Cases - 2011 term

Lafler v. Cooper

jgoldman — Mon, 31 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

42° 19' 53.1372" N, 83° 2' 44.7" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-209

Petitioner

Blaine Lafler, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Anthony Cooper

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2011

Argued

Monday, October 31, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, March 21, 2012

Advocates

John J. Bursch (Solicitor General of Michigan, for the petitioner)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor Gen eral, Department of Justice, for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Valerie R. Newman (for the respondent appointed by the Court)

Facts of the Case

Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake.

Question

Is a state habeas petitioner entitled to relief when his counsel deficiently advises him to reject a favorable plea bargain but the defendant is later convicted and sentenced pursuant to a fair trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lafler, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: habeas corpus

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, vacating the Sixth Circuit judgment and returning the case for reconsderation. The Court held that the Michigan court applied the wrong standard when it rejected Cooper’s claim to ineffective assistance of counsel. The proper test under Strickland v Washington is whether, absent the ineffective counsel, a defendant would have accepted an offered plea that was less severe than his eventual sentence, and the trial court would have accepted the terms of that plea. The majority also held that the proper remedy is not specific performance of the original plea. On remand, the prosecution should re-offer the plea and, if the defendant accepts it, the trial court can decide how to amend the original sentence.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, stating that there is no right to habeas relief when counsel’s advice caused a defendant to have a full and fair trial. A criminal defendant has no right to a plea bargain, so rejecting the plea did not deprive Cooper of any procedural right. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the Scalia dissent. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent except for Justice Scalia’s assertions that the majority's decision elevates the plea bargain to a constitutional right. Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate dissent criticizing the majority's "opaque discussion of the remedy...."

Missouri v. Frye

jgoldman — Mon, 31 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 2' 48.678" N, 92° 22' 52.68" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-444

Petitioner

Missouri

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Galin E. Frye

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2011

Argued

Monday, October 31, 2011

Advocates

Chris Koster (Attorney General of Missouri, for the petitioner)

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Emmett D. Queener (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Missouri prosecutors offered Galin Edward Frye two deals while seeking his conviction for driving while his license was revoked, but his lawyer never told Frye about the offers. Frye pleaded guilty to a felony charge and was sentenced to three years in prison. He appealed, saying his lawyer should have told him about the previous deals. A Missouri appeals court agreed. Prosecutors contend that not knowing about the deals they offered doesn't mean that Frye didn't know what he was doing when he decided to plead guilty.

Question

Can a defendant who validly pleads guilty assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by alleging that, but for counsel's error in failing to communicate a plea offer, he would have pleaded guilty with more favorable terms?

Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California

jgoldman — Mon, 03 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

34° 3' 8.0424" N, 118° 14' 37.266" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-958

Petitioner

Toby Douglas, Director, California Department of Health Care Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

09-1158, Douglas v. California Pharmacists' Association

10-283, Douglas v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Argued

Monday, October 3, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Advocates

Karin S. Schwartz (for the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Carter G. Phillips (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The California Legislature approved a series of cutbacks in the payments to physicians, hospitals and pharmacies to address the state's budget deficit. In each case, the providers have sued in federal court and won rulings from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which blocked the cutbacks on the grounds that they conflicted with the Medicaid law. The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear three separate appeals from the state, all of which raise the same issue. The lead case is Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California. The other two cases are Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital. David Maxwell-Jolly served as the director of California's Department of Health Care Services.

Question

Does federal law preempt state reductions in Medicaid payments?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Douglas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Maybe. In a 5-4 decision Justice Stephan G. Breyer wrote the majority opinion vacating the judgment and remanding to the Ninth Circuit. Since the court granted certiorari, the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMMS) approved many of the cutbacks as consistent with federal law. California withdrew all cutbacks that were not approved. In light of this development, the majority argued that the healthcare providers may need to seek review of the CMMS decision under the Administrative Procedure Act instead of maintaining a supremacy clause action. The Court remanded the case so the parties could prepare new arguments based on the new circumstances.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote a dissent, stating that he would reverse because the health care providers no longer have a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined in the dissent.

Howes v. Fields

jgoldman — Tue, 04 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Lenawee County Jail

United States

41° 50' 36.1896" N, 84° 1' 0.2712" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-680

Petitioner

Carol Howes, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Randall Lee Fields

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, January 24, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Advocates

John J. Bursch (Solicitor General of Michigan, for the petitioner)

Ginger D. Anders (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Elizabeth L. Jacobs (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A jury found Randall Fields guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child. Fields was in jail on a disorderly charge when Lenawee County, Michigan deputies questioned him about allegations of sex with a minor. The sex case was unrelated to the one Fields was in jail for at the time.

Fields filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals claiming that his statements were inadmissible because he had not been given his Miranda warnings before questioning. The state court reasoned that because Fields was free to return to the jail and was questioned on a matter unrelated to his incarceration, there was no obligation to provide him warnings under Miranda.

Fields then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated, and the U.S. District Court agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does federal law automatically require Miranda warnings before questioning jail or prison inmates about issues unrelated to the cases for which they were incarcerated?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Howes, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Miranda warnings

Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court reversing the lower court's decision. The Court stated that there was not yet any clearly established rule regarding what constituted Miranda custody. Mere imprisonment and private questioning about events in the outside world were not sufficient to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes. Furthermore, the prisoner in this case was not in custody under Miranda because he was told at the outset of the interrogation that he could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted and because he was not physically restrained.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Ginsburg agreed that what constituted custody was not clearly established in Fields' favor. However, the justice disagreed with the Court's determination that Fields was not in custody because Fields was subjected to incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere, was placed in an inherently stressful situation against his will, and had his freedom of action curtailed in a significant way.

Reynolds v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 03 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-6549

Petitioner

Billy Joe Reynolds

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, January 24, 2011

Argued

Monday, October 3, 2011

Decided

Monday, January 23, 2012

Advocates

Candace Cain (for the petitioner)

Melissa Arbus Sherry (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Billy Joe Reynolds pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly failing to register and update a registration, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of SORNA and the legality of the Interim Rule implementing that law. He also argued that his guilty plea should be invalidated because he is "actually innocent" of violating SORNA's registration requirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected his arguments and affirmed the conviction.

Question

1. Does Reynolds have standing under SORNA to raise claims concerning the Attorney General's Interim Rule?

2. Is review by the Court necessary to resolve a split among the circuit courts?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Reynolds, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)

Yes and yes. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that without an affirmative action by the Attorney General, pre-act offenders would not be obligated to register under SORNA. Hence, the Interim Rule must be valid for Reynolds to fall within SORNA’s authority and there remains a justiciable question. Breyer looked to the relevant text of SORNA, which mandates that sex offenders register with the state and keep their registration current when moving to a different state. The act also stated, however, that the Attorney General has the authority to specify the applicability of SORNA with respect to sex offenders convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment. He noted Congress’ use of the word “applicability” as opposed to “nonapplicability”, inferring that Congress wanted to give the Attorney General the discretion to apply SORNA to pre-act offenders, not the authority to make exceptions to SORNA. He reasoned, in part, that Congress wished to give the Justice Department some leeway with SORNA’s applicability, given that the Justice Department is tasked with the act’s enforcement. The Court therefore reversed the Third Circuit’s decision and remanded the case to determine if the Attorney General's Interim Rule is a valid specification.

Pacific Operators Offshore v. Valladolid

jgoldman — Tue, 11 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

34° 16' 46.308" N, 119° 15' 21.5892" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-507

Petitioner

Pacific Operators of Offshore, LLP, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Luisa L. Valladolid

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioners)

Joseph R. Palmore (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondent)

David C. Frederick (for the private respondent)

Facts of the Case

Pacific Operations Offshore runs two offshore oil drilling platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located more than three miles off the coast of California. Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific Operations as a roustabout, stationed primarily on the Hogan. He was killed, however, on the grounds of Pacific Operations's onshore oil-processing facility when he was crushed by a forklift. Following his death, his widow, Luisa, sought workers' compensation benefits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). An administrative law judge denied Mrs. Valladolid's OCSLA claim on the grounds that her husband's injury had occurred outside the geographic site of the outer continental shelf. The judge denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds: (1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs. The Benefits Review Board upheld the judge's denial of the OCSLA benefits under the "situs-of-injury" test, and affirmed the denial of LHWCA benefits on the maritime situs ground.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that the OCSLA does not have a situs-of-injury requirement. The court of appeals held that Section 1333(b) extends Longshore Act coverage to workers injured on land where there is "a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf." Two other circuits that have addressed the question have reached conflicting results.

Question

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act extends workers' compensation coverage under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act "with respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or transporting by pipeline the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf." Does the OCSLA extend Longshore Act coverage only to workers injured on the outer Continental Shelf itself?

