http://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/podcast U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en The Oyez Project at Chicago-Kent http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_182/argument On April 23, 2010, the Arizona State Legislature passed S.B. 1070; Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law. On July 6, 2010, the United States sought to stop the enforcement of S.B. 1070 in federal district court before the law could take effect. The district court did not enjoin the entire act, but it did enjoin four provisions. The court enjoined provisions that (1) created a state-law crime for being unlawfully present in the United States, (2) created a state-law crime for working or seeking work while not authorized to do so, (3) required state and local officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of anyone who was lawfully arrested or detained, and (4) authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States. Arizona appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the United States had shown that federal law likely preempted: (a) the creation of a state-crime for violation of federal registration laws, (b) the creation of a state-crime for work by unauthorized aliens, (c) the requirement to verify citizenship of all detained persons, and (d) the authorization for police officers to effect warrantless arrests based on probable cause of removability from the United States. Arizona appealed the court's decision. Wed, 25 Apr 2012 13:00:00 +0000 81116 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_246/argument The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band (“the Band”) is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community with about 3,000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior announced its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township –known as the “Bradley Tract”-- into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”). David Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary’s action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti-gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band’s gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act (“QTA”) precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust while Patchak’s suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Patchak’s suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar’s authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak’s interests do not fall within the IRA’s zone-of-interests. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone-of-interests test for standing. The court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering “affected members of the public” before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary’s argument that the QTA barred Patchak’s suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government’s interest. In contrast, Petchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. Tue, 24 Apr 2012 13:00:00 +0000 81117 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_166/argument RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC., owned the Radisson Hotel at the Los Angeles International Airport as well as an adjacent parking structure. In November of 2007, RadLax sought to expand the Radisson Hotel. It therefore obtained a $142 million construction loan from the Longview Ultra Construction Loan Investment Fund, for which Amalgamated Bank served as trustee and administrative agent. After taking out the loan, RadLAX was eventually forced to file voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Soon after, RadLax embarked on a campaign to sell the Radisson Hotel and adjacent parking structure. On June 4, 2010, RadLAX filed a joint chapter 11 plan, which proposed the auction of substantially all of its assets and the distribution of proceeds to various creditors. The debtors specified that no secured creditor would be permitted to credit bid at the sale. Amalgamated Bank objected to the proposed bid procedures on the grounds that a sale of its collateral, free of liens, required the debtor to allow a lender to credit bid. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with Amalgamated Bank and denied RadLax’s proposal with regard to credit bids. The case was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. RadLAX subsequently appealed the appellate court's decision. Mon, 23 Apr 2012 13:00:00 +0000 81118 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_551/argument In 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDA) became law. Among other things, the ISDA directs the Secretary of the Interior, at the request of any Indian tribe, to enter into contracts which permit tribal organization to administer federal programs that would otherwise be directly administered by the Secretary. The ISDA further requires the Secretary to pay the tribe's reasonable contract support costs, or the costs that the tribe would incur operating the program that the Secretary would not incur. The payment of these costs was made subject to the availability of appropriations, and Congress had imposed a statutory cap on the appropriations available to pay such costs. Ramah Navajo Chapter entered into multiple ISDA contracts for the administration a number of federally funded programs. The Ramah Navajo Chapter originally filed suit against the Secretary in 1990 on behalf of all BIA tribal contractors under the ISDA to challenge the methodology that Interior's Office of the Inspector General used to set indirect cost rates. In 1999 the district court granted the plaintiffs leave to add a new claim for the alleged underpayment of contract support costs due to insufficient appropriations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court eventually granted summary judgment for the government, rejecting tribal demands for contract support costs in excess of the express statutory caps on the funds available to pay such costs. The tribes appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed. The appeals court held that the government could be required to pay all of the contract support costs requested by every tribal contractor, even in excess of the statutory cap, because Congress appropriated sufficient funds to satisfy the demands of any single contractor considered in isolation. The government appealed the appellate court's decision. Wed, 18 Apr 2012 13:00:00 +0000 81099 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_5683/argument These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing. Tue, 17 Apr 2012 13:00:00 +0000 81100 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_204/argument Michael Christopher and Frank Buchanan began working for GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“Glaxo”) as pharmaceutical sales representatives (“PSRs”) in 2003. Glaxo developed, produced, marketed and sold pharmaceutical products to distributors or retail pharmacies, which subsequently sell those products to consumers when authorized by doctors via prescription. The plaintiffs worked between ten and twenty hours outside of normal business hours each week. PSRs are compensated with a salary and additional incentive-based pay; they are not paid overtime for work done outside of standard business hours. The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) was enacted in 1938 to protect the well-being of workers. It imposed a baseline overtime wage on employers for employees who work over forty hours a week. There was an exception to the rule for “outside salesmen”, defined by the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) as an employee whose primary duty is making sales or obtaining contracts and who is primarily and regularly engaged outside of the employer’s office. Christopher and Buchanan filed suit in August of 2008, alleging that Glaxo’s practice of requiring overtime work without additional pay violated the FLSA’s overtime provisions. Both parties filed for summary judgment, and the district court found for Glaxo, agreeing that the plaintiffs fell within the FLSA's "outside salesman" exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Secretary filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Christopher and Buchanan’s position, arguing that when a PSR promotes pharmaceutical products but does not receive items of value in exchange for those products, he does not fall within the “outside salesman” exception to the FLSA. The court rejected the Secretary’s argument, however, reasoning that this definition is a simple parroting of the Congressional statute; such definitions require less deference by courts because they are not interpretive. Instead, the court pointed to Christopher and Buchanan’s training in sales --and their experience in sales as a qualification for employment by Glaxo-- as evidence of their status as “outside salesmen.” The court noted that the pharmaceutical industry self-regulated marketing to doctors much like other industries self-regulate direct-to-consumer marketing. Mon, 16 Apr 2012 13:00:00 +0000 81098 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_400/argument3 Check out Oyez's deep-dive into the background of the Affordable Care Act cases. Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA. Mon, 26 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80716 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_400/argument4 Check out Oyez's deep-dive into the background of the Affordable Care Act cases. Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA. Mon, 26 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80718 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_400/11-398/argument Check out Oyez's deep-dive into the background of the Affordable Care Act cases. Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA. Mon, 26 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80706 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_400/11-398/argument2 Check out Oyez's deep-dive into the background of the Affordable Care Act cases. Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA. Mon, 26 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80709 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_199/argument On August 5, 2008, Joel Perez and Carlos Cruz drove to a Shell station in Arlington Heights, Illinois, with Cruz at the wheel. They met with Alejandro Diaz, who was working with Drug Enforcement Agency officials. He instructed them to meet him at a different location to complete the deal. Perez walked to a nearby Denny’s, where Alexander Vasquez waited for him in the driver’s seat of a black Pontiac Bonneville. Perez got into the passenger seat of the Bonneville and called Cruz, telling him that he was not willing to follow Diaz. Cruz then walked to the Denny’s, where he was introduced to Vasquez. Diaz contacted his DEA handler. Law enforcement agents then surrounded the parking lot in their vehicles; several officers approached the Bonneville to arrest Vasquez, Cruz, and Perez. Cruz, outside the car, raised his hands in surrender. Vasquez, however, attempted to escape in the Bonneville, with Perez still inside. Police found the Bonneville abandoned in a Walmart parking lot, and a short time later apprehended Vasquez and Perez. They found $23,000 stashed in a secret compartment in the Bonneville. A federal grand jury indicted Vasquez on conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and on attempting to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. At trial, Vasquez called Perez’s wife Marina as a witness to testify. Marina Perez testified that she called Vasquez before the events in question to ask him to pick up Joel Perez at the Denny’s, implying that Vasquez was there by coincidence. In response, the government introduced transcripts and audio recordings of conversations between Marina Perez and her husband as evidence of bias. This evidence indicated that Marina Perez spoke to her husband about a possible plea deal; she also mentioned that Vasquez’s attorney told her, “everybody is going to lose.” The trial judge allowed these transcripts and recordings to be admitted to show Marina Perez’s bias and for the truth of their contents. The jury found Vasquez guilty on the charge of conspiracy but not guilty on the charge of attempting to possess cocaine. In a split decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that evidence of conversations between Marina Perez and her husband were properly admitted to show bias and inconsistency with prior statements. Wed, 21 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80703 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_262/argument On June 16, 2006, Steven Howards saw Vice President Dick Cheney while strolling through Beaver Creek Mall. Howards decided to approach the Vice President to protest the President’s polices regarding the Iraq War. On that day, Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle were part of the Secret Service detail protecting the Vice President. Doyle heard Howards state into his cell phone “I’m going to ask him how many kids he’s killed today." Howards approached the Vice President and told the Vice President that the he disapproved of his policies in Iraq. When the Vice President turned to leave, Howards made unsolicited physical contact with the Vice President by touching the Vice President’s right shoulder with his open hand. Agent Reichle approached Howards, identified himself as a Secret Service agent, and asked to speak with Howards. After briefly questioning Howards, Reichle arrested him. Howards was initially charged with harassment under state law, but those charges were dismissed. No federal charges were filed. Howards sued agents Reichle and Doyle under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the agents had violated his Fourth Amendment right with an unlawful search and seizure and his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The agents moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion, ruling that fact issues regarding the agents’ immunity defense precluded summary judgment. The agents took an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they had probable cause to arrest Howards and also asserted that they were entitled to heightened immunity by virtue of their status as Secret Service agents protecting the Vice President. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel unanimously rejected Howards’ Fourth Amendment claim on the grounds that the agents objectively had probable cause to arrest Howards. However, the panel held that probable cause was not a bar to Howards’ First Amendment retaliation claim and that Howards could proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claim notwithstanding the fact that the agents had probable cause for his arrest. Wed, 21 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80704 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_9646/argument_1 In July 2003, Evan Miller, along with Colby Smith, killed Cole Cannon by beating Cannon with a baseball bat and burning Cannon’s trailer while Cannon was inside. Miller was 14 years old at the time. In 2004, Miller was transferred from the Lawrence County Juvenile Court to Lawrence County Circuit Court to be tried as an adult for capital murder during the course of an arson. In 2006, a grand jury indicted Miller. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court sentenced Miller to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller filed a post trial motion for a new trial, arguing that sentencing a 14-year-old to life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Miller’s petition for writ of certiorari. In the companion case, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson, along with Derrick Shields and Travis Booker, robbed a local movie store in Blytheville, Arkansas in November, 1999. The three boys were 14 years old at the time. While walking to the store, Jackson discovered that Shields was hiding a shotgun in his coat. During the robbery, Shields shot the store clerk and the three boys fled the scene. Jackson was tried and convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery in July, 2003. The trial court sentenced Jackson to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In January 2008, Jackson filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court. He argued that his sentence was unusual and excessive, violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The circuit court dismissed the petition and Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court’s decision. Tue, 20 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80701 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_9646/argument In July 2003, Evan Miller, along with Colby Smith, killed Cole Cannon by beating Cannon with a baseball bat and burning Cannon’s trailer while Cannon was inside. Miller was 14 years old at the time. In 2004, Miller was transferred from the Lawrence County Juvenile Court to Lawrence County Circuit Court to be tried as an adult for capital murder during the course of an arson. In 2006, a grand jury indicted Miller. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court sentenced Miller to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller filed a post trial motion for a new trial, arguing that sentencing a 14-year-old to life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Miller’s petition for writ of certiorari. In the companion case, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson, along with Derrick Shields and Travis Booker, robbed a local movie store in Blytheville, Arkansas in November, 1999. The three boys were 14 years old at the time. While walking to the store, Jackson discovered that Shields was hiding a shotgun in his coat. During the robbery, Shields shot the store clerk and the three boys fled the scene. Jackson was tried and convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery in July, 2003. The trial court sentenced Jackson to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In January 2008, Jackson filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court. He argued that his sentence was unusual and excessive, violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The circuit court dismissed the petition and Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court’s decision. Tue, 20 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80700 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_94/argument Southern Union Company is a diversified natural gas company with a storage facility in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In September of 2004, vandals broke into the facility and found liquid mercury. The vandals spilled the liquid mercury in and around the facility and around a nearby apartment complex. Southern Union did not discover the spill for several weeks, and the apartment residents were displaced for two months during the subsequent cleanup. On September 19, 2002, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Southern Union with illegally storing mercury without a permit. Southern Union was convicted by a jury, but the jury did not determine how many days Southern Union had illegally stored the mercury. At sentencing, the district court applied the penalty provision of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), which provided a maximum fine of $50,000 for each day of violation. The U.S. Office of Probation set the maximum fine for Southern Union's offense at $38.1 million dollars by multiplying $50,000 times 762, the full number of days referred to in the indictment. Southern Union objected. The company argued that the number of days that Southern Union illegally stored mercury was a fact that should have been determined by a jury, because it increased the maximum criminal penalty. As such, Southern Union believed that the imposition of the $38.1 million dollar fine was a violation of its rights to criminal due process under the Fifth Amendment and to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment. The district court requested briefs, but it ultimately concluded that a fact which increases a criminal penalty need not be tried by a jury if the penalty is a criminal fine. Southern Union appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Southern Union's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision. Mon, 19 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80705 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_159/argument In 1999, shortly after Robert and Karen Capato were married in New Jersey, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer, and was advised that chemotherapy might render him sterile. Before beginning treatment, Robert deposited semen at the Northwest Center for Infertility and Reproductive Endocrinology so the couple could conceive a child in the future. Karen Capato conceived a child naturally, however, giving