The Oyez Project: Criminal Procedure Issues - Right to Counsel Decisions

Alabama v. Shelton

Does the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, as defined in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, apply to a defendant who was sentenced to a suspended sentence?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held, according to Argersinger, that a suspended sentence that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded "the guiding hand of counsel" in the prosecution for the crime charged. The Court reasoned that, because the invocation of the suspended incarceration would constitute a prison term imposed for the assault offense of which defendant was convicted without the assistance of counsel, the Constitution required the provision of counsel. Justice Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that the Court's prior decisions emphasized actual imprisonment as the touchstone of entitlement to appointed counsel.

Anonymous v. Baker

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Argersinger v. Hamlin

Do the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a right to counsel to defendants who are accused of committing misdemeanors?

In Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) the Court found that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required states to provide an attorney to indigent defendants in cases involving serious crimes. In this case, a unanimous Court extended that right to cover defendants charged with misdemeanors who faced the possibility of a jail sentence. Justice Douglas's plurality opinion described the intricacies involved in misdemeanor charges and the danger that unrepresented defendants may fall victim to "assembly-line justice." Thus, in order to guarantee fairness in trials involving potential jail time, no matter how petty the charge, the Court found that the state was obligated to provide the accused with counsel.

Baldasar v. Illinois

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Brewer v. Williams

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Burger v. Kemp

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Burgett v. Texas

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Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States

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Carnley v. Cochran

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Cash v. Culver

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Chewning v. Cunningham

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Coleman v. Alabama

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Cuyler v. Sullivan

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Escobedo v. Illinois

Was Escobedo denied the right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment?

Yes. Justice Goldberg, in his majority opinion, spoke for the first time of "an absolute right to remain silent." Escobedo had not been adequately informed of his consitutitonal right to remain silent rather than to be forced to incriminate himself. The case has lost authority as precedent as the arguments in police interrogation and confession cases have shifted from the Sixth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment, emphasizing whether the appropriate warnings have been given and given correctly, and whether the right to remain silent has been waived.

Evitts v. Lucey

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Faretta v. California

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Fellers v. United States

(1) Was the appellate court correct to rule that officers did not violate Fellers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel because officers did not interrogate him? (2) Should Fellers' statements in the jailhouse - given after police Mirandized him - be suppressed because they were fruits of an unconstitutional interview in his home?

Question 1: No. Question 2: Remanded. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that officers violated Fellers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel by deliberately eliciting incriminating information from him after an indictment and in the absence of a lawyer. The Court rejected the appellate court's argument that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was irrelevant because police did not "interrogate" Fellers at his home. The Court sent the case back to the appellate court to determine - under the Sixth Amendment - whether Fellers' statements in jail should be suppressed because they were "fruits" of his unconstitutional questioning at home.

Ferguson v. Georgia

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Florida v. Nixon

1.) Is a defense lawyer's use of a strategy that concedes the defendant's guilt ineffective assistance of counsel if the strategy was pursued without the explicit approval of the defendant? 2.) Should counsel be held to a standard that considers whether counsel's statements were deficient and prejudicial to the defendant, or should counsel be considered ineffective per se?

In a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court ruled that Nixon's lawyer's strategy - pursued without Nixon's express approval - did not automatically qualify the lawyer as ineffective. The Court reversed the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court, faulting that court for inappropriately applying presumptions of prejudice and deficient performance. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent." Nixon's lawyer would have needed Nixon's consent for a formal guilty plea, but the Court ruled that the tactic of effectively conceding guilt in order to concentrate on the sentencing phase of the trial was legitimate as long as the defendant was informed of the strategy. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the decision of the case.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli

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Geders v. United States

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Gideon v. Wainwright

Did the state court's failure to appoint counsel for Gideon violate his right to a fair trial and due process of law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?

In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that Gideon had a right to be represented by a court-appointed attorney and, in doing so, overruled its 1942 decision of Betts v. Brady. In this case the Court found that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, which should be made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black called it an "obvious truth" that a fair trial for a poor defendant could not be guaranteed without the assistance of counsel. Those familiar with the American system of justice, commented Black, recognized that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."

Glover v. United States

Is a significant increase on a prison sentence required in order to show prejudice in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Court of appeals erred in engrafting onto the prejudice branch of the Strickland test the requirement that any increase in sentence must meet a standard of significance. Thus, the denial of Glover's motion to correct his sentence was reversed and remanded. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Court of Appeals erred "because there is no obvious dividing line by which to measure how much longer a sentence must be for the increase to constitute substantial prejudice. ... Although the amount by which a defendant's sentence is increased by a particular decision may be a factor to consider in determining whether counsel's performance in failing to argue the point constitutes ineffective assistance, ...it cannot serve as a bar to a showing of prejudice."

Hamilton v. Alabama

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Herring v. New York

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Hudson v. North Carolina

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In Re Groban

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Iowa v. Tovar

Given the 6th Amendment's right to counsel, to what extent must a defendant be informed of the consequences of pleading guilty while waiving the right to an attorney?

In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Tovar's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. In a case like Tovar's, the Sixth Amendment requires the judge to inform the accused of the charges against him, of his right to counsel regarding his plea, and of the range of punishments he faces if he pleads guilty. The Court decided Tovar's trial court judge satisfied these requirements and that Tovar's waiver of his right to counsel was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."