Stok & Assoc. v. Citibank, N.A.

jgoldman — Thu, 17 May 2012 03:08:18 +0000

Location

United States

25° 47' 20.2884" N, 80° 13' 35.1804" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-514

Petitioner

Stok & Associates, P.A.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citibank, N.A.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Facts of the Case

In November 2008, Stok & Associates, a Florida law firm, deposited a cashier's check for $173,015 from someone the firm thought was a client into its Citibank trust account. After Citibank accepted the check and made the funds available, the bank discovered the check was counterfeit and restricted Stok's use of the funds. The problem was the firm had already wired the money to the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. Stok said Citibank then removed $173,015 from his trust account and notified the Florida Bar of the deficiency in the trust account.

The firm filed a lawsuit in Florida state court, alleging fraud and breach of contract, among other things. Citibank meanwhile filed a petition in federal court to compel arbitration and stay the state court proceedings, pursuant to an arbitration clause that appears in the contract governing the parties' relationship. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.

Question

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, should a party be required to demonstrate prejudice after the opposing party waives its contractual right to arbitrate by participating in litigation?

Golan v. Holder

mgruhn — Wed, 05 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-545

Petitioner

Lawrence Golan, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Monday, March 7, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Advocates

Anthony T. Falzone (for the petitioners)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Section 514 of the act restored U.S. copyright protection to foreign parties whose works had entered the public domain. A group of artists, including musician Lawrence Golan, who made use of the works while they were in the public domain filed a lawsuit in Colorado's federal court to challenge the restoration of copyright, arguing that doing so violated their First Amendment rights.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that Section 514 of the URAA does not violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. The district court also rejected Golan's First Amendment challenge, seeing "no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns." The United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed that Section 514 of the URAA does not exceed Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause, but it vacated the district court's First Amendment ruling and remanded for further proceedings.

Question

(1) Does the Progress Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibit Congress from taking works out of the public domain?

(2) Does Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Holder, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No and no. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Court held that congress did have the power to enact Section 514 and the Uruguay Round Agreement. An exhaustive recount of the history of copyright law showed that the public domain is not untouchable, and congress may grant protection to previously unprotected works. The Court soundly rejected Golan's argument that taking works out of the public domain violated the constitutional "limited times" requirement, following the reasoning from Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Court also held that there were sufficient First Amendment protections built into the current copyright law in the form of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.

Justice Steven G. Breyer wrote a dissent, stating that the statutes in question violated the Constitution because they did not promote the production of new works. Justice Beyer also expressed concerns about the difficulty of finding authors of orphaned works in order to gain a copyright license.

Maples v. Thomas

jgoldman — Tue, 04 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

33° 31' 14.3796" N, 86° 48' 8.964" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-63

Petitioner

Cory R. Maples

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kim T. Thomas, Interim Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, March 21, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (for the petitioner)

John C. Neiman Jr. (Solicitor General of Alabama, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Cory Maples was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an Alabama jury in 1997. Alabama does not provide death row inmates with lawyers to appeal their convictions and sentences; they must rely on pro bono lawyers to represent them on appeal. Two associates from Sullivan & Cromwell, a New York law firm, agreed to represent Maples without charge. However the two associates subsequently left the firm, and when the Alabama court sent two copies of a ruling in Maples' case to the firm's mailroom it sent them back unopened. The firm had not notified the court or the mailroom that new lawyers had stepped in.

When Maples learned of the missed deadline, he immediately informed his step-mother, who contacted Sullivan & Cromwell. Other attorneys at that firm then sought leave to file an appeal notwithstanding the missed deadline, but that request was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court and later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also declined to waive the deadline for filing an appeal in his case.

Question

Did the Eleventh Circuit properly hold that there was no "cause" to excuse any procedural default when the petitioner was blameless for the default, the State's own conduct contributed to the default and the petitioner's attorneys of record were no longer functioning as his agents at the time of any default?

Rehberg v. Paulk

jgoldman — Tue, 01 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

31° 34' 42.6252" N, 84° 9' 20.6676" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-788

Petitioner

Charles A. Rehberg

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James P. Paulk, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, March 21, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 2011

Advocates

Andrew J. Pincus (for the petitioner)

John C. Jones (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Charles Rehberg, a forensic accountant, discovered evidence of unethical billing practices at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia. He publicized his findings by sending a series of anonymous faxes to the hospital. As a "favor" to the hospital, former Georgia District Attorney Kenneth Hodges and Chief Investigator James Paulk began investigating Rehberg for allegedly sending harassing e-mail messages and faxes to hospital administrators. In the course of their investigation, Hodges wrote and issued subpoenas to Rehberg's Internet service provider to obtain copies of Rehberg's e-mails, which were given to private investigators. Hodges and Paulk later secured three grand jury indictments against Rehberg, which were all subsequently dismissed.

Rehberg filed a civil suit against Hodges, Paulk, and specially appointed prosecutor Kelly Burke alleging, among other things, that they conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining his e-mails through a subpoena. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision.

Question

Are government officials who initiate prosecutions by providing false testimony in judicial proceedings absolutely immune from civil suit?

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC

jgoldman — Wed, 05 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-553

Petitioner

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, March 28, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

Advocates

Douglas Laycock (for the petitioner)

Leondra R. Kruger (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondent)

Walter Dellinger (for the private respondent)

Facts of the Case

Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her.

Perich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply.

Question

Does the ministerial exception, which prohibits most employment-related lawsuits against religious organizations by employees performing religious functions, apply to a teacher at a religious elementary school who teaches the full secular curriculum, but also teaches daily religion classes, is a commissioned minister, and regularly leads students in prayer and worship?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church and School, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans With Disabilities Act

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that Perich was a minister for the purposes of the Civil Rights Act’s ministerial exception, dismissing Perich’s suit and her claims for damages. Chief Justice Roberts described the history of the “ministerial exception”, established by courts to prevent state interference with the governance of churches, a violation of the First Amendment’s establishment and free exercise clauses. He rejected the EEOC and Perich’s argument that these clauses of the First Amendment are irrelevant to Hosanna-Tabor’s right to choose its ministers.

Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Perich indeed functioned as a minister in her role at Hosanna-Tabor, in part because Hosanna-Tabor held her out as a minister with a role distinct from that of its lay teachers. He also noted that Perich held herself to be a minister by accepting the formal call to religious service required for her position. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that Perich performed secular duties in her position and that lay teachers performed the same religious duties as Perich, but reasoned that Perich’s status as a commissioned minister outweighed these secular aspects of her job. He also rejected the EEOC and Perich’s suggestion that Hosanna-Tabor’s religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual, explaining that the purpose of the ministerial exception is not limited to hiring and firing decisions made for religious reasons.

Greene v. Fisher

jgoldman — Tue, 11 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Court of Common Pleas-Criminal Division Philadelphia, PA

United States

39° 57' 8.406" N, 75° 9' 49.6404" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-637

Petitioner

Eric Greene, aka Jarmaine Q. Trice

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jon Fisher, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, April 4, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner)

Ronald Eisenberg (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

A jury found Eric Greene guilty of second-degree murder and other crimes, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment because he participated in a grocery store robbery that left the owner dead. Greene was tried along with four co-defendants, two of whom made pretrial statements that linked Greene to the robbery. The prosecution used redacted versions of these statements as evidence, but because the co-defendants did not testify in court, Greene could not use cross-examination to challenge the statements.

Greene appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Among other arguments, he renewed his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that the codefendants' confessions as redacted did not so clearly implicate Greene as to violate the Confrontation Clause and Greene then filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, again pressing his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition but eight months later dismissed the appeal "as having been improvidently granted."

In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gray v. Maryland that the constitution forbids prosecutors from using redacted statements like those of Greene's co-defendants. Greene asked the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to vacate his conviction under a process known as "habeas corpus." By federal statute, habeas relief is allowed only when a state court violates "clearly established Federal law." The district court held that Greene could not rely on Gray because that decision was not "clearly established" when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.

Question

Does a Supreme Court decision qualify as “clearly established Federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if that Supreme Court decision was entered after the relevant state-court adjudication on the merits ?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fisher, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: ADEPA

No. In a unanimous opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court held that under §2254(d), “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” includes only the Supreme Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court adjudications on the merits. Since the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Gray by three months, the Third Circuit correctly held that Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” that would allow the federal court to grant Greene’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Scalia further observed that Greene missed two opportunities to obtain relief under Gray . Greene could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, which would have likely produced a remand in light of the Gray decision. Greene also could have asserted Gray in a petition for post-conviction relief.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington

jgoldman — Wed, 12 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Burlington County Jail

54 Grant Street

Mt Holly, NJ

United States

39° 59' 47.886" N, 74° 47' 26.7432" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-945

Petitioner

Albert W. Florence

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, April 4, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Decided

Monday, April 2, 2012

Advocates

Thomas C. Goldstein (for the petitioner)

Carter G. Phillips (for the respondents)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Albert Florence was searched twice in seven days after he was arrested on a warrant for a traffic violation he had already paid. Florence filed a lawsuit against officials at the two jails, contending the jailhouse searches were unreasonable because he was being held for failure to pay a fine, which is not a crime in New Jersey.

