http://www.oyez.org/issues/criminal-procedure/confrontation/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Tue, 21 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-497_19870421-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_497/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 27 Apr 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 87-578_19880427-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_87_578/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 16 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Dale G. Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a pro se civil rights action to contest the conditions of his confinement. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Becker's complaint. In appealing, Becker, still pro se, filed his notice of appeal using a government-printed form, on which he filled in all of the required information. On the line labeled "Counsel for Appellant" Becker typed, but did not sign, his name. The form contained no indication of a signature requirement. The District Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the Court of Appeals, and granted Becker leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, after notifying Becker that the court would not hold him to the same standards it required of attorneys in stating his case, dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The court held that the notice of appeal was fatally defective because it was not signed.</p> <p>When a party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, does the failure to sign the notice of appeal require the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal?</p> 00-6374_20010416-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_6374/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-381_19870422-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_381/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 13 Jan 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-6757_19880113-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_6757/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Michael Crawford stabbed a man he claimed tried to rape his wife. During Crawford's trial, prosecutors played for the jury his wife's tape-recorded statement to the police describing the stabbing. The statement contradicted Crawford's argument that he stabbed the man in defense of his wife. Because it was pre-recorded, Crawford could not cross-examine the statement. The jury convicted Crawford for assault.</p> <p>Crawford claimed the playing of his wife's statement, with no chance for cross-examination, violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The state supreme court upheld the conviction, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts (1980). That decision allowed the admission of out-of-court testimony against a defendant if that testimony was reliable.</p> <p>Does playing out-of-court testimony to a jury, with no chance for cross-examination, violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him?"</p> 02-9410_20031110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_9410/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Dec 1986 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 85-5939_19861201-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_5939/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 07 Oct 1980 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 78-1841_19801007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_78_1841/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Mar 2006 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did not testify, but the 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in <em>Crawford v. Washington</em>. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not "testimonial" and was therefore different from the statements at issue in <em>Crawford</em>.</p> <p>Under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in <em>Crawford v. Washington</em>, may statements made to police during investigation of a crime, though not made with the intent to preserve evidence, be admitted in court without allowing defendants to cross-examine the person who made the original statements?</p> 05-5224_20060320-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_5224/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 22 Apr 1996 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Brian Degen was indicted in 1989 for distributing marijuana, laundering money, and related crimes. On the same day the district court unsealed the indictment, it also unsealed a civil forfeiture complaint for properties allegedly worth $5.5 million and purchased with proceeds of Degen's drug sales or used to facilitate the sales. Degen is a citizen of both the U.S. and Switzerland, and in 1988 he and his family moved to Switzerland. He has not returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges and by treaty the Swiss are not obliged to extradite their nationals to the U.S. While residing in Switzerland, Degen filed an answer in the civil case, claiming that the forfeiture was barred by the statute of limitations and was an unlawful retroactive application of forfeiture laws. The district court did not consider his arguments. Instead, it entered summary judgment against him, holding that he was not entitled to be heard in the civil action because he remained outside the country, unamenable to criminal prosecution. On appeal, the government argued that the district court's inherent powers authorized it to strike Degen's claims under the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine."</p> <p>Should the fugitive disentitlement doctrine be extended to allow a court in a civil forfeiture suit to enter judgment against a claimant, without any opportunity to be heard, because the claimant is a fugitive from, or otherwise is resisting, a related criminal prosecution?</p> 95-173_19960422-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_95_173/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Jan 1986 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-1279_19860122-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1279/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 06 Nov 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-5916_19901106-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_5916/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Apr 1989 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 88-5014_19890424-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_88_5014/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 08 Dec 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1993, the State of Maryland tried Anthony Bell and Kevin Gray jointly for the murder of Stacy Williams. The State entered Bell's confession into evidence at trial. According to the trial judge's order, the police detective who read the confession said the word "deleted" or "deletion" whenever Gray's name appeared. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked the detective if Bell's confession led to Gray's arrest. The detective answered that it did. Ultimately, Gray testified and Bell did not. When instructing the jury, the trial judge specified that the confession was evidence only against Bell. The jury convicted both Bell and Gray. Setting aside Gray's conviction, Maryland's intermediate appellate court applied Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, in which the Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confessing codefendant, the introduction of such a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. Maryland's highest court reinstated the conviction.</p> <p>Does Bruton v. United States apply to a redaction that replaces a name with an obvious blank space or a symbol or a word such as "deleted?"</p> 96-8653_19971208-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_8653/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Mar 2006 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Hershel Hammon was charged with domestic abuse after police responded to a call from his house. When they arrived, Hammon's wife told police that her husband had beaten her. While Mrs. Hammon did not testify at Mr. Hammon's trial, the police officer did testify about what she had told him. Mr. Hammon's attorney objected to the admission of the testimony without cross-examination, but the judge allowed it under the "excited utterance" exception to the general rule against hearsay testimony (second-hand reports of what someone said or did). The police officer was not trying to preserve evidence but merely to assess the incident, so Mrs. Hammon's statements to him were not the sort of testimony prohibited under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <em>Crawford v. Washington</em>.</p> <p>Under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in <em>Crawford v. Washington</em>, may statements made to police during investigation of a crime, though not made with the intent to preserve evidence, be admitted in court without allowing defendants to cross-examine the person who made the original statements?