Jones v. Barnes

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Kimmelman v. Morrison

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Kuhlmann v. Wilson

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Lassiter v. Department Of Social Services

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Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department Of Correction v. Fretwell

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Maine v. Moulton

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Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.

Does a criminal defendant have a constitutional right to choose to represent himself on direct appeal?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that here is no constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. "We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing a right of self-representation on appeal," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Noting that the rights established by the Sixth Amendment "are presented strictly as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself" and that the Amendment "does not include any right to appeal," Justice Stevens concluded, "[i]t necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal." Justice Stevens added "[o]ur experience has taught us that "a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney." Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.

Massiah v. United States

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Mckaskle v. Wiggins

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Mcneal v. Culver

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Mcneil v. Wisconsin

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Mempa v. Rhay

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Michigan v. Harvey

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Michigan v. Jackson

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Mickens v. Taylor

Must a defendant show that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation when the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation in such a situation, a defendant must establish that a conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance. The Court rejected Mickens's argument that where the trial judge neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict the defendant, to obtain reversal, need only show that his lawyer was subject to a conflict of interest, not that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. In doing so, the Court noted that a defendant alleging ineffective assistance generally must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Middendorf v. Henry

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Milton v. Wainwright

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Moore v. Michigan

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Morris v. Slappy

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Nichols v. United States

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Nix v. Whiteside

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Nix v. Williams

Should evidence resulting in an arrest be excluded from trial because it was improperly obtained?

No. The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body even absent Williams's statements.

Patterson v. Illinois

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Perry v. Leeke

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Reynolds v. Cochran

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Roe v. Flores-Ortega

Does trial counsel have a duty to file a notice of appeal following a guilty plea if the defendant has not requested so, but has been informed of his appeal rights?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that counsel is not always required to file a notice of appeal after their clients plead guilty unless the clients specifically ask them to so. "We cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case counsel's failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable and therefore deficient," Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. "We therefore reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal," concluded Justice O'Connor. In dissent, Justice David Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, wrote that attorneys should be required to consult with their clients about possible appeals in virtually all cases, even those in which the defendants plead guilty.

Rompilla v. Beard

Did the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel require counsel to try to obtain material counsel had known the prosecution would probably use at the trial's sentencing phase?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rompilla's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make reasonable efforts to examine the file on Rompilla's prior conviction for rape and assault. Moreover, counsel had known the prosecution would probably present the prior conviction to the jury during sentencing. In that file counsel would have found mitigating evidence about Rompilla's troubled childhood and mental health.

Satterwhite v. Texas

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Scott v. Illinois

Did the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require Illinois to provide Scott with trial counsel?

A plurality held that Illinois had not violated the Constitution. Writing for four of the justices, Rehnquist clarified the Court's holding in Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) and argued that states could only sentence a convicted criminal to imprisonment if that person had been represented by counsel. Since Scott was not sentenced to imprisonment, even though the applicable statute allowed for it, the state was not obligated to provide counsel. Rehnquist called that line of reasoning "the central premise of Argersinger."

Skinner v. Louisiana

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Strickland v. Washington

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Texas v. Cobb

Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extend to crimes that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does not necessarily extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged. Since the right to counsel was offense specific, and the offenses were separate, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating [Cobb] regarding the murders, and [Cobb's] confession was therefore admissible." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

United States v. Martinez-Salazar

s a defendant's peremptory challenge right impaired or denied when he or she peremptorily challenges a potential juror, whom the district court erroneously refused to excuse for cause, and the defendant thereafter exhausts his peremptory challenges?

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if the defendant elects to cure such an error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right." The Court also concluded that the loss of a peremptory challenge did not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

United States v. Cronic

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United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez

If a trial court judge wrongly denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney of his own choosing, is the defendant automatically entitled to have his conviction overturned?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of one's own choosing is "structural" error. Unlike some other kinds of errors in which a defendant must also prove that the result would likely have been different had his rights not been violated, structural errors must result in automatic reversal of the conviction. "[T]he erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the 'framework within which the trial proceeds,'" Justice Scalia wrote. "It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. ... Harmless error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe."

United States v. Gouveia

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United States v. Henry

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United States v. Monsanto

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United States v. Morrison

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United States v. Tucker

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Weatherford v. Bursey

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Wheat v. United States

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White v. Maryland

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Wiggins v. Smith

Does a criminal defendant's attorneys' failure to investigate his background and present mitigating evidence of his unfortunate life history at his capital sentencing proceedings constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the performance of Wiggins's attorneys at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that Wiggins's counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation because, among other things, standard practice in Maryland in 1989 included the preparation of a social history report, which his attorneys did not commission even though the necessary funds were available. The Court concluded that Wiggins's counsels' failures prejudiced his defense. "Had the jury been able to place [Wiggins's] excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Yarborough v. Gentry

Was a federal appellate court correct in determining that a state appellate court was "objectively unreasonable" for ruling that Gentry's Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was not violated?

No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that the state appellate court was not "objectively unreasonable" in determining that Gentry's effective-counsel right was not violated. If a state court rejects an ineffective-assistance claim, a federal court may reverse this only if the decision was "objectively unreasonable." The right to effective assistance of counsel "is denied when a defense attorney's performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness." While Gentry's lawyer "was no Aristotle," the federal judiciary must respect the state court's reasonable conclusion that the lawyer was sufficient.