U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez ruled that the strip search of Florence violated the Constitution. However, officials representing both Burlington and Essex Counties appealed the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that it is reasonable to search everyone being jailed, even without suspicion that a person may be concealing a weapon or drugs.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment permit a jail to conduct a suspicion-less strip search whenever an individual is arrested, including for minor offenses?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Board of Chosen Freeholders, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the lower court, holding that the strip searches for inmates entering the general population of a prison do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded that a prisoner’s likelihood of possessing contraband based on the severity of the current offense or an arrestee’s criminal history is too difficult to determine effectively. The Court pointed out instances, such as the arrest of Ted Kaczynski, in which an individual who commits a minor traffic offense is capable of extreme violence. Correctional facilities have a strong interest in keeping their employees and inmates safe. A general strip search policy adequately and effectively protects that interest. The Court did note that there may be an exception to this rule when the arrestees are not entering the general population and will not have substantial contact with other inmates. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined the majority in its entirety. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority except with respect to the potential exceptions to the rule.

Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, emphasizing that the majority opinion leaves open the possibility of certain exceptions to the rule. Justice Alito also concurred, writing that the majority did not decide whether strip searches are always reasonable, only that the searches in this case were. Justice Alito wrote that strip-searching may not be reasonable for inmates held for minor offenses for a brief period of time.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, expressing that strip searches of individuals arrested for minor offenses that do not involve drugs or violence are unreasonable unless the prison official has a reasonable suspicion that that individual possesses drugs or contraband. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Judulang v. Holder

jgoldman — Wed, 12 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-694

Petitioner

Joel Judulang

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric H. Holder, Jr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, April 18, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Decided

Monday, December 12, 2011

Advocates

Mark C. Fleming (for the petitioner)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.

In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.

A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.

Question

Can a lawful permanent resident who was convicted by guilty plea of an offense that renders him deportable and excludable under differently phrased statutory subsections be prevented from seeking discretionary relief from removal under former Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Judulang, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: §212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

Yes. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that the rule is invalid. While the judgments on administrative agencies are given deference, they must still have a rational reasoning behind them. The BIA posited several legitimate reasons for the comparable grounds rule, but gave no rational basis for them. The current application of discretionary relief in deportation cases is arbitrary and capricious. The case was reversed and remanded.

Zivotofsky v. Clinton

jgoldman — Mon, 07 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Jerusalem Jerusalem

Israel

31° 46' 5.9448" N, 35° 12' 49.3596" E

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-699

Petitioner

M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, May 2, 2011

Argued

Monday, November 7, 2011

Decided

Monday, March 26, 2012

Advocates

Nathan Lewin (for the petitioner)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General of the United States, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky is a United States citizen born on October 17, 2002 in Jerusalem. In December 2002, Zivotofsky's mother filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and a United States passport for petitioner, listing his place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel." United States diplomatic officials informed petitioner's mother that State Department policy required them to record "Jerusalem" as petitioner's place of birth, which is how petitioner's place of birth appears in the documents he received.

On his behalf, Zivotofsky's parents filed this suit against the Secretary of State seeking an order compelling the State Department to identify petitioner’s place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel" in the official documents. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the complaint after concluding that petitioner lacked standing, and that the complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that petitioner had standing and that a more complete record was needed on the foreign policy implications of recording "Israel" as Zivotofsky's place of birth.

On remand, the State Department explained, among other things, that in the present circumstances if "Israel" were to be recorded as the place of birth of a person born in Jerusalem, such "unilateral action" by the United States on one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians "would critically compromise" the United States' ability to help further the Middle East peace process. The district court again dismissed on political question grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Zivotofsky's claim is foreclosed because it raises a nonjusticiable political question.

Question

Does the political question doctrine deprive a federal court of jurisdiction to enforce a federal statute that explicitly directs the Secretary of State how to record the birthplace of an American citizen on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a passport?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Zivotofsky, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Foreign Relations Authorization Act

No. In an 8-to-1 decision, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the Court vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the trial court for further consideration on the merits. Roberts argued that Zivotofsky’s claim did not involve a political question and is thus justiciable. Resolution of Zivotofsky’s claim would require the Judiciary to vindicate Zivotofsky’s statutory rights, a matter within its competence to resolve. Reaching a decision is not simple, however. A full airing on the merits will frame the issues for further review.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen Breyer joined Part I of Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s opinion. She wrote separately to emphasize that the inquiry required by the political question doctrine was more demanding than the majority suggested with its opinion.

Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. filed a special concurrence. He noted that determining the constitutionality of an Act of Congress could present a political question, but he did not think that the narrow issue before the court fell into that category of cases.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion. He wrote that a decision would touch upon several very sensitive foreign policy matters and that adjudication of the petitioner's claim would require the courts to answer a political question as defined by the Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr.

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood

jgoldman — Tue, 11 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 46' 29.748" N, 122° 25' 9.8976" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-948

Petitioner

CompuCredit Corporation, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wanda Greenwood, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, May 2, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Advocates

Michael W. McConnell (for the petitioners)

Scott L. Nelson (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit card under the brand name Aspire Visa to consumers with low or weak credit scores through massive direct-mail solicitations and the Internet. CompuCredit marketed the card and the cards were issued by Columbus Bank and Trust. Wanda Greenwood and other consumers filed suit against Compucredit and Columbus alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The lawsuit claimed that the CompuCredit and Columbus' promotional materials were deceptive because they mentioned the credit card fees in small print, buried in other information and not in proximity to the representation that no deposit was required.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the credit providers' motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The majority explained that a party must adhere to an agreement to arbitrate claims "unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Accordingly, the "burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies."

Question

Are claims arising under the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq., subject to arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement?

Minneci v. Pollard

jgoldman — Tue, 01 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

35° 8' 32.8812" N, 119° 27' 23.4288" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1104

Petitioner

Margaret Minneci, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richard Lee Pollard, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, May 16, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 2011

Advocates

Jonathan S. Franklin (for the petitioners)

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor Gen eral, Department of Justice, for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

John F. Preis (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Richard Lee Pollard, an inmate at a federal prison run by the private company GEO Group, slipped on a cart left in a doorway and injured both elbows. As GEO employees were preparing to transport him to an outside orthopedic clinic, he said they made him wear a jumpsuit and a "black box" wrist restraint, despite his claim that both would cause him excruciating pain. Pollard sued GEO and its employees for allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Pollard's suit. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for injury caused by "a federal agent acting under his authority."

Question

Can employees of private prison operators be sued for violating the constitutional rights of inmates?

Kawashima v. Holder

jgoldman — Mon, 07 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Kawashima restaurant

United States

34° 3' 34.9992" N, 118° 16' 28.9992" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-577

Petitioner

Akio Kawashima, et ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, May 23, 2011

Argued

Monday, November 7, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Advocates

Thomas J. Whalen (for the petitioners)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement.

Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation.

Question

Is filing a false statement on a corporate tax return an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit, which would render the immigrant removable?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Holder, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 26 U.S.C. Section 7206

Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the judgment of the appellate court. The Court held that filing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7206 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act when the Government's revenue loss exceeds $10,000. The Court rejected the argument that crimes under Section 7206 do not involve the fraud or deceit required by the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion which Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Elena Kagan joined. Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Court's construction of the statute was dubious because it characterized a tax crime as a crime of fraud or deceit, which would render the portion of the statute which directly addressed violations of tax law meaningless.

Perry v. New Hampshire

jgoldman — Wed, 02 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-8974

Petitioner

Barion Perry

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New Hampshire

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Tuesday, May 31, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

Advocates

Richard Guerriero (for the petitioner)

Michael A. Delaney (Attorney General of New Hampshire for the respondent)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Barion Perry is in prison for breaking into a car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N.H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things out of a parked car. She identified Perry at the scene but later could not pick him out of a photo lineup or describe him to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo lineup. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo identification because it was "unnecessarily suggestive" that he was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction.

Question

Do the Due Process protections against unreliable identification evidence apply to all identifications made under suggestive circumstances?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for New Hampshire, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness’ identification unless the identification was procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances, arranged by law enforcement. The Court further stated that the Constitution does not protect a defendant against a conviction based on questionable evidence by not prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by allowing a defendant to persuade the jury that the evidence should not be believed. Therefore, Due Process will only prohibit the introduction of evidence when inclusion of the evidence is so extremely unfair that its inclusion would violate fundamental concepts of justice. The Court also rejected Perry's argument that eyewitnesses are uniquely unreliable, and emphasized that the fallibility of eyewitness identification does not warrant a due process ruling requiring a trial court to screen evidence for reliability, unless there was improper state conduct.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas wrote separately because he would not have extended Stovall v. Denno, and subsequent related case law, which premised substantive due process rights on notions of fundamental fairness. Instead he believed that the Due Process Clause is not a general guarantee against unfairness but rather only a guarantee of process before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. She stated that it is not merely the act of suggestion, which creates a due process problem, but rather the effect of an act of suggestion on the reliability of a resulting identification. She maintained that the court's ruling would draw a distinction between intentionally suggestive conduct and inadvertently suggestive conduct, either of which could lead to the same unfair result.

Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.

jgoldman — Wed, 09 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 57' 8.406" N, 75° 9' 49.6404" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-879

Petitioner

Gloria Gail Kurns, Executrix of the Estate of George M. Corson, Deceased, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Railroad Friction Products Corporation, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 6, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, November 9, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, February 29, 2012

Advocates

David C. Frederick (for the petitioners)

Sarah E. Harrington (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Jonathan Hacker (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Gloria Gail Kurns and Freida E. Jung Corson brought suit on behalf of the decedent, George M. Corson, asserting a number of state law causes of action related to his alleged exposure to asbestos during his years employed by a railroad company. From 1947 to 1994, George M. Corson worked as a welder, machinist, and supervisor for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad. He was employed at different facilities in Montana and South Dakota. Much of his job involved removing insulation from locomotive boilers and putting brake shoes on the locomotives.

Kurns, the executor of his state, and Jung Corson, the widow, claim that throughout this time period, George Corson was repeatedly exposed to asbestos from the insulation and the brake shoes. After his retirement, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, the only known cause of which is exposure to asbestos. He passed away after the initiation of this litigation, and is represented by both Kurns and Jung Corson. Together they brought claims against multiple defendants including, the Railroad Friction Products Corp. over brake pads they manufactured containing asbestos.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the claims, contending that they were barred by the Locomotive Inspection Act, which provides that a railroad carrier may only use a locomotive that is in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

Question

Did Congress intend the federal railroad safety acts to preempt state-law-based tort lawsuits?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Railroad Friction Products Corp., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Locomotive Inspection Act

Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the lower court's decision. The Court held that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempted the state law design defect claims and the state law failure to warn claims. The Court emphasized that state law must yield to a Congressional Act, to the extent of any conflict with federal statute, even if there is no express preemption. The Court further determined that the Federal Railroad Safety Act did not change the scope of the Locomotive Inspection Act.

Justice Elena Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan agreed with the result, but emphasized that the notion, established in earlier case law, that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of locomotive equipment regulation was inaccurate.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Court's holding that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempted the claims for defective design. However, she did not think that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempted the claims for failure to warn because those claims were not based on any product's physical compensation, but on a failure to provide adequate instructions or warning.

Martinez v. Ryan

jgoldman — Tue, 04 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Renaissance Square Phoenix, AZ

United States

33° 26' 54.1572" N, 112° 4' 26.5332" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1001

Petitioner

Luis Mariano Martinez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 6, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Advocates

Robert D. Bartels (for the petitioner)

Kent E. Cattani (for the respondent)

Jeffrey B. Wall (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Luis Mariano Martinez is serving two consecutive terms of 35 years to life, following his conviction for two counts of sexual conduct with a person under 15. On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez' conviction, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Martinez then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in the first post-conviction relief proceeding in which he could present a claim of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that since there is no right to appointment of counsel during a defendant's post-conviction relief petition there is no right to effective assistance of counsel.

Question

May a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, establish cause for a procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial by showing ineffective assistance at the initial-review collateral proceeding?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Martinez, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: habeas

Yes. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court carved out an exception to its holding in Coleman v. Thompson, which held that attorney errors in post-conviction hearings do not qualify as cause to excuse procedural defaults. Justice Kennedy declined to answer whether this exception was required by the Constitution. Instead, he distinguished the initial-review collateral hearing from other postconviction review hearings because in the former an attorney’s error will likely preclude state courts at any level from further reviewing a prisoner’s claims. Justice Kennedy argued that the Court’s ruling does not upset stare decisis because the prisoner in Coleman was not claiming ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral hearing.

Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. He accused the majority of creating a constitutional right to effective counsel in all collateral hearings.

Gonzalez v. Thaler

mgruhn — Wed, 02 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

30° 43' 24.6936" N, 95° 33' 2.7972" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-895

Petitioner

Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 13, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (for the petitioner)

Jonathan F. Mitchell (Solicitor General of Texas, for the respondent)

Ann O'Connell (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Raphael Arriaza Gonzalez was convicted of murder in Texas state court on June 14, 2005, and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He filed an appeal to the Texas intermediate court of appeals, which affirmed his conviction on July 12, 2006. Gonzalez's counsel did not file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals within the 30-day timeframe permitted by state law. 2. On July 19, 2007, Gonzalez filed in Texas state court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied that petition on the merits on November 21, 2007. On January 24, 2008, Gonzalez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Question

Was there jurisdiction to issue a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and to adjudicate Gonzalez's appeal?

Did the application for a writ of habeas corpus run out of time under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) due to the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review?

Smith v. Cain

mgruhn — Tue, 08 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

29° 57' 52.9992" N, 90° 4' 13.8" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-8145

Petitioner

Juan Smith

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Burl Cain, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 13, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

Advocates

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner)

Donna R. Andrieu (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Juan Smith was convicted on five counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Louisiana state trial court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and state Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for review. Smith contends that the Louisiana state courts reached this result only by disregarding established precedents regarding the suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence to a prosecutor in past Supreme Court cases, Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois.

Question

Is there a reasonable probability that the outcome of Smith's trial would have been different but for Brady and Giglio/Napue errors?

Did the state courts violated the Due Process Clause by rejecting Smith's Brady and Giglio/Napue claims?

Setser v. United States

mgruhn — Wed, 30 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Courtroom of Hon. Samuel R. Cummings

1205 Texas Avenue

Lubbock, TX 79401

United States

33° 34' 40.3068" N, 101° 51' 18" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-7387

Petitioner

Monroe Ace Setser

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 13, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, March 28, 2012

Advocates

Jason D. Hawkins (for the petitioner)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent in support of the petitioner)

Evan A. Young (for amicus curiae in support of the judgment below (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

On October 1, 2007, Lubbock police officers arrested Monroe Ace Setser after finding suspected narcotics during a traffic stop. At the time he was arrested, Setser was serving a five-year term of probation stemming from a previous state conviction. State authorities subsequently charged Setser with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in the state court arising from the activities of October 1, 2007. They also filed a motion to revoke his probation in the 2006 state case. Before the state cases could be resolved, the federal government stepped in and charged Setser for his October 2007. Setser pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment and in exchange the government agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts. At sentencing, the federal district court sentenced Setser to 151 months of imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run consecutive to whatever sentence might be imposed in the pending state case, and concurrent to whatever sentence might be imposed in the 2007 state case. Neither case had been resolved in state court.

Question

Did the district court err by directing that petitioner's federal sentence be served consecutively to a state sentence that had not yet been imposed?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sentencing Reform Act

No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the lower court’s decision. The Court determined that the federal judge had discretion to order a federal sentence to run consecutively or concurrently with an anticipated state sentence. The Court found nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act which foreclosed the federal judge’s authority to make such a decision and noted that judges have traditionally had broad authority to determine whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined. Breyer argued that a federal judge does not have the power to order that a federal sentence run consecutively or concurrently with a state sentence that has yet to be imposed. Breyer noted that nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act explicitly granted federal judges that power. Furthermore, after discussing the history and purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, Breyer concluded that the Court’s decision was contrary to the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act.

Hall v. United States

mgruhn — Tue, 29 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The Hall's Farm

4699 E. Parker Ranch Rd

Wilcox, AZ 85643

United States

31° 59' 8.4948" N, 109° 40' 55.4232" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-875

Petitioner

Lynwood D. Hall, et ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 13, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

Decided

Monday, May 14, 2012

Advocates

Susan M. Freeman (for the petitioners)

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lynwood and Brenda Hall filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy and were forced to sell their family farm for $960,000 to settle their bankruptcy debts. That sale brought about capital gains taxes of $29,000. The Halls wanted the taxes treated as part of the bankruptcy, paying part of the debt and having the court discharge the rest. They argued that the taxes were dischargeable as a debt “incurred by the estate”. The IRS objected to that plan, saying all of the taxes must be paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, ruling that the Halls had to pay federal income tax on the gain from the sale of their farm during bankruptcy proceedings.

Question

Does 11 U.S.C. 1222(a)(2)(A) authorize the bankruptcy court to treat a federal tax debt arising out of the debtor's post-petition sale of a farm asset as a dischargeable debt “incurred by the estate”?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 11 U.S.C. 1222(a)(2)(A

No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that there is no separately taxable estate in Chapter 12 bankruptcies, so the taxes in question were not “incurred by the estate”. The debtor remains liable for these taxes independent of the bankruptcy proceedings. The Court noted that the Hall’s position is sympathetic, but the plain language of the statute does not allow a ruling in their favor. Congress is free to amend the statute if they are unhappy with this result.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the majority’s decision goes against the purpose of Chapter 12, which is to allow family farmers to reorganize debts without losing their farms. Justice Breyer read the statute’s language more broadly to fit this purpose and allow discharge of the tax debt. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

PPL Montana v. Montana

mgruhn — Wed, 07 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

46° 35' 44.9016" N, 112° 1' 37.2" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-218

Petitioner

PPL Montana, LLC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Montana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 20, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Gregory G. Garre (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, parents of Montana schoolchildren sued the owner of federally licensed hydroelectric dams on the Missouri, Madison and Clark Fork rivers within the state. The parents claimed that the owner, PPL, owed the state compensation because the riverbeds underlying its dams were part of Montana's "school trust lands." The State of Montana joined the suit in 2004, asserting that PPL also owed the state compensation pursuant to Montana's Hydroelectric Resources Act.