birth to a son in August of 2001. The Capatos wanted their son to have a sibling, but Robert’s health deteriorated quickly, and he died in Florida in March of 2002. He was insured by social security when he died. His will named only his son and two children from a previous marriage as beneficiaries. Shortly after Robert’s death, Karen began treatment for in vitro fertilization using her husband’s frozen semen. She gave birth to twins on September 23, 2003, eighteen months after her husband’s death. In October 2003, Karen applied for benefits from the Social Security Administration on behalf of her twins. § 416(e) of the Social Security Act (“SSA”) defined “child” as “the child or legally adopted child of an individual”. In addition, the child must be dependent on an insured individual at the time of the qualified individual’s death. § 416(h) provided an alternate method of determining a child’s qualification, directing the Commissioner of Social Security to look to the intestate property laws of the domiciliary of the deceased insured individual. The Social Security Administration denied her claim, and Karen requested a hearing in front of an administrative court. While noting that granting benefits would be consistent with the purpose of social security, the court held that the twins were not Robert’s “child(ren)” for the purposes of the SSA. The district court affirmed, echoing the ALJ’s interpretation of “child(ren)”. The court also held that because Robert died while domiciled in Florida, Florida’s law of intestacy applies. The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that the twins were clearly children under § 416(e) of the SSA because they were the biological children of a married couple. It rejected the district court’s argument that Florida state intestacy law should apply before § 416(e), holding § 416(h) to be an alternate definition only used when a child’s status is in doubt. Mon, 19 Mar 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80702 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_161/argument In April of 2001, the City of Indianapolis (“the city”) sent a letter to property owners in the Northern Estates neighborhood informing them that their properties were part of the Brisbane/Manning Barrett Law Sanitary Sewers Project (“the project”). The project was designed to connect properties to the city sewer system, reducing or eliminating the use of septic tanks. In July of 2004, the Indianapolis Board of Public Works (“the board”) levied an assessment of $9,278 against each property subject to the project. Indianapolis offered each property owner the option of paying the assessment in its entirety or of paying in monthly installments, subject to an annual interest rate. The petitioners, Christine Armour and 30 other property owners (“property owners”), chose to pay the assessment in its entirety. In 2005, the city abandoned the Barrett Law method of assessing owners’ contributions in favor of the Septic Tank Elimination Program (“STEP”). As part of the transition to STEP, the board passed a measure forgiving all outstanding Barrett Law assessment balances owed as of November 1, 2005, including those assessed for the project. As a result, owners who chose to pay their assessment in monthly installments were forgiven from future payment. Owners who chose to pay their assessments in their entirety were given no reimbursement. The property owners requested compensation from the board in February of 2006 and were denied. The property owners filed complaint against the city in July of 2007, alleging violation of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. All parties filed for summary judgment; the trial court granted the property owners’ motion, and entered judgment against the city. On appeal, the property owners abandoned their due process claim, arguing that the city violated equal protection. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the city did not have a rational basis for only forgiving the debt of owners who chose to pay in installments. The Indiana Supreme Court granted the city’s motion to transfer the case, vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals. Justice Frank Sullivan, writing for a unanimous court, held that the city’s tax policy survives rational basis review and does not violate equal protection. The city legitimately believed that 1) owners who fully paid their assessments were in a better financial position than those making monthly installments, 2) the benefits of simplifying funding for the sewer system outweighed the effort of continuing the previous taxation system and 3) the new taxation system would preserve city resources. He rejected the property owners’ argument that they were a “class of one” --requiring heightened scrutiny of the city’s action-- because the property owners were not singled out for discriminatory treatment. Wed, 29 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80672 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1491/reargument The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the Shell Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government’s human rights abuses. The petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. Both parties cross-appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners’ request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied. Following oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States. Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 83327 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1491/argument The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the Shell Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government’s human rights abuses. The petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. Both parties cross-appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners’ request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied. Following oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States. Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80670 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_88/argument In September of 1995, Azzam Rahim, an American citizen, was tortured and murdered while in the custody of Palestinian Authority intelligence officers in Jericho. The respondents, Jibril Rajoub, Amin Al-Hindi, Twfik Tirawi, the Palestinian Authority, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, never disputed liability for the torture and murder. The petitioners, Azzam Rahim's widow and children, filed suit against the respondents under the Torture Victim Protection Act. The district court dismissed the petitioners’ action against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization on the grounds that the Torture Victim Protection Act permits actions against natural persons only. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80674 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_45/argument Michael B. Elgin, Aaron Lawson, Henry Tucker, and Christon Colby, the petitioners, were all federal employees. Each man was terminated or constructively terminated under 5 U.S.C. § 3328, after the Office of Personnel Management determined that he was ineligible for federal employment under 5 U.S.C. § 3328 for failing to have registered for the selective service between the ages of 18 and 26. Elgin initially challenged his termination before the Merit Systems Protection Board, which has jurisdiction over challenged terminations of federal employees under certain conditions under the Civil Service Reform Act. On November 16, 2007, the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed Elgin’s appeal because it lacked jurisdiction over appeals where employees were terminated under absolute statutory prohibitions and that it lacked the power to rule on the constitutionality of a statute. On December 28, 2007, Elgin and the other petitioners joined and brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 5 U.S.C. § 3328 to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They claimed that the statute was an unlawful Bill of Attainder, and that the statute violated the petitioners’ rights to equal protection based on sex. Both sides moved for summary judgment as to certain issues, and the court granted the petitioner’s motion by finding that the law was a Bill of Attainder and granted part of the respondents’ motion by finding that the law was not a violation of the petitioners’ rights to equal protection. The government filed a motion for reconsideration as to whether the statute was a Bill of Attainder, and also argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The district court held that it did have jurisdiction, but, on reconsideration, determined that the statute was not a Bill of Attainder. Petitioners appealed the district court’s decisions dismissing the equal protection claim and granting the motion for reconsideration on the Bill of Attainder claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Circuit confirmed the lower court’s decision as to dismissal of the claims, and a divided court found that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The petitioners appealed in order to settle the question of jurisdiction. Mon, 27 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80673 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_9995/argument Patrick Wood filed pro se (on his own behalf) in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his convictions for felony murder and second degree murder violated the Sixth Amendment privilege against double jeopardy and challenging the validity of his jury trial waiver. The District Court denied relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit appointed Wood with an attorney and directed the parties to address the timeliness of Wood's petition. The appeals court found that Wood's habeas petition was untimely and affirmed the decision of the District Court. Mon, 27 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80671 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_210/argument On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board’s headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, “I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.” In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces. The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez’s motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal. Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court’s decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government’s request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals’ decision. Wed, 22 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80666 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1320/argument On November 28, 2007, Alex Blueford and a friend of his were left in charge of the 20-month-old son of Blueford’s live-in girlfriend. Approximately one hour after being left with the child, Blueford’s friend called emergency services because the child was having difficulty breathing. The child died two days after being rushed to the hospital. A medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was a close head injury, and the State of Arkansas subsequently brought several charges against Blueford for the death of the child. The state charged Blueford with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury to consider each charge one at a time, and to consider the greater offenses before lesser offenses. After over four hours of deliberation, the jury returned. The forewoman stated that the jury was deadlocked. The Judge asked the forewoman about each charge, and she stated that the jury was unanimously against the capital murder charge, unanimously against the first-degree murder charge, and deadlocked on the manslaughter charge. The jury returned for further deliberation but remained deadlocked. The judge released the jury, and the court declared a mistrial. The state sought to retry Blueford on all charges. Blueford filed a motion to dismiss the capital murder and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the jury had made a decision on those two counts. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the juror’s communication to the judge was a casual communication and not an acquittal. Blueford made an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. After the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Blueford’s petition for rehearing, Blueford appealed the decision. Wed, 22 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80664 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1042/argument In 2007, the Freemans and two other couples, each secured a mortgage from Quicken Loans, an online mortgage lender. At the closing of the mortgage, Quicken charged the Freemans a “loan discount fee”, and charged the other couples similar fees including a “loan origination fee” and a “loan processing fee”. The three couples contended these fees were unearned fees in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). In 2008, each couple filed suit separately in state court. Quicken removed the cases to a federal district court where the three cases were consolidated. Quicken moved for summary judgment, claiming that the claims were not actionable under RESPA because the fees were not split with another party. The district court noted a circuit split on the issue of whether RESPA did not apply where fees were not spit with another party. Nonetheless, the district court granted Quicken’s motion. The couples appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s opinion. The appealed the Appeals Court’s opinion. Tue, 21 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80663 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1472/argument On November 6, 2006, Kouichi Taniguchi, a Japanese baseball player, visited the Marianas Resort and Spa in the Northern Mariana Islands. During a tour of the resort, Taniguchi fell through a wooden deck. Immediately after the accident, Taniguchi stated that he did not need medical attention. Two weeks later, he informed Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of the resort, that he had sustained injuries, which he claimed resulted in various medical expenses and loss of income. Taniguchi subsequently brought a diversity lawsuit against Kan Pacific alleging negligence and seeking damages for losses suffered because of the accident. After discovery, the district court awarded summary judgment to Kan Pacific and awarded Kan Pacific litigation costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. During litigation, Kan Pacific spent $5,517.20 for the translation of contracts and other documents from Japanese to English. The district court included these costs in the award because it interpreted “compensation of interpreters” in U.S.C. § 1920(6), as including compensation for the translation of documents. Taniguchi appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the award of $5,517.20 for the document translation. The court denied Taniguchi’s petition for rehearing on May 11, 2011, and Taniguchi subsequently appealed. Tue, 21 Feb 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80665 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1211/argument Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported. Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed. Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas’ prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit’s decision. Wed, 18 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80590 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1542/argument Carlos Martinez Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied to an immigration judge for cancellation of his removal from the United States. The government appealed and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) sustained the government's appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Gutierrez's petition for review of the BIA's decision and remanded to the BIA to allow it to reconsider his case based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mercado Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). That case held that "[f]or purposes of satisfying the five years of lawful permanent residence required under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1), a parent's status as a lawful permanent resident is imputed to the unemancipated minor children residing with the parent." Wed, 18 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80591 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_139/argument Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $7,472,405. They then transferred the proceeds from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially identical Treasury Bonds on the open market for $7,359,043. This transaction created "outside basis," or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed. Home Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as a capital contribution. The taxpayers (except Home Oil) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $10,623,348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step-up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers' outside basis. Home Concrete again adjusted its inside basis to $10,527,250.53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $69,125.08 gain from the sale of its assets. The IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed "solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners." On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers' reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers' taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeking to recover the increase. As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six-year period for assessing tax remains open for "all taxable years… that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction… in which a decision had not become final." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs. Tue, 17 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80592 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1018/argument On August 15, 2006, Rialto firefighter Nicholas B. Delia sustained injuries while working to control a toxic spill. As a result of his injuries, Delia began using sick leave. The City of Rialto suspected that Delia was taking sick leave inappropriately, using his sick days to work on personal home improvement projects. After obtaining video of Delia purchasing home improvement supplies on one of his sick days, the city launched a formal internal affairs investigation. The city retained attorney Steve A. Filarsky to assist with the internal investigation. On September 18, 2006, the city ordered Delia to appear at an interview conducted by Filarsky. During the course of the interview, Delia stated that the home improvement supplies that he purchased were unused. Filarsky requested that Delia allow a warrantless search of his home in order to confirm that the supplies were unused. Delia refused, prompting Filarsky to order Delia to produce the supplies. Filarsky and some city officials subsequently followed Delia to his home, where Delia produced the supplies. On May 21, 2008, Delia brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court against the City of Rialto, the City of Rialto Fire Department, and several city officials. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the grounds that Delia failed to establish municipal liability against the city and that the individuals were entitled to qualified immunity. Delia appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court opinion as to Filarsky only. Filarsky appealed. Tue, 17 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80589 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1016/argument Former Maryland Court of Appeals employee Daniel Coleman filed a lawsuit under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, alleging that he was fired after requesting sick leave for a documented medical condition. The lower court dismissed Coleman's claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claim was properly dismissed because his employer is a state agency. Wed, 11 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80566 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1399/argument On February 24, 2002, Dana Roberts slipped on a patch of ice while working as a gatehouse dispatcher for Sea-Land Services Inc. As a result of his fall, Roberts suffered injuries to his shoulder and cervical spine. These injuries ultimately left Roberts permanently partially disabled and ended his longshore career. In accordance with the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Sea-Land’s insurer paid Roberts compensation for temporary total disability for a period from 2002 to 2005. In May 2005, the insurer disputed Roberts’ claim and stopped compensating him. On October 12, 2006, an administrative law