The Oyez Project: Civil Rights Issues - Sex Discrimination in Employment Decisions

Anderson v. Bessemer City

No details yet.

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applied the prohibition of employment discrimination to employers with fifteen or more employees. Did this limit federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, or did it only raise an issue going to the merits of a Title VII claim?

The Court held that the number-of-employees requirement is an element of the merits of a Title VII claim, not a jurisdictional limitation. The 8-0 opinion (Justice Alito not participating) by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reversed the Circuit Court, noting the "unfair[ness]" and "waste of judicial resources" that could result from a jurisdictional interpretation of the number-of-employees requirement as well as the lack of any specific jurisdictional language that would require such an interpretation. The Court relied on a "readily administrable bright line" rule that statutory limitations should be treated as non-jurisdictional unless specified as jurisdictional by Congress.

Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris

No details yet.

Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

Does a policy barring the participation of potentially fertile and pregnant women in occupations that could be detrimental to their reproductive capacities constitute sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court noted that even well intentioned proposals are forbidden if they result in discrimination. Johnson's fetal-protection plan discriminated against women by not requiring their male counterparts to demonstrate proof of medical sterility, despite the fact that lead exposure has also proved hazardous to male reproductive systems. The Court added that Johnson's fetal-protection plan fell outside the bona fide occupational qualification exception of Title VII, since the exception only permits employers to discriminate based on qualities that detrimentally impact on an employee's job performance. In the present case, although lead exposure may be harmful to the unborn, Johnson furnished no proof that it detracted from its female employees' abilities to perform any of their essential tasks.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth

Can an employee, who despite refusing sexually harassing advances by a supervisor suffers no adverse job-related consequences, recover against an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, without showing that the employer was responsible for the supervisor's harassing conduct?

Yes. In a 7-to-2 opinion, the Court held that employers are vicariously liable for supervisors who create hostile working conditions for those over whom they have authority. In cases where harassed employee's suffer no job-related consequences, employers may defend themselves against liability by showing that they quickly acted to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and that the harassed employee failed to utilize their employer's protection. Such a defense, however, in not available when the alleged harassment culminates in an employment action, such as Ellerth's.

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White

Did Sheila White suffer retaliatory discrimination for which her employer may be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Yes. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that White suffered retaliatory discrimination when she was reassigned to less desirable duties and suspended without pay. Though the duties were within the same classification and the pay was eventually reinstated, the action was nevertheless sufficiently harsh to constitute retaliatory discrimination. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and six other justices, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim of retaliatory discrimination, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." (internal citations omitted) Justice Samuel Alito wrote separately, agreeing with the result but arguing that the test adopted by the other members of the Court would eventually prove problematic.

California Federal S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra

No details yet.

Clark County School District v. Breeden

Does a single sexually explicit remark and a change in employment status less than a month after an employee files a complaint about the remark meet the threshold for an adverse employment action under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that a cause for retaliation was not shown. "No reasonable person could have believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title VII's standard," declared the Court. Continuing, the opinion noted that the occurrence was "at worst an 'isolated incident' that cannot remotely be considered 'extremely serious,' as our cases require."

Cleveland Board Of Education v. Lafleur

No details yet.

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan

No details yet.

County Of Washington v. Gunther

No details yet.

Davis v. Passman

Did the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause afford Davis a right to a civil remedy against Passman?

Yes. Relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (1971) and Butz v. Economou (1978), the Court reversed the lower court's conclusions. Both cases affirmed a citizen's right to bring suit against federal officers for constitutional violations. In this case, Passman violated Davis's rights through sexual discrimination. The Court added that Passman's actions and words did not constitute protected speech and that a damage remedy provided a ready mechanism for remedial action.

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa

Must a plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991?

No. In a unanimous opinion Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that direct evidence is not required. Given that Title VII, on its face, does not mention that a plaintiff must make a heightened showing through direct evidence, the Court reasoned that in order to obtain an instruction a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." "Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury," wrote Justice Thomas. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion.

Dothard v. Rawlinson

No details yet.

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton

May an employer be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the acts of an employee whose sexual harassment of subordinates has created a hostile work environment amounting to employment discrimination?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor. The Court also held that such liability is subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of the plaintiff victim. "The City had entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees and that its officials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors like [Faragher's]," wrote Justice Souter, "[u]nder such circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that the City could not be found to have exercised reasonable care to prevent the supervisors' harassing conduct."

Florida v. Long

No details yet.

Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC

No details yet.

Geduldig v. Aiello

No details yet.

General Electric Co. v. Gilbert

No details yet.

Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny

No details yet.

Harris v. Forklift Sys.

Must sexual harassment "seriously affect [an employee's] psychological well being" in order to create an "abusive work environment" that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

No. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court found that the district court had been wrong to focus on whether or not the harassment had caused "concrete psychological harm." Instead, Justice O'Connor wrote that the court should have focused on whether the conduct was hostile or abusive. "Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive... there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious (in order to find that it violates Title VII)."

Hishon v. King & Spalding

No details yet.

Los Angeles Dept. Of Water & Power v. Manhart

No details yet.

Mckennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.

No details yet.

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson

Did the Civil Rights Act prohibit the creation of a "hostile environment" or was it limited to tangible economic discrimination in the workplace?

The Court held that the language of Title VII was "not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination," finding that Congress intended "'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment. . ." The Court noted that guidelines issued by the EEOC specified that sexual harassment leading to noneconomic injury was a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The Court recognized that plaintiffs could establish violations of the Act "by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." The Court declined to rule on the degree to which businesses could be liable for the conduct of specific employees.

Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty

No details yet.

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC

No details yet.

North Haven Board Of Education v. Bell

No details yet.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.

Does the prohibition against sex discrimination, set out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, apply to same-sex sexual harassment?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that while Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace, it does bar all forms of discrimination "because of" sex. Such discrimination, whether motivated by sexual desire or not, is actionable so long at it places its victim in an objectively disadvantageous working condition, regardless of the victim's gender.

Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders

When a supervisor makes a workplace environment so hostile (through sexual harassment) that an employee has no choice but to quit, may the employee bring suit even if she did not use the internal procedures established by the employer to report sexual harassment claims?

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that an employee faced with a situation in which a "reasonable person ... would have felt compelled to resign" could bring suit even if she had not filed a report with the employer before resigning. Her employer, however, could use her failure to file a report, along with evidence of the safeguards it had in place to prevent harassment, in its defense. If it could prove that she had not attempted to prevent the harassment, and that the safeguards in place would have prevented it if she had, the employer would not be liable.

Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.

No details yet.

Pollard v. DuPont

Does "front pay" constitute an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, such that it is subject to the Act's statutory cap on such damages?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that front pay is not an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and thus is not subject to the damages cap imposed by the Act. "Because front pay is a remedy authorized under [the Civil Rights Act of 1964], Congress did not limit the availability of such awards in [the Civil Rights Act of 1991]. Instead, Congress sought to expand the available remedies by permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in addition to previously available remedies, such as front pay," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. All members of the Court joined Justice Thomas' opinion, except Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins

No details yet.

Richmond Unified School District v. Berg

No details yet.

Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Rel. Comm'n

No details yet.

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

No details yet.