The Oyez Project: Criminal Procedure Issues - Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Death Penalty Decisions

Arave, Warden v. Creech

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Atkins v. Virginia

Is the execution of mentally retarded persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Since it last confronted the issue, the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Moreover, the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty - retribution and deterrence of capital crimes - applies to mentally retarded offenders, due to their lessened culpability. "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender," wrote Justice Stevens. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Justice Clarence Thomas joined both. "This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game," argued Justice Scalia.

Baldwin v. Alabama

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Barclay v. Florida

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Barefoot v. Estelle

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Beck v. Alabama

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Bell v. Ohio

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Blystone v. Pennsylvania

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Booth v. Maryland

Does the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which protects a defendant from cruel and unusual punishment, prohibit a jury from considering a victim impact statement during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial?

Yes. The Court found that the victim impact statement created "a constitutionally unacceptable risk" and violated the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell argued that in a capital case, the jury's sentencing task is based on the defendant as a unique individual and not on the character or impact of the crime on the victim's family. Allowing the content of a victim impact statement to influence the jury could lead it to choose the death penalty for reasons which "were irrelevant to the [defendant's] decision to kill," thus diverting attention from the facts of the crime. Furthermore, concluded Powell, introducing the "emotionally-charged opinions" of family members into the process would erode the "reasoned decisionmaking" which is crucial in capital cases.

Boyde v. California

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Brown v. Payton

Was the 9th Circuit correct to rule the California Supreme Court objectively unreasonable in holding that California's "catch-all" mitigation instruction in capital cases is constitutional as applied to post-crime evidence in mitigation?

No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable to decline to distinguish between pre-crime and postcrime mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court reasonably read the relevant precedent, Boyde v. California (1990), as establishing that the catch-all factor's text was broad enough to accommodate Payton's post-crime religious conversion.

Brown v. Sanders

Was the Eighth Amendment violated when the California Supreme Court upheld a death sentence even though two of the four special aggravating circumstances considered by the jury were found to be invalid?

No. The Court upheld the sentence in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia. The Court established a new rule: invalidated sentencing factors make a sentence unconstitutional if they added aggravating weight to the jury's weighing process, "unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances." In Sanders's case, the two remaining valid special circumstances were sufficient to make him eligible for the death penalty. Furthermore, the two invalided circumstances did not add any improper aggravating weight, because another valid sentencing factor - an omnibus "circumstances of the crime" factor - gave aggravating weight to the same facts. Therefore, the Court ruled, "the erroneous factor could not have 'skewed' the sentence, and no constitutional violation occurred." Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which Justice Souter joined. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, which Justice Ginsburg joined.

Buchanan v. Angelone

Does the Eighth Amendment require that a capital jury be instructed on particular statutory mitigating factors and the concept of mitigating evidence generally?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the concept of mitigation generally and on the four mitigating factors did not violate Buchanan's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that the court's instructions, by directing the jury to base the decision on "all the evidence," afforded the jurors an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence and did not constrain the manner in which the jury was able to give effect to mitigation. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, "'there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors in [Buchanan's] case understood the challenged instructions to preclude consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by [Buchanan].'" Justices Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed in a dissent by Justice Breyer.

Cabana v. Bullock

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Caldwell v. Mississippi

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California v. Ramos

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Caritativo v. California

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Clemons v. Mississippi

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Coker v. Georgia

Was the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape a form of cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment?

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the death penalty was a "grossly disproportionate" punishment for the crime of rape. The Court noted that nearly all states at that time declined to impose such a harsh penalty, with Georgia being the only state that authorized death for the rape of an adult woman. Because rape did not involve the taking of another human life, the Court found the death penalty excessive "in its severity and revocability."

Darden v. Florida

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Darden v. Wainwright

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Darden v. Wainwright

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Eddings v. Oklahoma

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Enmund v. Florida

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Ford v. Wainwright

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Franklin v. Lynaugh

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Furman v. Georgia

Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.

Gardner v. Florida

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Godfrey v. Georgia

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Gomez v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California

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Gregg v. Georgia

Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment?

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.

Harris v. Alabama

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Hitchcock v. Dugger

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Hopkins, Warden v. Reeves

Does the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require jurors in capital cases to be given an option to convict a defendant of offenses that are not lesser-included offenses of the crime charged? Did the Nebraska trial court err in failing to give the requested jury instructions?

No and no. The Court held 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, that (1) in capital cases, a state trial court is not required, under the Constitution, to instruct the jury on offenses that are not lesser included offenses of the charged crime under state law; and (2) the Nebraska trial court did not commit federal constitutional error in failing to give the requested jury instructions as to second-degree murder and manslaughter.