The federal district court eventually dismissed the action for lack of diversity, and PPL filed suit in state court. The state countersued, arguing that it obtained title to the relevant streambeds at the time of statehood pursuant to the "equal footing doctrine." The trial court dismissed PPL's affirmative defenses, held that the State obtained title to the riverbeds at issue because those rivers were navigable at the time of statehood and concluded that the state was entitled to retroactive lease payments under the HRA. Following a bench trial to determine damages, the court imposed approximately $40 million in back lease payments, as well as future lease payments imposed by the state.

Question

Does the constitutional test for determining whether a section of a river is navigable for title purposes require a trial court to determine whether the relevant stretch of the river was navigable at the time of statehood?

First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards

mgruhn — Mon, 28 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 29' 58.182" N, 81° 41' 43.44" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-708

Petitioner

First American Financial Corporation, Successor in Interest to The First American Corporation, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Denise P. Edwards

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 20, 2011

Argued

Monday, November 28, 2011

Advocates

Aaron M. Panner (for the petitioners)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (for the respondent)

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Ohio resident Denise Edwards bought title insurance from First American Financial Corp. through a referral from Tower City, the title company that conducted the closing on her home purchase. Edwards later filed a lawsuit against First American Title Insurance Co. and its parent, the First American Corp., under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that First American improperly paid millions of dollars to individual title companies and in exchange those title companies entered into exclusive referral agreements with First American. Edwards also filed a class action complaint. The district court denied Edwards' motions to certify a nationwide class of customers of First American's captive title agents and a class limited to customers of First American's Tower City subsidiary.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denials of class certification, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in denying certification of a nationwide class without allowing discovery and had abused its discretion in denying certification of the Tower City class.

Question

Does Edwards have standing to sue?

FAA v. Cooper

mgruhn — Wed, 30 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 46' 29.748" N, 122° 25' 8.4" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1024

Petitioner

Federal Aviation Administration

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stanmore Cooper

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 20, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, March 28, 2012

Advocates

Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)

Raymond A. Cardozo (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2006, pilot Stanmore Cooper disclosed that he was HIV-positive to Social Security officials in order to receive medical benefits but withheld his status from the Federal Aviation Administration. But the Social Security Administration then turned over his medical records to the FAA, which revoked his license. Cooper filed suit against the agency for emotional distress for mishandling his medical records. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exchange of records was improper and that Cooper has standing to sue.

Question

Does the Privacy Act's "actual damages" provision cover mental and emotional distress?

Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.

mgruhn — Wed, 07 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Mayo Clinic Rochester, MN

United States

43° 9' 39.708" N, 77° 36' 39.3156" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1150

Petitioner

Mayo Collaborative Services, dba Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 20, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Advocates

Stephen M. Shapiro (for the petitioners)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae)

Richard P. Bress (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Prometheus Laboratories Inc. patented steps of testing for proper dosages of drug treatments used to treat gastrointestinal diseases like Crohn's disease, and sued the Mayo Clinic when it attempted to use its own, similar test. A federal judge invalidated the patents, holding that the patent couldn't cover the body's reaction to drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which specializes in patent issues, overturned the lower court order.

Question

Can certain types of diagnostic medical tests can be patented?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mayo Collaborative Services, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Patent Act, Section 101

No. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Stephen J. Breyer wrote a unanimous opinion reversing the lower court and holding that the processes involved in this test are unpatentable laws of nature. The success of a patent application cannot rely on the art of the drafter. The “steps” Promethus added to their application are merely instructions to apply the laws of nature. Past Supreme Court decisions also support the concern that allowing patents on laws of nature would unnecessarily inhibit further discovery.

Credit Suisse Securities LLC v. Simmonds

jgoldman — Tue, 29 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

47° 36' 22.356" N, 122° 19' 55.4556" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1261

Petitioner

Credit Suisse Securities LLC et. al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vanessa Simmonds

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

Advocates

Christopher Landau (for the petitioners)

Jeffrey B. Wall (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, for the United States)

Jeffrey I. Tilden (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Vanessa Simmonds alleged in 54 separate complaints that several investment banks shared in the profits of customers who received IPO allocations and sold their shares on the open market at higher prices. The lawsuits also claim the banks strategically allocated IPO shares to customers who would return the favor by giving the banks more business. Simmonds holds stock in the companies that issued shares through the disputed IPOs. She sent those companies letters demanding that they sue the underwriting banks for disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. When the companies declined, she invoked a provision of the Securities Exchange Act that allowed her to sue the banks herself. The banks argued that the lawsuits should be dismissed because they were filed after a two-year time statute of limitations for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said the suits were not too late because the time limit had been postponed. The court did dismiss 30 of Simmonds' lawsuits on other legal grounds.

Question

Is the two-year time limit for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act subject to tolling, and if so, does tolling continue even after the receipt of actual notice of the facts giving rise to the claim?

Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals

jgoldman — Wed, 11 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1016

Petitioner

Daniel Coleman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Court of Appeals of Maryland

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

Advocates

Michael L. Foreman (for the petitioner)

John B. Howard Jr. (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Former Maryland Court of Appeals employee Daniel Coleman filed a lawsuit under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, alleging that he was fired after requesting sick leave for a documented medical condition. The lower court dismissed Coleman's claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claim was properly dismissed because his employer is a state agency.

Question

Did Congress constitutionally abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passed the self-care leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act?

Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC

jgoldman — Mon, 28 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1195

Petitioner

Marcus D. Mims

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arrow Financial Services, LLC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Monday, November 28, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Advocates

Scott L. Nelson (for the petitioner)

Gregory G. Garre (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Marcus Mims sued Arrow Financial Services, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit both held that they lacked jurisdiction over Mims' TCPA claim because, in their view, the TCPA creates exclusive state-court jurisdiction over private actions.

Question

Did Congress divest the federal district courts of their federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over private actions brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mims, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg held that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over TCPA claims made by private individuals. Justice Ginsberg looked to the legislative history of the act, noting congress’ concern about companies evading state law prohibitions on telemarketing through interstate operations. She also noted that, apart from the deletion of an amount-in-controversy requirement, the federal-question provision of §1331 has not changed since 1875. According to Justice Ginsburg, there is a deeply rooted presumption of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction rebuttable only by an explicit statutory directive, an implication from legislative history, or an incompatibility between state and federal court interests.

Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the TCPA’s language is state-court oriented, but argued that it did not explicitly make state-court jurisdiction exclusive, citing other statutes where congress specifically excluded § 1331 claims. She contrasted the TCPA’s language on claims made by private individuals with its directive on suits brought by state Attorneys General; these latter claims may be brought “exclusively” in federal district courts, but no such language appears in the statute’s language on private actions. Justice Ginsburg explained that congress intended to remove any confusion about courts’ concurrent jurisdiction over TCPA claims and to give states’ flexibility over the venue for these claims.

Justice Ginsburg rejected Arrow’s concerns over defendants removing $500-per-violation TCPA claims to federal court to unfairly pressure plaintiffs to settle. She pointed out that the federal district court filing fee is $350 and that only sixty five such cases have been so removed, all class action suits.

National Meat Association v. Harris

jgoldman — Wed, 09 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-224

Petitioner

National Meat Association

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, November 9, 2011

Decided

Monday, January 23, 2012

Advocates

Steven J. Wells (for the petitioner)

Benjamin J. Horwich (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Susan K. Smith (Deputy Attorney General of California, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The National Meat Association contends that the Federal Meat Inspection Act prevents California from imposing its requirements on federally inspected slaughterhouses. In 2008, the state enacted the law after the Humane Society of the United States released a video of so-called downer cows being kicked, electrocuted, dragged with chains and rammed with a forklift at a slaughterhouse.
The California law bans slaughterhouses from buying or selling downer cows and from butchering them for human consumption. The measure also requires humane handling of the animals.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to grant a preliminary injunction blocking the law. Although the court said the humane-handling provision probably was pre-empted by federal law, the three-judge panel declined to block it, saying the trade group hadn't shown its members would suffer "irreparable injury."

Question

Is a California law requiring slaughterhouses to "immediately euthanize" any nonambulatory animal on its premises preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Meat Association, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U. S. C. §60

Yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Elena Kagan, Court reversed the lower court, holding that the Federal Meat Inspection Act's preemption clause applied broadly to any additional or different regulations a state imposes on slaughterhouses. The act prevails even where state law does not conflict with the federal act. The Court rejected arguments that the Act did not apply to animals rendered non-ambulatory before reaching the slaughterhouse. The Court also held that the criminal penalties imposed by the state law were more than a mere incentive to improve humane animal slaughter practices.

