Cases - 2010 term

Abbott v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 04 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 57' 8.406" N, 75° 9' 49.6404" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-479

Petitioner

Kevin Abbott

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Gould v. United States (09-7073)

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, January 25, 2010

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2010

Decided

Monday, November 15, 2010

Advocates

David L. Horan (for the petitioner in 09-7073, appointed by the Court)

James E. Ryan (for the petitioner in 09-479)

Roy W. McLeese (Acting Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In these consolidated cases, the defendants engaged in drug trafficking while using a firearm. Both defendants received an additional five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)A), even though they received longer mandatory minimum sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act. On appeal, they argued that the sentencing enhancement provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)A) should run concurrently with their already longer minimum sentences. The Third and Fifth Circuits rejected the defendants' arguments.

Question

Does a mandatory minimum sentence provided by 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)A) run concurrently or consecutively to another count that carries a longer than ordinary mandatory minimum sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(A)

Yes. In its first opinion of the term, a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ opinions. "A defendant is subject to the highest mandatory minimum specified for his conduct in §924(c), unless another provision of law directed to conduct proscribed by §924(c) imposes an even greater mandatory minimum," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in an 8-0 opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the decision because of her involvement in the case as the solicitor general.

Los Angeles County, CA v. Humphries

jgoldman — Tue, 05 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

34° 3' 8.0424" N, 118° 14' 37.266" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-350

Petitioner

Los Angeles County, CA

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Craig and Wendy Humphries

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, February 22, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Advocates

Timothy T. Coates (for the petitioner)

Andrew J. Pincus (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Craig and Wendy Humphries were accused of abuse by one of their children, arrested, and their children were taken away from them. They were charged with child abuse and felony torture, but the charges were dismissed once it became clear the allegations were not true. Despite the fact that the charges were dismissed, the Humphries were placed on California's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI") – a database for known and suspected child abusers. The Humphries subsequently filed suit against Los Angeles County and various County officials in a California federal district court. The Humphries argued that California's maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because identified individuals are not given fair opportunity to challenge the allegations against them. The district court dismissed their claims.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the erroneous listing of the Humphries on the CACI violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Humphries, as the prevailing party, then moved for attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit awarded the fees, reasoning that the limitations to liability established in Monell v. Department of Social Services do not apply to claims for declaratory relief.

Question

Are claims for declaratory relief against a local public entity subject to the requirement of Monell that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the constitutional violation was the result of the policy, custom, or practice attributable to the local public entity; or are such claims exempt as determined by the Ninth Circuit?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Los Angeles County, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: U.S. Constititution, Amendment XIV, Due Process Clause

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit decision, holding that Los Angeles County does not have to pay attorneys' fees in the case. Justice Stephen Breyer, who wrote the 8-0 opinion for the court, reasoned that the court’s ruling in Monell applies to claims against municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for damages. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the consideration and decision of the case because she worked on it while in the solicitor general's office.

Harrington v. Richter

jgoldman — Tue, 12 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 34' 53.6592" N, 121° 29' 39.84" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-587

Petitioner

Kelly Harrington, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joshua Richter

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, February 22, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Advocates

Harry Joseph Colombo (Deputy Attorney General of California, for the petitioner)

Clifford Gardner (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A California trial court convicted Joshua Richter of burglary and murder. He exhausted his state court remedies and filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. Mr. Richter argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the petition and was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

However, upon rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the state court's determination that Mr. Richter was not denied effective assistance of counsel was unreasonable. The court reasoned that under Strickland v. Washington the defendant must show that "counsel's performance was deficient." And, the defendant must show that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Here, the requirements of Strickland were met when Mr. Richter's counsel failed to conduct sufficient pre-trial investigation to determine what forensic evidence or experts would be useful to the defense's theory when it was foreseeable what evidence the state would introduce.

Question

Is a defense lawyer deficient for failing to consult blood evidence when planning strategy for trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Harrington, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)

No. Reversing the lower court order, the court held that the defense lawyer was not deficient in failing to consult blood evidence when planning strategy for trial. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion, which was joined by eight of the justices with Justice Elena Kagan taking no part in the consideration of the case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Michigan v. Bryant

jgoldman — Tue, 05 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

42° 19' 53.1372" N, 83° 2' 44.7144" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-150

Petitioner

Michigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richard Perry Bryant

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, March 1, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Decided

Monday, February 28, 2011

Advocates

Lori B. Palmer (Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the petitioner)

Leondra R. Kruger (Acting Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Peter Jon Van Hoek (for the respondent appointed by the Court)

Facts of the Case

A Michigan trial court convicted Richard Perry Bryant of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Mr. Bryant challenged the admission of the victim's statements at trial for violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The victim stated that Mr. Bryant shot him, but died shortly thereafter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements that the victim made to police before his death were testimonial and their admission violated Mr. Bryant's right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the victim's statements were made in the course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose was to establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. Therefore, the statements were "testimonial" for the purposes of the enhanced confrontation protections set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington and should not have been admitted against Mr. Bryant at trial because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the victim prior to his death.

Question

Are inquiries of wounded victims concerning the perpetrator non-testimonial if they objectively indicate that the purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, and, thus, not afforded heightened protection under Crawford v. Washington?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Michigan, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment: confrontation clause

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in a majority opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The court held that the identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were "not testimonial statements because they had a 'primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.' Therefore, their admission at Bryant's trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause." Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia criticized the majority opinion for distorting "our confrontation clause jurisprudence and leav[ing] it in a shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort.” The majority, he continued, “creates an expansive exception to the confrontation clause for violent crimes.” In a separate dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg agreed with Scalia, but observed a "well-established exception to the confrontation requirement: The cloak protecting the accused against admission of out-of-court testimonial statements was removed for dying declarations."

Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case.

Ortiz v. Jordan

jgoldman — Mon, 01 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 14' 11.2164" N, 83° 22' 1.7148" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-737

Petitioner

Michelle Ortiz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, April 26, 2010

Argued

Monday, November 1, 2010

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2011

Advocates

David E. Mills (for the petitioner)

Benjamin C. Mizer (Solicitor General of Ohio, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate, filed suit against several state and prison officials in an Ohio federal district court for violating her civil rights. While Ms. Ortiz served her sentence, she was sexually abused by a corrections officer on two consecutive nights. Prior to the second incident, Ms. Ortiz complained to prison officials, but was told "that the man was leaving," "this was his nature," and he "is just an old dirty man." The corrections officer assaulted her on the following night. At trial, the jury found in favor of Ms. Ortiz against two of the prison officials – Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted that while courts do not normally review the denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to the general rule. The court reasoned that Ms. Jordan's conduct did not violate Ms. Ortiz's Eight Amendment right to humane conditions because Ms. Jordan was not "deliberately indifferent" to Ms. Ortiz's plight.