judge determined that Sea-Land continued to be liable under the Longshore Act for Roberts’ on-the-job injuries after May of 2005. The Longshore Act required an employer to compensate a disabled worker at a rate based on the worker’s average weekly wage at the time of injury. However, the act set an upper limit to compensation based on the average national weekly wage in the fiscal year that an individual was newly awarded compensation. The administrative judge determined that the applicable maximum rate for Roberts was $966.08 per week, based on fiscal year 2002, the year Roberts first became disabled. Roberts claimed that his maximum rate should be $1,114 per week, based on fiscal year 2007, the year the administrative law judge awarded Roberts compensation. Roberts filed a motion for reconsideration, which the administrative judge denied. Both Sea-Land and Roberts appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which adopted the rationale that the maximum compensation rate was based on the year in which the disability began rather than the year compensation was awarded. Roberts appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the Benefit Review Board’s interpretation. Roberts appealed that decision. Wed, 11 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80571 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1293/argument In 2004, the Federal Communications Commission said that TV stations could be fined for indecency violations in cases when a vulgarity was broadcast during a live program. That happened on Fox in 2002 and 2003 when Cher and Nicole Richie cursed during award shows and were not bleeped.
The FCC never actually fined Fox, but the network took issue with the regulatory agency setting the stage for future fines and challenged the fleeting-expletive rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC's rules were "unconstitutionally vague" and had a "chilling effect." Tue, 10 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80570 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1121/argument All California state employees are required to pay a fee to the Service Employees International Union for its representation of them, and the union is required to tell employees how the money is spent and how to object. The union wanted to collect a special assessment for a "Political Fight Back Fund" in 2005. But some nonmembers wanted the union to give them a new notice and a new chance to object. They filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and equitable restitution for violations of the nonmembers' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court agreed, siding with the nonmembers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Tue, 10 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80568 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1219/argument When the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denies an application for a patent, the applicant may seek judicial review of the agency's final action by one of two means. The applicant may obtain direct review of the agency's determination in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alternatively, the applicant may commence a civil action against the director of the PTO in federal district court. The court will decide whether a plaintiff in a civil (§ 145) action may introduce new evidence that could have been presented to the agency in the first instance. The court will also consider whether, when new evidence is introduced under § 145, the district court may decide the factual questions to which the evidence pertains, without giving deference to the prior decision of the PTO. Gilbert P. Hyatt's patent application and subsequent claims were rejected. Hyatt appealed to the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. The Board reversed most of the examiner's written description rejections, but upheld some. Hyatt filed a request for rehearing on the rejected claims, which the Board dismissed on the basis that it raised new issues that could have been raised to either the examiner or the Board. Hyatt responded by filing a civil action at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under §145. He submitted a declaration supporting his new and amended claims. The PTO objected to the declaration, arguing that the district court should not consider the new evidence because Hyatt did not introduce it to either the Board or the examiner. The district court agreed with the PTO, ruling that Hyatt's failure to present the evidence to the PTO constituted a negligent act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision. Mon, 09 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80569 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1062/argument Chantell and Mike Sackett own a half-acre lot in a residential area near Priest Lake, Idaho. In April and May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in about one-half acre of that property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a house. On November 26, 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a compliance order against the Sacketts. The compliance order alleged that the parcel is a wetland subject to the Clean Water Act and that the Sacketts violated the CWA by filling in their property without first obtaining a permit. The order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the parcel to its original condition. The Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA to challenge the finding that the Parcel is subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant the Sacketts a hearing and continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over the parcel. The Sacketts filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. They challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an "any information available" standard that is unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the CWA precludes judicial review of compliance orders before EPA has started an enforcement action in federal court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court order. Mon, 09 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80567 at http://www.oyez.org /cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_11_715/argument The United States Census Bureau conducted a national census in 2010. In May and June of 2011, the Texas Legislature created a new electoral map based on changes in the state’s population. Texas Governor Rick Perry signed the new map into law in July of 2011. Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, either the Justice Department or a special three-judge district court must approve new electoral maps before state officials may enact the map. Texas officials submitted its map to the three-judge court in Washington. The Washington court determined that state officials had used improper standards with respect to two districts. It further held that a three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas must designate an interim redistricting plan for the 2012 election cycle. The district court redrew 36 electoral districts. Governor Perry and other state officials appealed the district court’s redistricting to the Supreme Court and requested that the Supreme Court stop the enactment of the lower court’s new map. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and stopped the enactment of the lower court’s new map until the Supreme Court could issue a further order on the matter. Mon, 09 Jan 2012 13:00:00 +0000 80572 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_218/argument In 2003, parents of Montana schoolchildren sued the owner of federally licensed hydroelectric dams on the Missouri, Madison and Clark Fork rivers within the state. The parents claimed that the owner, PPL, owed the state compensation because the riverbeds underlying its dams were part of Montana's "school trust lands." The State of Montana joined the suit in 2004, asserting that PPL also owed the state compensation pursuant to Montana's Hydroelectric Resources Act. The federal district court eventually dismissed the action for lack of diversity, and PPL filed suit in state court. The state countersued, arguing that it obtained title to the relevant streambeds at the time of statehood pursuant to the "equal footing doctrine." The trial court dismissed PPL's affirmative defenses, held that the State obtained title to the riverbeds at issue because those rivers were navigable at the time of statehood and concluded that the state was entitled to retroactive lease payments under the HRA. Following a bench trial to determine damages, the court imposed approximately $40 million in back lease payments, as well as future lease payments imposed by the state. Wed, 07 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80538 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1150/argument Prometheus Laboratories Inc. patented steps of testing for proper dosages of drug treatments used to treat gastrointestinal diseases like Crohn's disease, and sued the Mayo Clinic when it attempted to use its own, similar test. A federal judge invalidated the patents, holding that the patent couldn't cover the body's reaction to drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which specializes in patent issues, overturned the lower court order. Wed, 07 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80536 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1265/argument Facts of the case: Kenneth Clair was sentenced to death in Orange County, Calif., in 1987 for the sexual assault, beating and strangulation of babysitter Linda Faye Rodgers. Clair filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court appointed the federal public defender as Clair's federal habeas counsel. The district court then stayed the federal proceedings to give Clair a chance to return to the California Supreme Court to "exhaust" his state remedies on some newly raised claims. Clair filed a second state habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied. Clair then returned to federal court. On June 16, 2005, Clair wrote a letter to the court, requesting that new counsel be appointed. The court was aware that Clair was having problems with his counsel; only three months earlier it had received from him a letter alleging a longstanding pattern of inattention to his case. In response to that letter, the district court made inquiry of Clair's counsel, who notified the court in April 2005 