The Oyez Project: Civil Rights Issues - Sex Discrimination Decisions

Anderson v. Bessemer City

No details yet.

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applied the prohibition of employment discrimination to employers with fifteen or more employees. Did this limit federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, or did it only raise an issue going to the merits of a Title VII claim?

The Court held that the number-of-employees requirement is an element of the merits of a Title VII claim, not a jurisdictional limitation. The 8-0 opinion (Justice Alito not participating) by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reversed the Circuit Court, noting the "unfair[ness]" and "waste of judicial resources" that could result from a jurisdictional interpretation of the number-of-employees requirement as well as the lack of any specific jurisdictional language that would require such an interpretation. The Court relied on a "readily administrable bright line" rule that statutory limitations should be treated as non-jurisdictional unless specified as jurisdictional by Congress.

Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris

No details yet.

Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

Does a policy barring the participation of potentially fertile and pregnant women in occupations that could be detrimental to their reproductive capacities constitute sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court noted that even well intentioned proposals are forbidden if they result in discrimination. Johnson's fetal-protection plan discriminated against women by not requiring their male counterparts to demonstrate proof of medical sterility, despite the fact that lead exposure has also proved hazardous to male reproductive systems. The Court added that Johnson's fetal-protection plan fell outside the bona fide occupational qualification exception of Title VII, since the exception only permits employers to discriminate based on qualities that detrimentally impact on an employee's job performance. In the present case, although lead exposure may be harmful to the unborn, Johnson furnished no proof that it detracted from its female employees' abilities to perform any of their essential tasks.

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale

Does the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth

Can an employee, who despite refusing sexually harassing advances by a supervisor suffers no adverse job-related consequences, recover against an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, without showing that the employer was responsible for the supervisor's harassing conduct?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 opinion, the Court held that employers are vicariously liable for supervisors who create hostile working conditions for those over whom they have authority. In cases where harassed employee's suffer no job-related consequences, employers may defend themselves against liability by showing that they quickly acted to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and that the harassed employee failed to utilize their employer's protection. Such a defense, however, in not available when the alleged harassment culminates in an employment action, such as Ellerth's.

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White

Did Sheila White suffer retaliatory discrimination for which her employer may be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Yes. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that White suffered retaliatory discrimination when she was reassigned to less desirable duties and suspended without pay. Though the duties were within the same classification and the pay was eventually reinstated, the action was nevertheless sufficiently harsh to constitute retaliatory discrimination. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and six other justices, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim of retaliatory discrimination, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." (internal citations omitted) Justice Samuel Alito wrote separately, agreeing with the result but arguing that the test adopted by the other members of the Court would eventually prove problematic.

Caban v. Mohammed

No details yet.

Califano v. Goldfarb

No details yet.

Califano v. Webster

No details yet.

California Federal S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra

No details yet.

Clark County School District v. Breeden

Does a single sexually explicit remark and a change in employment status less than a month after an employee files a complaint about the remark meet the threshold for an adverse employment action under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that a cause for retaliation was not shown. "No reasonable person could have believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title VII's standard," declared the Court. Continuing, the opinion noted that the occurrence was "at worst an 'isolated incident' that cannot remotely be considered 'extremely serious,' as our cases require."

Cleveland Board Of Education v. Lafleur

No details yet.

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan

No details yet.

County Of Washington v. Gunther

No details yet.

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education

Can a school board be held responsible under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, meant to secure equal access of students to educational benefits and opportunities, for "student-on-student" harassment?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court began by noting that because there is an implied private right to education under Title IX, private damage actions may lie against schools that act with deliberate indifference to harassment that is severe enough to prevent victims from enjoying educational opportunities. The Court added that Title IX's prohibitions against harassment in school are clear enough to have served proper notice to school boards in general and the Board in particular. As such, consistent with the Spending Clause, the Title IX guidelines that Congress attached to its school funds obligate all recipient schools to comply or face the pain of legal action. The Court also observed that the Board acted with deliberate indifference, since it ignored several complaints by Davis, and that the harassment in question was serious and systematic.