Question

May a party appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits if the party chose not to appeal the order before trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ortiz, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: summary judgment

No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, which held that a party may not appeal a denial of summary judgment after a district court has conducted a full trial on the merits. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a special concurrence, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy.

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association

jgoldman — Tue, 02 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 34' 53.6592" N, 121° 29' 39.84" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1448

Petitioner

Edmund Gerald Brown, Governor et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Entertainment Merchants Association, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, April 26, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2011

Advocates

Zackery P. Morazzini (Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, for the petitioners)

Paul M. Smith (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly- enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute "obscenity" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective.

Question

Does the First Amendment bar a state from restricting the sale of violent video games to minors?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Entertainment Merchants Association, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection." Justice Samuel Alito concurred in judgment, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Alito noted that he disagreed "with the approach taken in the Court's opinion. In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make every effort to understand the new technology." Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer filed separate dissents. Adhering to his strict understanding of the Framers' intent with the Constitution, Thomas wrote: "The Court's decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment." Breyer argued that the California statute met current constitutional standards.

Connick v. Thompson

jgoldman — Wed, 06 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

29° 57' 52.9992" N, 90° 4' 14.0016" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-571

Petitioner

Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Thompson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Advocates

S. Kyle Duncan (for the petitioners)

J. Gordon Cooney Jr. (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.

Question

Can a prosecutor's office be held liable for the illegal conduct of one of its prosecutors, on the theory that the office failed to adequately train its employees, when there has been only one violation resulting from that deficient training?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Connick, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Section 1983

No. A divided Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's office could not be held liable for the illegal conduct of one of its prosecutors when there has been only one violation resulting from that deficient training. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion for the court. In a dissent read from the bench, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, argued that the "what happened here, the Court's opinion obscures, was no momentary oversight, no single incident of a lone officer's misconduct." Instead, Ginsburg contended, evidence "established persistent, deliberately indifferent conduct for which the District Attorney's Office bears responsibility under §1983."

Justice Antonin Scalia joined the majority opinion but filed a separate concurrence, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, which responded to the dissent.

Premo v. Moore

jgoldman — Tue, 12 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

45° 31' 24.4272" N, 122° 40' 34.3452" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-658

Petitioner

Jeff Premo, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Randy Joseph Moore

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Advocates

John R. Kroger (Attorney General of Oregon, for the petitioner)

Steven T. Wax (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Randy Moore pled no-contest to felony murder in an Oregon trial court and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. After exhausting his post- conviction state court remedies, Mr. Moore petitioned for habeas corpus relief in an Oregon federal district court. Mr. Moore argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that his taped confession was obtained unconstitutionally. The district court denied the petition.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Moore's counsel's failure to suppress Mr. Moore's confession was both constitutionally deficient and prejudicial under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The court was careful to note that even the state conceded the means by which the state elicited Mr. Moore's confession were unconstitutional because Mr. Moore's request for counsel had been ignored by the police.

Question

Does a lawyer provide inadequate representation by failing to seek suppression of a client's confession before he pleads no contest to murder?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Premo, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)

No. The court reversed the appeals court decision, holding that defense counsel was not ineffective and that Moore was not in any event prejudiced by his counsel's actions. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion for the court with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filing a concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic

jgoldman — Wed, 13 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

44° 28' 24.9456" N, 89° 28' 27.1848" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-834

Petitioner

Kevin Kasten

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Advocates

James H. Kaster (for the petitioner)

Jeffrey B. Wall (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Carter G. Phillips (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

On December 11, 2006, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic terminated Kevin Kasten's employment. Mr. Kasten filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in a Wisconsin federal district court alleging that he was retaliated against for filing complaints about the legality of the location of Saint- Gobain's time clocks. Mr. Kasten alleges that the location of the time clocks prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective gear. Saint-Gobain motioned for summary judgment arguing that purely verbal complaints, like those made by Mr. Kasten, were not protected activity under the FLSA. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that unwritten, purely verbal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA.

Question

The Fair Labor Standards Act protects employees from retaliation for complaining about violations of the statute. Does the protection apply only if the complaint is in writing?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kasten, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards Act

No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. The majority held that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to a complaint, whether oral or written. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. "The retaliation provision contemplates an official grievance filed with a court or an agency, not oral complaints—or even formal, written complaints — from an employee to an employer," Scalia argued. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the consideration of the case.

Flores-Villar v. United States

jgoldman — Wed, 10 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

32° 42' 55.1844" N, 117° 9' 26.118" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-5801

Petitioner

Ruben Flores-Villar

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2011

Advocates

Steven F. Hubachek (for the petitioner (appointed by the Court))

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A California federal district court convicted Ruben Flores-Villar under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") of being a deported alien found in the United States. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Flores-Villar argued that the relevant provisions of the INA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of age and gender. The provisions impose a five-year residency requirement, after age fourteen, on United States citizen fathers but not mothers, whose residency requirement is merely one year. The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's holding in Nguyen v. INS which did not deal precisely with the provisions before the court, but held that other more onerous residency requirements for fathers but not mothers in the INA did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the provisions challenged by Mr. Flores-Villar also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Question

Does Nguyen v. INS permit gender discrimination that has no biological basis?

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: None

Without answering the question, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an unsigned per curiam opinion. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue

jgoldman — Wed, 10 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

32° 22' 0.498" N, 86° 17' 59.8884" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-520

Petitioner

CSX Transportation, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama Department of Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 14, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioner)

Melissa Arbus Sherry (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

Corey L. Maze (Solicitor General of Alabama, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") brought suit against the Alabama Department of Revenue in an Alabama federal district court seeking an injunction to prevent the imposition of the state's sales and use tax on diesel fuel. CSX argued that the tax discriminates against railroad companies in violate of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("RRRR"). The district court had granted a preliminary injunction, but of its own accord, dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately dismissed the action. The court reasoned that because it had already ruled in favor of the Alabama Department of Revenue on an identical challenge to the tax in Norfolk S. R. v. AL Dep't of Rev., the district court was correct in dismissing CSX's suit.

Question

Can the CSX Transportation railroad company challenge an Alabama state tax of its purchase of diesel fuel?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for CSX Transportation, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. The majority held that a railroad could invoke the RRRR statute to challenge sales and use taxes that apply to rail carriers but exempt their competitors in the transportation industry. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Cullen v. Pinholster

jgoldman — Tue, 09 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

34° 3' 8.0424" N, 118° 14' 37.266" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1088

Petitioner

Vincent Cullen, Acting Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scott Lynn Pinholster

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 14, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

Decided

Monday, April 4, 2011

Advocates

James W. Bilderback II (Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, for the petitioner)

Sean K. Kennedy (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A California state court convicted Scott Lynn Pinholster of double murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, he petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial. The district court upheld Pinholster's conviction but granted habeas relief on his death sentence. The district court affirmed the conviction but reversed the grant of habeas relief on the death sentence.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court order, holding that the denial of habeas relief during the guilt phase was appropriate, but not during the penalty phase. The court noted that Strickland v. Washington requires trial counsel to investigate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Here, the court reasoned that Pinholster's counsel failed meet to meet his obligations.