Hopper v. Evans

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Hunter v. Tennessee

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Johnson v. Mississippi

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Johnson v. Texas

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Johnson v. United States

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Jones v. United States

Is a death-sentence-eligible defendant entitled to a jury instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock? Is there a reasonable likelihood that a jury might believe that a death-sentence-eligible defendant would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that they could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation?

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Jones was not entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not require such an instruction and the Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to require such an instruction in every capital case. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has 'a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.' [A] charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest." Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had been led to believe that Jones would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that the jury could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that, "'[a]ccurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury's] determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.' That 'indispensable prerequisite' was not satisfied in this case."

Jurek v. Texas

Is the death penalty a "cruel and unusual" punishment? Is Texas' capital-sentencing procedure unconstitutional?

The Court held that the death penalty was not per se a "cruel and unusual" punishment. Furthermore, the capital sentencing procedure in Texas was not unconstitutional on the theory that it would result in arbitrary and freakish impositions of the death penalty. While death penalty sentencing systems which permit juries to consider only aggravating, and no mitigating, circumstances are unconstitutional, Texas' sentencing system is not like this. Under its sentencing scheme, Texas juries may consider whatever evidence of mitigating circumstances there may be - thus allowing them to ponder not only why the death penalty should be imposed, but also why it should not. These options sufficiently focus the juries' attention on the defendant's unique circumstances and character, thus meeting constitutional requirements of particularity.

Kansas v. Marsh

(1) Does a statute that provides for the death penalty when mitigating and aggravating factors are in equipoise violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment? (2) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment?

No and Yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld the Kansas death penalty statute. The Court found that the Kansas Supreme Court's decision had necessarily rested on a federal constitutional issue, so the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The opinion by Justice Thomas drew a comparison with a similar death penalty statute in Arizona that was upheld in Walton v. Arizona. The Court decided to let the Walton precedent stand and uphold the Kansas statute as well. Even apart from the Walton precedent, however, the Court would have upheld the statute as "consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements." As long as juries are allowed to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence, states are allowed to require the death penalty when aggravating and mitigating factors are equally balanced. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented from the Court's opinion. Justice Souter wrote that various death penalty precedents suggested that the statute could not stand up to "reasoned moral judgment." He called the Kansas death penalty statute "morally absurd," "a moral irrationality," and "obtuse by any moral or social measure." Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that the Court should never have agreed to hear the case.

Lankford v. Idaho

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Lewis v. Jeffers

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Lockett v. Ohio

Did the Ohio law violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by limiting the consideration of mitigating factors?

Yes. The Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required, in all but the rarest capital cases, that sentencers not be precluded from considering a range of mitigating factors before imposing the death penalty. These factors included any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense proffered as a reason for a sentence less than death. The Court held that the Ohio statute did not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Constitution.

Lowenfield v. Phelps

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Maynard v. Cartwright

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McCleskey v. Kemp

Did the statistical study prove that McCleskey's sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Court held that since McCleskey could not prove that purposeful discrimination which had a discriminatory effect on him existed in this particular trial, there was no constitutional violation. Justice Powell refused to apply the statistical study in this case given the unique circumstances and nature of decisions that face all juries in capital cases. He argued that the data McCleskey produced is best presented to legislative bodies and not to the courts.

McKoy v. North Carolina

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Mills v. Maryland

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Oregon v. Guzek

Is there a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to introduce evidence of innocence during the sentencing phase of a trial?

No. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the Court: "We can find nothing in the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments that provides a capital defendant a right to introduce new evidence of this kind at sentencing." States are free "to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted." This can include excluding the introduction of evidence of innocence from the sentencing phase.

Parker v. Dugger

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Payne v. Tennessee

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Penry v. Johnson

Was a Texas trial court's supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence of mental retardation under the state's "special circumstances" for sentencing in capital murder cases to a jury constitutionally adequate? Does the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled interview with the defendant violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination?

No and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the supplemental instruction was constitutionally inadequate. "Any realistic assessment of the manner in which the supplemental instruction operated would therefore lead to the same conclusion we reached in Penry I," wrote Justice O'Connor "'A reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.'" Unanimously, the Court held that "considerable doubt" that the psychiatric report "even if erroneous, had a 'substantial and injurious effect'" on the verdict, meant not overturning the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of Penry's Fifth Amendment claim.

Penry v. Lynaugh

Was Penry's sentence cruel and unusual punishment?

The Court partially affirmed and partially reversed the lower court's decision. Justice O'Connor argued that the jury was improperly instructed and should have been told that it could have considered Penry's mental deficiencies when imposing its sentence. However, she rejected Penry's blanket claim that generally the Eighth Amendment does not allow death sentences for retarded defendants.

Proffitt v. Florida

Is the death penalty a "cruel and unusual" punishment? Is Florida's capital-sentencing procedure unconstitutional?