Davis v. Passman

Did the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause afford Davis a right to a civil remedy against Passman?

Yes. Relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (1971) and Butz v. Economou (1978), the Court reversed the lower court's conclusions. Both cases affirmed a citizen's right to bring suit against federal officers for constitutional violations. In this case, Passman violated Davis's rights through sexual discrimination. The Court added that Passman's actions and words did not constitute protected speech and that a damage remedy provided a ready mechanism for remedial action.

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa

Must a plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991?

No. In a unanimous opinion Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that direct evidence is not required. Given that Title VII, on its face, does not mention that a plaintiff must make a heightened showing through direct evidence, the Court reasoned that in order to obtain an instruction a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." "Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury," wrote Justice Thomas. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion.

Dothard v. Rawlinson

No details yet.

Duren v. Missouri

No details yet.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton

May an employer be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the acts of an employee whose sexual harassment of subordinates has created a hostile work environment amounting to employment discrimination?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor. The Court also held that such liability is subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of the plaintiff victim. "The City had entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees and that its officials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors like [Faragher's]," wrote Justice Souter, "[u]nder such circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that the City could not be found to have exercised reasonable care to prevent the supervisors' harassing conduct."

Florida v. Long

No details yet.

Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC

No details yet.

Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools

No details yet.

Frontiero v. Richardson

Did a federal law, requiring different qualification criteria for male and female military spousal dependency, unconstitutionally discriminate against women thereby violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?

Yes. The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated," violating the Due Process Clause. Applying a strict standard of review to the sex-based classification, the Court found that the government's interest in administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices. The Court held that statutes that drew lines between the sexes on those grounds alone necessarily involved "the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution.'"

Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. School Dist.

Can a federally funded educational program or activity be required, under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, to pay sexual harassment damages to a student who was involved in a secret relationship with a member of its staff?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that two minimal criteria must be met in order for an aggrieved party to recover sexual harassment damages under the Amendments. First, the party must show that a school district official, with the ability to institute corrective measures, knew of the forbidden conduct. Second, a showing must be made that despite having knowledge of the forbidden conduct, the educational establishment deliberately failed to respond in a proper manner. The Court concluded that Lago Vista never showed indifference to Gebser's relationship since it never knew, either formally or informally, of its existence. Accordingly, Lago Vista was not liable for sexual harassment damages.

Geduldig v. Aiello

No details yet.

General Electric Co. v. Gilbert

No details yet.

Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny

No details yet.

Grove City College v. Bell

Was Grove City College subject to federal requirements because its students received federal grants? Did the provisions of Title IX violate the First Amendments rights of the College?

The Court held that there was no "substantive difference" between institutional assistance and aid received by a school through its students; Title IX coverage, the Court found, was triggered by the BEOG's. The Court noted that the assistance did not trigger institutionwide coverage under the Amendments, however. Only the College's financial aid program was subject to the federal requirements. The Court concluded that prohibiting discrimination as a condition for federal assistance did not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the College and that the school was free to end its participation in the grant program.

Harris v. Forklift Sys.

Must sexual harassment "seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well being" in order to create an "abusive work environment" that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

No. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court found that the district court had been wrong to focus on whether or not the harassment had caused "concrete psychological harm." Instead, Justice O'Connor wrote that the court should have focused on whether the conduct was hostile or abusive. "Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive... there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious (in order to find that it violates Title VII)."

Heckler v. Matthews

Did the resurrection of pre-California law which allowed some gender-based classification in Social Security allocations violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

The unanimous Court upheld the law. Justice Brennan granted that the 1977 amendments temporarily revived gender-based eligibility requirements, but maintained that they served a legitimate government interest, namely, they protected individuals who had planned for their retirements relying on the law as it stood before the Court's Califano decision. The resurrected eligibility criteria were narrowly drawn, applying to those individuals who were eligible for spousal benefits prior to 1977 who retired by 1982. Since many individuals who are planning for retirement rely on the law in making investment and spending decisions, changing the law (as Califano did) without giving some leeway to people who had already planned for the future would place an unreasonable burden on many who were close to retirement.