Question

Can a federal court overturn a state criminal conviction on the basis of facts the defendant could have alleged, but did not, in state court?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Cullen, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: ADEPA

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. Limiting "review to the state-court record is consistent with our precedents," Thomas wrote for the 5-4 majority. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a partial dissent in which he contended that "I do not join Part III, for I would send this case back to the Court of Appeals so that it can apply the legal standards that Part II announces to the complex facts of this case." Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan, dissented in full. "Some habeas petitioners are unable to develop the factual basis of their claims in state court through no fault of their own," Sotomayor argued.

Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano

jgoldman — Mon, 10 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

33° 29' 39.012" N, 111° 55' 33.7872" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1156

Petitioner

Matrixx Inititiatives, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James Siracusano, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 14, 2010

Argued

Monday, January 10, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Advocates

Jonathan Hacker (for the petitioners)

David C. Frederick (for the respondents)

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Investors in Matrixx Inititiatives, Inc. ("Matrixx") filed suit against the company in an Arizona federal district court for violations of federal securities laws. The investors alleged that Matrixx failed to disclose that one of its products, Zicam nasal spray/gel, caused anosmia (the loss of the sense of smell) in numerous customers. The district court dismissed the case holding that the investors failed to alleged "materiality" in their claim because their evidence was not "statistically significant."

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the investors had pled sufficient facts going to the issue of materiality in order to avoid dismissal. The court reasoned that whether facts are statistically significant, and thus, material, is a question of fact that should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact – usually the jury. Here, the district court erred when it took liberties in making that determination on its own.

Question

Can a plaintiff state a claim under the Securities Exchange Act based on a pharmaceutical company's non-disclosure of adverse event reports even though the reports are not alleged to be statistically significant?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Siracusano, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Exchange Act

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The court ruled that the materiality of a pharmaceutical company's non-disclosure of adverse event reports in a securities fraud action does not depend upon whether there is a statistically significant health risk.

Chase Bank USA v. McCoy

jgoldman — Wed, 08 Dec 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 47' 0.366" N, 73° 57' 58.5" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-329

Petitioner

Chase Bank USA, N.A.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James A. McCoy, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 21, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 2010

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2011

Advocates

Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioner)

Joseph R. Palmore (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A class of Chase Bank ("Chase") credit card holders sued Chase in a California federal district alleging the bank violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). The investors argued that Chase violated the act when it increased interest rates retroactively after the credit account was closed as a result of a late payment to the bank. The district court dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding in part that Regulation Z of TILA required a creditor, like Chase, to provide contemporaneous notice of interest rate increases that occurred because of customer default. Here, Chase failed to provide such notice.

Question

When a creditor increases the periodic rate on a credit card account in response to cardholder default, but pursuant to a default rate term disclosed in the contract governing the account, does Regulation Z of TILA require the creditor to provide the cardholder with a change-in-terms notice?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Chase Bank USA, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Truth in Lending Act

No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor who held that at the time of the transactions at issue, Regulation Z did not require Chase to provide McCoy with a change-in-terms notice before implementing the agreement term allowing it to raise his interest rate.

Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Reinhard

jgoldman — Wed, 01 Dec 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 31' 58.8" N, 77° 28' 1.2" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-529

Petitioner

Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James S. Reinhard, Commissioner, Virginia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 21, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, April 19, 2011

Advocates

Seth M. Galanter (for the petitioner)

Ginger D. Anders (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. (Solicitor General of Virginia, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA"), a state agency dedicated to advocating on behalf of persons with disabilities, sued several Virginia state officials in their official capacities in a Virginia federal district court. VOPA alleged that the officials violated two federal statutes when the officials refused VOPA access to state records which VOPA argued it was entitled. The officials moved to dismissed the case arguing that they were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state officials were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress did not abrogate state immunity under the statutes which VOPA sued under and (2) the mere receipt of federal funds by Virginia under the two statutes did not mean that the state had consented to suit. The court declined to extend the Eleventh Amendment exception established in Ex parte Young, where a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials, noting that VOPA was not a private party but rather a state agency.

Question

Does the Eleventh Amendment categorically preclude an independent state agency from bringing an action in federal court against state officials for prospective injunctive relief to remedy a violation of federal law under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Eleventh Amendment, sovereign immunity

No. "Ex parte Young allows a federal court to hear a lawsuit for prospective relief against state officials brought by another agency of the same state," Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the 6-2 majority. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Roberts wrote that he disagreed with the majority’s "substantial and novel expansion of what we have also called a 'narrow exception' to a State's sovereign immunity." Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Walker v. Martin

jgoldman — Mon, 29 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 34' 53.6592" N, 121° 29' 39.84" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-996

Petitioner

James Walker, Warden, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Charles W. Martin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 21, 2010

Argued

Monday, November 29, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Advocates

Todd Marshall (for the petitioner)

Michael B. Bigelow (for the respondent (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

A California state court convicted Charles Martin of robbery and murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Mr. Martin filed a round of habeas petitions in state court – all of which were denied. He then raised several new claims in petitions for federal habeas relief in a California federal district court. The court denied to examine the claims because they were not yet exhausted in state court. After Mr. Martin exhausted these last claims in state court, he returned to federal court for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court again denied the petition relying on California's statute of limitations for filing state habeas corpus petitions.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that California's statute of limitations could not operate as an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. The court reasoned that California's statute of limitations was not sufficiently defined, nor consistently applied such that it could bar Mr. Martin's petition.

Question

In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is a state law barring a prisoner from attacking his conviction an insufficient procedural bar because the federal court thinks the rule is (1) vague and (2) the state failed to prove that the bar is consistently applied?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Walker, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: habeas corpus

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The Court held that the California rule requiring state habeas petitions to be filed "as promptly as the circumstances allow" constitutes an independent state ground that is adequate to bar habeas relief in federal court.

Ransom v. MBNA

jgoldman — Mon, 04 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

36° 6' 52.7256" N, 115° 10' 22.1376" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-907

Petitioner

Jason M. Ransom

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

MBNA, America Bank, N.A.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, April 19, 2010

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Advocates

Christopher P. Burke (for the petitioner)

Deanne E. Maynard (for the respondent)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Jason Ransom filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Nevada in 2006 and proposed a plan to make $500 monthly payments over a period of 60 months. The chapter 13 trustee and two creditors objected to confirmation of the plan, arguing that $500 per month was not Ransom's projected disposable income as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. They argued that Ransom improperly included a deduction against income for "vehicle ownership expense" of $471. The trustee and creditors claimed that the deduction should be disallowed and that the monthly payment should be increased. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the trustee and refused to confirm the plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, agreeing to hear the appeal on this interlocutory issue, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision.

