Cases - 2012 term

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum

mgruhn — Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Ogoniland, Nigeria

Nigeria

5° 52' 10.452" N, 5° 46' 7.932" E

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1491

Petitioner

Esther Kiobel, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, October 17, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 2012

Reargued:

Monday, October 1, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

Advocates

Paul L. Hoffman (for the petitioners (argument and reargument))

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners (argument))

Kathleen M. Sullivan (for the respondents (argument and reargument))

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent (reargument))

Facts of the Case

The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the Shell Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government’s human rights abuses.

The petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal.

Both parties cross-appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners’ request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied.

Following oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.

Question

1. Is corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort Statute an issue of subject matter jurisdiction?

2. Under the Alien Tort Statute, are corporations immune from tort liability for violations of the law of nations, such as torture, extrajudicial executions, or genocide?

3. Upon reargument, whether and when does the Alien Tort Statute allow courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States?

Florida v. Jardines

jgoldman — Wed, 31 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

A Private Residence Miami, FL

United States

25° 31' 40.872" N, 80° 24' 8.9352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-564

Petitioner

State of Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joelis Jardines

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Friday, January 6, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (for the petitioner)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Howard K. Blumberg (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On November 3, 2006, the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified ""crime stoppers"" tip that the home of Joelis Jardines was being used to grow marijuana. On December 6, 2006, two detectives, along with a trained drug detection dog, approached the residence. The dog handler accompanied the dog to the front door of the home. The dog signaled that it detected the scent of narcotics. The detective also personally
smelled marijuana.

The detective prepared an affidavit and applied for a search warrant, which was issued. A search confirmed that marijuana was being grown inside the home. Jardines was arrested and charged with trafficking cannabis. Jardines moved to suppress the evidence seized at his home on the theory that the drug dog's sniff was an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment and that all subsequent evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently ruled to suppress the evidence. The state appealed the suppression ruling and the state appellate court reversed, concluding that no illegal search had occurred since the officer had the right to go up to the defendant's front door and that a warrant was not necessary for the drug dog’s sniff. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and concluded that the dog's sniff was a substantial government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The state of Florida appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision.

Question

Is a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause?

Conclusion

Decision: votes for Jardines, vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth amendment

Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered a 5-4 opinion affirming the Florida Supreme Court’s decision. The Court held that the front porch of a home is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Typically, ordinary citizens are invited to enter onto the porch, either explicitly or implicitly, to communicate with the house’s occupants. Police officers, however, cannot go beyond the scope of that invitation. Entering a person’s porch for the purposes of conducting a search requires a broader license than the one commonly given to the general public. Without such a license, the police officers were conducting an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented, arguing that the majority’s interpretation of the public license to approach a person’s front door is too narrow and should extend even to police officers collecting evidence against an occupant. The dissent argued that the common law of trespass does not limit the public license to a particular category of visitors approaching the door for a specific purpose. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent.

United States v. Bormes

jgoldman — Tue, 02 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-192

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James X. Bormes

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Friday, January 13, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

John G. Jacobs (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In October 2000, the United States Treasury Department launched Pay.gov, a billing and payment processing system that allows consumers to make online payments to government agencies by credit or debit card. Numerous government agencies use Pay.gov to process credit and debit payments. On August 9, 2008, attorney James X Bormes filed a lawsuit on behalf of one of his clients in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, paying the filing fee with a credit card via Pay.gov. The confirmation page displayed the expiration date of Bormes’ credit card.

Bormes alleged that the inclusion of his card’s expiration date violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”); he brought this action on behalf of himself and a class of individual cardholders. The statute provides that no person accepting credit or debit cards for a business transaction shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card or the expiration date on any receipt provided to the cardholder after a transaction. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the FCRA, but granted the government’s motion to dismiss because the FCRA did not waive the government’s sovereign immunity. It held that Bormes’ invocation of the Little Tucker Act was moot because the court had jurisdiction under the FCRA.

On appeal, a motions panel denied the government’s motion to transfer to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. It held that Bormes’ complaint invoked the district court’s jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act; the Little Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to district courts over claims against the United States not exceeding $10,000. Afterwards, a panel of the Seventh Circuit determined that the Little Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for the FCRA in Talley v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Seventh Circuit later vacated this opinion; the Talley case remains pending. Bormes appealed his case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which determined that the FCRA mandates money damages from the federal government, giving jurisdiction to the district courts through the Little Tucker Act.

Question

Does the Little Tucker Act waive the sovereign immunity of the United States for claims of damages arising from violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Little Tucker Act

No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the lower judgment and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Little Tucker Act does not apply when the underlying law imposing monetary liability has its own specific judicial remedies, as in the FCRA. The Little Tucker Act does not create any substantive rights, and was intended to fill the gaps left in more general statutes where monetary relief might be warranted. The lower court should have used the text of the FCRA itself to decide whether sovereign immunity was waived. The Court did not decide whether the FCRA waives the government’s sovereign immunity.

Johnson v. Williams

jgoldman — Wed, 03 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-465

Petitioner

Deborah K. Johnson, Acting Warden of the Central California Women's Facility at Chowchilla

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tara Sheneva Williams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Friday, January 13, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Advocates

Stephanie Brenan (Deputy Attorney General, for the petitioner)

Kurt D. Hermansen (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1999, Tara Williams was charged with the 1993 robbery-murder of Hung Mun Kim. During jury deliberations at Williams’ trial, the judge received a jury note saying that one of the jurors, juror number six, expressed an intention to disregard the law due to a concern about the severity of the charge of first-degree murder. After an inquiry and evidentiary hearing, the judge dismissed the juror for bias.

Williams appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it removed juror number six, because the removal of the “lone holdout” juror violated Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury. The California Court of Appeals rejected her claim as meritless, and the California Supreme Court denied further direct appellate review.

Williams filed a state habeas corpus petition in Los Angleles County Superior Court. The court denied the petition, ruling that the issues raised in the petition were issues for direct appeal, not collateral attack. Williams next filed a federal habeas corpus petition, in which she again challenged the removal of juror number six. The magistrate judge concluded that the trial court’s factual finding of bias was entitled to deference and that the discharge of juror number six did not constitute a constitutional violation. The district court adopted the report of the magistrate judge and dismissed the petition with prejudice.

Williams appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed the district court, holding that the deferential-review standard did not apply because the California Court of Appeal had only reviewed her state claim and had not adjudicated her federal constitutional claim. The appellate court then conducted a review of Williams’ federal claim and concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not allow a trial judge to discharge a juror on account of his views on the merits of the case. The State of California appealed to the appellate court’s decision.

Question

Is a habeas petitioner's claim "adjudicated on the merits" if the state court denied relief in an explained decision but did not expressly acknowledge the federal-law basis for the claim?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Johnson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. delivered a unanimous opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanding for further proceedings. The Court held that Williams’ entire claim had been “adjudicated on the merits,” even though the California court did not expressly address the federal law claim. To adjudicate a claim on its merits, a state court is only required to evaluate the evidence and arguments; it is not required to expressly address every single claim. When a defendant presents a federal claim to a state court and the state court denies relief, it must be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on its merits. It is up to the defendant to rebut this presumption in order to seek federal habeas relief. To rule otherwise would unreasonably burden the state courts and require them to spend time expressly addressing even the most insignificant claims.

Lozman v. Riviera Beach

jgoldman — Mon, 01 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Riviera Beach Marina

600 West Blue Heron Blvd.

Riviera Beach, FL 33404

United States

26° 46' 24.5892" N, 80° 3' 5.58" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-626

Petitioner

Fane Lozman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Riviera Beach Marina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Argued

Monday, October 1, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

David C. Frederick (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2002, Fane Lozman purchased a floating residential structure. The structure was rectangular and made of plywood. It contained no bilge pumps, no raked bow, no navigation aids, no lifeboats, no propulsion mechanism, no steering, and cleats, which were inappropriate for towing.

Lozman kept his floating home in a marina in the City of Riviera Beach. Lozman signed a lease with the city, moored the floating home to the dock, and affixed the home to land based utilities. Later, the city council passed a revised dockage agreement and accompanying Marina Rules. Pursuant to these rules, the city informed Lozman it would revoke his permission to remain on the Marina unless he executed a new agreement and complied with the new regulations. Lozman did not execute a new agreement and continued to remain at the marina.

In response, the city filed an in rem suit in federal court for trespass under federal maritime law. The city filed for partial summary judgment on its trespass claim. Lozman argued that his floating home was not a “vessel” under 1 U.S.C. § 3, and therefore not subject to maritime law. The district court granted the city’s motion and held that Lozman’s floating home was a “vessel” for purposes admiralty jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the lower court, and Lozman appealed the appellate court’s determination that his floating home was a “vessel” under 1 U.S.C. § 3.

Question

Is a floating structure a "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3, thus triggering federal maritime jurisdiction, if that structure is indefinitely moored, receives power and other utilities from shore, and is not intended to be used in maritime transportation or commerce?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Lozman, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Rules of Construction Act

No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the 11th Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the 11th Circuit's definition of "vessel" is too broad. The Cort focused on the language of the statute, which states that a vessel is "capable of being used...as a means of transportation." While the floating home can move, it is not used for transportation in a practical way. The Court employed a "reasonable observer" test, holding that something's ability to float, does not automatically make it a vessel.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the reasonable observer test introduces a subjective element that upsets long established maritime precedent. The dissent would also remand the case to develop the record further. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.

Fisher v. University of Texas

jgoldman — Wed, 10 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

University of Texas

1 University Station

Austin, TX 78712

United States

30° 17' 24.18" N, 97° 44' 51.6948" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-345

Petitioner

Abigail N. Fisher

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

University of Texas at Austin, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Advocates

Bert W. Rein (for the petitioner)

Gregory G. Garre (for the respondents)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Click here to watch video explanations, read documents, and listen to the lower court arguments for this case.

In 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all high school seniors who ranked in the top ten percent of their high school classes. After finding differences between the racial and ethnic makeup of the university's undergraduate population and the state's population, the University of Texas decided to modify its race-neutral admissions policy. The new policy continued to admit all in-state students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school classes. For the remainder of the in-state freshman class the university would consider race as a factor in admission.

Abigail N. Fisher, a Caucasian female, applied for undergraduate admission to the University of Texas in 2008. Fisher was not in the top ten percent of her class, so she competed for admission with other non-top ten percent in-state applicants. The University of Texas denied Fisher's application.

Fisher filed suit against the university and other related defendants, claiming that the University of Texas' use of race as a consideration in admission decisions was in violation of the equal protection cause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a violation of42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The university argued that its use of race was a narrowly tailored means of pursuing greater diversity. The district court decided in favor of the University of Texas, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Fisher appealed the appellate court's decision.

Question

Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit the consideration of race in undergraduate admissions decisions?

Ryan v. Gonzales

jgoldman — Tue, 09 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Darrel Wagner's Town House Phoenix, AZ

United States

33° 26' 54.1572" N, 112° 4' 26.5332" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-930

Petitioner

Charles L. Ryan, Director Arizona Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ernest Valencia Gonzales

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 11-218, Tibbals v. Carter

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, March 19, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Advocates

Thomas C. Horne (Attorney General of Arizona, for the petitioner)

Leticia Marquez (for the respondent)

Alexandra T. Schimmer (Solicitor General of Ohio, for the petitioner in No. 11-218)

Scott Michelman (for the respondent in No. 11-218)

Ann O'Connell (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners in Nos. 11-218 and 10-930)

Facts of the Case

Ernest Valencia Gonzales was convicted for the murder of Darrel Wagner. His conviction and death sentence became final on January 8, 1996. Gonzalez exhausted his state-court post-conviction relief opportunities before challenging his conviction in federal court.

In November 1999, Gonzales initiated a federal habeas proceeding, which raised 60 claims for federal habeas relief, including claims relating to Gonzales' competence and ability to rationally communicate with his court-appointed attorneys. The federal court stayed Gonzales' execution pending resolution of those proceedings. Ultimately, the district court denied Gonzales' motion for a competency hearing and a stay of proceedings. Even though it determined that Gonzales was incompetent, the court considered this irrelevant because Gonzales’ claims could not benefit from rational communication with counsel.

Gonzales appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It disagreed with the lower court and held that Gonzales was entitled to a stay pending a competency determination. The Arizona Department of Corrections appealed.

The related case, Tibbals v. Carter, was a similar capital murder appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Sean Carter, the defendant, was adjudged incompetent to assist his attorneys following his murder conviction. The district court granted Carter a stay on his habeas corpus proceedings based on a right to competence in such proceedings. After the appellate court affirmed, the State appealed further and the Court granted certiorari to answer the same question as in Ryan v. Gonzales.

Question

Does a death row inmate have the right to suspend federal habeas corpus proceedings when found incompetent to assist counsel?

Conclusion

No. In a unanimous opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. The Court reasoned that neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to competence exists during federal habeas corpus proceedings. Though the district court has broad discretion to grant a stay on habeas proceedings, this discretion is not without its limitations. In both cases, a stay was unwarranted because communication between the defendant and his attorney was unnecessary. The record provided adequate information for an attorney to handle habeas proceedings on his own, regardless of a client’s incompetence. Even if the district court were to decide that the defendant’s competence was necessary, it should only grant a stay if the defendant is likely to regain competence in the foreseeable future. Otherwise, allowing a stay on their proceedings would unreasonably burden the judicial system.

Moncrieffe v. Holder

jgoldman — Wed, 10 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

New Orleans Immigration Court

365 Canal Street

New Orleans, LA 70130

United States

29° 57' 4.3128" N, 90° 3' 56.1888" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-702

Petitioner

Adrian Moncrieffe

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, April 2, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Advocates

Thomas C. Goldstein (for the petitioner)

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Adrian Moncrieffe, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1984. In 2008, police arrested Moncrieffe while he was in possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty in a Georgia court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

In 2010, the department of Homeland Security started removal proceedings against Moncrieffe for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and as an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense. Moncrieffe did not dispute his conviction but argued that that the conviction was not an “aggravated felony” and did not make him removable.

An immigration judge ruled that Moncrieffe was removable, holding that the petitioner’s conviction was an aggravated felony because Moncrieffe was convicted under a state law which was similar to a federal law which made possession of marijuana with intent to distribute a felony. Moncrieffe appealed and argued that possession of such a small amount of marijuana would not be a felony under federal law, but rather a misdemeanor. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Moncrieffe’s argument and dismissed the appeal. The United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the deportation order.

Question

Does conviction under a provision of state law for distribution of a small mount of marijuana constitute an aggravated felony, regardless of whether the conduct would constitute a federal felony?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Moncrieffe, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Nationality Act

No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a categorical approach must be used to determine whether a state offense is comparable to one listed in a federal statute. Because the Controlled Substances Act contains provisions for the conviction of the possession of marijuana as both a felony and a misdemeanor, it is unclear which one aligns with a conviction for the possession of marijuana under the Georgia state statute. Under the categorical approach, it is not possible to tell whether Moncrieffe’s conviction under the Georgia state statute would constitute an aggravated felony. The Court held that if a noncitizen’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance fails to establish whether remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, it cannot be considered an aggravated felony.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, because the Georgia state statute punishes Moncrieffe’s offense as a felony, and it is punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act, the conviction should be considered an aggravated felony. He also argued that the majority’s opinion allows state felonies to be treated as federal misdemeanors, which runs counter to existing precedent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority’s decision allows the leeway for convicted drug traffickers to remain in the country, which runs counter to the government’s interest and existing precedent. Rather than following a purely categorical approach, the majority’s decision creates a great deal of variation in the consequences for the conviction of the possession of a controlled substance based on the different state laws. He also argued that, because Moncrieffe did not prove that his offense falls under the definition of a misdemeanor, the deportation decision should be upheld.