Hishon v. King & Spalding

No details yet.

Hoyt v. Florida

Did the Florida statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the statute was based on a reasonable classification and was therefore constitutional. Noting that women were "still regarded as the center of home and family life," the Court found that the states could relieve them from the civic responsibility of jury duty unless they themselves determined that such service was consistent with their own "special responsibilities." The Court held that the case was distinct from other cases involving racial discrimination in jury selection, and that male-female disproportions on jury lists carried no constitutional significance.

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.

Was the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of their gender a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes. The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection bars the exclusion of potential jurors on the basis of their sex, just as it bars exclusion on the basis of race. "[G]ender-based classifications," wrote Justice Harry Blackmun for the majority, "require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in order to survive constitutional scrutiny." As a consequence, "[P]arties still may remove jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias."

Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education

Does Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 allow suits for retaliation for complaints about unlawful sex discrimination?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Title IX allowed suits alleging retaliation for reporting sex discrimination. Such retaliation, the majority reasoned, constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. Jackson therefore had the right under Title IX to pursue his claim in court.

Kahn v. Shevin

No details yet.

Kirchberg v. Feenstra

No details yet.

Lehr v. Robertson

No details yet.

Los Angeles Dept. Of Water & Power v. Manhart

No details yet.

Mathews v. De Castro

No details yet.

Mckennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.

No details yet.

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson

Did the Civil Rights Act prohibit the creation of a "hostile environment" or was it limited to tangible economic discrimination in the workplace?

The Court held that the language of Title VII was "not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination," finding that Congress intended "'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment. . ." The Court noted that guidelines issued by the EEOC specified that sexual harassment leading to noneconomic injury was a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The Court recognized that plaintiffs could establish violations of the Act "by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." The Court declined to rule on the degree to which businesses could be liable for the conduct of specific employees.

Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County

Did California's statutory rape law unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of gender?

No. In a plurality decision, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that "young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse." The Court found that the state had a strong interest in preventing "illegitimate pregnancy." The Court noted that "[i]t is hardly unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude them from punishment. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males."

Miller v. Albright

Does 8 U.S.C. Section 1409, establishing upon birth the U.S. citizenship of illegitimate foreign-born children whose mothers only are U.S. citizens but failing to do the same if only their fathers are U.S. citizens, violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantees?

No. After ruling that Miller had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute, the Court held that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that different treatment of mothers and fathers of out-of-wedlock children was justified since the two parents are not "similarly situated." While the child's relationship with its father may be undisclosed for several years, its blood relationship to its mother is usually apparent through hospital records. Moreover, whereas birth mothers will know immediately of their child's existence, birth fathers and their children may never know each other. The statutory requirement that a child born out of wedlock to a citizen father obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through legitimization, written acknowledgment by the father under oath, or adjudication by a competent court, is well tailored to address the difficulties of establishing a child's citizenship based only on the relation to the father.

Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan

Did the state statute which prevented men from enrolling in MUW violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Yes. The Court held that the state did not provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based distinction. The state's primary argument, that the policy constituted educational affirmative action for women, was "unpersuasive" to the Court since women traditionally have not lacked opportunities to enter nursing. If anything, argued Justice O'Connor, the statute "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively women's job."

Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty

No details yet.

NCAA v. Smith

Does the National Collegiate Athletic Association's receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions subject it to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that dues payments from recipients of federal funds do not suffice to subject the NCAA to suit under Title IX. Justice Ginsburg distinguished the coverage of Title IX in that "[e]ntities that receive federal assistance, whether directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the meaning of Title IX; entities that only benefit economically from federal assistance are not." Justice Ginsburg then concluded that "the Association's receipt of dues demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from the federal assistance afforded its members," which without more, "is insufficient to trigger Title IX coverage."

New York State Club Assn. v. New York City

No details yet.

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC

No details yet.

North Haven Board Of Education v. Bell

No details yet.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.

Does the prohibition against sex discrimination, set out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, apply to same-sex sexual harassment?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that while Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace, it does bar all forms of discrimination "because of" sex. Such discrimination, whether motivated by sexual desire or not, is actionable so long at it places its victim in an objectively disadvantageous working condition, regardless of the victim's gender.