Question

In calculating a debtor's "projected disposable income" during a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan period, can a bankruptcy court allow an ownership cost deduction for vehicles only if the debtor is actually making payments on the vehicles?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for MBNA, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Chapter 13, Bankruptcy Act

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, Justice Elena Kagan, in her first opinion for the Court, ruled that a debtor who does not make loan or lease payments could not take the car-ownership deduction. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nelson

jgoldman — Tue, 05 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

United States

34° 11' 55.212" N, 118° 10' 31.3788" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-530

Petitioner

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert M. Nelson, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, March 8, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Advocates

Neal Kumar Katyal (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)

Dan Stormer (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

A 2004 Bush administration antiterrorism initiative extended background checks required for many government jobs to contract employees, including scientists and engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a research facility operated by the California Institute of Technology under a contract with NASA. Twenty- eight lab employees, who do not have security clearances and are not involved in classified or military activities, filed suit over what they considered to be overly intrusive background checks. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the background checks halted while the case continued. The divided court later declined an en banc review.

Question

Does the government violate a federal contract employee's constitutional right to privacy by asking her whether she has received counseling or treatment for recent illegal drug use in the past year, or by asking her references if they have any reason to believe she is unsuited to work in a federal facility?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to privacy

No. The court reversed the lower court decision and upheld the background checks that NASA uses for employees of companies working under contract in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed his own concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.

Snyder v. Phelps

jgoldman — Wed, 06 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 34' 31.3644" N, 76° 59' 44.934" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-751

Petitioner

Albert Snyder

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fred W. Phelps, Sr., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, March 8, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Advocates

Sean E. Summers (for the petitioner)

Margie J. Phelps (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words."

Question

Does the First Amendment protect protesters at a funeral from liability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the family of the deceased?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Phelps, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, "I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point." Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case."

Freeman v. United States

jgoldman — Wed, 23 Feb 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 15' 9.594" N, 85° 45' 30.4416" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-10245

Petitioner

William Freeman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Advocates

Frank W. Heft, Jr. (for the petitioner)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

William Freeman was charged with one count of crack possession, among other charges, and entered a plea agreement that included a sentence of 106 months. After his agreement was accepted by the trial judge and his sentence was entered, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to reduce the disparity in the treatment of crack and powder cocaine, and made the amendment retroactive. Freeman sought to reduce his sentence accordingly.

But in December 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky refused to do so. In November 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a federal judge have the authority to reduce a criminal sentence after the U.S. Sentencing Commission amends the Sentencing Guidelines if the judge has already accepted a plea agreement?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Freeman, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2)

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a plurality opinion. "The Justices who join this plurality opinion conclude that the categorical bar enacted by the Court of Appeals finds no support in §3582(c)(2), Rule11(c)(1)(C), or the relevant Guidelines policy statements," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote. In the controlling opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted: "In my view, the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuant to an agreement authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) ((C) agreement) is 'based on' the agreement itself, not on the judge's calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines." Meanwhile, Chief Justice John Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. "I agree with the concurrence that the sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is based on the agreement, not the Sentencing Guidelines," Roberts wrote. "I would, however, adhere to that logic regardless whether the agreement could be said to 'use' or 'employ' a Guidelines range in arriving at the particular sentence specified in the agreement."

Sykes v. United States

jgoldman — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 46' 6.1572" N, 86° 9' 28.944" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-11311

Petitioner

Marcus Sykes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 9, 2011

Advocates

William E. Marsh (for the petitioner)

Jeffrey B. Wall (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Marcus Sykes pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana enhanced Sykes’ sentence under the ACCA after determining that he had previously been found guilty of three violent felonies.

In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that "fleeing police in a vehicle in violation of Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A) is sufficiently similar to ACCA’s enumerated crimes in kind, as well as the degree of risk posed, and counts as a violent felony under ACCA."

Question

Does a conviction for resisting arrest counts as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: federal sentencing guidelines

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Felony vehicle flight, as proscribed by Indiana law, is a violent felony for purposes of ACCA," Kennedy wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he wrote: "the majority errs by implying that the 'purposeful, violent, and aggressive' test may still apply to offenses 'akin to strict liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes.'" Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which he chastises the majority for an "ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion." Justice Elena Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "Vehicular flight comes in different varieties, and so too the statutes that criminalize the conduct," Kagan wrote. "Because petitioner Marcus Sykes was convicted only of simple vehicular flight, and not of any flight offense involving aggressive or dangerous activity, I would find that he did not commit a 'violent felony' under ACCA."

United States v. Tinklenberg

jgoldman — Tue, 22 Feb 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

42° 57' 48.096" N, 85° 40' 5.088" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1498

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jason Louis Tinklenberg

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Decided

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Following a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Jason Louis Tinklenberg was convicted of possessing firearms after having been convicted of a felony and possessing materials used to manufacture methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Before trial, the district court had denied Tinklenberg’s motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the STA. On appeal following Tinklenberg’s conviction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court had indeed violated the act and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.

Question

Is the time between the filing of a pretrial motion and its disposition automatically excluded from the deadline for commencing trial under the Speedy Trial Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Tinklenberg, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Speedy Trial Act of 1974

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer. The Speedy Trial Act "contains no requirement that the filing of a pretrial motion actually caused, or was expected to cause, delay of a trial," Breyer wrote for the unanimous court. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case. " I agree with the judgment of the Court in Part II that a pretrial motion need not actually postpone a trial, or create an expectation of postponement, in order for its pendency to be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act…. But I think that conclusion is entirely clear from the text of the Speedy Trial Act, and see no need to look beyond the text," Scalia argued.

Schindler Elevator v. U.S. ex rel Kirk

jgoldman — Tue, 01 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 46' 27.8796" N, 73° 31' 6.312" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-188

Petitioner

Schindler Elevator

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Daniel Kirk

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 2011

Decided

Monday, May 16, 2011

Advocates

Steven Alan Reiss (for the petitioner)

Jonathan A. Willens (for the respondent)

Melissa Arbus Sherry (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Daniel Kirk served with the U.S. Army in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971. Beginning in 1978, he worked at Millar Elevator Industries, which was later absorbed by Schindler Elevator in 2002. Although he had been promoted within the company on past occasions, in 2003, he was demoted from a managerial position to a non-managerial slot. He then resigned. Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor in 2004 claiming his demotion was in violation of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act. After his claim was denied by the department, he filed suit in the Southern District of New York in 2005 under the False Claims Act. Kirk claimed the company was shirking its obligation to take affirmative steps to employ and promote veterans, invite eligible veterans to identify themselves to employers and file annual reports detailing the hiring and placement of veterans.