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

jgoldman — Mon, 29 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Cornell University

410 Thurston Ave.

Ithaca, NY

United States

42° 27' 14.1192" N, 76° 29' 3.5988" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-697

Petitioner

Supap Kirtsaeng

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, April 16, 2012

Argued

Monday, October 29, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Advocates

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the petitioner)

Theodore B. Olson (for the respondent)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Supap Kirtsaeng came to the United States from Thailand in 1997. He obtained an undergraduate degree at Cornell University before being accepted into a PhD program at the University of Southern California. To subsidize the cost of his education, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of textbooks in Thailand and to ship those books to him in the United States. Kirstaeng then sold the textbooks on eBay at a profit. Among the books Kirtsaeng sold, were eight textbooks printed in Asia by John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Wiley sued Kirtsaeng in district court for copyright infringement under Section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which makes it impermissible to import a work “without the authority of the owner.” Kirtsaeng asserted a defense under Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a copy “lawfully made under this title” to sell or otherwise dispose of the copy without the copyright owner’s permission. The district court rejected Kirtsaeng’s argument, and held that the doctrine was inapplicable to goods manufactured in a foreign country.

Kirtsaeng appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A divided panel acknowledged that it was a difficult question of statutory construction, but the majority held that Section 109(a) referred specifically to works that are made in the United States and did not apply to works manufactured abroad. Kirtsaeng’s request for rehearing was denied, and he appealed the appellate court’s decision.

Question

If a copy was made legally, acquired abroad and then imported into the United States, can that foreign-made copy ever be resold within the United States without the copyright owner’s permission under Section 602(a)(1) and Section 109(a) of the copyright act?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kirtsaeng, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Copyright Act

Yes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no geographic restriction on the “first sale” doctrine, which states that the copyright owner maintains control of the first sale only. The language and common-law history of the Copyright Act support a non-geographic reading of the Act that allows for unrestricted resale of copyrighted goods regardless of the location of their manufacture. The Court also held that a geography-based reading of the “first sale” doctrine would drastically harm the used-book business as it would force book sellers to be subject to the whim of foreign copyright holders.

In her concurring opinion, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that the majority’s decision did not limit copyright protection for copyright owners any further than previous decisions had. She argued that a stricter reading of copyright protection goes against the demonstrated legislative intent of the Act. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the majority’s opinion runs counter to the Copyright Act’s purpose of protecting copyright owners from the importation of low-cost versions of their products. The language and legislative history of the Copyright Act indicate that Congress did not intend the “first sale” doctrine to apply to copies manufactured abroad. She also argued that the majority’s opinion drastically shifts the government’s policy in regards to international copyright agreements. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.

Chaidez v. United States

jgoldman — Thu, 01 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

219 S. Dearborn Street

Chicago, IL 60604

United States

41° 52' 45.1308" N, 87° 37' 45.5412" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-820

Petitioner

Roselva Chaidez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, April 30, 2012

Argued

Thursday, November 1, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Roselva Chaidez came to the United States from Mexico in 1971; she became a lawful permanent resident in 1977. In 2003, she was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on three counts of mail fraud in connection with an insurance scheme. On the advice of her attorney, Chaidez pleaded guilty and received a sentence of four years of probation. The U.S. government initiated removal proceedings in 2009 under a federal law that allows deportation of any alien who commits an aggravated felony. Chaidez’s attorney never told her that pleading guilty could lead to her deportation.

Chaidez filed for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. While this motion was pending before the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that it is ineffective assistance of counsel when an attorney fails to advise a client that he or she may face deportation as a result of pleading guilty. The district court concluded that Padilla did not announce a new rule, so its holding applied to Chaidez's case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla does announce a new rule and is not retroactively applicable in this case.

Question

Does the Padilla rule on ineffective assistance of counsel apply to persons whose convictions became final before its announcement?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment (retroactive application)

No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Padilla ruling created an entirely new rule relating to whether advice about deportation fell under the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because the Court considered this rule separately from previous cases, it was considered a new rule and therefore could not retroactively apply to already decided cases.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment only arguing that the Sixth Amendment provides for adequate assistance of counsel in the charged offense and does not extend to advice regarding possible consequences, such as deportation. He dissented in the Padilla case and therefore concurred only in the judgment in this case.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the decision in Padilla did not create a new rule but only extended previous analysis of Sixth Amendment rights to a new set of facts. Because the Padilla decision only clarified an attorney’s responsibility to a client and did not create any new distinctions, the ruling should apply retroactively to previously decided cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.

Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds

jgoldman — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Amgen Headquarters

1909 Oak Terrace Lane

Newbury Park, CA

United States

34° 11' 19.0608" N, 118° 55' 13.71" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1085

Petitioner

Amgen Inc, Kevin W. Sharer, Richard D. Nanula, Roger M. Perlmutter, George J. Morrow

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 11, 2012

Argued

Monday, November 5, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Advocates

Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioners)

David C. Frederick (for the respondent)

Melissa Arbus Sherry (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Amgen, Inc. is an American pharmaceutical corporation. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved two Amgen products that stimulate production of red blood cells and reduce the need for blood transfusions in anemic patients. Amgen allegedly made misrepresentations to the FDA about the safety of these products. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds brought an action against Amgen alleging four counts of misrepresentation. Connecticut Retirement Plans specifically alleged that Amgen misrepresented the nature of several FDA committee meetings to shareholders. It sought to certify a class of persons who purchased Amgen stock between April 22, 2004 and May 10, 2007, the dates when two of the meetings in question occurred. On May 10, 2007, Amgen’s stock value dropped by more than nine percent.

To certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, and that these questions predominate over questions affecting only individual members. Amgen opposed the class certification, arguing that the that the misrepresentations did not have any impact on the price of Amgen stock. The district court rejected Amgen’s arguments and granted the class certification. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed, rejecting Amgen’s argument that a plaintiff must give proof that the misrepresentations were material at the class certification stage.

Question

1. Must the district court require proof of materiality before certifying a class action based on the fraud-upon-the-market theory in a misrepresentation case?

2. Must the district court allow Amgen, Inc. to present evidence rebutting the applicability of the fraud-upon-the-market theory before certifying the plaintiff class

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Exchange Act (1934)

No, no. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the issue of materiality is dealt with when the case is decided on the merits, not during class certification. For a class to be certified, the members of the class must show only that the questions they have in common predominate over questions affecting solely individual members of the class. The Supreme Court also held that the district court ruled appropriately in preventing Amgen from bringing in rebuttal evidence to prevent class certification. Such evidence dealt with material issues of the case that would be decided when the case was considered on the merits, and thus did not relate to the issue of class certification.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, while he joins the majority’s opinion, recent economic evidence suggests that the fraud-on-the-market theory might rest on faulty economic presumptions that would be worth reexamining.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that a presumption of materiality was necessary for class certification in a fraud-on-the-market case. Because such a case is predicated on the idea that the members of the class relied on faulty information, there cannot be a suit without evidence that the faulty information was material.

In his separate dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that plaintiffs seeking to use the fraud-on-the-market theory must show evidence of all aspects of the theory, including materiality, to be certified as a class. Without proof of materiality along with the other elements, there is no evidence that the claim has class-wide relevance. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Scalia joined in the dissent.

Evans v. Michigan

jgoldman — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Vacant house that burned

9608 Meyers Road

Detroit, MI

United States

42° 22' 2.694" N, 83° 10' 3.9036" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1327

Petitioner

Lamar Evans

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 11, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Advocates

David A. Moran (for the petitioner)

Timothy A. Baughman (for the respondent)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house in Detroit, Michigan. He was charged with "burning other real property." The trial court required the prosecution to prove that the building was not a dwelling, although that is not an element of the crime under Michigan law. As a result of this extra element, the court granted Evans’ motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed the trial court decision and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that Double Jeopardy did not bar a retrial because the trial court did not resolve any factual element of the case. The directed verdict was based only on the prosecution’s failure to prove an element that is not part of the crime. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed.

Question

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar retrial after the trial judge wrongly holds a particular fact to be an element of the offense and then grants a directed verdict of acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove that fact?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Evans, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fifth Amendment

Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in an 8-1 opinion, reversed the lower court’s decision and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars Evans’ retrial. Even though the trial judge arrived at his ruling by erroneously adding a statutory element, Evans was acquitted for double jeopardy purposes. In general, any ruling based on the prosecution’s failure to establish criminal liability will result in an acquittal. However, the Court distinguishes between an acquittal granted for substantive purposes and one granted for procedural purposes. When determining whether double jeopardy applies, only an acquittal based on the culpability of the defendant will conclude the proceedings entirely. If the acquittal is merely procedural and unrelated to the factual guilt or innocence of the defendant, there is no expectation that double jeopardy will bar further proceedings. The Court held that the trial court’s acquittal factually resolved whether Evans was guilty or not; therefore it would be unfair to prosecute him again for the same crime.

Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority’s ruling goes beyond the original intent of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to protect people from prosecutors’ repeat attempts to convict an individual for the same offense. Since Evans moved for the directed verdict himself, the typical fear of repeat prosecution by the State does not arise. Despite the trial judge’s error, the State was entitled to one complete opportunity to convict the defendant.

Comcast v. Behrend

mgruhn — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA

United States

39° 59' 12.4368" N, 75° 10' 20.658" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-864

Petitioner

Comcast Corp., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Caroline Behrend, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Monday, November 5, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (for the petitioners)

Barry Barnett (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, Caroline Behrend, along with Stanford Glaberson, Joan Evanchuk-Kind, and Eric Brislawn, brought an antitrust class action suit against Comcast Corporation. The petitioners were all Comcast cable customers, alleging that the company obtained a monopoly on the cable market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. By contracting with competitors to swap customers and subsume the regional cable markets, the company excluded and prevented competition amongst cable providers in the Philadelphia area. The proposed class of plaintiffs included all cable television customers in the Philadelphia area who subscribe or subscribed to Comcast’s video programming services since December 1999.

In May 2007, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified the class, allowing the case to move forward. In light of a new antitrust decision in 2008 on class certification from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the District Court reconsidered its certification decision. The court held evidentiary hearings in October 2009, which consisted of dozens of expert testimonies and depositions. Following the hearings, the District Court recertified the class, finding sufficient evidence of a common impact amongst class members and a common methodology available to measure damages on a class-wide basis. Comcast subsequently appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision.

Question

Is a district court allowed to certify a class without adequate admissible evidence that damages may be measured and quantified on a class-wide basis?

Already LLC v. Nike

mgruhn — Wed, 07 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York New York, NY

United States

41° 1' 42.636" N, 73° 46' 15.3264" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-982

Petitioner

Already, LLC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nike, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Advocates

James W. Dabney (for the petitioner)

Ginger D. Anders (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Thomas C. Goldstein (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Since 1982, Nike Inc. sold a shoe called the Air Force 1. The shoe has a distinctive appearance and Nike owns multiple federal trademark registrations for the shoe’s design. In July 2009, Nike filed suit against Already, LLC for selling shoes that were confusingly similar to the Air Force 1 shoe. In November 2009, Already counterclaimed and requested cancellation of Nike’s trademark on the basis that it interfered with Already’s ability to continue selling its shoes.

To avoid further litigation, Nike provided Already with a covenant not to sue. The agreement promised that Nike would not pursue any legal action against Already with regard to trademark infringement. The District Court held a hearing to determine whether the covenant caused the court to lose subject matter jurisdiction over Already’s counterclaims. Following the hearing, the District Court determined that it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the counterclaim alone did not create a case or controversy before the court; therefore the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.

Question

Did Already’s counterclaim create a justiciable controversy sufficient to allow the District Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nike, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article III

No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that Nike’s covenant not to sue made the case moot. Nike met its burden to show that it “could not reasonably be expected” to resume trademark enforcement action against Already. The language of the covenant was broad enough that the Court could not conceive of a shoe that would fall outside of its scope. The Court also rejected Already’s assertion that dismissing the case would allow Nike to enforce invalid trademarks against any competitor by continually issuing covenants not to sue. Nike has an incentive not to do this because allowing many competitors to use Nike’s marks, or confusingly similar ones, could lessen the strength of Nike’s mark.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred, emphasizing that covenants not to sue should not be a first reaction to trademark litigation. Courts should be wary of large companies intentionally burdening smaller competitors with infringement actions only to turn around and promise not to sue after learning valuable future business information. A covenant not to sue should only terminate litigation when it meets the high burden required by in this case. Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.

Genesis Healthcare v. Symczyk

mgruhn — Mon, 03 Dec 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Genesis HealthCare Corporate Headquarters

101 East State Street

Kennett Square, PA

United States

39° 50' 49.4592" N, 75° 42' 41.67" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1059

Petitioner

Genesis Healthcare Corp., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Laura Symczyk

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Monday, December 3, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Advocates

Ronald Mann (for the petitioners)

Neal Kumar Katyal (for the respondent)

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Genesis Healthcare Corporation (“Genesis”) employed Laura Symczyk as a registered nurse between April 2007 and December 2007. During her employment, Genesis implemented a policy that automatically deducted pay for employees’ meal breaks whether or not they worked during those breaks. This prompted Symczyk to file a collective action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). In February 2010, Genesis offered to pay all of Symczyk’s unpaid wages and attorney’s fees. Symczyk did not respond to the offer. Genesis filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that Symczyk no longer had a real interest in the outcome of the action since they offered her full relief.

Since Genesis made an offer of judgment and no one had yet joined Symczyk’s collective action, the District Court dismissed the case. Symczyk appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The Third Circuit held that a full offer of relief does not cause an FLSA collective action suit to be dismissed.

Question

Does an offer of judgment providing full relief to a single plaintiff extinguish a collective action FLSA suit when no other parties had yet joined the suit?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Genesis Healthcare, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards Act

Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that established mootness principles determined that, in cases that lack other claimants, the suit on behalf of other “similarly situated” employees becomes moot when the individual claim does. Since Symczyk no longer had a personal interest and was not representing the interests of a broader class, the case was properly dismissed.

In her dissenting opinion, Justice Elena Kagan argued that the premise on which the majority’s decision is based—that Symczyk’s individual claim is moot—is incorrect. She wrote that, because Symczyk rejected the settlement offer, she retained her personal interest in the case, and there was no reason to consider her claim moot. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.

Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center

jgoldman — Tue, 04 Dec 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services

7500 Security Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21244

United States

39° 18' 57.4704" N, 76° 45' 47.7684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1231

Petitioner

Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Auburn Regional Medical Center et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

John F. Manning (for the Court-appointed amicus curiae (appointed by the Court))

Robert L. Roth (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Hospitals receive compensation from the federal government based on the number of low-income patients they serve. The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) decides how much this payment will be. In an unrelated case, it came out that CMS miscalculated this payment between 1993 and 1996 so hospitals received less than they were due. In 2006, a group of hospitals filed claims with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) for full payment from the Department of Health and Human Services for years 1987-1994. Although the statute of limitations for such claims is 180 days, the hospitals argued that the limitations period should be tolled because CMS knowingly and unlawfully failed to disclose its error. The PRRB held that it did not have the authority to toll the statute of limitations, so the claims were untimely.

The hospitals sued in district court, but the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the PRRB’s decision was not final. The court also held that the relevant statute does not allow for tolling the statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that it did have jurisdiction because the PRRB decision was final. It also held that tolling the statute of limitations for “good cause” is possible, but whether it is appropriate in this case is a question for remand. The court of appeals denied a petition for a rehearing en banc.

