The Oyez Project: Civil Rights Issues - Affirmative Action Decisions

Adarand Constructors v. Pena

Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.

Astroline Communications v. Shurberg Broadcasting

Does the FCC's minority preference policy, giving preference to minority ownership bids for new radio or television broadcasting licenses and permitting "distress sales" to minority owned enterprises only, violate a nonminority bidder's' Fifth Amendment equal protection rights?

No. The Court, in the last opinion authorer by Justice William J. Brennan,Jr., held that the FCC's minority preference policies are constitutional because they provide appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and are aimed at the advancement of the legitimate congressional objective of program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and is therefore consistent with First Amendment values. Finally, the Court noted that the FCC's minority preference policy did not unduly burden nonminorities. The FCC did not predetermine the number of distress sales, and could only invoke them in a small number of cases, when no competing bids are filed and the licensee elects to sell at a lower price rather than risk an FCC investigation.

Firefighters v. Cleveland

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Firefighters v. Stotts

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Fullilove v. Klutznick

Did the provision of the statute for minority business enterprises violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Court held that the minority set-aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power. The Court found that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise program under the Spending Power. The plurality opinion noted that Congress could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects under the Commerce Clause as well. The Court further held that in the remedial context, Congress did not have to act "in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion."

Gratz v. Bollinger

Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. While rejecting the argument that diversity cannot constitute a compelling state interest, the Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and did not provide the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause."

Grutter v. Bollinger

Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."

Johnson v. Transportation Agency

Did the Agency impermissibly take into account the sex of the applicants in the promotion process and violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

The Court affirmed the promotion procedures of the Agency. Justice Brennan argued that it was not unreasonable to consider sex as one factor among many in making promotion decisions, and that the Agency's actions did not create an absolute barrier to the advancement of men (a quota system did not exist).

Local 28 v. EEOC

Did provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 empower courts to order race-conscious membership quotas?

The Court held that Title VII did not prohibit courts from ordering, in appropriate circumstances, affirmative race-conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination. Specifically, the Court held that such relief was appropriate where employers or labor unions had engaged in "persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." The Court noted that injunctions simply reiterating Title VII's prohibition against discrimination were useless in cases of chronically discriminatory employers or unions.

Martin v. Wilks

Did Wilks and other white firefighters have a constitutional right to challenge the previously established decrees?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that because "a person cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party," the white firefighters were not precluded from challenging employment decisions taken pursuant to the consent decrees. The Court argued that "[t]he parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the action" and that they were better suited to intervene when their rights were immediately threatened. Conversely, the Court noted that "[n]o one can seriously contend that an employer might successfully defend against a Title VII claim by one group of employees on the ground that its actions were required by an earlier decree entered in a suit brought against it by another, if the later group did not have adequate notice or knowledge of the earlier suit."

Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC

Did the FCC's minority preference policies violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment?

No. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that the FCC's minority preference policies were constitutional because they provided appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and were aimed at the advancement of legitimate congressional objectives for program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and is therefore consistent with First Amendment values. Finally, the Court noted that the FCC's minority preference policy did not unduly burden nonminorities. The FCC did not predetermine the number of distress sales, and could only invoke them in a small number of cases, when no competing bids were filed and the licensee elected to sell at a lower price rather than risk an FCC investigation (see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena).

Minnick v. California Dept. Of Corrections

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Morton v. Mancari

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Regents of the University of California v. Bakke

Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school?

No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.

Did the Richmond law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that "generalized assertions" of past racial discrimination could not justify "rigid" racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to "any injury suffered by anyone," and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. O'Connor further held that allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: "The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."

Southeastern Community College v. Davis

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Texas v. Lesage

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the University of Texas was not entitled to summary judgment for its rejection of an African immigrant Ph.D. applicant of Caucasian descent even if he would have been rejected under a race-neutral policy?

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "[i]nsofar as the Court of Appeals held that [the University of Texas was] not entitled to summary judgment on Lesage's section 1983 claim for damages relating to the rejection of his application for the 1996-1997 academic year even if he would have been denied admission under a race-neutral policy, its decision contradicts our holding in Mt. Healthy." "Under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration," stated the opinion.

United States v. Paradise

Did the one-black-for-one-white promotion scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a plurality opinion, the Court upheld the promotion plan. The scheme did not impose an "absolute bar" to white advancement, was narrowly drawn to include only specific ranks in the department, and, according to the four justices who voted to affirm it, was "required in light of the Department's long and shameful record of delay and resistance" in complying with past judicial decisions. It is important to remember that courts had first found the Department's practices unconstitutional in 1972.

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber

Did United and Kaiser Aluminum's training scheme violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race?

No. The Court held that the training scheme was legitimate because the 1964 Act "did not intend to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps" to implement the goals of Title VII. Since the program sought to eliminate archaic patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy while not prohibiting white employees from advancing in the company, it was consistent with the intent of the law.

Weinberger v. Rossi

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Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Did the collective bargaining agreement provision for race-based layoffs violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court argued that Wygant's layoff stemmed from race and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court noted that the government, when embarking on affirmative action, had two duties: first, to justify racial classification with a compelling state interest and second, to demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly tailored to its purpose. Regarding the first, the Court rejected the lower court's argument that racial preferences were justified because the percentage of minority students exceeded the percentage of minority teachers. At best, this argument implied a separate but equal system, which the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education. Instead, racial preferences had to be based on prior discrimination. Second, the Court rejected the school's discrimination remedy: layoff preferences incorrectly addressed injurious prior discriminatory hiring practices since "denial of a future employment opportunity [was] not as intrusive as loss of an existing job."