Using documentation supplied by FOIA requests submitted by his wife and his own knowledge of company operations, he claimed the company failed to file reports from 1998 until late 2004 and filed false reports in 2004, 2005 and 2006, alleging that each claim for payment on the hundreds of government contracts submitted by Schindler was a violation of the False Claims Act.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint in March 2009 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the lower court order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Question

May a whistleblower use information obtained through FOIA to allege violations of the federal False Claims Act by a government contractor?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Schindler Elevator, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: False Claims Act, FOIA

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Justice Clarence Thomas. A written response to a FOIA request for records is a report within the meaning of the False Claims Act's disclosure bar, according to the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Ginsburg wrote that she would "affirm the Second Circuit's judgment as faithful to the text, context, purpose, and history of the FCA's public disclosure bar." Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Smith v. Bayer Corp.

jgoldman — Tue, 18 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 20' 59.352" N, 81° 37' 57.432" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1205

Petitioner

Keith Smith et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bayer Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Advocates

Richard A. Monahan (for the petitioners)

Philip S. Beck (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Bayer Corp. withdrew the cholesterol-lowering drug, Baycol, from the market in August 2001 because of its alleged role in serious side effects and the deaths of some patients using the drug. Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza filed a lawsuit in West Virginia state court in 2001, seeking class certification for Baycol users throughout the state. Meanwhile, a separate putative West Virginia class action, filed was removed to federal court and consolidated as part of a multidistrict litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. In August 2008, the court denied certification on grounds that plaintiffs could not litigate economic loss claims as a class.

Counsel for Smith and Sperlazza later received a notice declaring that their case in West Virginia state court was bound by that ruling. They appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court order in January 2010.

Question

Did a lower court erroneously prevent a group of plaintiffs from proceeding with a class-action lawsuit over a cholesterol-lowering drug that was removed from the market in 2001?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Smith, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Anti-Injunction Act

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's opinion in a unanimous decision by Justice Elena Kagan. "In enjoining the state court from considering Smith's class certification request, the federal court exceeded its authority under the 'relitigation exception' to the Act," Kagan wrote.

FCC v. AT&T

jgoldman — Wed, 19 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 54' 6.1092" N, 77° 2' 22.488" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1279

Petitioner

Federal Communications Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

AT&T

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2011

Advocates

Anthony A. Yang (for the petitioners)

Geoffrey M. Klineberg (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

CompTel, a trade association that represents some of AT&T;'s competitors, filed a FOIA request with the Federal Communications Commision in 2005, seeking documents related to an FCC probe into whether AT&T; had overcharged the agency for work on a technology education project. AT&T; fought the request, contending the production of the documents violated Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which exempts document disclosures in law enforcement records that would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy.”

The FCC rejected AT&T;'s argument, but in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the phrase "personal privacy" applied to corporations because other sections of FOIA had defined "person" as a corporation.

Question

May corporations assert personal privacy interests to prevent the government from releasing documents about them?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for FCC, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information Act, privacy

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.. The court held that corporations do not have a right of personal privacy that would protect them from the disclosure of public records that have been handed over to federal agencies. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Stern v. Marshall

jgoldman — Tue, 18 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

29° 45' 46.3824" N, 95° 22' 59.016" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-179

Petitioner

Howard K. Stern, Executor of the Estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Elaine T. Marshall, Executrix of the Estate of E. Pierce Marshall

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Advocates

Kent L. Richland (for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The saga continues in the long-running inheritance dispute over the estate of a deceased Texas billionare. J. Howard Marshall’s will left nearly all his money to his son, E. Pierce Marshall, and nothing to (now deceased wife) Anna Nicole Smith, aka Vickie Lynn Marshall. The younger Marshall died in 2006 and Smith died of a drug overdose in 2007. Smith had previously fought the will, claiming that her husband promised to leave her more than $300 million.Howard K. Stern, Smith's former attorney and boyfriend, has continued the legal battle on behalf of Smith's estate. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Marshall was mentally fit and under no undue pressure when he wrote a will leaving nearly all of his $1.6 billion estate to his son and nothing to Smith.

The Supreme Court will revisit the estate battle four years after the justices sent the case back to lower courts for further review. In the earlier case, the court only addressed whether or not federal courts can rule on Smith's claims.

Question

When a creditor files a claim in bankruptcy court, the debtor is sometimes required to file any counterclaim she may have or lose the right to assert that claim later or in another court. Can a bankruptcy judge conclusively resolve such compulsory counterclaims?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Marshall, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U. S. C. §157(b)

Conclusion: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Although the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on Vickie's counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional authority to do so," the chief justice wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The majority "fails to follow the analysis that this Court more recently has held applicable to the evaluation of claims of a kind before us here, namely, claims that a congressional delegation of adjudicatory authority violates separation-of-powers principles derived from Article III," Breyer wrote.

Astra USA v. Santa Clara County

jgoldman — Wed, 19 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 21' 14.7888" N, 121° 57' 18.72" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1273

Petitioner

Astra USA

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Santa Clara County, Calif.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (29011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (for the petitioners)

Ginger D. Anders (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

David C. Frederick (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2005, Santa Clara County, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports, alleging that pharmaceutical companies have systemically overcharged hospitals and clinics, making them pay millions of dollars more than necessary for prescription drugs. The Inspector General's report also argued that the government is ill- equipped to ensure that clinics are being charged correctly. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, but in March 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision.

Question

Can health care providers sue drug makers for overcharging public hospitals for prescription drugs?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Astra, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Public Health Services Act

No. The Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg that health care providers cannot sue drug makers for overcharging public hospitals for prescription drugs. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.

Bullcoming v. New Mexico

jgoldman — Wed, 02 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

36° 43' 41.0088" N, 108° 13' 6.96" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-10876

Petitioner

Donald Bullcoming

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New Mexico

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner)

Gary K. King (Attorney General of New Mexico, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Donald Bullcoming of New Mexico was sentenced to two years in prison for a felony aggravated DWI/DUI. The State introduced a blood alcohol test (blood draw) that was taken from Bullcoming under a search warrant issued following his refusal of the breath alcohol test. Bullcoming argued that the laboratory report of his blood draw results was testimonial evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause.

The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and upheld the trial court’s ruling that the forensic report was a business record. The court ruled that a blood alcohol report is admissible as a public record and that it presented no issue under the Confrontation Clause because the report was non- testimonial. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted discretionary review, but while the case was pending, this U.S. Supreme Court issued its 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v.Massachusetts, clarifying that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial and therefore the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits. In applying the Melendez-Diaz ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the blood alcohol report was testimonial evidence, but it was admissible even though the forensic analyst who performed the test did not testify.