that they had spoken with Clair and that he was willing to have them continue to represent him for the time being. The June 16th letter repeated allegations made in the previous letter, but also included a serious additional allegation: that a private investigator working on Clair's behalf had located important physical evidence from the crime scene that had never been tested, and that his counsel, despite having been informed of the evidence, had made no effort to obtain it, analyze it or present it to the court. Clair's private investigator sent the court a letter substantiating Clair's claims. The court received and opened the private investigator's letter, but returned it without filing it. Following receipt of Clair's June 16th letter, however, the district court made no inquiry into the truth of Clair's allegations or their potential impact on the case before it. The district judge without explanation denied the motion on the same day that he denied Clair's petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the district court abused its discretion. Tue, 06 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80537 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_8505/argument Sandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Illinois' appellate court affirmed Williams' conviction but reversed the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who relied upon a DNA report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation. Alternatively, Williams argued that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The state’s high court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Williams' Sixth Amendment rights weren't violated. Tue, 06 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80541 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_704/argument Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Curt Messerschmidt prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the residence of Jerry Bowen's foster mother. Bowen was suspected of assaulting his former girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun. The affidavit requested a night search because Bowen had gang ties, so that a surprise search at night would be safer for the community and the personnel serving the search warrant. The warrant was reviewed by a sergeant, a police lieutenant and a deputy district attorney before it was presented to, and signed by, a judge. Officers executed the warrant in the early morning hours. The homeowner, Augusta Millender, and her family responded by filing suit under for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights based on race, and for related state-law claims. The district court found the warrant valid, Messerchmidt's conduct reasonable and that probable cause existed to believe that Bowen was at the residence and that nighttime service was appropriate. As to the scope of the warrant, however, the district court found it overbroad. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court order and remanded the action with directions. The court held that law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity where they reasonably relied on a deputy attorney general and a judge to restrict an overbroad search warrant’s scope to items supported by probable cause. Mon, 05 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80539 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_844/argument Novo Nordisk sued Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. for infringement in the wake of Caraco filing an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") for a generic version of the Type 2 diabetes drug Prandin. Caraco and Sun promptly countersued. While the litigation was pending, Novo changed the FDA Orange Book's use code — a description of the scope of the patent —undermining Caraco's argument that patent did not apply to the purpose for which the generic product would be marketed. Caraco filed a counterclaim requesting an order that would require Novo Nordisk to change back the use code. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 authorized ANDA applicants to assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the brand to correct or delete submitted patent information on the grounds that the patent does not claim 1) the drug for which the brand’s new drug application was approved or 2) an approved method of using the drug. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the counterclaim and issued an injunction ordering Novo Nordisk to change the code. Novo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion. The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Novo, holding that Caraco could only assert a counterclaim if Novo’s patent did not claim any approved method of use. Mon, 05 Dec 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80540 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1024/argument In 2006, pilot Stanmore Cooper disclosed that he was HIV-positive to Social Security officials in order to receive medical benefits but withheld his status from the Federal Aviation Administration. But the Social Security Administration then turned over his medical records to the FAA, which revoked his license. Cooper filed suit against the agency for emotional distress for mishandling his medical records. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exchange of records was improper and that Cooper has standing to sue. Wed, 30 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80527 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_7387/argument On October 1, 2007, Lubbock police officers arrested Monroe Ace Setser after finding suspected narcotics during a traffic stop. At the time he was arrested, Setser was serving a five-year term of probation stemming from a previous state conviction. State authorities subsequently charged Setser with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in the state court arising from the activities of October 1, 2007. They also filed a motion to revoke his probation in the 2006 state case. Before the state cases could be resolved, the federal government stepped in and charged Setser for his October 2007. Setser pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment and in exchange the government agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts. At sentencing, the federal district court sentenced Setser to 151 months of imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run consecutive to whatever sentence might be imposed in the pending state case, and concurrent to whatever sentence might be imposed in the 2007 state case. Neither case had been resolved in state court. Wed, 30 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80531 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_875/argument Lynwood and Brenda Hall filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy and were forced to sell their family farm for $960,000 to settle their bankruptcy debts. That sale brought about capital gains taxes of $29,000. The Halls wanted the taxes treated as part of the bankruptcy, paying part of the debt and having the court discharge the rest. They argued that the taxes were dischargeable as a debt “incurred by the estate”. The IRS objected to that plan, saying all of the taxes must be paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, ruling that the Halls had to pay federal income tax on the gain from the sale of their farm during bankruptcy proceedings. Tue, 29 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80532 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1261/argument Vanessa Simmonds alleged in 54 separate complaints that several investment banks shared in the profits of customers who received IPO allocations and sold their shares on the open market at higher prices. The lawsuits also claim the banks strategically allocated IPO shares to customers who would return the favor by giving the banks more business. Simmonds holds stock in the companies that issued shares through the disputed IPOs. She sent those companies letters demanding that they sue the underwriting banks for disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. When the companies declined, she invoked a provision of the Securities Exchange Act that allowed her to sue the banks herself. The banks argued that the lawsuits should be dismissed because they were filed after a two-year time statute of limitations for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said the suits were not too late because the time limit had been postponed. The court did dismiss 30 of Simmonds' lawsuits on other legal grounds. Tue, 29 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80529 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1195/argument Marcus Mims sued Arrow Financial Services, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit both held that they lacked jurisdiction over Mims' TCPA claim because, in their view, the TCPA creates exclusive state-court jurisdiction over private actions. Mon, 28 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80528 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_708/argument Ohio resident Denise Edwards bought title insurance from First American Financial Corp. through a referral from Tower City, the title company that conducted the closing on her home purchase. Edwards later filed a lawsuit against First American Title Insurance Co. and its parent, the First American Corp., under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that First American improperly paid millions of dollars to individual title companies and in exchange those title companies entered into exclusive referral agreements with First American. Edwards also filed a class action complaint. The district court denied Edwards' motions to certify a nationwide class of customers of First American's captive title agents and a class limited to customers of First American's Tower City subsidiary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denials of class certification, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in denying certification of a nationwide class without allowing discovery and had abused its discretion in denying certification of the Tower City class. Mon, 28 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80530 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_224/argument The National Meat Association contends that the Federal Meat Inspection Act prevents California from imposing its requirements on federally inspected slaughterhouses. In 2008, the state enacted the law after the Humane Society of the United States released a video of so-called downer cows being kicked, electrocuted, dragged with chains and rammed with a forklift at a slaughterhouse. The California law bans slaughterhouses from buying or selling downer cows and from butchering them for human consumption. The measure also requires humane handling of the animals. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to grant a preliminary injunction blocking the law. Although the court said the humane-handling provision probably was pre-empted by federal law, the three-judge panel declined to block it, saying the trade group hadn't shown its members would suffer "irreparable injury." Wed, 09 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80184 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_879/argument Gloria Gail Kurns and Freida E. Jung Corson brought suit on behalf of the decedent, George M. Corson, asserting a number of state law causes of action related to his alleged exposure to asbestos during his years employed by a railroad company. From 1947 to 1994, George M. Corson worked as a welder, machinist, and supervisor for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad. He was employed at different facilities in Montana and South Dakota. Much of his job involved removing insulation from locomotive boilers and putting brake shoes on the locomotives. Kurns, the executor of his state, and Jung Corson, the widow, claim that throughout this time period, George Corson was repeatedly exposed to asbestos from the insulation and the brake shoes. After his retirement, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, the only known cause of which is exposure to asbestos. He passed away after the initiation of this litigation, and is represented by both Kurns and Jung Corson. Together they brought claims against multiple defendants including, the Railroad Friction Products Corp. over brake pads they manufactured containing asbestos. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the claims, contending that they were barred by the Locomotive Inspection Act, which provides that a railroad carrier may only use a locomotive that is in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Wed, 09 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80188 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1259/argument Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the "Levels" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant. Tue, 08 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80183 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_8145/argument Juan Smith was convicted on five counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Louisiana state trial court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and state Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for review. Smith contends that the Louisiana state courts reached this result only by disregarding established precedents regarding the suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence to a prosecutor in past Supreme Court cases, Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois. Tue, 08 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80187 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_577/argument Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement. Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation. Mon, 07 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80185 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_699/argument Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky is a United States citizen born on October 17, 2002 in Jerusalem. In December 2002, Zivotofsky's mother filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and a United States passport for petitioner, listing his place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel." United States diplomatic officials informed petitioner's mother that State Department policy required them to record "Jerusalem" as petitioner's place of birth, which is how petitioner's place of birth appears in the documents he received. On his behalf, Zivotofsky's parents filed this suit against the Secretary of State seeking an order compelling the State Department to identify petitioner’s place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel" in the official documents. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the complaint after concluding that petitioner lacked standing, and that the complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that petitioner had standing and that a more complete record was needed on the foreign policy implications of recording "Israel" as Zivotofsky's place of birth. On remand, the State Department explained, among other things, that in the present circumstances if "Israel" were to be recorded as the place of birth of a person born in Jerusalem, such "unilateral action" by the United States on one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians "would critically compromise" the United States' ability to help further the Middle East peace process. The district court again dismissed on political question grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Zivotofsky's claim is foreclosed because it raises a nonjusticiable political question. Mon, 07 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80186 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_895/argument Raphael Arriaza Gonzalez was convicted of murder in Texas state court on June 14, 2005, and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He filed an appeal to the Texas intermediate court of appeals, which affirmed his conviction on July 12, 2006. Gonzalez's counsel did not file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals within the 30-day timeframe permitted by state law. 2. On July 19, 2007, Gonzalez filed in Texas state court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied that petition on the merits on November 21, 2007. On January 24, 2008, Gonzalez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Wed, 02 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80169 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_8974/argument Barion Perry is in prison for breaking into a car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N.H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things out of a parked car. She identified Perry at the scene but later could not pick him out of a photo lineup or describe him to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo lineup. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo identification because it was "unnecessarily suggestive" that he was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction. Wed, 02 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80170 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_788/argument Charles Rehberg, a forensic accountant, discovered evidence of unethical billing practices at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia. He publicized his findings by sending a series of anonymous faxes to the hospital. As a "favor" to the hospital, former Georgia District Attorney Kenneth Hodges and Chief Investigator James Paulk began investigating Rehberg for allegedly sending harassing e-mail messages and faxes to hospital administrators. In the course of their investigation, Hodges wrote and issued subpoenas to Rehberg's Internet service provider to obtain copies of Rehberg's e-mails, which were given to private investigators. Hodges and Paulk later secured three grand jury indictments against Rehberg, which were all subsequently dismissed. Rehberg filed a civil suit against Hodges, Paulk, and specially appointed prosecutor Kelly Burke alleging, among other things, that they conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining his e-mails through a subpoena. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. Tue, 01 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80168 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1104/argument Richard Lee Pollard, an inmate at a federal prison run by the private company GEO Group, slipped on a cart left in a doorway and injured both elbows. As GEO employees were preparing to transport him to an outside orthopedic clinic, he said they made him wear a jumpsuit and a "black box" wrist restraint, despite his claim that both would cause him excruciating pain. Pollard sued GEO and its employees for allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Pollard's suit. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for injury caused by "a federal agent acting under his authority." Tue, 01 Nov 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80165 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_444/argument Missouri prosecutors offered Galin Edward Frye two deals while seeking his conviction for driving while his license was revoked, but his lawyer never told Frye about the offers. Frye pleaded guilty to a felony charge and was sentenced to three years in prison. He appealed, saying his lawyer should have told him about the previous deals. A Missouri appeals court agreed. Prosecutors contend that not knowing about the deals they offered doesn't mean that Frye didn't know what he was doing when he decided to plead guilty. Mon, 31 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80167 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_209/argument Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake. Mon, 31 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80166 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_694/argument Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18. In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari. Wed, 12 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80049 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_945/argument Albert Florence was searched twice in seven days after he was arrested on a warrant for a traffic violation he had already paid. Florence filed a lawsuit against officials at the two jails, contending the jailhouse searches were unreasonable because he was being held for failure to pay a fine, which is not a crime in New Jersey. U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez ruled that the strip search of Florence violated the Constitution. However, officials representing both Burlington and Essex Counties appealed the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that it is reasonable to search everyone being jailed, even without suspicion that a person may be concealing a weapon or drugs. Wed, 12 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80050 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_507/argument Pacific Operations Offshore runs two offshore oil drilling platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located more than three miles off the coast of California. Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific Operations as a roustabout, stationed primarily on the Hogan. He was killed, however, on the grounds of Pacific Operations's onshore oil-processing facility when he was crushed by a forklift. Following his death, his widow, Luisa, sought workers' compensation benefits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). An administrative law judge denied Mrs. Valladolid's OCSLA claim on the grounds that her husband's injury had occurred outside the geographic site of the outer continental shelf. The judge denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds: (1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs. The Benefits Review Board upheld the judge's denial of the OCSLA benefits under the "situs-of-injury" test, and affirmed the denial of LHWCA benefits on the maritime situs ground. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that the OCSLA does not have a situs-of-injury requirement. The court of appeals held that Section 1333(b) extends Longshore Act coverage to workers injured on land where there is "a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf." Two other circuits that have addressed the question have reached conflicting results. Tue, 11 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80047 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_948/argument CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit card under the brand name Aspire Visa to consumers with low or weak credit scores through massive direct-mail solicitations and the Internet. CompuCredit marketed the card and the cards were issued by Columbus Bank and Trust. Wanda Greenwood and other consumers filed suit against Compucredit and Columbus alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The lawsuit claimed that the CompuCredit and Columbus' promotional materials were deceptive because they mentioned the credit card fees in small print, buried in other information and not in proximity to the representation that no deposit was required. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the credit providers' motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The majority explained that a party must adhere to an agreement to arbitrate claims "unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Accordingly, the "burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies." Tue, 11 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80051 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_637/argument A jury found Eric Greene guilty of second-degree murder and other crimes, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment because he participated in a grocery store robbery that left the owner dead. Greene was tried along with four co-defendants, two of whom made pretrial statements that linked Greene to the robbery. The prosecution used redacted versions of these statements as evidence, but because the co-defendants did not testify in court, Greene could not use cross-examination to challenge the statements. Greene appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Among other arguments, he renewed his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that the codefendants' confessions as redacted did not so clearly implicate Greene as to violate the Confrontation Clause and Greene then filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, again pressing his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition but eight months later dismissed the appeal "as having been improvidently granted." In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gray v. Maryland that the constitution forbids prosecutors from using redacted statements like those of Greene's co-defendants. Greene asked the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to vacate his conviction under a process known as "habeas corpus." By federal statute, habeas relief is allowed only when a state court violates "clearly established Federal law." The district court held that Greene could not rely on Gray because that decision was not "clearly established" when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Tue, 11 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80048 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_553/argument Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her. Perich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply. Wed, 05 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80036 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_545/argument In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Section 514 of the act restored U.S. copyright protection to foreign parties whose works had entered the public domain. A group of artists, including musician Lawrence Golan, who made use of the works while they were in the public domain filed a lawsuit in Colorado's federal court to challenge the restoration of copyright, arguing that doing so violated their First Amendment rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that Section 514 of the URAA does not violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. The district court also rejected Golan's First Amendment challenge, seeing "no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns." The United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed that Section 514 of the URAA does not exceed Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause, but it vacated the district court's First Amendment ruling and remanded for further proceedings. Wed, 05 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80037 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_680%20/10-680_argument A jury found Randall Fields guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child. Fields was in jail on a disorderly charge when Lenawee County, Michigan deputies questioned him about allegations of sex with a minor. The sex case was unrelated to the one Fields was in jail for at the time. Fields filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals claiming that his statements were inadmissible because he had not been given his Miranda warnings before questioning. The state court reasoned that because Fields was free to return to the jail and was questioned on a matter unrelated to his incarceration, there was no obligation to provide him warnings under Miranda. Fields then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated, and the U.S. District Court agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Tue, 04 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80031 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_63/argument Cory Maples was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an Alabama jury in 1997. Alabama does not provide death row inmates with lawyers to appeal their convictions and sentences; they must rely on pro bono lawyers to represent them on appeal. Two associates from Sullivan & Cromwell, a New York law firm, agreed to represent Maples without charge. However the two associates subsequently left the firm, and when the Alabama court sent two copies of a ruling in Maples' case to the firm's mailroom it sent them back unopened. The firm had not notified the court or the mailroom that new lawyers had stepped in. When Maples learned of the missed deadline, he immediately informed his step-mother, who contacted Sullivan & Cromwell. Other attorneys at that firm then sought leave to file an appeal notwithstanding the missed deadline, but that request was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court and later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also declined to waive the deadline for filing an appeal in his case. Tue, 04 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80035 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1001/argument Luis Mariano Martinez is serving two consecutive terms of 35 years to life, following his conviction for two counts of sexual conduct with a person under 15. On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez' conviction, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Martinez then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in the first post-conviction relief proceeding in which he could present a claim of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that since there is no right to appointment of counsel during a defendant's post-conviction relief petition there is no right to effective assistance of counsel. Tue, 04 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80032 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_09_958/argument The California Legislature approved a series of cutbacks in the payments to physicians, hospitals and pharmacies to address the state's budget deficit. In each case, the providers have sued in federal court and won rulings from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which blocked the cutbacks on the grounds that they conflicted with the Medicaid law. The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid. The Supreme Court agreed to hear three separate appeals from the state, all of which raise the same issue. The lead case is Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California. The other two cases are Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital. David Maxwell-Jolly served as the director of California's Department of Health Care Services. Mon, 03 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80033 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_6549/argument Billy Joe Reynolds pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly failing to register and update a registration, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of SORNA and the legality of the Interim Rule implementing that law. He also argued that his guilty plea should be invalidated because he is "actually innocent" of violating SORNA's registration requirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected his arguments and affirmed the conviction. Mon, 03 Oct 2011 13:00:00 +0000 80034 at http://www.oyez.org