Question

Is the statute of limitations for filing a claim with the PRRB for Medicare payments subject to tolling for good cause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sebelius, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3)

Yes, but only up to 3 years. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the lower court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the 180-day statute of limitations is not “jurisdictional” so it may be extended in some cases. Unless Congress has clearly stated that a statutory limitation is jurisdictional it is presumed to be non-jurisdictional. The Secretary of Health and Human Services regulation allowing a 3-year extension for good cause was permissible, as courts must defer to agency regulations unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” The general presumption in favor of equitable tolling does not apply to an agency’s internal deadline, absent evidence of congressional intent, so the Court could not extend the deadline indefinitely. Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred, noting that the majority’s opinion does not establish that equitable tolling is never applicable to internal administrative deadlines.

Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center

jgoldman — Mon, 03 Dec 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Tillamook, OR

United States

45° 27' 22.3776" N, 123° 50' 38.4504" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-338

Petitioner

Doug Decker, in his official capacity as Oregon State Forester, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Northwest Environmental Defense Center, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

11-347, Georgia-Pacific West v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Monday, December 3, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Advocates

Timothy S. Bishop (for the petitioners)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Two logging roads in Oregon, Trask River Road and Sam Downs Road, are owned by the Oregon Department of Forestry and the Oregon Board of Forestry. The roads are used primarily by various logging companies. These roads run parallel to rivers and use a series of ditches, culverts, and channels to direct storm water runoff into the nearby rivers. This runoff deposits large amounts of sediment in the rivers, which adversely affects the fish and other wildlife that relies on the water.

The Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) sued the Oregon State Forester, the Oregon Board of Forestry and several timber companies. The NEDC alleged that, since the runoff ditches and channels can be defined as “point sources,” the petitioners violated the Clean Water Act by failing to obtain permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. In district court, the petitioners moved for dismissal by arguing that the runoff was exempt from the permits. The district court granted the motion. The NEDC appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the decision based on precedent that supported the NEDC interpretation of both the “point source” and the permit requirement.

Question

1. Do the runoff ditches and channels constitute “point sources” that require permits?

2. Are the petitioners exempt from the permit requirement?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Decker, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Water Act

No and yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 7-1 majority, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the Clean Water Act exempts the storm water runoff from the permitting scheme because the runoff is not associated with industrial activity. Even though the roads are used for the transport of raw materials, they are not used for the manufacturing, processing, or storage of those materials. The Court deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency’s own reasonable interpretation that the permit requirement extends only to traditional industrial sites, such as factories. Therefore, the runoff ditches and channels did not constitute point sources that require permits under the Act.

Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

jgoldman — Tue, 04 Dec 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Los Angeles County CA

United States

34° 23' 13.8552" N, 118° 6' 44.1648" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-460

Petitioner

Los Angeles County Flood Control Distric

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Advocates

Timothy T. Coates (for the petitioner)

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Aaron Colangelo (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The level of pollution detected in the Santa Clara River, the Los Angeles River, the San Gabriel River, and Malibu Creek—collectively known as the Watershed Rivers—far exceeds what is allowed by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit held by Los Angeles County. The National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and other environmental organizations brought legal action against the county and the district, alleging that the county violated the Clean Water Act. The allegations stem from the fact that the county and district allowed untreated storm water that had collected myriad pollutants to run unchecked through storm sewers and into the rivers. The county and district did not contest the fact that the amount of pollutants was high but rather contested the allegations that they were solely responsible.

The federal district court found for county and the district and held that there was no evidence that they were directly responsible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision with respect to the Santa Clara River and the Malibu Creek but reversed the decision with respect to the San Gabriel River and the Los Angeles River.

Question

Can the transfer of water from one portion of a river to another portion via a manmade improvement for the purpose of controlling storm water runoff still be considered a “discharge” under the Clean Water Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Water Act

No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the pumping of polluted water from one portion of a waterway to another section of the same waterway did not constitute pollution under the Clean Water Act. Based on the text of the CWA, the “discharge of a pollutant” refers to the addition of a pollutant to a waterway. Because the pollutant is coming from farther up the same waterway, it cannot be considered an addition. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in the judgment.

US Airways v. McCutchen

jgoldman — Tue, 27 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

700 Grant Street

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

United States

40° 26' 33.7848" N, 79° 59' 40.2972" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1285

Petitioner

US Airways, Inc. in its capacity as Fiduciary and Plan Administrator of the US Airways Employee Benefit Plan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James E. McCutchen

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Advocates

Neal Kumar Katyal (for the petitioner)

Joseph R. Palmore (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Matthew W.H. Wessler (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

After James E. McCutchen suffered a serious injury in a car accident, a benefit plan administered by US Airways paid $66,866 to cover his medical expenses. The plan requires the beneficiary to pay back the medical expenses out of any amount recovered from third parties. Once McCutchen recovered over $100,000 from third parties in a separate suit, the plan demanded that McCutchen reimburse them for the full amount they paid out. McCutchen argued that US Airways did not take into account his legal fees, which reduced his recovery amount from third parties to less than the amount demanded. US Airways then filed suit for “appropriate equitable relief” under the Employment Retirement Security Income Act (ERISA). The district court ordered McCutchen to pay the full $66,866.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment, holding that ERISA is subject to equitable limitations. To determine appropriate equitable relief, the district court must take into account the distribution of the amount recovered from third parties between McCutchen and his attorneys.

Question

Did the Third Circuit correctly hold that ERISA Section 502(a)(3) authorizes courts to use equitable principles to determine appropriate equitable relief?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for US Airway in part; McCutcheon in part, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: ERISA

Maybe. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a 5-4 majority, vacated the Third Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that equitable limitations did not apply to the benefit plan as a whole because the plan is a valid contract and the parties are only demanding what they bargained for under that contract. The common fund doctrine, however, may provide relief because the benefit plan is silent on the allocation of attorney fees. The common fund doctrine allows a litigant to recover attorney fees from a fund that is created, increased, or protected by that litigant. Because the parties did not contract otherwise, the common fund doctrine provides the best indication of the parties' intent. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the majority should not have discussed the plan’s lack of a provision for attorney fees because it was not included in the question presented. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.

Vance v. Ball State University

jgoldman — Mon, 26 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Ball State University

United States

40° 12' 17.1792" N, 85° 24' 28.8792" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-556

Petitioner

Maetta Vance

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ball State University

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Monday, November 26, 2012

Advocates

Daniel R. Ortiz (for the petitioner)

Sri Srinivasan (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party)

Gregory G. Garre (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Maetta Vance began working for University Dining Services at Ball State University in 1989 as a substitute server. She was the only African-American working in the department. Vance submitted a complaint to the University when a coworker used a racial epithet directed at her and African-American students at the University. The University issued the coworker a written warning, but following a series of incidents that resulted in Vance reporting that she felt unsafe in her workplace, the University investigated but found no basis for action. On October 3, 2006, Vance sued Ball State University in federal district court for lessening her work duties and ability to work overtime, forcing her to work through her breaks, and unjustly disciplining her. After filing the suit, Vance claimed her work environment continued to worsen, but the University’s investigations did not yield enough evidence to discipline anyone.

The University moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and held that there was not enough evidence to prove a hostile work environment and that the University was not liable for the actions of individual coworkers. Vance appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Question

Can a coworker who is vested with the authority to oversee the daily work of another worker be considered a supervisor for the purpose of determining employer liability for harassment?

Henderson v. United States

jgoldman — Wed, 28 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

300 Fannin Street

Shreveport, LA 71101

United States

32° 30' 57.2724" N, 93° 44' 57.966" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-9307

Petitioner

Armarcion D. Henderson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Advocates

Patricia A. Gilley (for the petitioner (appointed by the Court))

Jeffrey B. Wall (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Armarcion D. Henderson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of federal law. The sentencing guideline range was 33-41 months, but the judge sentenced Henderson to 60 months to ensure that he had the opportunity to enroll in the Bureau of Prisons drug program. Henderson did not object to the sentence. Eight days after sentencing, Henderson filed a motion to correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Henderson did not preserve the error for correction under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, so the court reviewed the decision for plain error. Henderson did not show plain error because the error was not clear under current law at the time of trial. The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc.

Question

1. Did the Fifth Circuit err when it held that Henderson did not preserve the error?

2. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that Henderson did not show plain error in his sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Henderson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes and yes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for a 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that that an error is deemed to be a “plain error” based on the law at the time of the appellate review of the case, not at the time of the trial. It is unreasonable to expect either the defendant or the trial court to predict the outcome of unsettled issues of law, therefore it is the role of the appellate court to review what is considered “plain error” at the time of the appellate review.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that an issue of law that is unsettled at the time of the trial cannot be considered “plain error” for the purposes of appellate review. An error can only be plain if it should have been obvious to the court and the prosecution at the time of the trial. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.

FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System

jgoldman — Mon, 26 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital

3rd Avenue West

Albany, GA

United States

31° 35' 24.5148" N, 84° 9' 27.1728" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1160

Petitioner

Federal Trade Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2012

Argued

Monday, November 26, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Advocates

Benjamin J. Horwich (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1941, the Georgia legislature enacted the Hospital Authorities Law, allowing the creation of hospital authorities as public bodies to oversee the public health needs of Georgia communities. The City of Albany and Dougherty County created the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County (“Authority”). Since its establishment, the Authority acquired hospitals throughout the area and leased the facilities to two non-profit corporations: Phoebe Putney Health System (“PPHS”) and Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (“PPMH”). In December 2010, PPHS presented to the Authority a plan to buy the only remaining hospital in the area, Palmyra Hospital. The Authority approved the plan in April 2011.

Following the approval, the petitioner Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) initiated an administrative proceeding to determine whether the plan would create a monopoly in the hospital services market in Dougherty County and the surrounding area. To ensure that the plan did not come into fruition prior to the FTC’s final determination, the FTC filed suit against the respondents: the Authority, PPMH, PPHS, and Palmyra. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the state-action doctrine immunized the Authority and its operation of the hospitals from antitrust liability. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and the FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the lower court decision, holding that the legislature in its enactment of the Hospital Authorities Law must have anticipated the anti-competitive effects that the FTC alleged.

Question

Does the state-action doctrine immunize a statutorily created hospital authority from antitrust liability for anti-competitive acts?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for FTC, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Trade Commission Act

No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, delivering a unanimous opinion, reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that state-action immunity does not apply because the Georgia legislature did not clearly articulate any intent to allow anticompetitive activity through the Hospital Authorities Law. A state legislature is not required to expressly state this intent. State-action immunity applies if the anticompetitive effect was a foreseeable result of the State’s legislation. However, the Court found no evidence that the State anticipated, or even contemplated, that hospital authorities would displace competition. While the Hospital Authorities Law grants hospital authorities general powers to participate in the marketplace, it does not allow them to use those powers anticompetitively.

Bailey v. United States

mgruhn — Thu, 01 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

103 Lake Drive, Wyandanch, New York 11798

United States

40° 44' 58.2648" N, 73° 21' 14.0112" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-770

Petitioner

Chunon L. Bailey aka Polo

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 4, 2012

Argued

Thursday, November 1, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Advocates

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner)

Jeffrey B. Wall (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On July 28, 2005, an informant told Officer Richard Sneider of the Suffolk County Police Department that he had purchased six grams of crack cocaine at 103 Lake Drive, Wyandanch, New York, from an individual named “Polo.” Officer Sneider obtained a warrant to search the basement apartment at that address; the warrant provided that the apartment was occupied by a heavy set black male with short hair, known as “Polo.” That evening during surveillance, officers observed two men -later identified as Chunon L. Bailey and Bryant Middleton- exiting the gate that led to the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive. The officers followed Bailey and Middleton as they left the premises in a black Lexus, and pulled the Lexus over about one mile from the apartment.

The officers patted down Bailey and Middleton, finding keys in Bailey’s front left pocket. They placed both men in handcuffs and informed them that they were being detained, not arrested. Bailey insisted that he did not live in the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive, but his driver’s license address in Bay Shore was consistent with the informant’s description of Polo. The police searched the apartment while Bailey and Middleton were in detention, finding a gun and drugs in plain view. The police arrested Bailey, and seized his house keys and car key incident to his arrest; later, an officer discovered that one of the house keys opened the door to the basement apartment.

Question

Did Suffolk County police officers lawfully detain Bailey incident to the execution of a search warrant when officers saw Bailey leaving the immediate vicinity of his apartment before they executed the warrant?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Bailey, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the rule from Michigan v. Summers did not apply because Bailey was not in or immediately outside the residence being searched when he was detained. Also, none of the law enforcement interests mentioned in Summers were served by detaining Bailey. Arrests incident to the execution of a search warrant are lawful under the Fourth Amendment, but once an individual leaves the premises being searched, any detention must be justified by another means. On remand, the Second Circuit should consider whether stopping Bailey was proper under Terry v. Ohio.

Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, emphasizing that Summers provides a bright line rule for law enforcement to follow. The Second Circuit’s balancing test was an improper and would make it harder for officers to decide whether a seizure is constitutionally permissible before carrying it out. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the majority applied an arbitrary geographical line instead of weighing actual Fourth Amendment concerns. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA

mgruhn — Mon, 29 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

District Court for the Southern District of New York

United States

40° 42' 50.0004" N, 74° 0' 7.1712" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1025

Petitioner

James R. Clapper, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Amnesty International USA, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, May 21, 2012

Argued

Monday, October 29, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Advocates

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)

Jameel Jaffer (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Several groups, including attorneys, journalists, and human rights organizations, brought a facial challenge to a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The provision creates new procedures for authorizing government electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. for foreign intelligence purposes. The groups argue that the procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, and the principle of separation of powers. The new provisions would force these groups to take costly measures to ensure the confidentiality of their international communications. The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the groups did not have standing to bring their challenge. The groups only had an abstract subjective fear of being monitored and provided no proof that they were subject to the FISA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the groups had standing based on a reasonable fear of injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury.

Question

Do respondents have Article III standing to seek prospective relief under the FISA?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Clapper, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article III

No. Justice Samuel A. Alito, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the respondents did not have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because no injury occurred. Claiming a reasonable likelihood that their communications would be intercepted under FISA is not enough to show future injury for standing purposes. The Court also refused to acknowledge a present injury stemming from the respondents’ choice to take costly measures to protect their confidential communications.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the future harm to respondents is not speculative and therefore should be sufficient to establish standing. Since there is a high probability that the government will intercept at least some of the respondents’ communications, the respondents should have standing to bring the suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Florida v. Harris

mgruhn — Wed, 31 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Liberty County Courthouse

10818 NW SR 20

Bristol, FL

United States

30° 25' 57.1512" N, 84° 56' 48.0516" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-817

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Clayton Harris

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, March 26, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (for the petitioner)

Joseph R. Palmore (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Glen P. Gifford (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The State of Florida charged Clayton Harris with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. At trial, Harris moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his car. Police searched the car during a traffic stop for expired registration when a drug detection dog alerted the officer. This dog was trained to detect several types of illegal substances, but not pseudoephedrine. During the search, the officer found over 200 loose pills and other supplies for making methamphetamine. Harris argued that the dog’s alert was false and did not provide probable cause for the search. The trial court denied Harris motion, holding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that there was probable cause to conduct the search. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not prove the dog’s reliability in drug detection sufficiently to show probable cause.

Question

Does a drug-detection dog's alert to the exterior of a vehicle provide an officer with probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Florida, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

Yes. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Florida Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s rigid requirement that police officers show evidence of a dog’s reliability in the field to prove probable cause. Probable cause is a flexible common sense test that takes the totality of the circumstances into account. A probable cause hearing for a dog alert should proceed like any other, allowing each side to make their best case with all evidence available. The record in this case supported the trial court’s determination that police had probable cause to search Harris' car.