Question

Can a blood-alcohol test admitted without the actual testimony of the person who prepared the results violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bullcoming, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: confrontation clause

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Confrontation Clause does not permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the certification," Ginsburg wrote, adding: "The accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification." Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined all but Part 4 of the opinion; Justice Clarence Thomas joined all but Part 4 and Footnote 6. Sotomayor concurred in part, writing: "I agree with the Court that the trial court erred by admitting the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) report. I write separately first to highlight why I view the report at issue to be testimonial—specifically because its 'primary purpose' is evidentiary—and second to emphasize the limited reach of the Court's opinion." Meanwhile, Anthony Kennedy dissented, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito. "Far from replacing live testimony with 'systematic' and 'extrajudicial' examinations, these procedures are fully consistent with the Confrontation Clause and with well-established principles for ensuring that criminal trials are conducted in full accord with requirements of fairness and reliability and with the confrontation guarantee."

Kentucky v. King

jgoldman — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 1' 54.1704" N, 84° 29' 42.36" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1272

Petitioner

Kentucky

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hollis King

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2011

Decided

Monday, May 16, 2011

Advocates

Joshua D. Farley (for the petitioner)

Ann O'Connell (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Jamesa J. Drake (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Police officers in Lexington, Ky., entered an apartment building in pursuit of a suspect who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. The officers lost sight of the suspect and mistakenly assumed he entered an apartment from which they could detect the odor of marijuana. After police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard movements, which they believed indicated evidence was about to be destroyed. Police forcibly entered the apartment and found Hollis King and others smoking marijuana. They also found cash, drugs and paraphernalia. King entered a conditional guilty plea; reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an illegal search.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that exigent circumstances supporting the warrantless search were not of the police’s making and that police did not engage in deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement. In January 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, finding that the entry was improper. The court held that the police were not in pursuit of a fleeing suspect when they entered the apartment, since there was no evidence that the original suspect even knew he was being followed by police.

Question

Does the exclusionary rule, which forbids the use of illegally seized evidence except in emergency situations, apply when the emergency is created by lawful police actions?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Kentucky, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: exclusionary rule

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Samuel Alito. "The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment," Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, contending that "the Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in drug cases. "

Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc.

jgoldman — Tue, 12 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 21' 19.2492" N, 80° 2' 58.1928" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-152

Petitioner

Russell Bruesewitz, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wyeth, Inc., fka Wyeth Laboratories, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, March 8, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Advocates

David C. Frederick (for the petitioners)

Kathleen M. Sullivan (for the respondents)

Benjamin J. Horwich (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six-month diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. When their daughter was three-years-old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the type of vaccine used in Hannah's inoculation from the market.

The Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed to develop a safer vaccine and should be held accountable for preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over vaccine injury claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed.

Question

Can a federal law shield vaccine manufacturers from certain product liability lawsuits in state court that seek damages for serious health problems suffered by children?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Wyeth, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. The majority reasoned that Congress had set up a special vaccine court as a way to provide compensation to injured children without driving drug manufacturers from the vaccine market. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Skinner v. Switzer

jgoldman — Wed, 13 Oct 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

35° 26' 43.1736" N, 100° 16' 15.438" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-9000

Petitioner

Henry W. Skinner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lynn Switzer, District Attorney for the 31st Judicial District of Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2011

Advocates

Robert C. Owen (for the petitioner)

Gregory S. Coleman (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Texas state court convicted Henry Skinner of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mr. Skinner brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the prosecuting attorney in a Texas federal district court alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the district attorney refused to allow him access to biological evidence for DNA testing. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that circuit precedent established that Mr. Skinner's claim was not cognizable as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, but instead must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Question

Can a convicted prisoner seeking access to biological evidence for DNA testing assert that claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Skinner, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Section 1983

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in which the majority found that Skinner had "properly invoked § 1983."

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel Alito. Thomas cautioned: "Allowing such challenges under § 1983 would undermine Congress' strict limitations on federal review of state habeas decisions. If cognizable at all, Skinner's claim sounds in habeas corpus."

Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.

jgoldman — Wed, 03 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

33° 44' 44.0628" N, 117° 52' 4.2024" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1314

Petitioner

Delbert Williamson, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mazda Motor of America, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Advocates

Martin N. Buchanan (for the petitioners)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Three members of the Williamson family were involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Delbert and Alexa wore lap/shoulder seatbelts and survived, while Thanh wore a lap-only seatbelt and died. Subsequently, they sued Mazda Motor of America for strict products liability, negligence, deceit, and wrongful death in a California state court. The court dismissed the claims, holding that federal law precluded a state court tort action "to the extent the theory of liability [was rooted in] the lap-only seat belt." On appeal, a California appellate court affirmed, holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") regulation allowing minivan rear seats to have either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts preempted state court wrongful death actions.

Question

Does the NHTSA regulation allowing vehicle manufacturers to install either lap-only or lap/shoulder seatbelts in certain seating positions impliedly preempt a state-law claim alleging that the manufacturer should have installed lap/should seatbelts in one of its seating positions?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Williamson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer. The court held that the state tort lawsuit in this case is not preempted by federal auto safety standards. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, while Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Sossamon v. Texas

jgoldman — Tue, 02 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1438

Petitioner

Harvey Leroy Sossamon III

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, April 20, 2011

Advocates

Kevin K. Russell (for the petitioner)

Sarah E. Harrington (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

James C. Ho (Solicitor General of Texas, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Harvey Sossamon, a Texas inmate, sued the state of Texas and various state officials in their official and individual capacities in a Texas federal district court. In part, he argued that he was denied access to the prison's chapel and religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). The district court dismissed the claim.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Sossamon could not sue Texas officials in their individual capacities under the RLUIPA. The court reasoned that because the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' Spending Power and not its Fourteenth Amendment Power, it did not create a cause of action for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Question

Under the RLUIPA, can a person sue a state official in his individual capacity for damages?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Texas, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: RLUIPA

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. "States, in accepting federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages under RLUIPA," Thomas wrote for the 6-2 majority. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Stephen J. Breyer. "Our precedents make clear that the phrase 'appropriate relief' includes monetary relief," she argued. "By adopting a contrary reading of the term, the majority severely undermines the 'broad protection of religious exercise' Congress intended the statute to provide." Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion

jgoldman — Tue, 09 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

32° 42' 55.1844" N, 117° 9' 26.118" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-893

Petitioner

AT&T Mobility LLC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vincent Concepcion, et ux.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, April 27, 2011

Advocates

Andrew J. Pincus (for the petitioner)

Deepak Gupta (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Customers brought a class action lawsuit against AT&T Mobility LLC in a California federal district court. They alleged that the company's offer of a free phone to anyone who signed up for its service was fraudulent to the extent the company charged the new subscriber sales tax on the retail value of each free phone. AT&T; moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained within its contract of service. The district court denied the motion.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that (1) the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") did not expressly or impliedly preempt California law governing unconcionability.

