The Oyez Project: Civil Rights Issues - Deportation Decisions

Accardi v. Shaughnessy

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Agosto v. Ins

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Bonetti v. Rogers

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Boutilier v. Immigration Service

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Brownell v. Tom We Shung

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Calcano-Martinez v. INS

Does the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 remove the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts to review direct appeals of final deportation orders, but preserve federal district courts' habeas jurisdiction over challenges to those orders?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions for direct but petitioners can proceed with their habeas petitions if they wish to obtain relief. "As petitioners in this case were convicted of 'aggravated felonies' within the meaning of the relevant statutes," wrote Justice Stevens, "the plain language of [IIRIRA] fairly explicitly strips the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear their claims on petitions for direct review." Justice Stevens continued that "Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity to strip the district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions raising identical claims."

Ceballos v. Shaughnessy

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Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration Ser

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Clark v. Martinez

In Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court said admitted immigrants could be detained for deportation for more than 90 days, but no longer than reasonably necessary. Did this ruling apply to inadmissible aliens, such as Benitez and Martinez?

Yes. In a 7-2 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court said the requirement that immigrants be detained no longer than reasonably necessary for deportation applied to both admissible and inadmissible immigrants. Because readmission to Cuba was unforeseeable, the detentions of Martinez and Benitez were unreasonable. The Court refused to give the same immigration statute different interpretations based on immigrants' characteristics.

Costello v. Immigration Service

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Demore v. Kim

Does the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides for no-bail, civil detention, violate a lawful permanent resident alien's liberty interest?

No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 6-3, that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to aliens challenging their detention under section 1226(c) and, 5-4, that detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Congress, concerned that deportable criminal aliens may fail to appear for their removal hearings, has the authority to require that persons be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, dissented from the first holding, reasoning that the Act deprives federal courts of jurisdiction in such a case. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented from the Court's second holding. The minority argued against the Court's approval of lengthy mandatory detention.

Dessalernos v. Savoretti

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Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales

(1) Does the reinstatement statute of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows a prior deportation order against an illegal alien to be reinstated, apply to aliens who re-entered the U.S. before the statute went into effect? (2) If so, is this application impermissibly retroactive?

Yes and no. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the reinstatement statute does apply to illegal aliens who re-entered the U.S. before the effective date of the statute, and that the application to such aliens was not impermissibly retroactive. The Court held that the purpose of Section 421(a)(5) was most consistent with a broad application, and "Common principles of statutory interpretation fail to unsettle the apparent application [...] to any reentrant present in the country, whatever the date of return." The majority opinion affirmed the presumption against retroactive statutes, but found the reinstatement statute permissible under a test set out in Landgraf v. USI Film Products. The main weakness in Fernandez-Vargas's argument was that his offense was not a "past act that he is helpless to undo," but rather the "continuing violation" of remaining in the country illegally.

In a lone dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens disagreed with both of the Court's conclusions. He wrote that Fernandez-Vargas "legitimately complains that the Government has changed the rules midgame."

Foti v. Immigration Service

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Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy

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Heikkinen v. United States

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Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy

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Immigration And Naturalization Service v. Yueh-Shaio Yang

May the Imigration and Naturalization Service, when deciding whether to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation under the applicable provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, take into account acts of fraud committed by an alien in connection to his entry into the United States?

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that in deciding whether to grant a waiver under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General or her delegate, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may take into account acts of fraud committed by the alien in connection to his entry into the United States. Justice Scalia wrote, the Act "imposes no limitations on the factors that the INS may consider in determining who, among the class of eligible aliens, should be granted relief."

Immigration And Naturalization Service v. National Center For Immigrants' Rights, Inc.

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Immigration And Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias

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Immigration Service v. Errico

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Immigration Service v. Stanisic

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Ins v. Abudu

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INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre

Does the Immigration and Nationality Act require deportation boards, who face aliens that committed nonpolitical crimes prior to seeking asylum, to: balance the severity of the alien's offenses against the threat of political persecution, compare the atrocities of the crimes with others it faced in the past, or consider whether the crimes were politically necessary or successful?