Marx v. General Revenue Corporation

mgruhn — Wed, 07 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

General Revenue Corporation

United States

39° 16' 42.5964" N, 84° 20' 51.2412" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1175

Petitioner

Olivea Marx

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

General Revenue Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Advocates

Allison M. Zieve (for the petitioner)

Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Lisa S. Blatt (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Elenea Marx defaulted on her student loans. In September 2008, her guarantor, EdFund, a division of the California Student Aid Commission, hired the General Revenue Corporation (“GRC”) to collect on the account. That same month, a GRC agent faxed Marx's employer a form displaying basic contact information for GRC. It also left blanks for the employer to fill in information about the employee’s employment status and other related information.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) prohibited communications with third parties in connection with the collection of debt. It also allowed courts to award costs to prevailing defendants in actions brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, prevented courts from awarding courts if a statute provided otherwise. Marx sued GRC in October 2008, alleging abusive and threatening phone calls in violation of the FDCPA. She amended her complaint in March 2009 to add a claim that GRC violated the FDCPA by sending the fax to her workplace to request employment information.

The district court dismissed her complaint, holding that the fax was not a “communication” within the meaning of the act, and ordering Marx to pay court costs. The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, affirmed with one dissent, holding that the fax was not a communication. The Tenth Circuit also held that the act did not prevent courts from awarding costs to prevailing defendants. Marx’s petition for an en banc rehearing was denied.

Question

Did the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prevent the district court from awarding costs to the General Revenue Corporation unless Marx filed her claim in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for General Revenue Corporation, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)

No. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure operate on the presumption that the prevailing party is entitled to be awarded costs unless a statute explicitly states otherwise. Because the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act lists another situation in which costs may be awarded to the prevailing party, the statute does not contradict the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also held that, had Congress intended the statute to limit a court’s discretion in awarding costs, the language would have been explicit in doing so.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the default position of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives way to a statute that “provides otherwise.” The language of the Rule in question indicates that a statute that provides an alternative provision for awarding costs overrides it, but the statute does not necessarily need to directly contradict the Rule. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Smith v. United States

mgruhn — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

United States

38° 53' 34.602" N, 77° 0' 55.6992" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-8976

Petitioner

Calvin Smith, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, June 18, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Advocates

A. J. Kramer (for the petitioners)

Sarah E. Harrington (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does withdrawing from a conspiracy prior to the statute of limitations period put the burden of persuasion on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was a member of the conspiracy during the relevant period?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fifth Amendment

No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Court held that the defendant has the burden of proving withdrawal from a conspiracy regardless of when the withdrawal took place. Placing the burden on the defense does not violate the Due Process Clause because a defense of withdrawal does not negate an element of the crime of conspiracy. Instead, it assumes that the crime has occurred and starts the clock on the statute of limitations period for the prosecution. The Court held that a defense of withdrawal is considered an affirmative defense that places the burden of proof on the defendant. The Court also held that placing the burden on the prosecution to prove the withdrawal never happened would be a nearly impossible task, as witnesses would invoke the Fifth Amendment rather than discuss their criminal associations with the defendant.

Kloeckner v Solis

jgoldman — Tue, 02 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Department of Labor Employee Benefits Security Administration

1222 Spruce St Suite 6310

St. Louis, MO 63103

United States

38° 37' 27.7104" N, 90° 11' 59.4564" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-184

Petitioner

Carolyn M. Kloeckner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hilda L. Solis, Secretary of Labor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Friday, January 13, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Decided

Monday, December 10, 2012

Advocates

Eric Schnapper (for the petitioner)

Sarah E. Harrington (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Carolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging hostile work environment as well as sex and age discrimination. When her employer charged her with being "absent without leave," she amended her complaint to include retaliation. Kloeckner never returned to work, and eventually her employer terminated her. Kloeckner challenged the termination while her initial complaint was still pending, making it a "mixed case." Kloeckner appealed the termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but then requested a dismissal so she could amend her EEOC complaint. The MSPB granted the dismissal, giving her a set period to refile.

When the EEOC found there had been no discrimination or retaliation, Kloeckner appealed the decision to the MSPB. While the appeal was within 30 days of the EEOC decision, it was 10 months after the refilling period set by the MSPB. The MSPB dismissed the case as untimely. Kloeckner filed an appeal in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was removed to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction because the MSPB had not ruled on the merits of the case.

Question

Does a District Court or a Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over an employment discrimination claim that was dismissed by the Merit Systems Protection Board without ruling on the merits?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kloeckner, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Service Reform Act

Yes, the district court has jurisdiction. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that the two relevant sections of Civil Service Reform Act both direct mixed cases to the district court rather that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. There was no legislative history to support a reading of the statutes as creating a distinction between merits-based as opposed to procedural appeals. The Court also held that Kloeckner’s appeal was timely because it was filed within 30 days of her received notice of a “judicially reviewable action.”

Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States of America

jgoldman — Wed, 03 Oct 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area

United States

36° 17' 46.6584" N, 90° 41' 51.8748" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-597

Petitioner

Arkansas Game & Fish Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, April 2, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Advocates

James F. Goodhart (f0r the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

From 1993 through 2000, the United States Army Corps of Engineers imposed a temporary flood regime around the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area. The flood regime caused flooding across the region encompassed by the wildlife management area, which restricted access to and destroyed or degraded thousands of timber trees.

The petitioners brought a case in federal court in an attempt to recover under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment for the loss of their property resulting from the United State’s flood regime. The federal court held that the flood regime constituted a Fifth Amendment taking and that the United States owed petitioners approximately $5.6 million as just compensation.

The government appealed, and the appellate court reversed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court reasoned that the flood regime was a temporary government action, and that only a permanent flooding condition would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The petitioners appealed the appellate court’s decision.

Question

Is the United States liable under the Fifth Amendment's takings clause for physically taking property through temporary flood invasions?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fifth Amendment-Takings Clause

Yes, in some cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for an 8-0 majority, reversed the Federal Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that there is no temporary flooding exception to the Takings Clause. Prior precedent clearly establishes that a temporary interference with property can constitute a compensable taking. The length and severity of the interference is just one factor among many a court must consider when determining whether a specific action was a taking. Other factors include the intent behind the action and the degree to which the interference was a foreseeable result of an authorized government action. On remand, the Federal Circuit must decide whether the circumstances in this case constituted a Fifth Amendment taking.

Standard Fire Insurance Company v. Knowles

jgoldman — Mon, 07 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Miller County Circuit Court

400 Laurel Street

Texarkana, AR

United States

33° 25' 32.7612" N, 94° 2' 19.518" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1450

Petitioner

The Standard Life Insurance Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Greg Knowles

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Friday, August 31, 2012

Argued

Monday, January 7, 2013

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Advocates

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the petitioner)

David C. Frederick (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

According to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), defendants in a class action lawsuit can move the case to federal court if the potential damages exceed $5 million. In the past, plaintiffs have attempted to avoid federal jurisdiction by stipulating that the potential damages in a given case are worth less than $5 million, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has allowed such a stipulation.

The defendant, Standard Fire Insurance Company moved the case from the Miller County Circuit Court to the Western District of Arkansas. The district court held that the plaintiffs’ stipulation that the potential damages were less than $5 million was sufficient to prove with “legal certainty” that was the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Can a plaintiff in a class action case stipulate that the potential damages are less than $5 million, which removes the case from federal jurisdiction?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Standard Fire Insurance Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Class Action Fairness Act of 2005

No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the lower court decision and remanded. To defeat jurisdiction the stipulation must be binding, and a plaintiff bringing a proposed class action cannot bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified. Knowles only has the authority to bind himself to a stipulated claim amount. Federal jurisdiction cannot be based on contingent future events, and the non-binding stipulation may not survive the certification process. For example, the complaint may clearly show an amount in controversy over $5 million, Knowles may be an inadequate class representative, or another party might intervene with an amended complaint. Individual plaintiffs may control jurisdiction through stipulation, but a named plaintiff in a not yet certified class action cannot.

Descamps v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 07 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington

920 West Riverside Avenue

Spokane, WA 99201

United States

47° 39' 31.2552" N, 117° 25' 33.438" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-9540

Petitioner

Matthew R. Descamps

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, August 31, 2012

Argued

Monday, January 7, 2013

Advocates

Dan B. Johnson (for the petitioner (appointed by the Court))

Benjamin J. Horwich (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps’ prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.

Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.

Question

Did the United States properly plead and prove the defendant's prior violent felony convictions for application of an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Chafin v. Chafin

jgoldman — Wed, 05 Dec 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama

1729 Fifth Avenue North

Birmingham, AL

United States

33° 30' 58.5612" N, 86° 48' 43.092" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1347

Petitioner

Jeffrey L. Chafin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lynne H. Chafin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, August 13, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Advocates

Michael E. Manely (for the petitioner)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Stephen J. Cullen (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In March 2006, U.S. Army sergeant Jeffrey L. Chafin married United Kingdom citizen Lynne Hales Chafin in Scotland. They had one child, who holds dual citizenship in the United States and the United Kingdom. In February 2010, Lynne Chafin traveled to Alabama with the couple’s child and intended to return to Scotland in May 2010 for the child’s schooling. Before they could leave the country, Jeffrey Chafin filed a divorce petition in the Alabama courts and sought emergency relief to prevent his wife from leaving the country with the child. The trial court ordered both parties to stay in the country with the child throughout the divorce proceeding. Lynne Chafin filed a motion in federal district court requesting to return to Scotland with the child and citing The Hague Convention ruling on international child abduction. The district court held that the child was being unlawfully detained in the United States and allowed Lynne Chafin to return to Scotland with the child. Jeffrey Chafin appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the issue as moot because the child had already returned to Scotland.

Question

Can a district court rule on a petition to return a child to his or her country of residence according The Hague Convention’s articles once the child has returned to that country?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Chafin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA)

Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., in a unanimous opinion, vacated the Eleventh Circuit decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the controversy is not moot just because the child had already returned to Scotland. Jeffrey Chafin still maintains a valid claim in U.S. courts to have his child returned to the United States. Even though Lynne Chafin has returned to Scotland, U.S. courts continue to have personal jurisdiction over her. Therefore, a court has authority to issue an order for the child’s return, regardless of Lynne’s location. Even though Lynne may chose to defy the court’s order, this does not necessarily render the case moot. Courts adjudicate disputes even where relief may not be likely or practical. A likelihood that Lynne will not comply with the order should not preclude Jeffrey from asserting his claims.

Millbrook v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Penitentiary Lewisburg, PA

United States

40° 59' 15.3888" N, 76° 54' 53.208" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-10362

Petitioner

Kim Millbrook

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Decided

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Advocates

Christopher J. Paolella (for the petitioner (appointed by the Court))

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent in support of reversal and remand)

Jeffrey S. Bucholtz (for the Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)

Facts of the Case

Kim Millbrook was an inmate at the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Millbrook alleges that a correctional officer took him to the basement of the Special Management Unit and sexually assaulted him while other officers stood by. Millbrook filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging sexual assault. Under 28 U.S.C. §2680(h), the United States is not liable for the intentional torts of its employees, except for certain torts committed by law enforcement officials. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d. 868 (1986) limited claims that arise under §2680(h) to intentional torts by a law enforcement officer while executing a search, seizing evidence, or making arrests for violations of federal law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that Millbrook’s claim was precluded by Pooler. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the definition of seizure is limited to seizure of evidence.

Question

Does 2680(h) allow claims against the United States for the intentional torts of prison guards who are not exercising authority to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law?

Boyer v. Louisiana

jgoldman — Mon, 14 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Road in Sulphur Louisiana Sulphur, LA

United States

30° 14' 11.4972" N, 93° 22' 38.9496" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-9953

Petitioner

Jonathan Edward Boyer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Louisiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Friday, October 5, 2012

Argued

Monday, January 14, 2013

Decided

Monday, April 29, 2013

Advocates

Richard Bourke (for the petitioner)

Carla S. Sigler (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2002, Jonathan Edward Boyer and his brother Anthony walked along a roadway in Sulphur, Louisiana. When Bradlee Marsh gave the brothers a ride, Boyer demanded money from Marsh. Marsh refused, and Boyer shot him in the head three times and took his money and a silver chain. Marsh died from his injuries.

Boyer was indicted in Louisiana state court on second-degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm charges. The jury found Boyer guilty on both counts. Boyer filed a motion for a new trial, but was denied. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the second-degree murder charge, and 104 years without parole for the armed robbery charge. On appeal, Boyer argued that that the trial court erred in determining his mental competency, by sustaining the State’s objection to Boyer’s attempt to present testimony showing his brother - Anthony - had violent tendencies, and by giving Jonathan Boyer an excessively long sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not prejudice Boyer.

Question

Should a state's failure to fund counsel for an indigent defendant for five years be weighed against the state for speedy trial purposes?

Is a defendant's due process right to present a complete defense, to compulsory process, and to confront the witnesses against him violated when relevant and reliable expert testimony as to the psychology of interrogations and false confessions is excluded at trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for dismissal, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: N/A

Unanswered. In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

McBurney v. Young

jgoldman — Wed, 20 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement

801 East Main Street

Richmond, VA 23219

United States

37° 32' 19.0716" N, 77° 26' 13.6932" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-17

Petitioner

Mark J. McBurney et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nathaniel L. Young, Deputy Commissioner and Director, Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Friday, October 5, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Decided

Monday, April 29, 2013

Advocates

Deepak Gupta (for the petitioners)

E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. (Solicitor General of Virginia, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Mark McBurney is a citizen of Rohde Island and a former resident of Virginia where his son lives. When McBurney’s wife defaulted on child support obligations, he asked the Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement (VDCSE) to file a petition for child support on his behalf. After a nine-month delay, the petition was filed and granted. He then filed a Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) request with the VDCSE for all records pertaining to his son and ex-wife. The VDCSE denied the request, arguing that the information was confidential and McBurney was not a citizen of the state. While McBurney eventually obtained most of needed the information through other sources, he never got all of the information from his VFOIA request.

McBurney sued in district court arguing that denial of the VFOIA request violated the privileges and immunities clause and the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution. The district court ruled against McBurney. Mc Burney along with two others appealed their VFOIA denials to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court. The Court of Appeals held that VFOIA did not hinder a non citizen's right to pursue buisness in the state and did not place a burden on interstate commerce.

Question

Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the dormant Commerce Clause of the U. S. Constitution, may a state preclude citizens of other states from enjoying the same right of access to public records that the state affords its own citizens?

Gunn v. Minton

jgoldman — Wed, 16 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

District Court of Texas, 48th Judicial District

401 W. Belknap

Fort Worth, TX

United States

32° 45' 23.49" N, 97° 20' 8.6352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1118

Petitioner

Jerry Gunn, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vernon Minton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Friday, October 5, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, January 16, 2013

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Advocates

Thomas M. Michel (for the petitioners)

Jane Webre (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In the early 1990s, Vernon Minton, a former securities broker, developed the Texas Computer Exchange Network (TEXCEN) software that allowed financial traders to execute trades on their own. R.M. Stark & Co. (Stark) agreed to lease TEXCEN. More than one year later, Minton filed for a patent that was granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office on January 11, 2000.

