Cases - 2013 term

Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:34:29 +0000

Location

United States Steel Corporation

600 Grant Street

Pittsburgh, PA

United States

40° 26' 28.878" N, 79° 59' 41.4708" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-417

Petitioner

Clifton Sandifer, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States Steel Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Facts of the Case

Workers at the United Steel Corporation brought a class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent changing into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the locker room to their work stations. The Act states that an employer does not need to compensate employees for time spent “changing clothes.” United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as it relates to compensation for changing clothes but not in relation to compensation for transit time.

The company appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to compensate the employees for either the time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations.

Question

Does changing into required safety gear constitute “changing clothes” under the Fair Labor Standards Act?

McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:34:29 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

333 Constitution Ave NW

Washington, DC

United States

38° 53' 34.4184" N, 77° 0' 59.0904" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-536

Appellant

Shaun McCutcheon, et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Respondent

Federal Election Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Facts of the Case

In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which established two sets of limits to campaign contributions. The base limit placed restrictions on how much money a contributor—defined broadly as individuals, partnerships, and other organizations—may give to specified categories of recipients. The aggregate limit restricted how much money an individual may donate in a two-year election cycle. The limits were periodically recalibrated to factor in inflation.

Shaun McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who is eligible to vote. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, he donated to the Republican National Committee, other Republican committees, as well as individual candidates. He wished to donate more in amounts that would be permissible under the base limit but would violate the aggregate limit. McCutcheon and the other plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the aggregate limit violated the First Amendment by failing to serve a “cognizable government interest” and being prohibitively low. The district court held that the aggregate limit served government interests by preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption and was set at a reasonable limit.

Question

Is the two-year aggregate campaign contribution limit constitutional under the First Amendment?

Madigan v. Levin

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:34:29 +0000

Location

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

219 S. Dearborn Street

Chicago, IL

United States

41° 52' 45.0156" N, 87° 37' 45.5376" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-872

Petitioner

Lisa Madigan et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harvey N. Levin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, March 18, 2013

Facts of the Case

Harvey N. Levin was hired as an Illinois Assistant District Attorney on September 5, 2000. On May 12, 2006 when he was fired, Levin was over the age of sixty, and he believed that he was fired due to his age and gender. He was replaced by a female attorney in her thirties. Levin sued the state of Illinois, the Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan in both her individual and official capacities, and four other Attorney General employees under the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit by arguing that either the claim under the ADEA precluded the Civil Rights Act claim or that they were entitled to qualified immunity under the ADEA. The district court originally ruled that the ADEA did not prevent the claim from proceeding under the Civil Rights Act and granted the qualified immunity. After the case was reassigned to a different district court judge, the district court held that Levin was not an employee for the purpose of the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA, so he could not pursue those claims, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the existence of a specific route for the redress of age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination Employment Act prevent local and state employees from seeking redress under the Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act?

Kaley v. United States

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:34:29 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

400 North Miami Avenue

Miami, FL 33128

United States

25° 46' 39.7416" N, 80° 11' 40.686" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-464

Petitioner

Kerri L. Kaley and Brian P. Kaley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, March 18, 2013

Facts of the Case

In 2005, a grand jury began investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2007, the grand jury indicted the Kaleys on seven criminal counts. One of these counts was a criminal forfeiture count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their offenses. This property included a certificate of deposit for $500,000, which the Kaleys intended to use to pay their defense attorneys.

Following the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring or disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order because it prevented them from hiring their attorneys in violation of their right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion without granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded.

On remand, the district court granted a pretrial hearing, but limited it to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys’ offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, the district court refused to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that they should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Question

Do the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a district court to allow a criminal defendant to challenge the evidence behind her charges in a pretrial hearing when a protective order freezes the assets necessary for the defendant to hire her attorney?

Kansas v. Cheever

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:34:29 +0000

Location

Hilltop, Kansas Hilltop, KS

United States

37° 40' 16.212" N, 97° 17' 22.4376" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-609

Petitioner

State of Kansas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scott D. Cheever

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, February 25, 2013

Facts of the Case

On January 19, 2005, Scott D. Cheever shot and killed Greenwood County Sheriff Matthew Samuels at the residence of Darrell and Belinda Coopers in Hilltop, Kansas. Samuels had gone to the Coopers’ residence based on a tip to arrest Cheever for outstanding warrants. He found the Coopers, Cheever, and two others cooking and ingesting methamphetamines. In the following attempts to arrest Cheever and retrieve the injured Samuels, Cheever also shot at several other officers.

At trial, Cheever asserted a voluntary intoxication defense and argued that the methamphetamine use rendered him mentally incapable of the premeditation required for murder. During the course of the trial, the judge ordered Cheever to undergo a psychiatric examination conducted by a psychiatric hired by the government. The prosecution sought to bring the transcript of the interview into evidence to impeach Cheever’s testimony regarding the order of events at the Coopers’ residence, which the court allowed. After the defense rested their case, the prosecution called the psychiatrist to the stand as a rebuttal witness to respond to the defense’s claims regarding Cheever’s mental capacity at the time of the crime. The trial court allowed the psychiatrist’s testimony as a rebuttal witness. The jury found Cheever guilty and, at a separate sentencing hearing, sentenced him to death. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the admission of the government psychiatrist’s testimony into evidence violated Cheever’s Fifth Amendment rights.

