Are Don King and his corporation a distinct "person" and "enterprise," such that RICO applies?</p> 00-549_20010418-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_549/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 26 Mar 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-5744_19910326-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_5744/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 03 Oct 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-658_19901003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_658/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Louisiana law authorizes the State to award nontransferable, annually renewable licenses to operate video poker machines. In 1992, Fred Goodson and his family formed Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd. (TSG), a video poker business. Carl Cleveland, a lawyer, assisted Goodson in preparing TSG's video poker license applications, each of which identified Goodson's children as the sole beneficial owners of the partnership. From 1992 through 1995, TSG successfully renewed its license. In 1996, Cleveland and Goodson were charged with money laundering under federal law, along with racketeering and conspiracy in connection with a scheme to bribe state legislators to vote in a manner favorable to the video poker industry. Acts supporting these charges came from federal mail fraud charges, defined as "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining...property by means of...fraudulent...representations." The indictment alleged that Cleveland and Goodson fraudulently concealed that they were the true owners of TSG in the license applications they had mailed to the State because they had tax and financial problems that could have undermined their ability to receive a video poker license. Before trial, Cleveland moved to dismiss the mail fraud counts on the ground that the alleged fraud did not deprive the State of "property." The District Court denied the motion, concluding that licenses constitute property even before they are issued. A jury found Cleveland guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Do state video poker licenses qualify as property for purposes of the federal mail fraud statute?</p> 99-804_20001010-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_804/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 09 Nov 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-6194_19921109-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_6194/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 28 Feb 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-5209_19940228-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_5209/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1994, Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who has three previous convictions for a violent felony, Daniels' sentence was enhanced. After an unsuccessful appeal, Daniels filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Daniels argued that his sentence violated the Constitution because it was based in part on two prior convictions that were themselves unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>May a federal defendant, who has been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, challenge his federal sentence through a motion on the ground that his prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained?</p> 99-9136_20010108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_9136/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Mar 1993 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Between January and April 1990, Thomas Lee Deal committed six bank robberies. In each robbery, he used a gun. Subsequently, Deal was convicted, in a single proceeding, of six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a 5-year prison term for the first such conviction, in addition to the punishment provided for the crime of violence, and requires a 20-year sentence "in the case of [a] second or subsequent conviction under this subsection." The District Court sentenced Deal to 5 years' imprisonment on the first section 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the five other counts, the terms to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does a criminal's second through sixth convictions under section 924(c)(1) in a single proceeding arise "in the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1)?</p> 91-8199_19930301-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_8199/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 29 Nov 1982 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 81-1180_19821129-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1180/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Feb 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>At Vincent Edwards, Reynolds A. Wintersmith, Horace Joiner, Karl V. Fort, and Joseph Tidwell's trial for "conspiring" to "possess with intent to...distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substances," the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of "cocaine or cocaine base (crack)." After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioners' illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. On appeal, the petitioners argued that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word "or" in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines treats cocaine more leniently than crack. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy.</p> <p>May federal judges sentence someone convicted of taking part in a drug conspiracy based on a finding that two illegal drugs were involved, even if the jury might have convicted based on one drug?</p> 96-8732_19980223-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8732/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Dec 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-7873_19921208-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_7873/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 10 Oct 1984 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 83-6061_19841010-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_6061/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 30 Oct 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-7370_19901030-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_7370/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Nov 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 87-1252_19881108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1252/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 09 Nov 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Franois Holloway, a.k.a. Abdu Ali, was charged with several federal offenses, including carjacking. Federal law defines carjacking as "tak[ing] a motor vehicle ... from ... another by force and violence or by intimidation" "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Holloway's accomplice testified that there was no intent to harm the drivers of the cars, just steal their vehicles. However, he said he would have used his gun if he had been given a "hard time." The District Court judge instructed the jury that the requisite intend under law may be conditional. Moreover, the government would satisfy this condition if it had proved to them that the defendant intended to cause death or bodily harm if the drivers refused to turn over their cars. Subsequently, the jury found Holloway guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that a conditional intent to harm was within a reasonable interpretation of the legislative purpose of the carjacking law.</p> <p>Does the federal carjacking law apply to crimes committed with the "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands?</p> 97-7164_19981109-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_7164/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-172_19950221-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_172/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 23 Mar 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 87-6_19880323-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_87_6/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 Mar 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-5691_19900327-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_5691/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 16 Oct 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-925_19911016-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_925/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 22 Feb 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with supervised release. If release conditions are violated, the sentencing court may revoke the release and order the violator to serve part or all of the release term in prison without credit for time previously served on release. In 1994, Cornell Johnson was convicted of conspiring to produce and use counterfeit credit cards. Johnson was sentenced to imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. While on supervised release, Johnson violated its terms. Subsequently, the District Court revoked Johnson's release and ordered him to serve an 18-month prison term to be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The court cited no authority for ordering the new supervised release. The court could have cited a subsection added to the Act in 1994, 18 USC section 3583(h), which explicitly gave it the authority to add the new term; however, Congress made the amendment after Johnson's conviction. On appeal, Johnson argued that the application of the federal law established after his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision.</p> <p>May a district court, under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, impose an additional term of supervised release following the reimprisonment of those who violate the conditions of an initial term of supervised release, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause?</p> 99-5153_20000222-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_5153/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 25 Feb 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>While testifying before a federal grand jury, which was investigating the disposition of proceeds from the alleged drug trafficking of her boyfriend Earl James Fields, Joyce B. Johnson testified that she had received a box of cash that she had used to fund home improvements. Subsequently, Johnson was indicted for perjury under federal law, which proscribes "knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration" under oath before a grand jury. Johnson did not object when the District Court judge instructed the jury that materiality was a question for him to decide, and that he had determined that her statements were material. Afterwards, Johnson was convicted of perjury. However, before her appeal, the Supreme Court handed down a precedent that a jury, rather than a trial judge, must decide the materiality of a false statement. The Court of Appeals concluded the District Court judge had erred, but that any such error did not affect "substantial rights" because its independent review of the record showed that there was overwhelming evidence of materiality and that no reasonable juror could conclude that Johnson's false statements about the money's source were not material to the grand jury's investigation.</p> <p>Must criminal convictions for perjury be reversed when a trial judge fails to let the jury rule on whether the underlying statements were material?</p> 96-203_19970225-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_96_203/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 21 Mar 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Walker's home was severely damaged. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. section 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to "maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. Before both courts, Jones unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.</p> <p>Does the federal arson statute apply to the arson of a private residence?</p> 99-5739_20000321-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_5739/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 05 Oct 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Nathaniel Jones was indicted on federal offenses for using a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence and carjacking. Federal law prescribed varying prison terms based on the extent of the carjacking crime. Specifically, it imposed a maximum of 25 years for crimes resulting in serious bodily injury, but not-more-than-fifteen-years and life sentence clauses were included in the law. The Magistrate Judge explained to Jones that he faced a maximum of fifteen years on the carjacking charge. Based on the Magistrate's judgment, the District Court's instructions to the jury rested on the fact that the government only had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking had occurred to convict Jones for up to fifteen years. Subsequently, the jury found Jones guilty. However, a later report showed one of the carjacking victims had sustained a serious injury to the head as a result of the carjacking. Thus, the District Court imposed a twenty-five year sentence on Jones. The court rejected Jones' arguments that a serious bodily injury had neither been pleaded in the indictment nor proved before the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It held that a serious bodily injury was a sentencing factor, not an element of an offense.</p> <p>Does the federal carjacking law define a single crime with three penalty options dependent on sentencing factors?</p> 97-6203_19981005-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_6203/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Feb 1996 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Petitioners Stacey C. Koon and Laurence M. Powell, Los Angeles police officers, were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force in the beating of Rodney King during an arrest. They were convicted under 18 U. S. C. Section 242 of violating the victim's constitutional rights under color of law. Although the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guideline, 1992 USSG Section 2H1.4, indicated that they should be imprisoned for 70 to 87 months, the District Court granted them two downward departures from that range. The first was based on the victim's misconduct, which significantly contributed to provoking the offense. The second was based on a combination of four factors: (1) that the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison; (2) that the petitioners would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement; (3) that the petitioners had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions; and (4) that the petitioners posed a low risk of recidivism. The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each petitioner to 30 months. The Court of Appeals reviewed the departure decisions utilizing a de novo standard and rejected all of them.</p> <p>Did the Court of Appeals use the wrong standard in deciding whether a federal trial judge had erred in departing from the federal Sentencing Guidelines and giving lighter sentences to two ex-policemen convicted in the beating of Rodney King?</p> 94-1664_19960220-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1664/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1986, after being convicted for simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief, Edward R. Coss, Jr., filed a petition for relief, but the Pennsylvania courts never ruled on the petition. In 1990, after he had served the full sentences for his 1986 convictions, Coss was convicted of aggravated assault. Ultimately, the sentencing court did not consider Coss' 1986 convictions in determining his eligible sentencing range. In choosing a sentence within the applicable range, the court considered several factors including Coss' extensive criminal record, making reference to his 1986 convictions. Coss then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1986 convictions were constitutionally invalid. The Federal District Court denied the petition reasoning that Coss had not been prejudiced by his 1986 counsel's ineffectiveness. The Court of Appeals found that Coss would not have been convicted in 1986 but for the ineffective assistance. The court remanded the case ordering a retrial or resentencing without consideration of the 1986 conviction.