The Oyez Project: Attorneys Issues - Attorneys' Fees

Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society

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Ardestani v. Immigration And Naturalization Service

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Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy

Using the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Joseph Murray's parents brought legal action to require the Arlington Central School District to pay for their son's private school tuition. After they prevailed, they sought reimbursement from the school district for fees they had paid to an educational consultant during the proceedings. They relied on an IDEA provision that allows courts to "award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs" to prevailing parents. The school district argued that under Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, expert fees can only be reimbursed when there is explicit authorization in the statute. Because the statute made no specific mention of expert fees, the school district argued, the fees could not be reimbursed. The federal district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, however, finding that a Congressional Conference Committee Report and a footnote in Casey referencing it showed that IDEA was intended to authorize reimbursement of expert fees.

Blanchard v. Bergeron

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Blum v. Stenson

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Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert

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Bowen v. Galbreath

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Bradley v. Richmond School Board

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Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia

Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents. Buckhannon filed an inspection by the West Virginia fire marshal's office because some residents were incapable of "self-preservation." Buckhannon brought suit against the State and others arguing that the "self-preservation" requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Afterwards the state legislature eliminated the requirement and the District Court dismissed the case as moot. Buckhannon then requested attorney's fees as the "prevailing party" under the FHAA and ADA. Buckhannon based its claim on the "catalyst theory," which posits that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC

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City Of Burlington v. Dague

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Commissioner, INS v. Jean

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Department of Labor v. Triplett

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Evans v. Jeff D.

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F. D. Rich Co., v. Industrial Lumber Co.

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Farrar, Coadministrators Of Estate Of Farrar, Deceased v. Hobby

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Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.

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Flight Attendants v. Zipes

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Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.

After successfully defending against a copyright infringement suit filed against him by Fantasy Inc. (Fantasy), John Fogerty sought to recover the cost of his attorney's fees from Fantasy. Fogerty based his claim on 17 U.S.C. section 505 which states in part that: "the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." On appeal from an unfavorable district court ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed as it found that Fogerty did not demonstrate that Fantasy's original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Fogerty appealed again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart

Under 42 USC section 406(b), an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security benefits claimant in court may be awarded a reasonable fee not in excess of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimant, payable out of the amount of the past-due benefits. After three individuals prevailed on their claims for Social Security disability benefits and successfully sought attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, their attorneys were to collect 25 percent of all past-due benefits recovered from each claimant, pursuant to contingent-fee agreements. In each case, the District Court declined to give effect to the attorney-client fee agreement, instead employing a "lodestar" method, under which the number of hours reasonably devoted to each case was multiplied by the reasonable hourly fee. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Hall v. Cole

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Hensley v. Eckerhart

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Hewitt v. Helms

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Hopkins v. Cohen

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Hughes v. Rowe

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Kay v. Ehrler

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Kentucky v. Graham

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Lamie v. United States Trustee

In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Congress created a list of people that corporations could pay while going through Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy attorney for the corporation was not included in that list. John Lamie, a bankruptcy attorney, challenged the law, arguing that the omission of bankruptcy attorneys from the list was accidental. The bankruptcy court that heard the case ruled that the omission was not inadvertent. Nevertheless, it awarded Lamie the fees in question because money intended to pay them had been set aside in a retainer before the corporation entered Chapter 7 proceedings. A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision to pay Lamie, holding that the retainer was not separate from the corporation's other funds. On the issue of whether the omission of the bankruptcy attorney from the list of acceptable payees, the panel affirmed the lower court's decision.

Library Of Congress v. Shaw

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Maher v. Gagne

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Marek v. Chesny

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Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. The Court ruled that the state court did not act unreasonably when it determined that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations were credible. Although there might have been some evidence that could be interpreted as undermining the prosecutor's credibility, the trial court was in a better position to determine those facts. The Court faulted the Ninth Circuit for substituting "its own debatable interpretation of the record" for the trial courts findings, and for "misapplying settled rules that limit [the Circuit Court's] role and authority."

Martin v. Hadix

Everett Hadix and other prisoners in the Michigan prison system filed a class action lawsuit against prison officials claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thereafter, Hadix and the officials entered into a consent decree to remedy the situation. In 1987, the District Court ruled that Hadix was entitled to attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring of compliance with the decrees. The court established specific market rates for awarding fees. By April 26, 1996, the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the market rate was $150 per hour. The PLRA limited the size of fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits to a maximum hourly rate of $112.50. When first presented with the issue, the District Court concluded that the PLRA cap did not limit attorney's fees for services performed in these cases prior to, but that were still unpaid by, the PLRA's effective date. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Next, fee requests were filed with the District Court for services performed during a period encompassing work performed both before and after the PLRA's effective date. The District Court reiterated its earlier conclusion. The Court of Appeals held that the PLRA's fee limitation does not apply to cases pending on the enactment date because if it did, it would have an impermissible retroactive effect, regardless of when the work was performed.

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite

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Missouri v. Jenkins

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N.C. Dept. Of Transp. v. Crest St. Council

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New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey

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Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises

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Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council

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Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council

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Pierce v. Underwood

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Rhodes v. Stewart

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Riverside v. Rivera

In 1975, eight Chicano individuals were attending a party that was broken up by the Riverside police using tear gas and physical force without a warrant. Subsequently, the eight individuals filed suit in Federal District Court against the city and various police officers under several federal Civil Rights Acts, alleging violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The jury found in the individuals' favor and awarded $33,350 in compensatory and punitive damages. The individuals also sought attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 in the amount of $245,456.25, based on 1,946.75 hours expended by their two attorneys at $125 per hour and 84.5 hours expended by law clerks at $25 per hour. Finding both the hours and rates reasonable, the District Court awarded the requested amount, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court found that the fee award was not excessive merely because it exceeded the amount of damages awarded by the jury.

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper

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Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club

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Scarborough v. Principi

Randall Scarborough won a case against the Department of Veterans Affairs. He then applied for attorney's fees to the U.S. Veterans' Court under the federal Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Under the EAJA, the government must pay attorney's fees to anyone who wins against the federal government in litigation unless the government can show that its position was "substantially justified." However, Scarborough's attorney submitted an incomplete application, neglecting to assert that the government's position was not substantially justified. Though he amended and resubmitted it, he did so after the 30-day filing deadline. The Veterans' Court dismissed the application for "lack of subject matter jurisdiction" - that is, because it was not filed in its complete form within the 30-day deadline. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services v. Schaefer

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Smith v. Robinson

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Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Commission

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Sullivan v. Hudson

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Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v. Carpenters

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Texas Teachers Assn. v. Garland School Dist.

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U.S. v. Ball Construction Co.

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Venegas v. Mitchell

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Walters v. Nat. Assn. Of Radiation Survivors

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Webb v. Dyer County Bd. Of Ed.

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West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey

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White v. New Hampshire Dept. Of Empl. Sec.

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