Question

Did the state violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination by bringing in evidence from the court-ordered mental evaluation of the defendant to rebut an affirmative defense based on mental incapacity?

Burt v. Titlow

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:34:29 +0000

Location

Donald Rogers' Residence Troy, MI

United States

42° 36' 38.5812" N, 83° 8' 55.1436" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-414

Petitioner

Sherry L. Burt, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vonlee Nicole Titlow

Respondent Type

Respondent

Facts of the Case

In August 2000, Vonlee Nicole Titlow helped his aunt Billie Rogers murder his wealthy uncle Donald Rogers. After Titlow was charged with first-degree murder, the prosecution offered him a plea bargain. In exchange for testifying against Billie Rogers, Titlow could plead guilty to manslaughter and receive a reduced sentence. After consulting with his attorney, Titlow accepted the deal. However, before sentencing, Titlow spoke to a sheriff’s deputy who suggested that he withdraw his guilty plea and consult another attorney. Titlow followed the deputy’s advice, hired a new attorney and withdrew his guilty plea.

Following his trial, a jury convicted Titlow of second-degree murder and sentenced him to 20-to-40 years in prison. This led Titlow to accuse his second attorney of ineffective assistance of counsel for allowing him to withdraw the original guilty plea. Both the trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Titlow’s claim. Titlow petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court to hear his case, but they refused to do so.

Titlow then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, but the district court denied his claim as well. The district court held that Titlow failed to meet the standard for overturning a state-court conviction under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and ordered the state to reoffer Titlow’s original plea agreement. The appellate court held that Titlow’s second attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate his claims further, failing to obtain documents from the first attorney, and failing to convince Titlow to take the plea bargain.

Question

1. Did the Sixth Circuit give appropriate deference to the Michigan trial court under the AEDPA?

2. Can a defendant establish prejudice in an ineffective assistance claim by presenting subjective testimony that he would have accepted the plea offer absent the attorney’s deficient advice?

3. Does the Court’s decision in Lafler v. Cooper require a state trial court to resentence a defendant when he claims that ineffective assistance of counsel led him to reject a plea offer?

Walden v. Fiore

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:34:29 +0000

Location

Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport

2600 Maynard H. Jackson Jr Blvd

Atlanta, GA 30354

United States

33° 38' 27.3084" N, 84° 25' 36.1884" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-574

Petitioner

Anthony Walden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gina Fiore, Keith Gipson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, March 4, 2013

Facts of the Case

In 2006 Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson traveled from Las Vegas, Nevada to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to San Juan, Puerto Rico before returning to Las Vegas by way of Atlanta, Georgia. The two are professional gamblers with residences in California and Las Vegas. At a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoint in San Juan, Fiore and Gipson were subjected to heightened security because they were travelling on a one-way ticket. TSA officers search the gamblers luggage and found $97,000 in U.S. currency. San Juan Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers arrived and questioned the pair to determine whether the money was the proceeds of illegal drug trade. Fiore and Gipson stated that the cash was their seed money and winnings from gambling. The DEA let Fiore and Gipson board the plane to Atlanta with their luggage.

When Fiore and Gipson landed at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, Anthony Walden and other DEA agents approached and questioned them. Fiore and Gipson repeated their story and produced records of their travels. When a drug-detecting dog pawed Gipson’s bag once, Walden stated that he had probable cause to seize the cash and took both Fiore and Gipson’s bags before allowing them to continue on to Las Vegas without the money. When Fiore and Gipson got to Las Vegas they sent records of their gambling earnings along with past tax returns to prove their status as professional gamblers to Walden. Walden refused to return the money and referred the matter to a U.S. Attorney in Georgia based on a false probable cause affidavit. The U.S. Attorney found no probable cause and ordered the money returned. The money was returned to Fiore and Gipson seven months after it was seized.

Fiore and Gipson sued Walden in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada alleging that the seizure violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Walden moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the District Court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the court did have personal jurisdiction because Walden intentionally caused foreseeable harm in Nevada by falsifying the probable cause affidavit and attempting to secure the seized funds permanently for the Atlanta DEA.

Question

Does due process allow the Nevada court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Walden?

Is the District of Nevada the place where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” for purposes of establishing venue when all of defendant’s alleged acts or omissions happened in another district?

Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:34:29 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan

231 W Lafayette Blvd

Detroit, MI

United States

42° 19' 49.3356" N, 83° 2' 58.2432" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-682

Petitioner

Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, March 25, 2013

Facts of the Case

In November 2006 election, a majority of Michigan voters supported a proposition to amend the state constitution to prohibit “all sex- and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting.” The day after the proposition passed, a collection of interest groups and individuals formed the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (Coalition). The Coalition sued the governor and the regents and boards of trustees of three state universities in district court by arguing that the proposition as it related to public education violated the Equal Protection Clause. About a month later, the Michigan Attorney General and Eric Russell, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School, filed separate motions to intervene as defendants, which were granted. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved to have Russell removed from the case as he did not represent interests separate from those of the Michigan Attorney General. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and granted the motion to remove Russell as an intervenor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding the proposed amendment unconstitutional and upholding the removal of Russell as a party to the litigation.

Question

Does an amendment to a state’s constitution to prohibit race- and sex-based discrimination and preferential treatment in public university admission decisions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?