</p> <p>May a state prisoner use a federal habeas petition to challenge a current sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an unconstitutional prior conviction for which the sentence has fully expired?</p> 99-1884_20010220-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1884/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 12 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>While living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that "whoever within... any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment," Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made Lewis' acts punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder.</p> <p>Does the federal Assimilative Crimes Act make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute applicable on a federal Army base located in Louisiana?</p> 96-7151_19971112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_7151/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Oct 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-7427_19951003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_7427/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 19 Mar 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-5108_19850319-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_5108/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Congress has provided the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) with the statutory authority to reduce the prison term of an inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony by up to one year, if the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse program. The BOP's implementing regulation categorically denies early release to prisoners whose offense is a felony attended by "the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm." In 1997, Christopher A. Lopez was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Additionally, the court found that Lopez possessed a firearm in connection with his offense. While incarcerated, Lopez requested substance abuse treatment. The BOP found Lopez qualified for its residential drug abuse program, but was found him categorically ineligible for early release. The District Court, in ordering the BOP to reconsider Lopez for early release, held that the BOP may not, based on weapons possession, categorically count out inmates, whose underlying conviction was for a nonviolent crime. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>Does the Bureau of Prisons have the authority to categorically deny consideration for eligibility for early release to inmates convicted of non-violent offenses after they have completed substance abuse programs?</p> 99-7504_20001030-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_7504/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 03 Oct 1984 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 83-912_19841003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_912/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Apr 1957 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Andrew Mallory was arrested by federal officers on charges of rape. Upon arresting Mallory, the officers questioned him until he confessed roughly seven hours later. After the confession, the police officers sought to reach a United States Commissioner for the purpose of arraigning Mallory.</p> <p>Did the questioning of Mallory prior to his appearance before a commissioner violate Due Process and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure?</p> 521_19570401-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/1956_521/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 31 Mar 1986 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In the morning of July 26, 1984, Lamont McLaughlin and a companion, both wearing stocking masks, entered a bank in Baltimore. McLaughlin displayed a handgun and ordered everyone in the bank to put his hands up and not to move. While McLaughlin remained in the lobby area holding the gun, his companion placed about $3,400 in a brown paper bag. A police officer apprehended the two as they left the bank. The police then found that McLaughlin's gun was not loaded. Ultimately, McLaughlin pleaded guilty to charges of bank robbery and bank larceny and was found guilty of assault during a bank robbery "by the use of a dangerous weapon." The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Is an unloaded handgun a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute?</p> 85-5189_19860331-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_85_5189/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 Feb 1996 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After purchasing cocaine, Juan Melendez was charged with violating federal drug laws. The law carried a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Melendez signed a plea agreement stating he would be cooperative. In turn the government agreed to give him a short sentence. The District Court thus sentenced Melendez to ten years in prison, the mandatory minimum. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Does a federal prosecutor's plea agreement that a cooperating defendant be given the minimum sentence authorize a judge to depart below a statutory minimum?</p> 95-5661_19960227-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_95_5661/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Oct 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-964_19901001-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_964/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Mar 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his "carrying" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1).</p> <p>Does the fact that guns were found in a locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car, preclude the application of 18 U section 924(c)(1), which imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime"?</p> 96-1654_19980323-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1654/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 04 Dec 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A federal District Court sentenced Meirl Gilbert Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute. The amount of LSD was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper, or carrier medium, containing the drug. The combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams. Thus, the court ruled that Neal was subject to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, an en banc Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights.</p> <p>Does U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual's revised system for determining LSD amounts take precedence over 21 U.S.C. 841 in determining sentencing?</p> 94-9088_19951204-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_9088/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Mar 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1997, Maria Ohler was arrested and charged with importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, after a customs inspector noticed that someone had tampered with one of Ohler's van interior panels and discovered approximately 81 pounds of marijuana. Before the trial, the government filed in limine motions to admit Ohler's prior felony conviction as character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a)(1). Also before the trial, the District Court denied the motion to admit the conviction as character evidence. After the beginning of the trail, the court ruled that if Ohler testified, evidence of her prior conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). While testifying, Ohler admitted on direct examination that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993. Subsequently, Ohler was found guilty. On appeal, Ohler challenged the District Court's in limine ruling, allowing the government to use her prior conviction for impeachment purposes. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Ohler waived her objection by introducing evidence of the conviction during her direct examination.