The Oyez Project: Criminal Procedure Issues - Ex Post Facto Decisions

California Department Of Corrections v. Morales

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Collins v. Youngblood

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Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe

Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require that persons convicted of sexual offenses subject to Connecticut's "Megan's Law" receive a hearing before the public disclosure of their registry?

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme. The Court reasoned that, because the law was not based on an offender's dangerousnes, but rather only on convictions, disclosing an offender on the registry without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court did not answer whether the law violated the substantive component of due process. Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter filed concurring opinions. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Dobbert v. Florida

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Garner v. Jones

Does the retroactive application of a Georgia provision permitting the extension of intervals between parole considerations violate the Ex Post Facto Clause?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the retroactive application of the Georgia provision permitting extension of intervals between parole considerations does not to necessarily violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court concluded that the key element in deciding whether an increase in the interval between a state's parole hearings for prison inmates violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is whether the change creates a sufficient risk of increasing the punishment attached to the covered crimes. "States must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedure and addressing problems associated with confinement and release," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Lynce v. Mathis

Does Florida's 1992 statute canceling early release credits to prison inmates after they have been awarded violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution?

Yes. In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the 1992 statute canceling provisional release credits violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution.

Miller v. Florida

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Smith v. Doe

Does the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I Section 10 prohibit the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's registration requirement as a retroactive punishment?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the act is nonpunitive. The Court reasoned that the act was clearly intended as a civil, non-punitive means of identifying previous offenders for the protection of the public. The Court also found that the stigma, which could result from registration, did not render the act effectively punitive, since the dissemination of the registration information did not constitute the imposition of any significant affirmative disability or restraint. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the act could only cover those convicted of offenses committed after the effective date of the act without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the act was "ambiguous in intent and punitive in effect" and that its retroactive application was incompatible with the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Stogner v. California

Does the Ex Post Facto Clause bar the application of California's retroactive extension of the statutes of limitations for sexual offenses committed against minors?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution. The Court reasoned that the features of the law produce the kind of retroactivity that the Constitution forbids by inflicting punishment where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment. "After...the original statute of limitations had expired,...Stogner was not 'liable to any punishment,'" wrote Justice Breyer. "California's new statute therefore 'aggravated' Stogner's alleged crime, or made it 'greater than it was, when committed,' in the sense that...it 'inflicted punishment' for past criminal conduct that...did not trigger any such liability." In his dissent, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy argued, "A law which does not alter the definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the crime 'greater than it was, when committed.'"

Weaver v. Graham

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