Knox v. Service Employees International Union

jgoldman — Tue, 10 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1121

Petitioner

Dianne Knox, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Service Employees International Union, Local 1000

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

Advocates

William J. Young (for the petitioners)

Jeremiah A. Collins (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

All California state employees are required to pay a fee to the Service Employees International Union for its representation of them, and the union is required to tell employees how the money is spent and how to object. The union wanted to collect a special assessment for a "Political Fight Back Fund" in 2005. But some nonmembers wanted the union to give them a new notice and a new chance to object. They filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and equitable restitution for violations of the nonmembers' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court agreed, siding with the nonmembers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Question

(1) May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition employment on the payment of a special union assessment intended solely for political and ideological expenditures without first providing a notice that includes information about that assessment and provides an opportunity to object to its exaction?

(2) May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition continued public employment on the payment of union agency fees for purposes of financing political expenditures for ballot measures?

Kappos v. Hyatt

jgoldman — Mon, 09 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1219

Petitioner

David J. Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gilbert P. Hyatt

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Monday, January 9, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Advocates

Ginger D. Anders (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Aaron M. Panner (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

When the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denies an application for a patent, the applicant may seek judicial review of the agency's final action by one of two means. The applicant may obtain direct review of the agency's determination in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alternatively, the applicant may commence a civil action against the director of the PTO in federal district court. The court will decide whether a plaintiff in a civil (§ 145) action may introduce new evidence that could have been presented to the agency in the first instance. The court will also consider whether, when new evidence is introduced under § 145, the district court may decide the factual questions to which the evidence pertains, without giving deference to the prior decision of the PTO.

Gilbert P. Hyatt's patent application and subsequent claims were rejected. Hyatt appealed to the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. The Board reversed most of the examiner's written description rejections, but upheld some. Hyatt filed a request for rehearing on the rejected claims, which the Board dismissed on the basis that it raised new issues that could have been raised to either the examiner or the Board. Hyatt responded by filing a civil action at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under §145. He submitted a declaration supporting his new and amended claims. The PTO objected to the declaration, arguing that the district court should not consider the new evidence because Hyatt did not introduce it to either the Board or the examiner. The district court agreed with the PTO, ruling that Hyatt's failure to present the evidence to the PTO constituted a negligent act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision.

Question

(1) Can a plaintiff, who is appealing the denial of an application of a patent by commencing a civil action against the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in a federal district court pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145, introduce new evidence that could have been presented to the agency in the first instance?

(2) When new evidence is introduced under Section 145, can the district court decide de novo the factual questions to which the evidence pertains, without giving deference to the prior decision of the PTO?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hyatt, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: federal rules of procedure

Yes and Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for a unanimous court affirming the lower court's decision. The Court held a patent applicant's ability to introduce new evidence in a civil action against the Patent and Trademark Office was only limited by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also held that a district court can decide a de novo factual question without giving deference to the prior decision and that it may take both new evidence and the administrative record into account.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion which Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's decision should not foreclose a district court's authority to exclude evidence that was deliberately suppressed or withheld in bad faith.

Martel v. Clair

jgoldman — Tue, 06 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 56' 29.0004" N, 122° 29' 2.0004" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1265

Petitioner

Michael Martel, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kenneth Clair

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Decided

Monday, March 5, 2012

Advocates

Ward A. Campbell (for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Facts of the case: Kenneth Clair was sentenced to death in Orange County, Calif., in 1987 for the sexual assault, beating and strangulation of babysitter Linda Faye Rodgers. Clair filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court appointed the federal public defender as Clair's federal habeas counsel. The district court then stayed the federal proceedings to give Clair a chance to return to the California Supreme Court to "exhaust" his state remedies on some newly raised claims. Clair filed a second state habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied. Clair then returned to federal court. On June 16, 2005, Clair wrote a letter to the court, requesting that new counsel be appointed. The court was aware that Clair was having problems with his counsel; only three months earlier it had received from him a letter alleging a longstanding pattern of inattention to his case. In response to that letter, the district court made inquiry of Clair's counsel, who notified the court in April 2005 that they had spoken with Clair and that he was willing to have them continue to represent him for the time being.

The June 16th letter repeated allegations made in the previous letter, but also included a serious additional allegation: that a private investigator working on Clair's behalf had located important physical evidence from the crime scene that had never been tested, and that his counsel, despite having been informed of the evidence, had made no effort to obtain it, analyze it or present it to the court. Clair's private investigator sent the court a letter substantiating Clair's claims. The court received and opened the private investigator's letter, but returned it without filing it. Following receipt of Clair's June 16th letter, however, the district court made no inquiry into the truth of Clair's allegations or their potential impact on the case before it. The district judge without explanation denied the motion on the same day that he denied Clair's petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the district court abused its discretion.

Question

Is a condemned state prisoner in federal habeas corpus proceedings entitled to replace his court-appointed counsel with another court-appointed lawyer because he expresses dissatisfaction and alleges that his counsel was failing to pursue potentially important evidence?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Martel, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: court appointed counsel

No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court reversing the lower appellate court's judgment. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the prisoner's motion to replace court-appointed counsel. The Court further held that courts considering a motion to replace court-appointed counsel in capital cases should apply the same "interest of justice" standard applied in non-capital cases.

Sackett v. EPA

jgoldman — Mon, 09 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1062

Petitioner

Chantell Sackett, et vir

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Monday, January 9, 2012

Advocates

Damien M. Schiff (for the petitioners)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Chantell and Mike Sackett own a half-acre lot in a residential area near Priest Lake, Idaho. In April and May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in about one-half acre of that property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a house. On November 26, 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a compliance order against the Sacketts. The compliance order alleged that the parcel is a wetland subject to the Clean Water Act and that the Sacketts violated the CWA by filling in their property without first obtaining a permit. The order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the parcel to its original condition.

The Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA to challenge the finding that the Parcel is subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant the Sacketts a hearing and continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over the parcel. The Sacketts filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. They challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an "any information available" standard that is unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the CWA precludes judicial review of compliance orders before EPA has started an enforcement action in federal court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.

Question

Do landowners have a right to go to court to challenge a Clean Water Act order of the Environmental Protection Agency?

Williams v. Illinois

jgoldman — Tue, 06 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 52' 41.2104" N, 87° 37' 47.2728" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-8505

Petitioner

Sandy Williams

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Advocates

Brian W. Carroll (for the petitioner)

Anita Alvarez (State's Attorney, Chicago Illinois, for the respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Sandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Illinois' appellate court affirmed Williams' conviction but reversed the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who relied upon a DNA report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation. Alternatively, Williams argued that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The state’s high court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Williams' Sixth Amendment rights weren't violated.

Question

Can an expert witness be called as a stand-in for a lab analyst who actually did a test on criminal evidence, but did not appear at the trial?

United States v. Jones

jgoldman — Tue, 08 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1259

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Antoine Jones

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

Decided

Monday, January 23, 2012

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Stephen C. Leckar (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the "Levels" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant.

Question

Did the warrantless use of a tracking device on Jones's vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violate Jones' Fourth Amendment rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the government had obtained information by usurping Jones’ property and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.

Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but criticized the framing of the question in terms of trespass to property. He believed that such a construction of the problem strained the language of the Fourth Amendment and that it would be better to analyze the case by determining whether the Government violated Jones' reasonable expectations of privacy.

Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S

jgoldman — Mon, 05 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Novo Nordisk U.S. Headquarters

800 Scudders Mill Road

Plainsboro Township, NJ

United States

40° 20' 26.9664" N, 74° 36' 15.4044" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-844

Petitioner

Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Novo Nordisk A/S, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Monday, December 5, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Advocates

James F. Hurst (for the petitioners)

Benjamin J. Horwich (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Mark A. Perry (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Novo Nordisk sued Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. for infringement in the wake of Caraco filing an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") for a generic version of the Type 2 diabetes drug Prandin. Caraco and Sun promptly countersued. While the litigation was pending, Novo changed the FDA Orange Book's use code — a description of the scope of the patent —undermining Caraco's argument that patent did not apply to the purpose for which the generic product would be marketed. Caraco filed a counterclaim requesting an order that would require Novo Nordisk to change back the use code.

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 authorized ANDA applicants to assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the brand to correct or delete submitted patent information on the grounds that the patent does not claim 1) the drug for which the brand’s new drug application was approved or 2) an approved method of using the drug.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the counterclaim and issued an injunction ordering Novo Nordisk to change the code. Novo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion. The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Novo, holding that Caraco could only assert a counterclaim if Novo’s patent did not claim any approved method of use.

Question

(1) Does the counterclaim provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act only apply if Novo’s Prandin patent does not claim any approved method of use?