Minton later sued the NASDAQ and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and alleged that their services infringed on his patent. NASD and NASDAQ argued that a patent is invalid when the invention claimed is sold more than a year before the patent application is filed. The district court granted summary judgment for NASD and NASDAQ. Minton retained new counsel to argue his case under the experimental use exception, which states that the patent remains valid if the invention was sold primarily for experimental, rather than commercial, use. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

Minton sued his original attorneys (collectively referred to as Gunn) for legal malpractice and argued that their failure to argue the experimental use exception in the original suit cost him the case. Gunn filed for summary judgment arguing no-evidence due to the fact that the attorneys did not know of the earlier sale in order for the experimental use exception to be relevant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gunn. Minton appealed to the Second Court of Appeals for Texas. Shortly after he filed his appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided a case that gave jurisdiction to the federal courts in malpractice suits arising from patent litigation. Minton filed a motion to dismiss his case from the Second Court of Appeals for Texas, but the court denied his motion and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and dismissed the case.

Question

Do the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in any cases that involve patent law, even when the patent issue is not the primary issue in the case?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gunn, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. §1338(a)

No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the lower court and remanded. The Supreme Court applied Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., which provided that a case only arises under federal patent law when it “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” The Court held that Minton failed to show that the federal issue in the case carried the necessary significance. The need to decide a hypothetical patent case is not substantial enough to deprive the state court of jurisdiction. A state court decision in a state law malpractice case relating to patent law will not substantially affect federal patent law.

Koontz v. St. John's River Water Management

jgoldman — Tue, 15 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

South of State Road 50, immediately east of the eastern extension of the East–West Expressway Orange County, FL

United States

28° 33' 45.0432" N, 81° 11' 17.8008" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1447

Petitioner

Coy Koontz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

St. John's River Water Management

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, October 5, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

Advocates

Paul J. Beard II (for the petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (for the respondent)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Coy A. Koontz requested a permit from St. John’s River Water Management to develop more of his land than the original permit allowed. St. John’s had jurisdiction over Koontz’s land. St. John’s agreed to issue the permit on the condition that Koontz deed the rest of his property into a conservation area and do some mitigation work on the surrounding areas. Koontz agreed to the deed but not to the mitigation work. St. John’s denied the permit application.

Koontz sued St. John’s River Water Management, and the trial court found in favor of Koontz. A Florida trial court held that St. John’s actions effected a taking of Koontz land and that imposing requirements for the issuance of a permit is only constitutional if the required action serves the same governmental purpose as the ban on development. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed.

Question

Is the government liable for a taking when it refuses to issue a permit until the landowner has agreed to dedicate personal resources to a public use?

Bowman v. Monsanto

jgoldman — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Knox County Knox County, IN

United States

38° 39' 59.6952" N, 87° 25' 14.7072" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-796

Petitioner

Vernon Hugh Bowman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Monsanto Company, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Friday, October 5, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2013

Advocates

Mark P. Walters (for the petitioner)

Melissa Arbus Sherry (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae)

Seth P. Waxman (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted a patent to the Monsanto Company for genetic material from a virus that can be used to incorporate new genetic material into a plant. In 2006, Monsanto patented a gene that makes plants resistant to the glyphosate-based herbicides that farmers can use on weeds. Both patents are included in the Monsanto Technology agreement which states that growers who purchase Monsanto’s products may only use the seed for a single season and may not sell the seeds to any other grower. Growers may sell the second-generation seed to a grain elevator.

Vernon Hugh Bowman, a farmer in Knox County, Indiana, began purchasing Monsanto’s Pioneer Hi-Bred seed in 1999 and followed the terms of the agreement by not saving any of his seed. Also beginning in 1999, Bowman purchased second-generation seed from a grain elevator for his second planting and saved seeds from that purchase for reuse later. In 2006, Monsanto contacted Bowman to examine his planting activities and found that his second-round crops contained the patented genetic material. Monsanto sued Bowman for patent infringement. The district court granted summary judgment for Monsanto. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a patent right for self-replicating technology expire after an authorized sale?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Monsanto, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Patent exhaustion

No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered a unanimous opinion holding that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not allow the purchaser to make copies of a patented item. Because the product in question is a seed, using the seed to grow a crop and then harvesting those seeds for future use constitutes creating copies of a patented item. In this case, Bowman’s one-time purchase of Monsanto’s product allowed him to take advantage of their patented product over the course of many seasons without respecting the rights of the patent holder. The Court also held that this reading of the doctrine allowed patents for plants to retain their value.

Gabelli v. Securities and Exchange Commission

jgoldman — Tue, 08 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Gabelli Global Growth Fund

1 Corporate Center

Rye, NY

United States

40° 58' 22.3788" N, 73° 42' 1.6272" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1274

Petitioner

Marc J. Gabelli, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Securities Exchange Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Decided

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Advocates

Lewis J. Liman (for the petitioners)

Jeffrey B. Wall (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Defendant Mark Gabelli was the portfolio manager for the Gabelli Global Growth Fund (GGGF), as well as several affiliated funds, from 1997 until 2004. Defendant Bruce Alpert had been the Chief Operating Officer of Gabelli Funds, a company that advises GGGF, since 1988. Beginning in 1999, Gabelli permitted another company, Headstart, to engage in “market-time” trading with GGGF. “Market-time” trading is premised on the fact that price movements during the New York trading day can cause corresponding movements in the international markets that will not be incorporated into new stock prices until the following day. Traders can then buy and sell at artificially low and high prices, respectively. By early 2002, Alpert became concerned about the effects of market-timing and instructed Headstart to reduce the number of those transactions. On August 7, 2002, Gabelli announced that all market-timing must stop, and Headstart pulled its money from GGGF.

On September 3, 2003, the New York Attorney General announced an inquiry into market-timing. On April 24, 2008, the SEC sued the defendants and alleged that Gabelli and Alpert knew of Headstart’s market-timing but deliberately mislead GGGF’s Board and shareholders in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed the SEC’s claims for failure to bring the suit within the five-year statute of limitations, and the SEC appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.

Question

Does the five-year statute of limitations begin when the SEC can first bring an action, or when the alleged violation is committed?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gabelli, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. §2462

When the alleged violation is committed. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Second Circuit and remanded. Starting the limitations period at the time of the violation is the most natural reading of the statute. This reading is supported by past precedent and dictionary definitions. In the past, the "discovery rule", which pauses the statute of limitations until fraud is discovered, has been applied when the victims of the fraud would be denied relief. The protection that the rule provides for the injured is not relevant to a Government enforcement action such as this one. It would also be nearly impossible to determine when the Government "knows" of a violation and Congress did not require that determination.

Levin v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 15 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Naval Hospital Guam

Building #1 Farenholt Ave

Agana Heights, GU

United States

13° 28' 25.8924" N, 144° 44' 15.1836" E

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1351

Petitioner

Steven A. Levin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

Advocates

James A. Feldman (Court-appointed amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On March 12, 2003, Steven Levin was scheduled to undergo cataract surgery performed by Lieutenant Commander Frank Bishop, M.D., a United States Navy surgeon in Guam. Levin previously gave his written consent to the procedure but claims that he attempted to orally withdraw it prior to the surgery. He suffered complications from the surgery and faces continuing treatment with unclear likelihood of success. Levin sued Dr. Bishop for battery and negligent medical malpractice. The United States substituted itself for Dr. Bishop and filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the negligent medical malpractice claim, not the battery claim. The United States then filed for dismissal of the battery claim and alleged that the Federal Tort Claims Act preserved sovereign immunity against battery claims. The district court dismissed the claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the Federal Tort Claims Act prevent the United States from being prosecuted for battery caused by military medical personnel acting within the scope of employment?

Missouri v. McNeely

jgoldman — Wed, 09 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Cape Girardeau Cape Girardeau, LA

United States

37° 18' 21.1824" N, 89° 31' 5.3328" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1425

Petitioner

Missouri

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tyler G. McNeely

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Decided

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

Advocates

John N. Koester, Jr. (for the petitioner)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Steven R. Shapiro (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the centerline three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely’s blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit.

The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely’s blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a departure from current case law; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment prevent the taking of a warrantless blood sample under exigent circumstances?

Maracich v. Spears

jgoldman — Wed, 09 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles

10311 Wilson Boulevard Building C

Blythewood, SC 29016

United States

34° 10' 49.206" N, 80° 58' 15.9996" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-25

Petitioner

Edward F. Maracich, Martha L. Weeks, and John C. Tanner, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Eugene Spears; Michael Spears, PA; Gedney Main Howe III; Gedney Main Howe III, PA; Richard A. Harpootlian; Richard A. Harpootlian, PA; A. Camden Lewis; Lewis & Babock, LLP

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Advocates

Joseph R. Guerra (for the petitioners)

Paul D. Clement (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Michael Eugene Spears and three other lawyers instituted several “group action” lawsuits against several South Carolina car dealerships for allegedly collecting unlawful fees from car buyers. The lawyers obtained the personal information of thousands of car buyers from the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles through a Freedom of Information Act request. The lawyers used this data to identify potential plaintiffs for the group action, and sent mailings to each of those plaintiffs notifying them of the litigation.

Edward F. Maracich and two other car buyers who received mailings, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, sued the lawyers. The buyers alleged that the lawyers violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) by obtaining their personal information for purposes of mass solicitation. The lawyers argued that they acted properly under the litigation exception to the DPPA. The DPPA allows disclosure of private information in connection with any state or federal litigation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the lawyers, holding that they did not engage in prohibited solicitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the lawyers did engage in solicitation, but their actions were within the litigation exception to the DPPA.

Question

1. Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that lawyers who obtain, disclose, or use personal information to find potential plaintiff for a group action are protected by the litigation exception of the DPPA?

2. Did the Fourth Circuit err in reaching the conclusion that a lawyer who files an group action before finding plaintiffs may use DPPA-protected personal information to find plaintiffs for that action through a direct mail advertising campaign?

Wos v. E.M.A. et al.

jgoldman — Tue, 08 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina: Statesville Division

200 W. Broad St.

Statesville, NC

United States

35° 47' 3.9156" N, 80° 53' 25.404" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-98

Petitioner

Aldona Wos, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

E. M. A., a Minor, By and Through Her Guardian ad Litem, Daniel H. Johnson, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Decided

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Advocates

John F. Maddrey (Solicitor General, North Carolina, for the petitioner)

Christopher G. Browning, Jr. (for the respondents)

Ginger D. Anders (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Emily M. Armstrong, daughter of Sandra and William Earl Armstrong, was born on February 25, 2000. She was seriously injured during her delivery resulting in mental retardation, cerebral palsy and several other medical conditions. Emily’s mother applied for Medicaid two months after her daughter’s birth. Since then the North Carolina state Medicaid program had paid over $1.9 million in medical expenses on Emily’s behalf. Emily’s parents and guardian sued the physicians for negligently delivering their child and won a settlement of $2.8 million. As a result, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) placed a lien on Emily’s settlement, looking to recover some of the money it paid for Emily’s health care services. Under the North Carolina third-party liability statutes, when a patient wins an award of medical expenses, the DHHS has the right to recover either the total amount spent on the patient’s health care, or one third of the patient’s recovery payment, which ever is less.

Emily’s parents and guardian brought suit against the DHHS, claiming that federal Medicaid law prevents the DHHS from taking her proceeds. Federal law prohibits recovery from any payments not made for past medical expenses. Since under North Carolina law a minor child is not allowed to recover for past medical expenses, Emily’s settlement could not include such expenses. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina disagreed with this argument and granted summary judgment to the state.

The Armstrongs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision. While the appellate court agreed with the lower court that the DHHS has the right to recover from Emily’s settlement, it remanded the case because the state failed to provide a mechanism for determining what part of a settlement covers past medical expenses. Since the North Carolina statutes do not attempt to recover payment for past medical expenses, they violate federal Medicaid law.

Question

Does federal Medicaid law prohibit North Carolina’s third-party liability statutes from mandating reimbursement of medical expenses from a patient’s lump-sum settlement?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for E.M.A., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicaid anti-lien provision

Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the lower court. The North Carolina law is preempted by federal law to the extent that it would allow the state to recover part of a Medicaid beneficiary's tort judgment or settlement not designated for medical expenses. Arbitrarily designating one-third of a judgment as recoverable medical expenses lacks any limiting principle. If upheld, nothing could stop a state from arbitrarily designating one-half or all of a judgment as medical expenses. Calculating the actual amount of medical expenses in each case may be more difficult than the one-third rule, but similar allocation procedures are already used other circumstances, such as worker's compensation and separating compensatory and non-compensatory damages for tax purposes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred, stating that he agreed with the majority because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services had already reached the same conclusion.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. dissented, arguing that no regulation or prior case law requires a specific allocation of damages recovered for medical expenses. States should be allowed more leeway to come up with a workable regulation to recoup Medicaid payments. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.

City of Arlington, TX v. FCC

jgoldman — Wed, 16 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

1550 N. Northwest Hwy #306

Park Ridge, IL 60068

United States

42° 2' 5.964" N, 87° 51' 57.9852" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1545

Petitioner

City of Arlington, TX; City of San Antonio, TX

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Communications Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

11-1547, Cable Telecommunications and Technology v. FCC

Granted

Friday, October 5, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, January 16, 2013

Advocates

Thomas C. Goldstein (for the petitioners)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Generally, wireless phone service providers must obtain zoning approvals from state and local governments before building wireless towers or attaching wireless equipment to buildings. To speed up the process, Congress amended the 1934 Communications Act and required local governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time. Despite this law, the zoning approval process still dragged on and severely delayed construction. In 2008, the Wireless Association petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to bring an end to these unreasonable delays. The Association recommended placing time limits on how long these zoning requests could take. The FCC agreed and in November 2009 set the following “reasonable time” limits for zoning requests: 90 days for attachments to current buildings and a 150 days for new structures.

The local governments claimed that the FCC cannot set these limits because the FCC cannot determine its own power under the Communications Act. When Congress passed the Act, it granted a certain amount of power to the FCC to enforce and define the rules under the Act. Under the long-standing Chevron doctrine of interpretation, courts should always defer to an agency’s interpretation of a particular act. However, the Supreme Court had never determined whether this applies to situations where the agency defines its own power under a particular law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless deferred to the FCC and affirmed the declaratory ruling. The local governments appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari exclusively to answer whether the Chevron doctrine applies in this situation.

Question

Should a court apply the Chevron doctrine and defer to an agency’s interpretation of its jurisdiction under a particular law when that interpretation is called into question?

Alleyne v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 14 Jan 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Mapco/East Coast Convenience Store

6460 Boydton Plank Road

Petersburg, VA

United States

37° 11' 0.2436" N, 77° 29' 13.6788" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-9335

Petitioner

Allen Ryan Alleyne

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, October 5, 2012

Argued

Monday, January 14, 2013

Advocates

Mary E. Maguire (for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On October 1, 2009, Allen Ryan Alleyne and two accomplices robbed the store manager of a Mapco/East Coast convenience store in Petersburg, Virginia as he was dropping off the nightly deposit at the bank. In April 2010, after an extensive investigation, the authorities arrested Alleyne and a grand jury indicted him for robbery and possessing a firearm. On September 7, 2010, after a week-long trial, the jury convicted Alleyne on both counts and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced him to 130 months imprisonment.

Alleyne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming the district court made three specific errors: 1) the evidence against him wasn’t strong enough to support his convictions; 2) he was convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery and not carrying it out, which changed his original indictment; and 3) he should not have received a mandatory 7 year sentence for possession of a firearm. The Fourth Circuit rejected all three of his claims. First, the appellate court refused to overrule the jury’s decision on the strength of the evidence because a jury is best equipped to determine whether evidence is credible. Second, since aiding and abetting a crime is not itself a separate offense, it does not need to be included in the indictment and does not change the original charge. Finally, there was no indication that the district court should not have imposed the minimum sentence for possessing a firearm.