</p> 05-5705_20060320-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_5705/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Dec 1975 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 74-5822_19751201-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_5822/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 27 Apr 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 87-5428_19880427-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_87_5428/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Apr 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-260_19900418-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_260/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 06 Nov 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-1124_19911106-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_1124/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-572_19870422-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_572/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 21 Apr 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Marvin Klehr purchased inadequate cattle feed containers from A. O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. (Harvestore) in 1974. Over a long period of time, the containers damaged Klehr's cattle feed. In 1993, Klehr filed a civil claim against Harvestore under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). The District Court dismissed Klehr's suit, ruling that the four-year time limit for bringing a civil RICO suit had expired. Klehr claimed that he was not at fault for failing to discover the injury within four years, because Harvestore purposely designed the containers to conceal their inadequacy. <br /> <br />The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court. The Eighth Circuit held that Klehr should have discovered the pattern of racketeering activity much earlier. Since the statute of limitations began from the time Klehr could reasonably be expected to have discovered the pattern, Klehr was out of time. The Eighth Circuit's "pattern of activity" rule contradicted the Third Circuit's "last predicate act" rule, which allows a plaintiff to recover damages accumulated since the first injury as long as the last RICO violation ("last predicate act") happened within four years of the lawsuit.</p> <p>1)Does the time limit for filing a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO) begin after the plaintiff discovers the last illegal act ("last predicate act") at the end of a pattern of racketeering activity? <br /> <br />2)If the plaintiff demonstrates "fraudulent concealment" of the injury inflicted, can RICO's civil-claim limitations period be extended?</p> 96-663_19970421-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_96_663/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 09 Dec 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-6807_19851209-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_6807/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 29 Mar 1999 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Benjamin Lee Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly, and Gary Barker were arrested after stealing liquor and guns and abducting Alex DeFilippis, who was later shot and killed. Under police questioning, Mark admitted stealing liquor, but claimed that Benjamin and Barker stole the guns and that Benjamin shot DeFilippis. When Virginia called Mark as a witness at Benjamin's subsequent criminal trial, Mark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court then admitted his statements to the police as declarations of an unavailable witness against penal interest. The court overruled Benjamin's objections that the statements were not against Mark's penal interest because they shifted responsibility for the crimes to Barker and Benjamin, and that their admission would violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Subsequently, Benjamin was convicted of the DeFilippis murder and other crimes. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because Mark's statements fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. The court also held that the statements were reliable because Mark knew that he was implicating himself as a participant in numerous crimes and because the statements were independently corroborated by other evidence at trial.</p> <p>Does trial evidence that includes out-of-court statements, that admit some wrongdoing but place primary blame on the defendant, by an alleged, nontestifying accomplice violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right to confront all adverse witnesses?</p> 98-5881_19990329-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_5881/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Apr 1990 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Sandra Ann Craig, the operator of a kindergarten and pre-school facility, was accused of sexually abusing a six-year-old child. Over Craig's objections, a trial court allowed the alleged child victim to testify via one-way closed circuit television. The child testified outside the courtroom while Mrs. Craig, through electronic communication with her lawyer, could make objections. The judge and jury also viewed the testimony in the courtroom. This was done in order to avoid the possibility of serious emotional distress for the child witness. The trial court convicted Craig, but the Maryland high court reversed.</p> <p>Did the closed-circuit testimony violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment?</p> 89-478_19900418-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_478/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Dec 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-6109_19871202-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_6109/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 26 Mar 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-149_19910326-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_149/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 02 Nov 1999 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact to establish procedures for resolution of one state's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another state. Under the Compact Clause, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. In order to resolve outstanding murder and robbery charges against Michael Hill, an Ohio prisoner, the State of New York lodged a detainer against him under the IAD. Hill filed a request for disposition of the detainer, pursuant to IAD Article III, and was returned to New York. Article III provides that, upon such a request, that the prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days. Thereafter, Hill's counsel agreed to a trial date outside the 180-day period. Subsequently, Hill moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired. The trial court denied Hill's motion, concluding that his defense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of Hill's IAD rights. After his conviction and subsequent appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss. In reversing, the state Court of Appeals ordered that Hill's indictment be dismissed because his counsel's agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive his IAD speedy trial rights.</p> <p>Does a defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the 180-day time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers waive the defendant's right to a speedy trial?</p> 98-1299_19991102-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1299/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 25 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) authorizes a civil enforcement action by aggrieved employees or their union against a covered employer who fails to give 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, but provides no limitations period for such an action. In 94-835, the United Steelworkers of America filed a WARN claim, charging Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. with laying off 85 employees without giving the required 60-day notice. In rejecting Crown Cork's contention that the statute of limitations had run, the District Court held that the source of the limitations period for WARN suits is state law and that the union's suit was timely under any of the arguably applicable Pennsylvania statutes. In 94-834, another District Court granted summary judgment for North Star Steel Company, holding the nonunion employees' suit barred under a limitations period borrowed from the National Labor Relations Act, which the court believed was more analogous to WARN than any state law. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that a WARN limitations period should be borrowed from state, not federal, law.</p> <p>Is state law the proper source of the limitations period for civil actions brought to enforce the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act?</p> 94-834_19950425-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_834/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 16 Oct 1996 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Johnny Lynn Old Chief was involved in a disturbance involving gunfire. Subsequently, Old Chief was charged with violating federal law, 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. The earlier crime that was charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury. Old Chief moved for an order requiring the Government to refrain from revealing the name and nature of his prior assault conviction, which, he argued, would unfairly tax the jury's capacity to hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence, on current charges of assault, possession, and violence with a firearm. Old Chief offered to stipulate, or concede, to the fact of the prior conviction without releasing its name or nature. The Government refused to join the stipulation. The Government argued it had the right to present its own evidence of the prior conviction. The District Court ruled in favor of the Government. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals found that the Government was entitled to introduce probative evidence to prove the prior offense regardless of the stipulation offer.</p> <p>Does a District Court have the authority to reject a defendant's offer to conceded a prior conviction and admit the prosecution's presentation of it when the name or nature of the conviction raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction?</p> 95-6556_19961016-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_6556/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 07 Dec 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-7749_19921207-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_7749/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 23 Apr 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-615_19910423-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_615/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Mar 1987 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Ronald Calder was a native of Iowa working in Puerto Rico, He was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. After posting bail, he fled to his home state. Puerto Rico submitted a petition to Branstad, Iowa's governor at the time, to extradite Calder for court proceedings. Branstad refused.</p> <p>Do federal courts have the power to order governors to fulfill obligations under the Constitution's Extradition Clause in Article IV, Section 2?</p> 85-2116_19870330-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_2116/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-281_19870428-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_281/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 24 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-790_19950424-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_790/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 14 Jan 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 85-1433_19870114-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1433/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 23 Mar 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-130_19870323-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_130/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 07 Oct 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-5963_19871007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_5963/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 18 Mar 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 83-2143_19850318-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_2143/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 07 Oct 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-5630_19851007-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_5630/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 01 Apr 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-712_19920401-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_712/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 01 Mar 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Three days after his arrest by local police on state narcotics charges, Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to the Secret Service that federal reserve notes found in his home were counterfeit. When he was subsequently charged with the federal offense of possession of counterfeit currency, Alvarez defended himself by claiming that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible. Alvarez cited 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c), which pronounced separate charge-based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's decision to uphold the confession, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.</p> <p>Does federal statute 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c), declaring separate charge-based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention, apply to suspects that are held only on state or federal charges?</p> 92-1812_19940301-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_92_1812/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 02 Dec 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-1300_19921202-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_1300/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 02 Oct 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 89-1363_19901002-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_1363/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Dec 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-1580_19851203-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1580/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Nov 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 86-877_19871104-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_877/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 05 Nov 1984 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 83-1307_19841105-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1307/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 12 Nov 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada and seized the illegal drugs that it was carrying. With the help of the truck drivers, the police set up a sting. Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza came for the truck and were subsequently arrested. A jury convicted Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza of conspiracy, but the trial judge ordered a new trial under Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent that held a conspiracy terminates when "'there is affirmative evidence of...defeat of the object of the conspiracy.'" In other words, the federal government could not prosecute the drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the government seized the drugs. The new jury convicted the two men once again. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence presented at the second trial was insufficient to show that Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza had joined the conspiracy before the drug seizure.</p> <p>Is the Ninth Circuit rule -- that a conspiracy ends automatically when the object of the conspiracy becomes impossible to achieve -- valid?</p> 01-1184_20021112-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1184/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 Feb 1973 12:00:00 -0500 <p>At the conclusion of an undercover drug investigation, Richard Russell was arrested by Washington police and eventually convicted in a district court for drug manufacturing crimes. Russell challenged his conviction as the result of unconstitutional entrapment practices, since an undercover agent supplied him with an essential ingredient of his drug manufacturing operation. On appeal from an adverse Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.</p> <p>Does an undercover law enforcement officer's participation in criminal conduct constitute entrapment in violation of the Fifth Amendment's due process protections?</p> 71-1585_19730227-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1972/1972_71_1585/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Apr 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 91-872_19920420-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_872/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Nov 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>While defending himself before a military court martial on, among other things, substance abuse charges, airman Edward G. Scheffer sought to introduce his polygraph examination results. The results indicated there was "no deception" in Scheffer's denial that he used drugs while enlisted. Relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707 ("Rule 707"), prohibiting the use of polygraph results in court-martial proceedings, the military judge refused Scheffer's request to admit his results into evidence. On successive appeals, following his conviction on all charges, the Air Force Court of Appeals affirmed but the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, finding the evidentiary exclusion to be unconstitutional. The United States appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p> <p>Does Military Rule of Evidence 707, excluding the admission of polygraph results into evidence, violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a fair defense?</p> 96-1133_19971103-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1133/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Jan 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-1972_19920122-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_1972/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Jan 1992 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-1745_19920115-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_1745/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 05 Nov 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 90-6113_19911105-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_6113/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist