The Oyez Project: Criminal Procedure Issues - Discovery and Inspection Decisions

Banks v. Dretke

Was the Fifth Circuit wrong to reject Banks' claim relating to Farr's testimony under Brady v. Maryland on the ground that such a claim must first be made in state court? Was the Fifth Circuit wrong to reject Banks' claim relating to Cook's testimony on the grounds that such a claim should have been raised earlier and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) does not apply?

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held 7-2 that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to dismiss Banks' claim under Brady relating to Farr's testimony and 9-0 that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to deny Banks' appeal based on Cook's testimony. Banks could make his Brady claim relating to Farr's testimony in federal court without have made the claim in state court because he demonstrated both cause for failing to present evidence in state court and evidence that that failure prejudiced the proceedings against him. The Court held that both the district court and the Fifth Circuit wrongly denied Banks' appeal with regard to his Brady claim on Cook's testimony. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) does apply in this case and requires courts to treat Banks' claim relating to Cook's testimony as if it were raised in earlier proceedings.

Bracy v. Gramley

Does a prisoner make a sufficient factual showing to establish "good cause," as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim by showing that the trial judge was steeped in corruption and by making specific allegations as to how his case was affected?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Bracy had made a sufficient factual showing to establish "good cause," as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias in his case. Chief Justice Rehnquist drew heavily on Bracy's contentions that his trial attorney, a former associate of Maloney's, had allegedly been involved in corruption and that he might have agreed to take Bracy's case to trial quickly so that the conviction would deflect any suspicion surrounding the rigged murder cases.

Brady v. Maryland

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Campbell v. United States

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Campbell v. United States

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Clancy v. United States

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Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest

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Goldberg v. United States

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Harris v. Nelson

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Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc.

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Jencks v. United States

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Kerr v. United States District Court

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Kyles v. Whitley, Warden

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Lev v. United States

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Lightfoot v. United States

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Palermo v. United States

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Pennsylvania v. Ritchie

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Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. U.S.

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Rosenberg v. United States

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Roviaro v. United States

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Scales v. United States

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Simmons v. United States

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Swidler & Berlin v. United States

Are communications between a client and his or her lawyer protected under the attorney-client confidentiality doctrine, beyond the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination, even after the client's death?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court reminded that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote public observance of the law by encouraging complete and truthful communication between attorneys and their clients. Confidentiality, even after the client's death, is essential for such honesty in both criminal and civil contexts. The Court held that absent a posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege, people would be likely to withhold information for fear of their friends' or family's reputation, civil liability, and general well-being.

Test v. United States

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United States Dept. Of Justice v. Julian

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United States v. Armstrong

Must criminal defendants who pursue selective-prosecution claims demonstrate people of other races were not prosecuted for similar crimes?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that in order to file selective-prosecution claims, defendants must show that the government failed to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races. "If the claim . . . were well founded," wrote Rehnquist, "it should not have been an insuperable task to prove that persons of a different race were not prosecuted."

United States v. Bagley

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United States v. Lasalle National Bank

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United States v. Nixon

Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune from judicial review?

No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.

United States v. Nobles

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United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc.

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United States v. Zolin

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Wood v. Bartholomew

Did a Court of Appeals err in concluding, in habeas corpus proceedings, that the prosecution's failure to disclose to the accused the inadmissible results of a polygraph test of a witness violated due process?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals's decision was a misapplication of the Court's Brady jurisprudence. Because evidence is material under Brady and the failure to disclose it justifies setting aside a conviction, only where there exists a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different, the Court reasoned that the polygraph results were not evidence and their disclosure would have had no direct effect on the trial's outcome because Bartholomew could have made no mention of them. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer dissented from the summary disposition of the case.