Question

Does the FAA preempt states from conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for AT&T, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Arbitration Act

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Justice Antonin Scalia. The 5-4 majority held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts "state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives." Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "The Court is wrong to hold that the federal Act pre-empts the rule of state law," wrote Breyer.

Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn

jgoldman — Wed, 03 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

33° 26' 54.1572" N, 112° 4' 26.5332" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-987

Petitioner

Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kathleen M. Winn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Decided

Monday, April 4, 2011

Advocates

Neal Kumar Katyal (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Paula S. Bickett (for the petitioners)

Paul Bender (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Arizona taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's tuition tax credit in an Arizona federal district court. They alleged the tax credit violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it funneled money to private religious schools. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the taxpayers had standing to bring their suit and had alleged a viable Establishment Clause claim.

Question

Do the plaintiffs lack standing because they cannot allege that the Arizona tuition tax credit involves the appropriation or expenditure of state funds?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: standing, Article III

Yes. The Supreme Court overturned the lower court in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. The majority held that the challengers to the tax credit in Arizona lack standing under Article III. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. "State sponsorship of religion sometimes harms individuals only (but this 'only' is no small matter) in their capacity as contributing members of our national community," Kagan wrote for the dissenters.

Mayo Foundation v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 08 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

44° 1' 17.8716" N, 92° 28' 11.6364" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-837

Petitioner

Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Argued

Monday, November 8, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (for the petitioners)

Matthew D. Roberts (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research ("Mayo") and the University of Minnesota ("University") sued the United States in a Minnesota federal district court seeking a refund for taxes paid under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"). They argued that payments made to doctors in their residency qualify for FICA's student exemption. The district court agreed and awarded judgment in favor of Mayo and the University.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the residents in this case did not qualify for the FICA exemption. The court reasoned that Treasury Regulation 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10) excludes "full-time employees" from the FICA student exemption. Here, the resident doctors were full-time employees and, therefore, were excluded from the FICA exemption.

Question

Can the Treasury Department categorically exclude all medical residents who meet the FICA definition of student and who would be subject to the FICA student exemption?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10)

Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. writing for a unanimous Court, upheld the Treasury Department's rule that treats medical residents as full-time employees, and therefore not exempt from the payment of payroll taxes is a valid interpretation of federal law. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the decision.

Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd

jgoldman — Wed, 02 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 0' 4.7988" N, 77° 24' 29.8692" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-98

Petitioner

John Ashcroft

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Abdullah al-Kidd

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, October 18, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2011

Advocates

Neal Kumar Katyal (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Lee Gelernt (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, the FBI arrested Abdullah al-Kidd as he was preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islamic law. He was held for 16 days as a material witness in the terrorism trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Al- Kidd has since argued the government classified him as a material witness because it lacked enough evidence to hold him as a suspect. He filed a lawsuit against then-Attorney General John Ashcroft personally, claiming that he created and authorized a program that allegedly misued the material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists.

The lawsuit did not go to trial and in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Ashcroft's bid for absolute immunity, holding that it didn't apply because the government's motive for arresting al- Kidd allegedly had nothing to do with the al-Hussayen prosecution.

Question

Is the former government official entitled to qualified immunity from the pretext claim based on the conclusions that (a) the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from executing a valid material witness warrant with the intent of conducting further investigation or preventively detaining the subject; and (b) this Fourth Amendment rule was clearly established at the time of Al-Kidd's arrest?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Ashcroft, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Efficient and even-handed application of the law demands that we look to whether the arrest is objectively justified, rather than to the motive of the arresting officer," Scalia wrote.

Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined as to Part I. Kennedy expressed concern that the court's "holding is limited to the arguments presented by the parties and leaves unresolved whether the government's use of the Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful."

Ginsburg filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined. Ginsburg also addressed the Material Witness Statute and wrote that Al-Kidd's "ordeal is a grim reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, constraints that will control officialdom even in perilous times."

Meanwhile, Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. "Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the pretextual use of a material witness warrant for preventive detention of an individual whom the Government has no intention of using at trial is, in my view, a closer question than the majority's opinion suggests," Sotomayor declared.

Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

DePierre v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 28 Feb 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

42° 21' 30.3516" N, 71° 3' 35.1828" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1533

Petitioner

Frantz DePierre

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 9, 2011

Advocates

Andrew J. Pincus (for the petitioner)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In April 2008, a federal court jury found Frantz DePierre guilty of distributing cocaine. He was also found guilty of distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, which carries a 10-year minimum sentence. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the sentence, citing its past precedent. The opinion also notes that the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits also interpret the statute the same way.

Question

Does the term "cocaine base" encompass every form of cocaine that is classified chemically as a base, or is the term "cocaine base" limited to "crack" cocaine?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: federal sentencing guidelines

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Cocaine base "means not just 'crack cocaine,' but cocaine in its chemically basic form," Sotomayor wrote for the court. Justice Antonin Scalia declines to join Section III-A, which is the portion of the opinion that discusses legislative history.

Duryea v. Guarnieri

jgoldman — Tue, 22 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 20' 38.2884" N, 75° 44' 18.6936" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1476

Petitioner

Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

harles J. Guarnieri

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2011

Advocates

Daniel R. Ortiz (for the petitioners)

Joseph R. Palmore (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioners)

Eric Schnapper (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2005, Duryea police chief Charles Guarnieri filed a discrimination lawsuit against the Pennsylvania borough, alleging that council members retaliated against him because he had successfully challenged a 2003 decision to fire him. Guarnieri had challenged his firing through arbitration and was reinstated to his position as chief in 2005. His suit alleged that council then issued 11 employment directives, which he claimed placed humiliating restrictions on him, to retaliate against him. He further alleged the borough improperly withheld overtime pay from him and had improperly delayed issuing health insurance benefits. A jury heard the case in April 2008 and awarded Guarnieri $45,358 in compensatory damages and $52,000 in punitive damages. The borough appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the verdict. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the overall verdict entered by a federal jury, but it overturned the panel's award of $52,000 in punitive damages. The ruling differs from decisions by all 10 other federal circuits and four state supreme courts.