No and no. The Court held that the death penalty was not a "cruel and unusual" punishment per se, and that Florida's capital-sentencing procedure was not unconstitutionally arbitrary and/or capricious. Although empowering trial judges with sole sentencing authority, the statutory procedure tightly prescribed their relevant decision-making process. The procedure requires sentencing judges to focus on both the crime's circumstances and the defendant's character by weighing eight statutory aggravating factors against seven statutory mitigating factors. Furthermore, sentencing judges are required to submit a written explanation of their death-sentence finding for the purpose of automatic review by Florida's Supreme Court. Such strict requirements sufficiently safeguard against the presence of any constitutional deficiencies arising from an arbitrary and/or capricious imposition of the death penalty.

Pulley v. Harris

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Richmond v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Department Of Corrections

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Ring v. Arizona

Does Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violate the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee by entrusting to a judge the finding of facts sufficient to impose the death penalty?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operates as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be "exposed...to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone," the Court overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, insofar it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. "The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death," wrote Justice Ginsburg.

Roberts v. Louisiana

Does Louisiana's death-penalty sentencing scheme violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' safeguards against arbitrary and capricious death penalty impositions?

Yes. By mandating the death penalty's imposition for certain crimes, Louisiana's sentencing scheme fails to afford juries the constitutionally required opportunity to consider any mitigating factors presented either by the circumstances of the crime or the individual offender's character. The Supreme Court also held that by requiring jurors to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second-degree murder, even if no evidence exits to support such verdicts, Louisiana's sentencing scheme encourages them to disregard their oaths by recommending a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel that the death penalty is inappropriate.

Roberts v. Louisiana

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Romano v. Oklahoma

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Roper v. Simmons

Does the execution of minors violate the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the 14th Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rhenquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.

Skipper v. South Carolina

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Smith v. Texas

Was the Eighth Amendment violated by jury instructions that told jurors to give effect to mitigating evidence only by voting "no" on what would otherwise be affirmative responses to two special issues relating to deliberateness and future dangerousness?

In a 7-2 per curiam opinion, the Court held that instructing the jury to return a false answer to a special issue to avoid a death sentence did not allow the jury to fully consider Smith's relevant mitigating circumstances. The Court cited its decision in Penny v. Johnson (2001), which held a similar instruction unconstitutional.

Sochor v. Florida

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South Carolina v. Gathers

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Spaziano v. Florida

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Stanford v. Kentucky

Does the imposition of the death sentence on convicted capital offenders below the age of 18 years old, violate the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that in weighing whether the imposition of capital punishments on offenders below the age of eighteen is cruel and unusual, it is necessary to look at the given society's evolving decency standards. With respect to American society, there is no national consensus regarding the imposition of capital punishments on 17- or 16-year-old individuals. Of the 37 states which permit capital punishment, 12 prohibit the death penalty for offenders below the age of 17 while 15 states prohibit capital punishment for 16 year olds. Moreover, discrepancies in national opinion polls, interest group views, and professional association studies, all indicate a lack of unanimity concerning the acceptability of death sentences for such relatively young offenders. Thus, the decision whether to subject 17 or 16 year olds to capital punishment must be made locally by the states and cannot be categorically pronounced as cruel and unusual punishment at this time.

Sumner v. Shuman

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Thompson v. Oklahoma

Would the execution of a 15 year old violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments"?

Yes. After noting that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the execution of a person under the age of 16 was unconstitutional. In noting the uniform ban among all relevant state statutes against the execution of one under the age of 16, the Court explained that such an act would violate the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The case was reversed and remanded.

Tison v. Arizona

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Tuggle v. Netherland

Did the Court of Appeals correctly interpret Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, to establish a rule that, in States that do not weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances, a death sentence may be upheld on the basis of one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for which another aggravating factor may have been found to be invalid?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Zant was incorrect. The Court reasoned that the record here does not provide comparable support for the death sentence because, even after elimination of the invalid aggravator, the death sentence in Zant rested on two remaining unimpeached aggravating factors. Moreover, the Court noted, the Ake error prevented Tuggle from developing his own evidence to rebut the Commonwealth and to enhance his defense in mitigation, allowing the Commonwealth's psychiatric evidence to go unchallenged, which may have unfairly increased its persuasiveness and affected the jury's decision to impose death rather than life imprisonment.

Tuilaepa v. California

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United States v. Jackson

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Walton v. Arizona

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Woodson v. North Carolina

Did the mandatory death penalty law violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the North Carolina law was unconstitutional. The Court found three problems with the law: First, the law "depart[ed] markedly from contemporary standards" concerning death sentences. The historical record indicated that the public had rejected mandatory death sentences. Second, the law provided no standards to guide juries in their exercise of "the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live and which shall die." Third, the statute failed to allow consideration of the character and record of individual defendants before inflicting the death penalty. The Court noted that "the fundamental respect for humanity" underlying the Eighth Amendment required such considerations.

Zant v. Stephens

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Zant v. Stephens

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