(2) Does Novo's use code for Prandin qualify as “patent information submitted under subsections (b) and (c)” for the purposes of the act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Hatch-Waxman Act

Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that the Hatch-Waxman Act allows counterclaims to challenge unpatented uses of generic drugs even if other approved uses are still under patent. Justice Kagan looked to the language and purpose of the statute, focusing on the meaning of the phrase, “the patent does not claim...an approved method of using the drug.” While acknowledging that the words “not an” could be interpreted to mean “not any,” as Novo suggested, Justice Kagan rejected Novo’s argument that the counterclaim right evaporates if Novo has a patent over another use not claimed or contested by Caraco and Sun. She argued that the act’s counterclaim provision essentially allows a generic drug marketer to challenge a brand’s assertion of rights over whichever use the generic drug marketer wishes to pursue. Justice Kagan noted that if Congress intended Novo’s “not any” interpretation, it could have used that exact phrasing.

Justice Kagan also held that Novo’s use code was “patent information submitted by the brand under subsection (b) or (c)” for the purposes of the act. She pointed out that the use code describes the methods of use claimed in a patent, and must qualify as “patent information” under any ordinary understanding of that phrase. Looking to the Court’s precedent, Justice Kagan determined that information “submitted under” a federal law suggests doing so in furtherance of or in compliance with a comprehensive scheme of regulation. Justice Kagan noted that subsections (b) and (c) provide the basis for the regulation requiring brands to submit use codes and dictate the form of those submissions; thus, a brand use code is “submitted under” sections (b) and (c). She rejected Novo’s argument that congress only intended to allow generic drug marketers to correct improperly numbered or listed patents.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations

jgoldman — Tue, 10 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1293

Petitioner

Federal Communications Commission, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

Advocates

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)

Carter G. Phillips (for the Fox Television Stations, Inc. et al. respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (for the ABC, Inc. et al. respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2004, the Federal Communications Commission said that TV stations could be fined for indecency violations in cases when a vulgarity was broadcast during a live program. That happened on Fox in 2002 and 2003 when Cher and Nicole Richie cursed during award shows and were not bleeped. The FCC never actually fined Fox, but the network took issue with the regulatory agency setting the stage for future fines and challenged the fleeting-expletive rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC's rules were "unconstitutionally vague" and had a "chilling effect."

Question

Does the current indecency enforcement regime violate the First or Fifth Amendments?

Messerschmidt v. Millender

jgoldman — Mon, 05 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Residence of Jerry Bowen's foster mother

United States

34° 3' 8.0424" N, 118° 14' 37.266" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-704

Petitioner

Curt Messerschmidt, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Augusta Millender, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

565 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Argued

Monday, December 5, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Advocates

Timothy T. Coates (for the petitioners)

Sri Srinivasan (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Curt Messerschmidt prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the residence of Jerry Bowen's foster mother. Bowen was suspected of assaulting his former girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun. The affidavit requested a night search because Bowen had gang ties, so that a surprise search at night would be safer for the community and the personnel serving the search warrant. The warrant was reviewed by a sergeant, a police lieutenant and a deputy district attorney before it was presented to, and signed by, a judge. Officers executed the warrant in the early morning hours. The homeowner, Augusta Millender, and her family responded by filing suit under for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights based on race, and for related state-law claims.

The district court found the warrant valid, Messerchmidt's conduct reasonable and that probable cause existed to believe that Bowen was at the residence and that nighttime service was appropriate. As to the scope of the warrant, however, the district court found it overbroad. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court order and remanded the action with directions. The court held that law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity where they reasonably relied on a deputy attorney general and a judge to restrict an overbroad search warrant’s scope to items supported by probable cause.

Question

Are police officers entitled to qualified immunity when they obtain a valid warrant to search for firearms, firearm-related materials, and gang-related items in the residence of a gang member and felon who had threatened to kill his girlfriend and fired a sawed-off shotgun at her?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Messerschmidt, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. delivered the opinion of the court, which reversed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability when their conduct does not violate any clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known. The Court further determined that the officers in this instance acted in a reasonable manner.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer wrote separately to emphasize that the multiple facts together made it reasonable for an officer to believe that it was reasonable to search for all firearms and for evidence of gang-related activity.

Justice Elena Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Kagan agreed with the Court's determination that a reasonable police officer could have thought that there was enough probable cause to authorize a search for all firearms. However, she disagreed with the Court's determination that a reasonable police officer could believe that there was enough probable cause to authorize a search for all evidence of gang membership.

Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority's assertion that the conduct of the police officers was objectively reasonable because the officer's search included a search for evidence unrelated to the specific crime the officers were investigating.

Filarsky v. Delia

mgruhn — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

City of Rialto Fire Department

131 South Willow Avenue

Rialto, CA

United States

34° 5' 58.5852" N, 117° 22' 28.038" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1018

Petitioner

Steve A. Filarsky

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nicholas B. Delia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (for the petitioner)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Michael A. McGill (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On August 15, 2006, Rialto firefighter Nicholas B. Delia sustained injuries while working to control a toxic spill. As a result of his injuries, Delia began using sick leave. The City of Rialto suspected that Delia was taking sick leave inappropriately, using his sick days to work on personal home improvement projects. After obtaining video of Delia purchasing home improvement supplies on one of his sick days, the city launched a formal internal affairs investigation. The city retained attorney Steve A. Filarsky to assist with the internal investigation.

On September 18, 2006, the city ordered Delia to appear at an interview conducted by Filarsky. During the course of the interview, Delia stated that the home improvement supplies that he purchased were unused. Filarsky requested that Delia allow a warrantless search of his home in order to confirm that the supplies were unused. Delia refused, prompting Filarsky to order Delia to produce the supplies. Filarsky and some city officials subsequently followed Delia to his home, where Delia produced the supplies.

On May 21, 2008, Delia brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court against the City of Rialto, the City of Rialto Fire Department, and several city officials. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the grounds that Delia failed to establish municipal liability against the city and that the individuals were entitled to qualified immunity. Delia appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court opinion as to Filarsky only. Filarsky appealed.

Question

If a private lawyer is retained by the government, is that attorney precluded from claiming qualified immunity solely because he or she is a private lawyer rather than a government employee?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Filarsky, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision as to Filarsky. Looking at the history of common law and case law on qualified immunity, the Court held that there is no reason to distinguish part time or temporary government workers from full time employees. There is a strong public policy interest in protecting all public employees while they are working on behalf of the government. Denying protection to temporary employees working alongside full time employees would leave the temporary employees “holding the bag” for conduct for which they are not fully responsible.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred, noting that qualified immunity is overcome when the government worker knew or should have known that his conduct violated a clearly established right. Justice Ginsburg instructed the lower court to consider this issue carefully on remand. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence, clarifying that not every private individual who temporarily works for the government is protected by qualified immunity in all circumstances.

Vartelas v. Holder

mgruhn — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

John F. Kennedy International Airport

United States

40° 38' 38.3352" N, 73° 46' 57.2628" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1211

Petitioner

Panagis Vartelas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, March 28, 2012

Advocates

Stephanos Bibas (for the petitioner)

Eric D. Miller (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.

Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.

Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas’ prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit’s decision.

Question

Can 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) be applied retroactively to a Lawful Permanent Resident who pleads guilty to a crime of moral turpitude prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Vartelas, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg--writing for a 6-3 majority--reversed the lower court, holding that a determination of Vartelas’ ability to travel abroad falls under the laws in effect at the time of his conviction. The Court applied the principle against retroactivity. Under this principle, courts will refrain from applying a law retroactively unless Congress expressly provides for it. The Court held that applying the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) imposed a new disability on Vartelas by effectively banning travel abroad. Vartelas also likely relied on the laws at the time, which would allow him brief international trips, when he decided to plead guilty.

Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, stating that the applicable activity for deciding retroactivity is not Vartelas’ conviction, but the act of leaving and then attempting to return to the United States. Vertelas’ trip to Greece and return to the U.S. took place after the IIRIRA took effect, so he is subject to the law. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito joined in the dissent.

Roberts v. Sea-Land Services

mgruhn — Wed, 11 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1399

Petitioner

Dana Roberts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sea-Land Services, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Advocates

Joshua T. Gillelan II (for the petitioner)

Joseph R. Palmore (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondent)

Peter D. Keisler (for the private respondent)

Facts of the Case

On February 24, 2002, Dana Roberts slipped on a patch of ice while working as a gatehouse dispatcher for Sea-Land Services Inc. As a result of his fall, Roberts suffered injuries to his shoulder and cervical spine. These injuries ultimately left Roberts permanently partially disabled and ended his longshore career. In accordance with the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Sea-Land’s insurer paid Roberts compensation for temporary total disability for a period from 2002 to 2005. In May 2005, the insurer disputed Roberts’ claim and stopped compensating him.