Question

1. Did the district court find enough evidence to convict Alleyne for armed robbery?

2. Did convicting Alleyne of aiding and abetting the robbery change the original indictment?

3. Should the court have imposed a minimum sentence for possession of a firearm in relation to a robbery?

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona

jgoldman — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Arizona State Capitol

1700 W. Washington St.

Phoenix, AZ

United States

33° 26' 53.2248" N, 112° 5' 49.6104" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-71

Petitioner

Arizona, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, October 15, 2012

Argued

Monday, March 18, 2013

Advocates

Thomas C. Horne (Attorney General of Arizona, for the petitioners)

Patricia A. Millett (for the respondents)

Sri Srinivasan (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

On November 2, 2004, Arizona passed Proposition 200, which required voters to provide proof of citizenship when registering to vote or casting a ballot. Shortly after the Proposition passed, a group of plaintiffs, including the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona sued the state. They argued that Proposition 200 violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments, and is inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). The district court denied a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs appealed.

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted an emergency injunction to allow the case to proceed without allowing Proposition 200 to affect the 2006 election. The Supreme Court vacated the emergency injunction and remanded the case for consideration on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction and held that the Proposition was not an unconstitutional poll tax and did not violate the NVRA. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Arizona. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the Proposition was not an unconstitutional poll tax and did not violate the NVRA, but that the NVRA preempts the Proposition’s requirements.

Question

Did the United States Court of Appeals err by creating a new test of preemption?

If so, does the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 preempt other voter registration requirements?

Trevino v. Thaler

jgoldman — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Espada Park San Antonio, TX

United States

29° 20' 26.0988" N, 98° 27' 47.1672" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-10189

Petitioner

Carlos Trevino

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, October 29, 2012

Argued

Monday, February 25, 2013

Advocates

Warren A. Wolf (for the petitioner)

Andrew S. Oldham (Deputy Solicitor General of Texas, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On the night of June 9, 1996, Carlos Trevino and four others drove to a nearby store to pick up beer for a party. One of the men noticed 15-year old Linda Salinas and offered to drive her to a nearby restaurant. Instead, the group drove Linda to Espada Park in San Antonio, Texas where they started to sexually assault her. Trevino's cousin, Juan Gonzalez, refused to participate and returned to the car; meanwhile, Trevino and the three other men continued the assault. Linda's body was discovered in the park the next day with fatal stab wounds to her neck.

After their investigation, the San Antonio Police arrested Trevino and a grand jury indicted him on one count of intentional murder and attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault. At trial, Trevino's cousin Gonzalez testified against him. Gonzalez testified that the men returned to the car with blood on their shirts discussing the murder, with Trevino bragging about how he learned to kill in prison. With this evidence, the jury found Trevino guilty and was left to decide on an appropriate punishment. They determined that Trevino intended to kill Linda and was likely to commit such violent acts in the future. At the jury's suggestion, the trial court sentenced Trevino to death.

Through both the punishment phase of the trial and the first state habeas corpus proceeding, Trevino's attorney did not investigate or present any mitigating evidence that could have reduced Trevino's sentence. During the federal habeas proceeding that followed, Trevino's attorney withdrew and the court appointed new counsel. Trevino's new counsel undertook his own investigation and discovered several pieces of evidence that the jury could have found relevant during the punishment phase of the trial.

Trevino returned to state court and filed a second habeas corpus application on the basis that his first attorney had a duty to investigate and present the mitigating evidence. Since the attorney failed to do so, Trevino claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to a competent attorney had been denied. The state court denied his application, stating that Trevino should have presented the ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the first state habeas proceeding. Trevino returned to the federal district court to reassert this claim, but that court also denied his claim because it was never properly raised in state court. The district court went on to explain that the allegedly ineffective performance of his first attorney during state habeas proceedings did not excuse his failure to present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim during those proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and Trevino appealed further. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question below.

Question

Can the ineffective assistance of a criminal defendant's counsel during state habeas proceedings excuse his failure to properly claim ineffective assistance earlier in the proceedings?

Lefemine v. Wideman

jgoldman — Sat, 18 May 2013 05:01:01 +0000

Location

Location of Columbia Christians for Life protest

Montague Street and U.S. 25/S.C. 72 Bypass

Columbia, SC

United States

34° 11' 44.7324" N, 82° 9' 54.9072" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-168

Petitioner

Steven Lefemine dba Columbia Christians for Life

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dan Wideman et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Monday, November 5, 2012

Decided

Monday, November 5, 2012

Facts of the Case

Steven Lefemine and Members of the Columbia Christians for Life engaged in pro life demonstrations where they carry posters featuring graphic pictures of aborted fetuses. During a protest in Greenwood, South Carolina, police officers told Lefemine that he would be ticketed for a breach of the peace if he did not discard the posters. Lefemine objected, arguing that the police officers were infringing on his First Amendment right to free speech, but he eventually disbanded the group. A year later, Lefemines attorney sent a letter to Dan Wideman, sheriff of Greenwood County, informing him that the group would be protesting again on the same site with the posters. The police reiterated that they would ticket the group if they showed up with the offending posters. The group decided not to protest, but two years later Lefamine filed a complaint alleging First Amendment violations and seeking nominal damages, a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and attorneys fees.

Under the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act the prevailing party in a suit may recover attorney fees from the opposing party. The district court issued a permanent injunction against the police officers, but declined to award money damages. The court also denied attorney fees, holding that attorney fees were not warranted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Lefemine was not a prevailing party under the Act. The court reasoned that the injunction did not alter the relative positions of the parties, so no party actually prevailed.

Question

Is a party a "prevailing party" under the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act when they secure a permanent injunction against the opposing party, but no money damages?

Conclusion

Decision: 0 votes for Lefemine, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. §1988

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and remanded. The Court held that Lefemine was the prevailing party so attorney fees could be awarded. The injunction changed the legal relationship between the parties by removing the threat of police action during protests. The Court noted that special circumstances may still prevent the award of attorney fees, but that is an issue for consideration on remand.

Shelby County v. Holder

jgoldman — Wed, 27 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Shelby County, Alabama Shelby County, AL

United States

33° 18' 14.1444" N, 86° 39' 39.9888" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-96

Petitioner

Shelby County, Alabama

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric Holder, Jr. Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, November 9, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Advocates

Bert W. Rein (for the petitioner)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondents)

Debo P. Adegbile (for the respondents Bobby Pierson, et al.)

Facts of the Case

The Fourteenth Amendment protects every person’s right to due process of law. The Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not expressly granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government for each state.

The Civil Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. Section 4(b) defines the eligible districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, 1964 and less than 50% turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect” of negatively impacting any individual’s right to vote based on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been continually renewed since that time.

Shelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Sections and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the issue of voting discrimination.

Question

Does the renewal of Section 5 of the Voter Rights Act under the constraints of Section 4(b) exceed Congress’ authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and therefore violate the Tenth Amendment and Article Four of the Constitution?

Maryland v. King

jgoldman — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Maryland State Police, Forensic Services Division

221 Milford Mill Road

Pikesville, MD 21208

United States

39° 21' 57.7116" N, 76° 43' 13.1988" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-207

Petitioner

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alonzo Jay King Jr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, November 9, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Advocates

Katherine Winfree (for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison.

King appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege against warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the MDCA was unconstitutional. The court held that King's expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's interest in using the DNA for identification purposes.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment allow states to collect and analyze DNA from people arrested, but not convicted, of serious crimes?

American Express Co., et al. v. Italian Colors Restaurant

jgoldman — Wed, 27 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

500 Pearl Street

New York, NY 10007

United States

40° 42' 50.2416" N, 74° 0' 1.908" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-133

Petitioner

American Express, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Italian Colors Restaurant

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, November 9, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Advocates

Michael K. Kellogg (for the petitioners)

Paul D. Clement (for the respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

American Express Company provides charge card services to supermarkets and other merchants throughout the United States. When a store decides to accept American Express cards, it must enter into a Card Acceptance Agreement. This standard form contract outlines the basic relationship between American Express and the merchant. A clause within the agreement requires arbitration of all claims brought against American Express and prohibits merchants from bringing any class action claims.

Several merchants, including Italian Colors Restaurant, brought individual lawsuits against American Express, claiming that the Card Acceptance Agreement violates U.S. antitrust laws. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York consolidated the cases and American Express moved to dismiss in order to force the merchants to arbitrate. The district court enforced the arbitration clause and dismissed the case. The merchants appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the arbitration clause, in particular the class action waiver, is unenforceable because it would essentially protect American Express from antitrust suits. American Express further appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court vacated the ruling and remanded for further proceedings in light of its decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International. The appellate court reevaluated its decision and still found the class action waiver to be unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari again to resolve this issue.

Question

Is American Express Company’s arbitration clause prohibiting class action suits enforceable, even though it would compel arbitration of antitrust claims?

Peugh v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Davis, IL

United States

42° 25' 21.054" N, 89° 24' 49.4136" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-62

Petitioner

Marvin Peugh

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, November 9, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Advocates

Stephen B. Kinnaird (for the petitioner)

Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1996, Marvin Peugh and Steven Hollewell formed two companies: the Grainary, Inc., which bought, stored and sold grain; and Agri-Tech, Inc., which provided custom farming services to landowners and tenants. From January 1999 to August 2000, the two obtained bank loans by falsely representing future contracts and inflating the bank accounts by writing bad checks between the two accounts. Peugh pleaded not guilty to all counts, while Hollewell pleaded guilty to one count and agreed to testify against Peugh in exchange for the other charges being dropped. After a jury trial, Peugh was convicted on five counts of bank fraud. At sentencing, Peugh argued that he should be sentenced under the 1999 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that were in effect at the time of the offense, rather than the 2009 Guidelines that were in effect at the time of sentencing. He argued that use of the later Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. He was sentenced to 70 months in prison, and he and Hollewell were jointly ordered to pay nearly $2 million. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the use of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing rather than those in effect at the time of the offense violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if there is significant risk that the newer Guidelines would result in a longer sentence?

Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard

jgoldman — Sat, 18 May 2013 05:01:01 +0000

Location

District Court of Johnson County

403 West Main Street

Tishomingo, OK 73460

United States

34° 14' 11.526" N, 96° 40' 49.4364" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1377

Petitioner

Nitro-Lift Technologies LLC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eddie Lee Howard and Shane D. Schneider

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, November 26, 2012

Decided

Monday, November 26, 2012

Facts of the Case

Eddie Lee Howard and Shane D. Schneider worked for Nitro-Lift Technologies LLC. As a condition of employment, they entered into confidentiality and noncompetition agreements that contained a clause requiring any dispute between Nitro-Lift and its employees to be settled in arbitration. When Howard and Schneider quit, they went to work for one of Nitro-Lift’s competitors. Nitro-Lift demanded arbitration for breach of the noncompetition agreements. Howard and Schneider sued in the District Court of Johnson County, Oklahoma, asking the court to declare their noncompetition agreements null and void. The court dismissed the case, holding that the agreements contained a valid arbitration clause, so the arbitrator had to settle any dispute between the parties. On appeal, Nitro-Lift cited several U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), noting that the law favoring arbitration applied in both federal and state cases. Despite this, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the existence of an arbitration clause did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement. The court went on to find the noncompetition agreements “void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma’s public policy.”

Question

Did the Oklahoma Supreme Court err in preventing the arbitration of the non competition agreement?

Conclusion

Decision: 0 votes for Nitro-Lift Technologies, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Arbitration Act

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the lower judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the Oklahoma Supreme Court clearly erred in disregarding binding precedent. The FAA is the “supreme law of the land,” giving it priority over any conflicting state statute or policy. The FAA provides that a court may review the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself, but if the clause is valid, the validity of the remainder of the agreement is for the arbitrator to decide.

United States v. Windsor

mgruhn — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

500 Pearl Street

New York, NY

United States

40° 42' 48.1464" N, 74° 0' 4.2696" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-307

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Edith Windsor, in her capacity as the executor of the estate of Thea Clara Spyer, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Advocates

Vicki C. Jackson (appointed by the Court as amicus curiae -- jurisdiction)

Sri Srinivasan (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner supporting affirmance -- jurisdiction)

Paul D. Clement (for the respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives -- jurisdiction & merits)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent in support of affirmance -- merits)

Roberta A. Kaplan (for the respondent Windsor -- merits)

Facts of the Case

The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in 1996, states that, for the purposes of federal law, the words “marriage” and “spouse” refer to legal unions between one man and one woman. Since that time, some states have authorized same-sex marriage. In other cases regarding the DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the rationale.

Edith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, Thea Clara Spyer, who died in 2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by New York state law. Thea Syper left her estate to her spouse, and because their marriage was not recognized by federal law, the government imposed $363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been recognized, the estate would have qualified for a marital exemption, and no taxes would have been imposed.

On November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the government’s position was that DOMA must be defended. On February 23, 2011, the President and the Attorney General announced that they would not defend DOMA. On April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives filed a petition to intervene in defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case. The district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the executive branch’s agreement with the lower court that the act is unconstitutional deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the case?

Does the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives have standing in the case?

Does the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines the term “marriage” under federal law as a “legal union between one man and one woman” deprive same-sex couples who are legally married under state laws of their Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection under federal law?

Hollingsworth v. Perry

mgruhn — Tue, 26 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Northern District of California

450 Golden Gate Avenue #36060

San Francisco, CA

United States

37° 46' 52.9536" N, 122° 25' 4.6344" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-144

Petitioner

Dennis Hollingsworth, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kristin Perry, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Advocates

Charles J. Cooper (for the petitioners)

Theodore B. Olson (for the respondents)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2000, the citizens of California passed Proposition 22, which affirmed a legal understanding that marriage was a union between one man and one woman. In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution required the term “marriage” to include the union of same-sex couples and invalidated Proposition 22. Later in 2008, California citizens passed Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide that “only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California.”

The respondents, a gay couple and a lesbian couple, sued the state officials responsible for the enforcement of California’s marriage laws and claimed that Proposition 8 violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. When the state officials originally named in the suit informed the district court that they could not defend Proposition 8, the petitioners, official proponents of the measure, intervened to defend it. The district court held that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Do the petitioners have standing under Article III of the Constitution to argue this case?

Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the state of California from defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman?

Dan's City Used Cars v. Pelkey

jgoldman — Wed, 20 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Colonial Village Apartments

130 West Clarke Stree

Manchester, NH 03104

United States

43° 0' 34.0704" N, 71° 28' 9.75" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-52

Petitioner

Dan’s City Used Cars d/b/a Dan’s Auto Body

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert Pelkey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2013

Advocates

Andre D. Bouffard (for the petitioner)

Brian C. Shaughnessy (for the respondent)

Lewis S. Yelin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2009, Dan’s City Used Cars towed Robert Pelkey’s car from the parking lot of the Colonial Village apartments pursuant to a policy requiring tenants to move their cars during snowstorms. Pelkey was confined to bed with a serious medical condition, so he did not know his car had been towed. Soon after, he was admitted to the hospital to amputate his left foot. During the operation, Pelky suffered a heart attack. After recovering and returning home, Pelky discovered that his car was missing. Pelkey’s attorney learned that Dan’s had possession of the car and planned to sell it at public auction. When the attorney tried to arrange return of the vehicle, Dan’s falsely told him that the car had already been sold. Dan’s later traded the car to a third party, but Pelky did not receive any compensation.

Pelkey sued for violations of the Consumer Protection Act, a statute concerning liens, and a negligence claim based on the common law duty of a bailee. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dan’s, holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act) preempted Pelkey’s claims. The Act provides that state law claims “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier, with respect to the transportation of property” are preempted. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed, holding that Pelkey’s claims only related to Dan’s role in disposing of the vehicle, and did not concern the transportation of property.

