<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" version="2.0">
 <channel>
  <title>The Oyez Project: Civil Rights Issues - Affirmative Action Arguments</title>
  <link>http://www.oyez.org/issues/civil-rights/affirmative-action/</link>
  <description>U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</description>
  <language>en-us</language>
  <itunes:image>http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg</itunes:image>
  <itunes:category text="Government &amp; Organizations"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</itunes:subtitle>
    
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Adarand Constructors v. Pena - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jan 1995 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>93-1841_19950117-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1841/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1841/argument/93-1841_19950117-argument.mp3" length="14010349" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Astroline Communications v. Shurberg Broadcasting - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 1990 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In an effort to comply by its duty to promote programming diversity, under the Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted two minority preference policies. The first policy awarded preferences to minority ownership bids for licenses for new radio or television broadcasting stations. The second policy allowed radio or television broadcasters with questionable license qualifications, to avoid an FCC investigation of their actions by making a "distress sale" of their licenses to a legitimate minority outfit. Upon FCC approval, Faith Center Inc. "distress sold" its television license to Astroline's minority-owned outfit. Shurberg, a nonminority applicant for a similar license, sought appellate review of Astroline's award. The appellate court agreed, and invalidated the distress sale policy as unconstitutional. Astroline appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Does the FCC's minority preference policy, giving preference to minority ownership bids for new radio or television broadcasting licenses and permitting "distress sales" to minority owned enterprises only, violate a nonminority bidder's' Fifth Amendment equal protection rights?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>89-700_19900328-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_700/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_700/argument/89-700_19900328-argument.mp3" length="14872867" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Firefighters v. Cleveland - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>84-1999_19860225-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1999/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1999/argument/84-1999_19860225-argument.mp3" length="14441239" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Firefighters v. Stotts - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 06 Dec 1983 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>82-206_19831206-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_206/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_206/argument/82-206_19831206-argument.mp3" length="14188015" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Fullilove v. Klutznick - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 1979 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the provision of the statute for minority business enterprises violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>78-1007_19791127-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1007/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_78_1007/argument/78-1007_19791127-lq-argument.mp3" length="16134399" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Gratz v. Bollinger - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." In addition, the University has a policy to admit virtually all qualified applicants who are members of one of three select racial minority groups - African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered to be "underrepresented" on the campus. Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the District Court held that the admissions policies for years 1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly tailored. After the decision in Grutter, Gratz and Hamacher petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 for a writ of certiorari before judgment, which was granted.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>02-516_20030401-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_516/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_516/argument/02-516_20030401-argument.mp3" length="15116544" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Grutter v. Bollinger - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2003 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>02-241_20030401-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_241/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_241/argument/02-241_20030401-argument.mp3" length="14679391" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Johnson v. Transportation Agency - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, California promoted Diane Joyce to road dispatcher over Paul Johnson. Both candidates were qualified for the job. As an affirmative action employer, the Agency took into account the sex of the applicants in making the promotion decision.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the Agency impermissibly take into account the sex of the applicants in the promotion process and violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>85-1129_19861112-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1129/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_1129/argument/85-1129_19861112-argument.mp3" length="14437973" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Local 28 v. EEOC - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1975, a federal district court found the Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Union guilty of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court established a 29 percent minority membership goal and ordered the union to implement procedures to meet the goal. In 1982 and 1983, the union was found guilty of civil contempt for disobeying the court orders. The court then established a 29.23 percent nonwhite membership goal to be met by August 1987.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 empower courts to order race-conscious membership quotas?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>84-1656_19860225-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1656/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1656/argument/84-1656_19860225-argument.mp3" length="15236179" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Martin v. Wilks - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 1989 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;As a result of a lawsuit in 1974, the Jefferson County Personnel Board in Birmingham, Alabama, entered into consent decrees that included hiring blacks as firefighters and for promoting them. The decrees were approved by a federal district court. Years later, Robert K. Wilks, a white firefighter, challenged the decrees and alleged that whites were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks. Wilks argued that such practices violated Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The personnel board agreed that it was making race-conscious decisions but argued it was doing so pursuant to the original decrees. The Court combined arguments in two companion cases: Personnel Board v. Wilks and Arrington v. Wilks.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did Wilks and other white firefighters have a constitutional right to challenge the previously established decrees?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>87-1614_19890118-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1614/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1614/argument/87-1614_19890118-argument.mp3" length="14410034" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 1990 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This case challenged the constitutionality of two minority preference policies of the Federal Communications Commission. Under the first policy challenged by Metro Broadcasting, Inc., minority applicants for broadcast licenses were given preference if all other relevant factors were roughly equal. The second policy, known as the "distress sale," was challenged by Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford Inc. This policy allowed broadcasters in danger of losing their licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the FCC formally ruled on the viability of the troubled stations. This case was decided together with Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting, in which Faith Center Inc. made a "distress sale" of its television license to a minority outfit owned by Astroline. Shurberg, a non-minority applicant for a similar license, challenged the FCC's approval of Faith Center's sale to Astroline.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Did the FCC's minority preference policies violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>89-453_19900328-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_453/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_453/argument/89-453_19900328-argument.mp3" length="14895346" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Minnick v. California Dept. Of Corrections - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 02 Dec 1980 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>79-1213_19801202-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_1213/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_1213/argument/79-1213_19801202-argument.mp3" length="15122925" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Regents of the University of California v. Bakke - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 12 Oct 1977 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>76-811_19771012-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_811/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_811/argument/76-811_19771012-argument.mp3" length="28604162" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 05 Oct 1988 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the Richmond law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>87-998_19881005-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_998/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_998/argument/87-998_19881005-argument.mp3" length="12346010" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>United States v. Paradise - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In response to a series of NAACP-initiated lawsuits in the 1970s, the Alabama Department of Public Safety was required to implement a promotion scheme in which half of the department's promotions to certain ranks would go to black officers if enough qualified blacks were available.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the one-black-for-one-white promotion scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>85-999_19861112-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_999/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_999/argument/85-999_19861112-argument.mp3" length="13592504" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>United Steelworkers of America v. Weber - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 1979 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program. Weber claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. These cases (United Steelworkers v. Weber and Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber) were also decided together with United States v. Weber.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did United and Kaiser Aluminum's training scheme violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>78-432_19790328-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_78_432/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_78_432/argument/78-432_19790328-lq-argument.mp3" length="24333635" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 06 Nov 1985 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Under the collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. It was also agreed not to lay off a percentage of minority personnel that exceeded the percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of a layoff. When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing "role models" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. When the appeals court affirmed, the Supreme Court granted Wygant certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the collective bargaining agreement provision for race-based layoffs violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>84-1340_19851106-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1340/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1340/argument/84-1340_19851106-argument.mp3" length="13960982" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
 </channel>
</rss>