Orr v. Orr

No details yet.

Parham v. Hughes

No details yet.

Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders

When a supervisor makes a workplace environment so hostile (through sexual harassment) that an employee has no choice but to quit, may the employee bring suit even if she did not use the internal procedures established by the employer to report sexual harassment claims?

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that an employee faced with a situation in which a "reasonable person ... would have felt compelled to resign" could bring suit even if she had not filed a report with the employer before resigning. Her employer, however, could use her failure to file a report, along with evidence of the safeguards it had in place to prevent harassment, in its defense. If it could prove that she had not attempted to prevent the harassment, and that the safeguards in place would have prevented it if she had, the employer would not be liable.

Personnel Administrator MA v. Feeney

Did the law discriminate against women and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Court held that the law was enacted to serve "legitimate and worthy purposes" and not to discriminate on the basis of sex. Even though few women benefitted from the scheme, Justice Stewart argued that "veteran status is not uniquely male." Furthermore, the law placed many men who were not veterans at a disadvantage as well. The distinction in the law was clearly between veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women.

Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.

No details yet.

Pollard v. DuPont

Does "front pay" constitute an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, such that it is subject to the Act's statutory cap on such damages?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that front pay is not an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and thus is not subject to the damages cap imposed by the Act. "Because front pay is a remedy authorized under [the Civil Rights Act of 1964], Congress did not limit the availability of such awards in [the Civil Rights Act of 1991]. Instead, Congress sought to expand the available remedies by permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in addition to previously available remedies, such as front pay," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. All members of the Court joined Justice Thomas' opinion, except Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins

No details yet.

Quilloin v. Walcott

No details yet.

Reed v. Reed

Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."

Richmond Unified School District v. Berg

No details yet.

Roberts v. United States Jaycees

Did Minnesota's attempts to enforce the anti-discrimination law violate the Jaycees' right to free association under the First Amendment?

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Jaycees chapters lacked "the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women." The Court reasoned that making women full members would not impose any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. The Court thus held that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against women justified enforcement of the state anti-discrimination law. The Court found that the Minnesota law was not aimed at the suppression of speech and did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.

Rostker v. Goldberg

Did the MSSA's gender distinctions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Congress's decision to exempt women from registration "was not the 'accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females'" and did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court found that men and women, because of combat restrictions on women, were not "similarly situated" for the purposes of draft registration. The Court also upheld Congress's judgment that the administrative and military problems that would be created by drafting women for noncombat roles were sufficient to justify the Military Selective Service Act.

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez

No details yet.

Schlesinger v. Ballard

No details yet.

Stanley v. Illinois

No details yet.

Stanton v. Stanton

No details yet.

Taylor v. Louisiana

No details yet.

Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS

Is 8 USC section 1409(a)'s statutory distinction, which imposes different requirements for a child's acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent is the mother or the father, consistent with the equal protection guarantee embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "[section 1409(a)] is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection." "For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives,'" wrote Justice Kennedy, "[f]or reasons to follow, we conclude [section 1409(a)] satisfies this standard." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, with whom Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, dissented, noted that "[n]o one should mistake the majority's analysis for a careful application of this Court's equal protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based classifications."

United States v. Virginia

Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

No. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men. The VWIL would not provide women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and connections that VMI affords its male cadets. Finally, the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" between VMI and VWIL was misplaced. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit's "substantive comparability" standard was a displacement of the Court's more exacting standard, requiring that "all gender-based classifications today" be evaluated with "heightened scrutiny." When evaluated with such "heightened scrutiny," Virginia's plan to create the VWIL would not provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men and so it failed to meet requirements of the equal protection clause. [NOTE: Justice Ginsberg's announcement of the Court's opinion (below) may be considered an address to the American public. It is a plain-spoken and forceful summary of the majority position.]

Vorchheimer v. School District Of Philadelphia

No details yet.

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld

No details yet.

Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co.

No details yet.

Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Rel. Comm'n

No details yet.

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

No details yet.