Question

Are state law claims against a tow-motor carrier based on state law regulating the sale and disposal of a towed vehicle preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Pelkey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994

No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered a unanimous opinion holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Act of 1994 does not preempt the state law because the claims are not “related to” the transportation of property. That phrase limits the scope of the preemption solely to transportation, rather than the disposal of property that occurs after the transportation, with which Pelkey’s claim is concerned.

Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter

jgoldman — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

John Ivan Sutter Pediatrics

925 Clifton Ave Suite 102

Clifton, NJ 07013

United States

40° 51' 52.2864" N, 74° 9' 39.1716" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-135

Petitioner

Oxford Health Plans

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Ivan Sutter

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2012

Argued

Monday, March 25, 2013

Advocates

Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioner)

Eric D. Katz (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

John Ivan Sutter and Oxford Health Plans entered into a Primary Care Physician Agreement (PCPA). Under this agreement, Sutter provided primary care health services to patients in Oxford’s care network in exchange for reimbursement by Oxford. The contract also included a general arbitration clause, which stated, in part, “No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court.” In 2002, Sutter initiated a class action, on behalf of himself and other health care providers under the PCPA, against Oxford, alleging breach of contract and violations of New Jersey law. Oxford moved to compel arbitration. The arbitrator found that the arbitration clause was so general that it encompassed any conceivable court action, including class actions. The arbitrator certified the class, and Oxford moved to vacate that decision in district court arguing the arbitration clause did not encompass class actions and the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The district court denied the motion and class wide arbitration proceeded.

In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stolt-Neilson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., which held that an arbitrator exceeded his authority by allowing class arbitration when the parties had no agreement on the issue. Oxford moved for reconsideration from the arbitrator in light of Stolt-Neilson, and then moved in district court to vacate the arbitrator’s most recent award. Both motions were unsuccessful. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does an arbitrator exceed his authority when he determines that parties agreed to class arbitration based only on broad contractual language precluding litigation and requiring arbitration of any dispute arising under their contract?

PPL Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

jgoldman — Wed, 20 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Internal Revenue Service

1111 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20004

United States

38° 53' 32.1684" N, 77° 1' 37.8372" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-43

Petitioner

PPL Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, October 29, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner)

Ann O'Connell (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

PPL Corporation held a 25 percent stake in South Western Electricity Board, a utility in England subject to a onetime windfall tax. After PPL paid the tax, it claimed a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. §901 on its U.S. tax return. §901 allows a credit for foreign taxes on "income, war, profits, [or] excess profits." The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the tax credit and issued a notice of deficiency. PPL then filed a petition in Tax Court to challenge the IRS’s determination. The Tax Court agreed with PPL and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that §901 does not cover the windfall tax because it is a tax on the company’s value, not its profits. PPL argued that, looking beyond the face of the statute, the windfall tax was intended to act as a tax on excess profits. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the CIR, holding that the windfall tax is not eligible for credit.

Question

Should courts use a formalistic approach or a substance-based approach that takes into account how the tax actually operates when determining the creditability of a foreign tax?

McQuiggin v. Perkins

jgoldman — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Northern Division

202 W Washington St

Marquette, WI 49855

United States

46° 32' 36.9816" N, 87° 23' 43.9008" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-126

Petitioner

Greg McQuiggin, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Floyd Perkins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, October 29, 2012

Argued

Monday, February 25, 2013

Advocates

John J. Bursch (Michigan Solicitor General, for the petitioner)

Chad A. Readler (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Floyd Perkins was convicted for the murder of Rodney Henderson in Michigan state court. The conviction became final on May 5, 1997 and under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Perkins should have filed a writ of habeas corpus by May 5, 1998, but he did not file until July 13, 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Perkins claimed problems with the sufficiency of evidence, jury instruction, trial procedure, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the petition as barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations. Perkins objected, arguing that the “new evidence” provision, which extends the statute of limitations to one year from when the “factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence”, applied.

In support of his objection, Perkins produced three previously unpresented affidavits that alluded to his innocence. The affidavits were signed in 1997, 1999 and 2002, so the district court denied the writ, holding that the ADEPA statute of limitations extension expired in 2003, one year after the last affidavit was signed. Perkins then asked the court to extend the statute of limitations because he was actually innocent of the crime. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the “new” evidence was not the type needed to pursue an actual innocence claim, and even if it were, Perkins did not pursue his claims with reasonable diligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that tolling the statute of limitations requires parties to be reasonably diligent in pursuit of their claims, no court has analyzed whether actual innocence claims must be pursued in the same way.

Question

1. Must an accused claiming actual innocence prove that extraordinary circumstances prevented the timely filing of his habeas petition?

2. If so, must an accused pursue an actual innocence claim with the same reasonable diligence required to toll the statute of limitations for other habeas petition claims?

Bullock v. BankChampaign

jgoldman — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

BankChampaign

2101 South Neil Street

Champaign, IL

United States

40° 8' 34.6128" N, 88° 14' 50.0676" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1518

Petitioner

Randy Curtis Bullock

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

BankChampaign, N.A.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

569 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, October 29, 2012

Argued

Monday, March 18, 2013

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2013

Advocates

Thomas M. Byrne (for the petitioner)

Bill D. Bensinger (for the respondent)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General , Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1978, Randy Curtis Bullock became the trustee of his father’s trust. The trust’s only asset was his father’s life insurance policy, and Bullock and his four siblings were the trust’s only beneficiaries. As trustee, Bullock was only allowed to borrow from the trust to pay the life insurance premiums and to satisfy a withdrawal request from another trustee. Despite these restrictions, Bullock borrowed from the trust three times: to satisfy a debt on his father’s business, to allow him and his mother to purchase certificates of deposit, and to allow him and his mother to purchase real estate. All of the loans were fully repaid.

When Bullock’s two brothers learned of the existence of the trust and their brother’s actions, they sued him in Illinois state court. They claimed that Bullock had breached his fiduciary duty by taking loans that violated the guidelines of the trust. The brothers moved for summary judgment and the court granted it. The court ordered Bullock to pay $250,000 in damages for the benefits he received from his dealings with the trust, $35,000 in attorneys’ fees, and placed the property Bullock purchased—a mill in Ohio—in a constructive trust. The constructive trust was awarded to BankChampaign, which replaced Bullock as the trustee of his father’s trust. Bullock was unable to sell the mill to satisfy the Illinois judgment.

In 2009, Bullock filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 to discharge his debt from the Illinois judgment. The bank started an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court where it argued that debts arising out of fraud in a fiduciary capacity are not dischargeable by bankruptcy. The bank moved for summary judgment and the bankruptcy court granted the motion. Bullock appealed the bankruptcy court’s judgment to district court, and the district court affirmed. The district court did recognize that the only way for Bullock to satisfy the judgment debt was to sell the mill, and the bank could not hold it in perpetuity, so the district court concluded that the bank was abusing its power. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court.

Question

Are debts arising out of fraud in a fiduciary capacity dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bullock, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(4)

No. Justice Stephen J. Breyer delivered a unanimous opinion holding that a bankruptcy proceeding resulting from “fraud or defalcation” is not dischargeable and that the term “defalcation” encompasses knowledge of or grossly reckless behavior in a fiduciary capacity. The Court held that the term should include a knowledge or intent requirement because such a reading follows statutory and judicial precedent. Additionally, this interpretation differentiates the term from others in the statute and provides a clear definition on which courts may rely.

Sebelius v. Cloer

jgoldman — Tue, 19 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

University of Missouri Student Health Center

1020 Hitt St

Columbia, MO 65201

United States

38° 56' 18.7476" N, 92° 19' 30.5184" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-236

Petitioner

Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Melissa Cloer, M.D.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Advocates

Benjamin J. Horwich (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Robert T. Fishman (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While a student at the University of Missouri, Dr. Melissa Cloer was vaccinated for Hepatitis B in 1996 and 1997. Soon after, she began developing symptoms of multiple sclerosis (MS). Several years later, Dr. Cloer learned about a possible connection between the vaccine and MS. Dr Cloer sued under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (the Act). The Chief Special Master denied her claim as untimely because she brought it more than 36 months after the onset of symptoms. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. Dr. Cloer appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Federal Circuit granted the government’s petition for rehearing and held that the Act’s statute of limitations can be paused in certain circumstances, but Dr. Cloer’s case did not meet the requirements. Her claims were again dismissed as untimely, but she filed a petition for attorney fees and costs incurred in the appeal. The Act provides that a claimant may recover attorney fees in connection with any proceeding under the Act brought in good faith with a reasonable basis for the claim even if the claimant does not win the case. The Federal Circuit held that Dr. Cloer was entitled to attorney fees if her claim was brought in good faith with a reasonable basis. The court remanded the case with instructions to decide those issues

Question

Can a person whose petition under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is dismissed as untimely recover from the United States an award of attorneys’ fees and costs?

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett

jgoldman — Tue, 19 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Massachusetts General Hospital

55 Fruit Street

Boston, MA 02114

United States

42° 21' 47.0268" N, 71° 4' 7.266" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-142

Petitioner

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Karen L. Bartlett

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, November 30, 2012

Argued

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Advocates

Jay P. Lefkowitz (for the petitioner)

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

David C. Frederick (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In December 2004, Karen Bartlett’s doctor prescribed Sulindac, a generic anti-inflammatory medication, to help treat her shoulder pain. Within months she began suffering from a severe reaction called Stevens-Johnson syndrome, which caused the skin condition toxic epidermal necrolysis. This condition deteriorated over 60 percent of her skin to the point of causing open wounds. As a result, she has suffered permanent and serious injuries, including near-blindness.

Bartlett filed a lawsuit against the Sulindac medication manufacturer, Mutual Pharmaceutical Company. Bartlett initially presented several negligence and product liability claims, but only her design defect product liability claim made it to trial. Beginning in August 2009, a jury at the Federal District Court for the District of New Hampshire heard evidence that Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous to consumers and therefore was defectively designed. Mutual countered, among several other defenses, that federal law governs generic drug manufacturers’ conduct; therefore Karen could not pursue a state design defect claim.

After 14 days of trial, the jury deliberated and sided with Bartlett, awarding over $20 million in compensatory damages. Mutual appealed the decision for several reasons, including the following: the district court misunderstood New Hampshire product liability law; and, the court improperly admitted several pieces of evidence and the jury award of damages was excessive. Mutual also reasserted its claim that federal law should prevail over a state defective design claim. Despite Mutual’s arguments, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. Mutual appealed further to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari.

Question

Does federal law preempt a state design defect claim against a generic drug manufacturer?

Horne v. Department of Agriculture

jgoldman — Wed, 20 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Raisin Valley Farms

3678 North Modoc Avenue

Kerman, CA

United States

36° 47' 20.8104" N, 120° 5' 10.8276" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-123

Petitioner

Marvin D. Horne, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department of Agriculture

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Advocates

Michael W. McConnell (for the petitioners)

Joseph R. Palmore (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) was enacted to protect farmers from radical fluctuations in the market. The AMAA allows the Secretary of Agriculture to impose production quotas or supply limitations on products as needed. Refusal to comply with these orders can result in civil and criminal penalties. The orders only applied to “handlers,” those who process and package the products for distribution. The Raisin Marketing Order of 1949 created reserve-tonnage, a percentage of raisins that must be turned over the government each year.

Marvin and Laura Horne were raisin producers living in California who implemented a system to bring their raisins to market without handlers to avoid the AMAA. The Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service initiated an enforcement action against the Hornes for failure to comply with the orders. The Administrative Law Judge held that the Hornes should be subject to the Order under the auspices of the AMAA. The Judicial Officer affirmed the decision and held the Hornes liable. The Hornes filed for judicial review in district court, and the court granted summary judgment for the Department of Agriculture.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the Hornes’ claim that the Order violated their Fifth Amendment rights under the Takings Clause. The Court held that the Hornes must bring that claim before the Court of Federal Claims, as required by the Tucker Act.

Conclusion

Can the Takings Clause be used as a defense in actions regarding a government-mandated transfer of funds?

If so, does the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have jurisdiction over the case?

FTC v. Actavis Inc.

jgoldman — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

75 Spring Street SW

Atlanta, GA 30303

United States

33° 45' 11.3184" N, 84° 23' 45.096" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-416

Petitioner

Federal Trade Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Actavis Inc. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2012

Argued

Monday, March 25, 2013

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Jeffrey I. Weinberger (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2000, Solvay Pharmaceuticals successfully patented AndroGel, a topical gel medication. Shortly after the FDA approved the medication, generic drug manufacturers Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories began developing generic versions of the gel. Solvay filed a patent infringement suit against Watson and Paddock, but the manufacturers counter-claimed that Solvay’s patent was invalid to begin with. As the infringement suit progressed, Solvay feared that it would lose its monopoly on AndroGel. To prevent this, Solvay entered into a reverse payment agreement with the two manufacturers. In return for dropping the suit and maintaining exclusivity, Solvay agreed to pay the manufacturers a sizeable fee. The agreement allowed Solvay to maintain its monopoly, despite the possible invalidity of the patent, in exchange for sharing some of the profits with its potential competitors.

Shortly after entering the agreement, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a complaint against the pharmaceutical companies. The FTC claimed that Solvay was unlikely to win the patent infringement suit; therefore the settlement unfairly protected an invalid patent monopoly. By limiting competition in the AndroGel market, the manufacturers were restraining trade in violation of antitrust laws. The manufacturers argued that the FTC failed to state a valid claim because the agreement merely protected Solvay’s already existing patent rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with the manufacturers and dismissed the case. The FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court explained that the manufacturers’ reverse payment settlement is lawful as long as it restrains competition in the same way that patent protection typically restrains competition.

Question

Are reverse payment agreements per se lawful, rather than presumptively anticompetitive?

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

mgruhn — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Biological Mother's residence

United States

36° 44' 51.6768" N, 95° 58' 45.8616" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-399

Petitioner

Adoptive Couple

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Baby Girl, a minor child under the age of fourteen years, Birth Father, and the Cherokee Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Friday, January 4, 2013

Argued

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (for the petitioner)

Paul D. Clement (for respondent Guardian ad Litem in support of the petitioner)

Charles A. Rothfeld (for respondents Birth Father et al.)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting respondents Birth Father et al.)

Facts of the Case

When the biological mother of Baby Girl became pregnant she did not live with the father and the father did not support the mother financially. The mother sent the father a text message asking if he would rather pay child support or relinquish his parental rights. He sent a text back, saying that he would relinquish his rights, though he later testified that he thought he was relinquishing his rights only to the mother. The biological father was a registered member of the Cherokee Nation. The biological mother attempted to verify this status, but spelled the father’s name wrong and misrepresented his birthday in the request, so the Nation could not locate the father’s registration. The mother listed Baby Girl’s ethnicity as “Hispanic” instead of “Native American” on the birth certificate. The mother decided to put Baby Girl up for adoption because she had two other children that she struggled to support.

Adoptive Couple, who resided in South Carolina, began adoption proceedings in that state. The Cherokee Nation finally identified the father as a registered member and filed a notice of intervention, stating that Baby Girl was an “Indian Child” under the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father stated that he did not consent to the adoption and would seek custody of Baby Girl. After trial, the family court denied Adoptive Couple’s petition for adoption and granted custody to the biological father. The court held that the biological father was a “parent” under the ICWA because of his paternity and pursuit of custody as soon as he learned that Baby Girl was being put up for adoption. Adoptive Couple did not follow the procedural directives in the ICWA to obtain the father’s consent prior to initiating adoption proceedings. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed.

Question

Can a non-custodial parent invoke ICWA to block an adoption voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent under state law?