</p> <p>Does a defendant waive her right to appeal a ruling granting the government's motion to introduce evidence of a prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), if she introduces the prior conviction while testifying on direct examination?</p> 98-9828_20000320-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_9828/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 09 Nov 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Carl J. Pasquantino, David B. Pasquantino and Arthur Hilts smuggled large quantities of liquor from the United States into Canada to evade that country's heavy alcohol import taxes. A federal district court convicted them for violating the federal wire fraud statute, which prohibited the use of interstate wires for "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." The Fourth Circuit affirmed their convictions, rejecting the petitioners' argument that they could not be prosecuted because of the common-law revenue, which rule barred courts from enforcing foreign tax laws.</p> <p>Did a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violate the federal wire fraud statute?</p> 03-725_20041109-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_725/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 11 Jan 1999 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1992, the District Court sentenced Manuel D. Peguero to 274 months of imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to federal drug charges. During sentencing, the court did not inform Peguero of his right to appeal the sentence. In 1996, in a later motion for habeas relief, Peguero claimed that the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) by failing to advise him of his right to appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that, although it failed to advise Peguero of his right, he knew of his right when the sentencing hearing occurred. Thus the court, rejecting Peguero's claim that any violation of Rule 32 is enough to vacate a sentence, held that he was not entitled to relief because he was aware of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that a Rule 32 violation was subject to harmless-error review and concluded that the rule's purpose had been served since Peguero was aware of his right to appeal.</p> <p>Does a District Court's failure to advise a defendant of his right to appeal, as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provide ground for habeas relief when the defendant was aware of his right and elected not to appeal?</p> 97-9217_19990111-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_9217/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 05 Oct 1993 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 92-903_19931005-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_903/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 22 Feb 1999 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A federal criminal statute, 21 U.S.C. section 848(a), proscribes any person from engaging in "continuing criminal enterprise (CCE)," which is defined as involving a violation of federal drug statutes where such a violation was part of a "continuing series of violations." Eddie Richardson, who had organized and managed the Chicago street gang called the Undertaker Vice Lords in order to sell drugs, was charge with a CCE violation. At trial, Richardson proposed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree not only that he committed some "continuing series of violations" but also that the he committed each of the individual "violations" necessary to make up that "continuing series." In other words, the proposed instruction would have required the jury to unanimously agree on which three acts constituted the alleged series of violations. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal and, instead, instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to agree as to the particular offenses. Subsequently, the jury convicted Richardson. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's jury instruction.</p> <p>Does the "continuing criminal enterprise" statute require juror unanimity as to each specific violation of federal law for conviction?</p> 97-8629_19990222-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_8629/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 12 Nov 1980 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 79-1013_19801112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_1013/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Oct 1983 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 82-472_19831005-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_472/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Nov 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Tommy L. Rutledge was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. The District Court convicted Rutledge on both counts. It sentenced him to life imprisonment without possible release on each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Rutledge's argument that his convictions and concurrent life sentences punished him twice for the same offense.</p> <p>Can a criminal be given concurrent life sentences for conspiring to distribute drugs and operating a continuing criminal enterprise?</p> 94-8769_19951127-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_8769/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 08 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Hidalgo County agreed to take federal prisoners into its custody in return for federal money. During this agreement, Brigido Marmolejo, the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, and Mario Salinas, his deputy, accepted money and two watches and a truck respectively, from Homero Beltran-Aguirr, a federal prisoner housed in the county jail, in exchange for permitting his girlfriend to visit him. Ultimately, Salinas was charged with one count of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC section 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to violate RICO, section 1962(d), and two counts of bribery, section 666(a)(1)(B). The jury convicted him on all but the substantive RICO count. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> <p>Is the federal bribery statute, 18 USC section 666, limited to cases in which the bribe has a demonstrated effect upon federal funds? Does the conspiracy prohibition contained in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act apply only when the conspirator agrees to commit two of the predicate acts that RICO forbids?</p> 96-738_19971008-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_738/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Mar 1977 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 75-1344_19770302-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_1344/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 30 Nov 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 87-6431_19881130-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_6431/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Nov 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Reginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more "violent felony" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed "burglary" as a violent felony and in <em>Taylor v. U.S.</em>(1990) the U.S. Supreme Court said the act meant "generic burglary" of a "building or other structure." However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA.</p> <p>May a court sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act look to police reports or complaint applications to determine whether an earlier guilty plea necessarily admitted, and supported a conviction for, generic burglary?</p> 03-9168_20041108-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9168/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 01 Nov 1977 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 76-5761_19771101-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_5796/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 03 Nov 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term "convicted in any court" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small.</p> <p>Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. Does "convicted in any court" include convictions in foreign courts?</p> 03-750_20041103-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_750/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 23 Mar 1993 12:00:00 -0500 <p>John Angus Smith offered to trade an automatic weapon, a MAC-10, to an undercover officer for cocaine. Subsequently, he was charged with numerous firearm and drug trafficking offenses. Federal law imposes mandatory sentence enhancement penalties, specifically 30 years for a "machinegun", if a defendant "during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm." A jury convicted Smith on all counts, which triggered the sentence enhancement. On appeal, Smith argued that the federal penalty for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense covers only situations in which the firearm is used as a weapon, not as a medium of exchange. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the plain language of the penalty does not require that a firearm be used as a weapon, but that it applies to any use of a gun that facilitates, in any fashion, the perpetration of a drug offense.</p> <p>Does trading a gun for drugs make a convicted defendant eligible for sentence enhancement under a federal law, which requires such treatment if the defendant "during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm?"</p> 91-8674_19930323-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_8674/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 30 Nov 1993 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 92-1441_19931130-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1441/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 24 Mar 1993 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-8685_19930324-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_8685/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 31 Mar 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-177_19870331-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_177/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Feb 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 88-7194_19900228-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_7194/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 05 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-6892_19941005-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_6892/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 17 Apr 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-6282_19910417-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_6282/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 13 Oct 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-781_19921013-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_781/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-270_19950320-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_270/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Mar 1983 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 81-1938_19830302-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1938/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 04 Oct 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In <em>Blakely v. Washington</em> (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range.</p> <p>Following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge.</p> <p>In another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases.</p> <p>1.) Does an enhanced sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on the judge's determination of a fact violate the Sixth Amendment? 2.) If so, are the Sentencing Guidelines altogether unconstitutional?</p> 04-104_20041004-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_104/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 15 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Leonard Cotton and others with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base. After a jury convicted them, Cotton and the others received a sentence based on the District Court's finding of drug quantity of at least 50 grams of cocaine base, which implicated certain enhanced penalties. They did not object in the District Court to the fact that the sentences were based on a quantity not alleged in the indictment. While their appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment. Cotton and others then argued before the Court of Appeals that their sentences were invalid under Apprendi, because the drug quantity issue was neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted to the petit jury. The appellate court vacated the sentences on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment.</p> <p>Does the omission from a federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence justify a Court of Appeals' vacating the enhanced sentence, even though the defendant did not object in the trial court?</p> 01-687_20020415-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_687/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Jan 1978 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 77-142_19780111-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_77_142/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 15 Dec 1975 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 74-1141_19751215-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1141/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Dec 1996 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Miguel Gonzales, Orlenis Hernandez Diaz, and Mario Perez were convicted in New Mexico state court on charges arising from their use of guns to holdup undercover officers during a drug sting. After they began to serve their state sentences, they were convicted by a District Court on federal drug and firearm charges related to the sting. Federal law requires a five-year prison sentence for carrying a gun while committing a crime. A Court of Appeals vacated the additional firearms sentences on the ground that they should have run concurrently with the state prison terms.</p> <p>Can the federal mandatory five-year prison term for carrying a gun while committing a crime be served concurrently with a separate state sentence?</p> 95-1605_19961211-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1605/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 10 Jan 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Granderson, convicted for mail destruction, faced potential imprisonment of 0-6 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced him to five years of probation. When Granderson tested positive for cocaine, the court resentenced him under section 3565 of the U.S. Code. The section says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, "the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence." The district court interpreted the phrase "original sentence" to refer to the term of probation imposed (60 months), rather than the 0-6 month imprisonment range set by the Guidelines. The court resentenced Granderson to 20 months' imprisonment.</p> <p>The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Granderson's new sentence. Citing "lenity," the court agreed with Granderson that "original sentence" referred to the potential imprisonment range under the Guidelines, not to the actual probation sentence.</p> <p>United States Code section 3565 says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, "the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence." Does "original sentence" refer to the original imprisonment sentence range set by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, or to the term of probation?</p> 92-1662_19940110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1662/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 15 Apr 1997 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 96-667_19970415-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_96_667/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 12 Jan 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 85-1613_19870112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1613/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 08 Dec 1999 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Roy Lee Johnson had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. The District Court ordered his immediate release. Johnson's 3-year term of supervised release that was yet to be served on the remaining convictions then went into effect. As a result of serving time for the two invalid convictions, Johnson had served 2.5 years' too much prison time. After his release, Johnson filed a motion to credit the excess two and one-half years he was erroneously incarcerated toward his three-year supervised release sentence. The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release commenced upon Johnson's actual release from incarceration, not before. In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted Johnson's argument that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.</p> <p>May a federal criminal defendant's excess prison time be credited towards this supervised release term, reducing its length?</p> 98-1696_19991208-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1696/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 23 Feb 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-2000_19880223-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_2000/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Jan 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>28 USC section 994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to "assure" that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of" adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. Initially, the Guidelines failed to delineate whether the basic statutory maximum persons convicted of a particular offense or the enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense should be applied. After the District Court used and the Court of Appeals affirmed the enhanced sentence for sentencing George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer, who qualified as career criminals, the Commission adopted Amendment 506, which precludes the consideration of statutory sentence enhancements. When the District Court split over whether reduce LaBonte, Hunnewell, and Dyer's sentences, the Court of Appeals found that Amendment 506 was a reasonable implementation of section 994(h)'s directive.</p> <p>Did Congress intend by "maximum term authorized" in 28 USC section 994(h) the maximum term available for the offense of conviction including any applicable statutory sentencing enhancements?</p> 95-1726_19970107-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1726/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Oct 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-744_19851009-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_744/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Jan 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>David W. Lanier was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while he served as a state judge. The jury had been instructed that the Government had to prove, as an element of the offense, that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to liberty, which included the right to be free from sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. The District Court denied Lanier's motion, which sought to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the law is void for vagueness. The en banc Court of Appeals vacated Lanier's convictions for "lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage." The Court of Appeals held that the law may be imposed only if the constitutional right, said to have been violated, is first identified in a decision of the U.S Supreme Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation "fundamentally similar." The court regarded these combined requirements as substantially higher than the "clearly established" standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil cases.</p> <p>Did the Court of Appeals use a too demanding standard when it ruled that freedom from sexual assault, as included under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process right to liberty, has never been recognized as a federally protected constitutional right and therefore cannot be the basis for a federal prosecution?</p> 95-1717_19970107-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1717/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Dec 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-1640_19851202-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1640/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-1340_19941102-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1340/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 09 Jan 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-163_19900109-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_163/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Oct 1975 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 74-759_19751007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_759/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Mar 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. In 1998, the United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive director. The government argued that the Cooperative's activities violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. Although the District Court enjoined it, the Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana. Rejecting the Cooperative's medical necessity defense, the court found the Cooperative in contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court modified its injunction to incorporate a medical necessity defense, under which medically necessary distributions were to be permitted.</p> <p>Does a medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including marijuana, exist?</p> 00-151_20010328-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_151/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Dec 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-1306_19921209-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_1306/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Feb 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-251_19950227-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_251/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 Mar 1984 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 83-620_19840327-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_620/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Mar 1983 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 81-1032_19830302-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1032/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Oct 1994 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 93-981_19941003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_981/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Apr 1981 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 80-808_19810427-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_80_808/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 06 Nov 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 lays out steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule 11(h)'s requirement that any variance from those procedures "which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded" is similar to the general harmless-error rule in Rule 52(a). On February 28, 1997, Alphonso Vonn was charged with federal bank robbery and firearm crimes. That day a Magistrate Judge twice advised him of his constitutional rights. Vonn also signed a statement saying that he had read and understood his rights and he answered yes to the court's questions whether he had understood the court's explanation of his rights and whether he had read and signed the statement. When Vonn later pleaded guilty to robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice required by Rule (11)(c)(3) that he would have the right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently, Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court advised him of the rights he was waiving, but did not mention the right to counsel. Appealing his convictions, Vonn raised Rule 11 for the first time. The Court of Appeals agreed that there had been error and vacated the