On October 12, 2006, an administrative law judge determined that Sea-Land continued to be liable under the Longshore Act for Roberts’ on-the-job injuries after May of 2005. The Longshore Act required an employer to compensate a disabled worker at a rate based on the worker’s average weekly wage at the time of injury. However, the act set an upper limit to compensation based on the average national weekly wage in the fiscal year that an individual was newly awarded compensation. The administrative judge determined that the applicable maximum rate for Roberts was $966.08 per week, based on fiscal year 2002, the year Roberts first became disabled. Roberts claimed that his maximum rate should be $1,114 per week, based on fiscal year 2007, the year the administrative law judge awarded Roberts compensation.

Roberts filed a motion for reconsideration, which the administrative judge denied. Both Sea-Land and Roberts appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which adopted the rationale that the maximum compensation rate was based on the year in which the disability began rather than the year compensation was awarded. Roberts appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the Benefit Review Board’s interpretation. Roberts appealed that decision.

Question

Under the Longshore Act, is the period when an individual is newly awarded compensation the fiscal year when an injured worker first becomes entitled to compensation or the fiscal year when the injured worker is actually awarded compensation?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Sea-Land Services, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act

The period is when an individual first becomes disabled. In an 8-to-1 decision, Justice Sonia Sotomayor writing for the majority held that the maximum compensation rate is set at the time that the worker becomes disabled no matter when a compensation order is entered. Given that most employers pay compensation voluntarily with no official award entered, the relevant section of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is meaningless as interpreted by the petitioner Roberts. The Court also held that this way of calculating maximum compensation gives employers more certainty in calculating liability, and eliminates disparate treatment of similarly situated employees. Setting the cap at the time of disability also prevents “gamesmanship” or unnecessary delays in the claims process.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in part and dissented in part. Ginsburg argued that the time of disability is not when the maximum compensation rate should be set. That rate should be set either when an employer voluntarily begins to pay compensation, or when a judge or other review board enters an order to pay.

Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan

mgruhn — Tue, 21 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1472

Petitioner

Kouichi Taniguchi

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Advocates

Michael S. Fried (for the petitioner)

Dan Himmelfarb (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On November 6, 2006, Kouichi Taniguchi, a Japanese baseball player, visited the Marianas Resort and Spa in the Northern Mariana Islands. During a tour of the resort, Taniguchi fell through a wooden deck. Immediately after the accident, Taniguchi stated that he did not need medical attention. Two weeks later, he informed Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of the resort, that he had sustained injuries, which he claimed resulted in various medical expenses and loss of income.

Taniguchi subsequently brought a diversity lawsuit against Kan Pacific alleging negligence and seeking damages for losses suffered because of the accident. After discovery, the district court awarded summary judgment to Kan Pacific and awarded Kan Pacific litigation costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. During litigation, Kan Pacific spent $5,517.20 for the translation of contracts and other documents from Japanese to English. The district court included these costs in the award because it interpreted “compensation of interpreters” in U.S.C. § 1920(6), as including compensation for the translation of documents.

Taniguchi appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the award of $5,517.20 for the document translation. The court denied Taniguchi’s petition for rehearing on May 11, 2011, and Taniguchi subsequently appealed.

Question

Are costs incurred in translating documents “compensation of interpreters” under 28 U.S.C. Section § 1920(6)?

Holder v. Gutierrez

mgruhn — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1542

Petitioner

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carlos M. Gutierrez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Holder v. Sawyers (No. 10-1543)

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Advocates

Leondra R. Kruger (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Stephen B. Kinnaird (for the respondent in No. 10-1542)

Charles A. Rothfeld (for the respondent in No. 10-1543)

Facts of the Case

Carlos Martinez Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied to an immigration judge for cancellation of his removal from the United States. The government appealed and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) sustained the government's appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Gutierrez's petition for review of the BIA's decision and remanded to the BIA to allow it to reconsider his case based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mercado Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). That case held that "[f]or purposes of satisfying the five years of lawful permanent residence required under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1), a parent's status as a lawful permanent resident is imputed to the unemancipated minor children residing with the parent."

Question

1. Can a parent's years of lawful permanent resident status be applied to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years"?

2. Can a parent's years of residence after lawful admission to the United States can be applied to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status"?

Wood v. Milyard

mgruhn — Mon, 27 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado

901 19th Street

Denver 80294

United States

39° 45' 0.8136" N, 104° 59' 24.9288" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-9995

Petitioner

Patrick Wood

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kevin Milyard, Warden, Sterling Correctional Facility, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Argued

Monday, February 27, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, April 24, 2012

Advocates

Kathleen A. Lord (for the petitioner)

Daniel D. Domenico (Solicitor General of Colorado, for the respondents)

Melissa Arbus Sherry (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Patrick Wood filed pro se (on his own behalf) in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his convictions for felony murder and second degree murder violated the Sixth Amendment privilege against double jeopardy and challenging the validity of his jury trial waiver. The District Court denied relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit appointed Wood with an attorney and directed the parties to address the timeliness of Wood's petition. The appeals court found that Wood's habeas petition was untimely and affirmed the decision of the District Court.

Question

1) Does an appellate court have the authority to raise the statute of limitations defense without a request by any party?

2) Does the state’s declaration before the district court that it "will not challenge, but [is] not conceding, the timeliness of Wood's habeas petition," amount to a deliberate waiver of any statute of limitations defense the state may have had?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wood, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: habeas corpus

Yes and yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a 9-0 majority, reversed the lower decision and remanded. The Supreme Court held that under Day v. McDonough appellate courts have the authority, though not the obligation, to raise a forfeited statute of limitations defense on its own. The prosecution in this case, however, expressly waived the statute of limitations through its repeated refusal to raise the defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit abused its discretion when it overrode the prosecution’s express waiver of the statute of limitations.

Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, arguing that Day v. McDonough was wrongly decided so district and appellate courts should not have the authority to raise the statute of limitations on their own. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the concurrence.

United States v. Home Concrete & Supply

mgruhn — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Home Concrete & Supply Wilmington, NC

United States

34° 13' 32.0556" N, 77° 56' 39.9912" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-139

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

566 U.S. ___ (2012)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

Decided

Wednesday, April 25, 2012

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Gregory G. Garre (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $7,472,405. They then transferred the proceeds from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially identical Treasury Bonds on the open market for $7,359,043. This transaction created "outside basis," or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed.

Home Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as a capital contribution. The taxpayers (except Home Oil) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $10,623,348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step-up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers' outside basis. Home Concrete again adjusted its inside basis to $10,527,250.53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $69,125.08 gain from the sale of its assets.

The IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed "solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners." On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers' reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers' taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeking to recover the increase.

As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six-year period for assessing tax remains open for "all taxable years… that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction… in which a decision had not become final." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs.

Question

1. Can an understatement of gross income attributable to an overstatement of basis in sold property qualify as an "omi[ssion] from gross income" that triggers the extended six-year assessment period?

2. Is a final regulation from the Department of the Treasury reflecting the IRS's view that an understatement of gross income attributable to an overstatement of basis which can trigger the extended six-year assessment period entitled to judicial deference?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Home Concrete & Supply, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No and no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a four-justice plurality, affirmed the Fourth Circuit decision. The Supreme Court held that Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner decides this case. It interpreted language almost identical to the statute in question. Also, the statutory history shows that Congress intended to exclude overstatements of basis from the extended statute of limitations period. A treasury regulation cannot change Colony’s the interpretation of the statute.

Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that Colony decides the case, but argued that the court should not have ruled on whether to give treasury regulations deference.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented, arguing that the Treasury regulation only interpreted a statute that had no established meaning. He argued that courts should be open to new interpretations through regulations when Congress amends a statute. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Blueford v. Arkansas

mgruhn — Wed, 22 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1320

Petitioner

Alex Blueford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arkansas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Advocates

Clifford M. Sloan (for the petitioner)

Dustin McDaniel (Attorney General of Arkansas, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On November 28, 2007, Alex Blueford and a friend of his were left in charge of the 20-month-old son of Blueford’s live-in girlfriend. Approximately one hour after being left with the child, Blueford’s friend called emergency services because the child was having difficulty breathing. The child died two days after being rushed to the hospital. A medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was a closed head injury, and the State of Arkansas subsequently brought several charges against Blueford for the death of the child.

The state charged Blueford with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury to consider each charge one at a time, to consider the greater offenses before lesser offenses. After some deliberation, the jury returned. The forewoman stated that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked. The Judge asked the forewoman about each charge, and she stated that the jury was unanimously against the capital murder charge, unanimously against the first-degree murder charge, and deadlocked on the manslaughter charge. The jury returned for further deliberation but remained deadlocked. The judge released the jury, and the court declared a mistrial.

The state sought to retry Blueford on all charges. Blueford filed a motion to dismiss the capital murder and first-degree murder charges on Double Jeopardy grounds, arguing that the jury had made a decision on those two counts. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the juror’s communication to the judge was a casual communication and not an acquittal. Blueford made an interlocutory appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. After the Arkansas Supreme Court denied Blueford’s petition for rehearing, Blueford appealed the Arkansas Supreme Court decision.

Question

If a jury deadlocks on a lesser-included offense and expresses unanimous agreement against guilt on a greater offense, does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar re-prosecution of the greater offense?