Does ICWA define “parent” to include an unwed biological father who has not complied with state law rules to attain legal status as a parent?

Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann

mgruhn — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma

United States

35° 28' 16.3128" N, 97° 31' 1.5492" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-889

Petitioner

Tarrant Regional Water District

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rudolf John Herrmann, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Friday, January 4, 2013

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (for the petitioner)

Ann O'Connell (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Lisa S. Blatt (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Tarrant Regional Water District (Tarrant) supplies water to north-central Texas. In 1955, Congress allowed Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas to negotiate an agreement allocating the water from the Red River, which forms the boundary between southeastern Oklahoma and northeastern Texas. In 1980, the states signed the Red River Compact and Congress ratified it.

In 2007, Tarrant sought to appropriate water from three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas and applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), which was established to regulate in-state and out-of-state water usage. On November 1, 2007, Tarrant sued the OWRB and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Oklahoma statutes on water usage. Tarrant argued that the statutes placed burdens on interstate water commerce that are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and overstep the bounds of the Compact that Congress allowed the states to establish. OWRB moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Did Congress’ approval of an interstate water compact illustrate congressional intent to allow state laws to interfere with interstate commerce in water?

Does the Compact preempt protectionist state laws that restrict state access to water to which they are entitled under the Compact?

United States v. Davila

mgruhn — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia

United States

33° 28' 20.316" N, 81° 58' 7.6296" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-167

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Anthony Davila

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Friday, January 4, 2013

Argued

Monday, April 15, 2013

Advocates

Eric J. Feigin (for the petitioner)

Robert M. Yablon (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In early 2010, Anthony Davila was tried for defrauding the federal government by filing false tax returns. During a hearing before the magistrate judge, Davila requested to discharge his court-appointed attorney. Davila was concerned that the attorney had not discussed any possible trial strategies with him; the attorney merely insisted that Davila plead guilty. The magistrate judge explained to Davila that there might not be another viable option and that pleading guilty may be the best advice his attorney could have given him. Following the judge’s advice, Davila plead guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 115 months imprisonment.

Davila appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Davila argued that the magistrate judge’s advice to plead guilty warranted a new trial. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court must not be involved in any plea discussions. Since the judge commented on the weight of the evidence against Davila and suggested that a guilty plea would result in a more lenient sentence, he participated in such a plea discussion. As a result of this violation, Davila claimed that the court should vacate the judgment. The appellate court agreed with Davila, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Question

Did the magistrate judge’s improper participation in a plea discussion warrant vacating the defendant’s guilty plea?

Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International

jgoldman — Mon, 22 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Capitol

United States Capitol Complex

Washington , DC 20004

United States

38° 53' 22.9992" N, 77° 0' 32.0004" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-10

Petitioner

United States Agency for International Development, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alliance for Open Society International, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, January 11, 2013

Argued

Monday, April 22, 2013

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)

David W. Bowker (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, Congress enacted the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (“the Act”). Through the Act, Congress apportioned billions of dollars towards the funding of non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS. NGOs qualify to receive this funding only if they satisfy certain conditions. One of these conditions requires that all federally funded NGOs implement a policy explicitly opposing prostitution.

The Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., Pathfinder International, Global Health Council, and InterAction are NGOs that receive funding under the Act. The NGOs brought suit against the Agency for International Development and the other agencies responsible for enforcing the Act, challenging the constitutionality of the Act’s funding provisions. The NGOs argued that the funding provisions violate the First Amendment by restricting the organizations’ speech and forcing them to promote the government’s viewpoint on prostitution. The district court agreed with the NGOs and held that the provisions were too broad of a restriction on free speech. The agencies appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a requirement that non-governmental organizations institute an explicit anti-prostitution policy in order to receive federal funding violate the First Amendment?

American Trucking Associations v. City of Los Angeles

jgoldman — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The Port of Los Angeles Harbor Commission

425 South Palos Verdes Street

Los Angeles 90731

United States

33° 44' 26.3724" N, 118° 16' 53.436" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-798

Petitioner

American Trucking Associations, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

The City of Los Angeles, the Harbor Department of the City of Los Angeles, and the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, January 11, 2013

Argued

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Advocates

Daniel N. Lerman (for the petitioner)

John F. Bash (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Steven S. Rosenthal (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, the Port of Los Angeles (“the Port”) introduced a plan to expand its cargo terminals to better accommodate its high shipping volume. Following public concern that the plan could significantly increase air pollution, the Board of Harbor Commissioners adopted a Clean Air Action Plan (“CAAP”). The CAAP aimed to reduce emissions and specifically targeted the Port’s drayage truck business. Roughly 16,000 drayage trucks regularly serve the Port, transporting goods between customers and the cargo terminals. Beginning in 2008, the CAAP banned drayage trucks from the Port, unless the carriers entered into a series of concession agreements. These agreements imposed a progressive ban on older trucks and provided incentives for drayage truck operators to convert their aging fleets to cleaner trucks.

American Trucking Associations (“ATA”), a national association of motor carriers, challenged several provisions within the concession agreements and brought suit against the City of Los Angeles and its Harbor Department. ATA argued that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAA”) preempted the agreements. The FAAA Act prohibits a state from enacting any regulation related to the “price, route, or service of any motor carrier.” ATA claimed that the concession agreements amounted to such a regulation. ATA further argued that the State could not limit a federally licensed motor carrier’s access to a port.

The district court disagreed with ATA and held that none of the provisions were preempted; ATA appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court determined that when the Port was acting as a market participant, rather than a market regulator, the FAAA Act did not apply. ATA appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari limited to the two questions below.

Question

Can a municipal government limit the activities of motor carriers when it acts as a market participant, as opposed to a market regulator?

Can a municipal government bar federally licensed motor carriers from access to a port?

Hillman v. Maretta

jgoldman — Mon, 22 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

State of Virginia Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit

4110 Chain Bridge Road

Fairfax, VA 22030

United States

38° 50' 37.446" N, 77° 18' 36.5688" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1221

Petitioner

Jacqueline Hillman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Judy A. Maretta

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, January 11, 2013

Argued

Monday, April 22, 2013

Advocates

Daniel H. Ruttenberg (for the petitioner)

Steffen N. Johnson (for the respondent)

Elaine J. Goldenberg (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In December 1996, Warren Hillman made his wife, Judy Maretta, the beneficiary of his Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance (“FEGLI”) policy. In 1998, the two divorced and Mr. Hillman remarried. Despite the divorce, Mr. Hillman never changed the beneficiary designation on his policy to his new wife, Jacqueline Hillman. In 2008, Warren died and Jacqueline Hillman attempted to claim the death benefits under his policy. Her claim was denied because she was not the named beneficiary on her husband's policy; Ms Maretta received the death benefits instead. Mrs Hillman sued Ms Maretta for the full amount of death benefits under the policy.

When a divorce is finalized in Virginia, state law revokes any beneficiary designations between former spouses. State law also creates a cause of action against anyone who wrongfully receives FEGLI policy proceeds. However, federal law under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act dictates that death benefits from FEGLI policies shall go to the designated beneficiary, regardless of state regulation to the contrary. The trial court applied state law and granted summary judgment to Mrs. Hillman, but Ms Maretta appealed. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the lower court’s decision and held that federal law preempted the state law; therefore Mr. Hillman's beneficiary designation was not revoked. Mrs. Hillman appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Question

Does federal law preempt a Virginia state law that revokes a spouse’s beneficiary designation in a Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance policy upon divorce?

Salinas v. Texas

jgoldman — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Houston Police Department Headquarters

1200 Travis Street

Houston, TX 77002

United States

29° 45' 20.4264" N, 95° 22' 2.6868" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-246

Petitioner

Genovevo Salinas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, January 11, 2013

Argued

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner)

Alan K. Curry (for the respondent)

Ginger D. Anders (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found in Salinas’ home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas’ gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could not be located.

15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas’ silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed.

Question

Does the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause protects a defendant’s refusal to answer questions asked by law enforcement before he has been arrested or read his Miranda rights?

Sekhar v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Office of the State Comptroller of New York

110 State Street 15th Floor

Albany, NY 12236

United States

42° 39' 0.2664" N, 73° 45' 13.3668" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-357

Petitioner

Giridhar C. Sekhar

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, January 11, 2013

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner)

Sarah E. Harrington (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2008 the General Counsel for the Office of the State Comptroller of New York advised against investing in a fund managed by FA Technology Ventures. The investment would have given FA Technology millions in service fees. The General Counsel received an anonymous email of “blackballing a recommendation on a fund” and threatened to disclose the General Counsel’s extramarital affair to his wife, to the Comptroller, and to others if he did not change his recommendation within 36 hours. On the advice of law enforcement, the General Counsel asked for more time, which the individual granted. The FBI traced the emails to Giridahr Sekhar, a managing partner of FA Technology. Sekhar later admitted to sending the emails.

Sekhar was charged with one account of extortion and six counts of interstate transmission of extortionate threats under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act prohibits obtaining property by threats. Sekhar moved to dismiss, arguing that the General Counsel’s recommendation was not property. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the General Counsel’s right to make professional decisions without outside influence was intangible personal property. Sekhar was convicted on six of the seven counts and sentenced to 15 months in jail. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is the "recommendation" of an attorney, who is a salaried employee of a governmental agency, intangible property that can be the subject of an extortion attempt under the Hobbs Act?

United States v. Kebodeaux

jgoldman — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

525 Magoffin Avenue

El Paso, TX 79901

United States

31° 45' 34.8516" N, 106° 28' 58.0944" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-418

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Anthony James Kebodeaux

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, January 11, 2013

Argued

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

M. Carolyn Fuentes (Assistant Federal Public Defender, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Anthony Kebodeaux was a registered sex offender. He served three years in prison in for his offense. After his release Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). When Kebodeaux moved from San Antonio, Texas to El Paso, Texas, he failed to update his residence in the registry within three days, as required, and was charged and convicted under SORNA. He appealed, arguing that the law was unconstitutional as it applied to him because regulating a sex offender’s intrastate travel after being released from custody exceeds Congress’ powers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that past commission of a federal crime is insufficient to permit the federal government to have unending criminal authority over Kebodeaux. While SORNA was unconstitutional under the circumstances of this case, the court did not question Congress’ ability to place restrictions on federal prisoners after release, including requiring sex offenders convicted after SORNA to register intrastate changes of residence.

Question

Did the court of appeals err in conducting its constitutional analysis on the premise that Kebodeaux was not under a federal registration obligation until SORNA was enacted, when pre SORNA federal law also obligated him to register as a sex offender?

Did the court of appeals erred in holding that Congress lacks the Article I authority to provide for criminal penalties as applied to a person who was convicted of a sex offense under federal law and completed his criminal sentence before SORNA was enacted?

Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics

jgoldman — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Patent and Trademark Office

600 Dulany Street

Alexandria, VA

United States

38° 48' 4.2516" N, 77° 3' 50.0076" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-398

Petitioner

Association for Molecular Pathology et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Myriad Genetics

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, November 30, 2012

Argued

Monday, April 15, 2013

Advocates

Christopher A. Hansen (for the petitioners)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae)

Gregory A. Castanias (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Association for Molecular Pathology along with several other medical associations, doctors and patients sued the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Myriad Genetics to challenge several patents related to human genetics. The patents cover the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and certain mutations that indicate a high risk of developing breast cancer. The suit also challenged several method patents covering diagnostic screening for the genes. Myriad argued that once a gene is isolated, and therefore distinguishable from other genes, it could be patented. By patenting the genes, Myriad had exclusive control over diagnostic testing and further scientific research for the BRCA genes. Petitioners argued that patenting those genes violated §101 the Patent Act because they were products of nature. They also argued that the patents limit scientific progress. §101 limits patents to “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that isolating a gene does not alter its naturally occurring fundamental qualities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that isolated genes are chemically distinct from their natural state in the human body. In March 2012, Petitioners sought certiorari; the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Mayo Collective Services v. Prometheus Laboratories. On remand, the Federal Circuit again upheld the patentability of the BRCA genes.

Question

Does §101 of the Patent Act allow patents on human genes?

Metrish v. Lancaster

jgoldman — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Southfield, MI

United States

42° 28' 24.1284" N, 83° 13' 18.7428" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-547

Petitioner

Linda Metrish, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Burt Landcaster

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, January 18, 2013

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Advocates

John J. Bursch (Michigan Solicitor General, for the petitioner)

Kenneth M. Mogill (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On April 23, 1993, Burt Lancaster, a former Detroit police officer with a history of mental health problems, shot and killed his girlfriend. He was charged with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At his trial in state court, Lancaster admitted to the killing but argued he was not guilty by reason of insanity and diminished capacity. The jury convicted Lancaster on both counts.

After exhausting his appeals in state courts, Lancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court and argued that the state had improperly excluded a black juror based on his race. The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus, and Lancaster received a new trial in 2005. At the new trial, Lancaster waived his right to a jury and limited his defense to diminished capacity. Since Lancaster’s first trial, the Michigan Supreme Court had held that diminished capacity defense was no longer valid. The trial court held that the Michigan Supreme Court ruling applied retroactively and that Lancaster could not use the diminished capacity defense. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and Lancaster was again convicted on both counts.

Lancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a substantive change in the law and that the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retroactively applying the change to his case. The district court denied his petition and held that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a reasonable change because the defense was not well established under Michigan law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the retroactive application of the new ruling denied Lancaster his right to due process.

Question

Was the Michigan Supreme Court’s abolition of the diminished capacity defense an “unexpected and indefensible” change?

Did the Michigan Court of Appeals err in retroactively applying the change to Lancaster’s case?

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

jgoldman — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Location

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center

1801 Inwood Rd

Dallas, TX

United States

32° 48' 48.5604" N, 96° 50' 52.4256" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

12-484

Petitioner

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Naiel Nassar

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, January 18, 2013

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Advocates

Daryl Joseffer (for the petitioner)

Brian P. Lauten (for the respondent)

Melissa Arbus Sherry (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Dr. Naiel Nassar, who is of Middle Eastern descent, was hired by the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) in 1995 to work at the Amelia Court Clinic (Clinic), which specializes in HIV/AIDS treatment. After three years there, he left to pursue additional training and returned in 2001 as an Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and Infectious Diseases and Associate Medical Director of the Clinic. His immediate supervisor at the Clinic was Dr. Philip Keiser, whose supervisor at UTSW was Dr. Beth Levine. After being hired in 2004, Levine immediately began inquiring into Nassar’s productivity and billing practices. In 2005, after interviewing a candidate who was of Middle Eastern descent, Levine stated in Nassar’s presence, “Middle Easterners are lazy.” In 2006, after hiring the candidate, Levine made a similar statement in Keiser’s presence. Keiser informed Nassar of these comments as well as the fact that Levine scrutinized Nassar’s productivity more than any other doctor. Around this time, Nassar applied for a promotion that Levine actively undermined. In 2006, Nassar resigned from the UTSW faculty and cited Levine’s harassment and the creation of an unhealthy work environment in his resignation letter. Nassar resigned with the understanding that he would be offered a position at the Amelia Court Clinic unaffiliated with the UTSW, but the Clinic was forced to withdraw its offer after heavy opposition from the UTSW faculty, who have an agreement with the Clinic regarding positions to be filled by faculty doctors.

In 2008, Nassar sued UTSW under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and argued that UTSW had constructively discharged and retaliated against him. The jury found in favor of Nassar and awarded him back pay and compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the retaliation claim but insufficient evidence to support the claim of constructive discharge.

Question

Does the retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 require a plaintiff to prove that an employer would not have taken an action but for the existence of an improper motive, or does the provision require only proof that the employer had mixed motives for taking an action?