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court noted that withholding of deportation is mandatory if an alien establishes that it is more likely than not that he or she will suffer political persecution if deported. The Court added that the BIA was not required to balance the severity of the acts in question against threats of political persecution, compare the actions with others, or pronounce on their political success or necessity. Likelihood of political persecution is the overarching issue when considering an alien's deportability, followed by a determination of whether the crimes at issue were serious and nonpolitical.

Ins v. Cardoza-Fonseca

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INS v. Lopez-Mendoza

Do the strictures of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule apply in deportation proceedings?

No. In both criminal and civil proceedings, the "body" or identity of a defendant is never suppressible as fruit of an illegal arrest. This alone was sufficient basis to uphold Lopez-Mendoza's deportation order. Moreover, deportation proceedings are civil actions and the protections afforded defendants in the criminal context do not apply. Specifically, Sandoval-Sanchez's appeal to the exclusionary rule in his motion to suppress his admission fails because the purpose the exclusionary rule is designed to serve_deterring official misconduct_is not served in the context of a deportation proceeding. First, the INS is only required to show identity and alienage to meet its burden in a deportation hearing. Since the defendant's body is not suppressible, the INS must only prove alienage, generally not a difficult task even absent a confession. Further, INS has its own comprehensive oversight program in place to monitor Fourth Amendment compliance internally. The exclusionary rule would do little to enhance these efforts. Finally, deportations hearings, unlike criminal trials, are designed to prevent the continued violation of the law. The social cost of releasing a defendant whose mere presence in the country puts him in continued violation of the law is too high to bear in light of the minimal benefits derived from application of the exclusionary rule in this context.

Ins v. Phinpathya

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Ins v. Rios-Pineda

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INS v. St. Cyr

Do the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 strip district courts of their jurisdiction under the general habeas corpus statute to entertain St. Cyr's challenge? Do the AEDPA and IIRIRA deny relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to aliens who would have been eligible for such relief at the time of their convictions?

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that habeas jurisdiction was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA. Additionally, the Court held that "[section 212(c)] relief remains available for aliens, like [Enrico St. Cyr], whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for [section 212(c)] relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect." Justice Stevens wrote that "[w]e find nothing in IIRIRA unmistakably indicating that Congress considered the question whether to apply its repeal of [section 212(c)] retroactively to such aliens."

Ins v. Stevic

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Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

May immigration officials deport a person to his country of birth under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)(E)(iv), if that country lacks a functioning central government that is able to accept the person's return?

Yes. Federal immigration law permitted an alien to be removed to a country without the advance consent of that country's government. Of the four removal options federal immigration law listed, an acceptance requirement appeared in only one clause: "...he shall be removed to another country whose government will accept him." That clause only applied after the attorney general attempted the prior deportation option. The grammatical "rule of the last antecedent," prevented "another" from applying to the earlier options. Nor did the law's structure impose an acceptance requirement. Moreover, contrary to Jama's argument, the acceptance requirement was hardly settled judicial interpretation.

Jay v. Boyd

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Kimm v. Rosenberg

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Lehmann v. Carson

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Leng May Ma v. Barber

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Leocal v. Ashcroft

Is a conviction of driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury a "crime of violence" under federal immigration law that allows the person to be deported as an aggravated felon?

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice William Rhenquist, the Court held that state DUI offenses, except when involving purposeful intent, are accidental and not crimes of violence under federal law. Le therefore did not commit an aggravated felony for which he could be deported.

Mulcahey v. Catalanotte

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Niukkanen v. Mcalexander

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Rabang v. Boyd

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Reid v. Ins

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Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee

Does the IIRIRA deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over aliens' suits alleging that actions of the Attorney General are selectively enforced?

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the IIRIRA deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over the selective-enforcement claim. Justice Scalia wrote, "[a]s a general matter -- and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case -- an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation."

Reno, Attorney General v. Flores

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Rogers v. Quan

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Rosenberg v. Fleuti

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Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration And Naturalization Service v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

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Stone v. Immigration And Naturalization Service

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United States v. Mendoza-Lopez

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United States v. Witkovich

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Woodby v. Immigration Service

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Zadvydas v. Davis

Does the post-removal-period statute authorize the Attorney General to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the 90-day removal period?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States" and "does not permit indefinite detention." "Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention of aliens in the former category would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit 'reasonable time' limitation, the application of which is subject to federal court review," wrote Justice Breyer.