Question

May state and local government employees sue their employers for retaliation under the First Amendment's Petition Clause when they petition the government on matters of private concern?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Duryea, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment, Petition Clause

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "A government employer's allegedly retaliatory actions against an employee do not give rise to liability under the Petition Clause unless the employee's petition relates to a matter of public concern," Kennedy wrote. "The Third Circuit's conclusion that the public concern test does not limit public employees' Petition Clause claims is incorrect." Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, writing: "Even where a public employee petitions the government in its capacity as sovereign, I would balance the employee's right to petition the sovereign against the government's interest as an employer in the effective and efficient management of its internal affairs." Meanwhile, Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in part: "I find the proposition that a lawsuit is a constitutionally protected 'Petition' quite doubtful."

Bond v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 22 Feb 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 57' 8.406" N, 75° 9' 49.6404" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1227

Petitioner

Carol Anne Bond

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, in support of the petitioner)

Stephen R. McAllister (for amicus curiae in support of the judgment below (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

Carol Anne Bond was found guilty of trying to poison her husband's mistress, Myrlinda Haynes, with toxic chemicals at least 24 times over the course of several months. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Bond with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of a criminal statute implementing the treaty obligations of the United States under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The grand jury also charged Bond with two counts of mail theft. Bond's attorneys argue that the statute was intended to deal with rogue states and terrorists and that their client should have been prosecuted under state law instead. Bond, a laboratory technician, stole the chemical potassium dichromate from the company where she worked. Haynes was not injured. Bond's husband had a child with Haynes while married to Bond. Haynes had contacted police and postal authorities after finding the chemicals at her home. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Bond lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on the basis of the Tenth Amendment.

Question

Does a criminal defendant, who has been convicted under a federal statute, have standing to challenge the conviction on grounds that the statute is beyond the federal government's enumerated powers and inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bond, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 10th Amendment

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Bond has standing to challenge the federal statute on grounds that the measure interferes with the powers reserved to States," Kennedy wrote. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer in which she argued: "I join the Court's opinion and write separately to make the following observation. Bond, like any other defendant, has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law."

Camreta v. Greene

jgoldman — Tue, 01 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

44° 3' 7.4484" N, 123° 5' 12.3144" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1454

Petitioner

Bob Camreta

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sarah Greene, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

09-1478, Alford v. Greene

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 2011

Decided

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Advocates

John R. Kroger (Attorney General of Oregon, for the petitioners)

Leondra R. Kruger (Acting Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Carolyn A. Kubitschek (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Sarah Greene filed a lawsuit against Bob Camreta, a caseworker with the Oregon Department of Human Services, and Deputy Sheriff James Alford, contending they interviewed her daughter without a warrant, probable cause or parental consent. The girl's father, Nimrod Greene, was arrested for allegedly molesting a 7-year-old boy. The boy's mother told police that Sarah Greene had complained that she "doesn't like the way Nimrod makes (his daughters) sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated and she doesn't like the way he acts when they are sitting in his lap." After interviewing one of the girls, Camreta concluded that she had been sexually abused and had the girls removed from the home. Nimrod was charged with sexually assaulting the boy and one of his own daughters. After a mistrial, he accepted a plea bargain in which he maintained his innocence but admitted there was enough evidence to convict him. Greene insisted the allegations were lies, and the daughter who was interviewed later recanted her statements. District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the lawsuit. In December 2009, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing Greene to pursue her Fourth Amendment claims against both defendants.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment require a warrant, a court order or parental consent before law enforcement and child welfare officials may conduct a temporary seizure and interview at a public school of a child whom they reasonably suspect was being sexually abused?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Camreta, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: mootness

The Supreme Court declined to address the Fourth Amendment question in the case. "We conclude that this Court generally may review a lower court's constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official granted immunity. But we may not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it. The case has become moot because the child has grown up and moved across the country, and so will never again be subject to the Oregon in-school interviewing practices whose constitutionality is at issue," Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the majority. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion and Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. "I agree with the Court's conclusion that this case is moot and that vacatur is the appropriate disposition; unlike the majority, however, I would go no further," Sotomayor wrote. "The majority suggests that we must decide whether Camreta has a 'right to appeal' in order to vacate the judgment below. But that view does not accord with our past practice." Meanwhile, Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. "The correct solution is not to override jurisdictional rules that are basic to the functioning of the Court and to the necessity of avoiding advisory opinions," Kennedy argued.

Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB

jgoldman — Wed, 23 Feb 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 47' 55.3596" N, 74° 14' 20.526" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-6

Petitioner

Global-Tech Appliances

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

SEB S.A.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2011

Advocates

William Dunnegan (for the petitioners)

R. Ted Cruz (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

French-based SEB S.A. sells home cooking products in the United States through an indirect subsidiary, T-Fal Corp. SEB owns a patent for a type of deep fryer with an inexpensive plastic outer shell. The improvement of the patent was to separate the shell from the fryer pan to allow for the less expensive material. Hong Kong-based Pentalpha Enterprises, a subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances, a British Virgin Islands corporation, began selling its deep fryers to Sunbeam Products Inc. in 1997. The company developed the product after purchasing an SEB deep fryer and copying its features. Though Pentalpha solicited and received a "right-to-use study" from a U.S. attorney citing no infringement of any patent, the company had failed to notify the attorney of the copying. SEB filed a lawsuit against Sunbeam and the companies settled. Though Pentalpha was aware of that litigation, it subsequently sold the same deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co. In 1999, SEB sued Montgomery Ward, Global-Tech, and Pentalpha for infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled against Pentalpha. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision and further held that "deliberate indifference" to potential patent rights satisfies the knowledge requirement for induced infringement.

Question

Does induced infringement under the patent clause require knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for SEB, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: patent infringement, 35 U. S. C. §271(b)

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court holding in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "Induced infringement under §271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement," Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Anthony Kennedy dissented, contending that the majority is "incorrect in the definition it now adopts; but even on its own terms the Court should remand to the Court of Appeals to consider in the first instance whether there is sufficient evidence of knowledge to support the jury’s finding of inducement."

Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:22:39 +0000

Location

United States

42° 58' 50.1528" N, 75° 48' 24.8688" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-72

Petitioner

Madison County, New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oneida Indian Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Decided

Monday, January 10, 2011

Facts of the Case

In 2005, U.S. District Judge David Hurd barred Oneida and Madison counties in New York from foreclosing on Oneida Indian Nation-owned properties on which taxes haven't been paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, noting that the counties don't have the right to sue an Indian tribe unless Congress has authorized the lawsuit or the tribe has waived its legal immunity.

Question

(1)Does tribal sovereign immunity from suit prevent taxing authorities from foreclosing to collect lawfully imposed property taxes?

(2) Is the ancient Oneida reservation in New York disestablished or diminished?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Madison County, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: None

In a per curiam decision, the Court vacated the judgment below. Because the Oneida Nation waived its sovereign immunity, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further proceedings in light of the waiver. Justice Sonia Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision in the case.

United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation

jgoldman — Mon, 01 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

32° 9' 1.0008" N, 112° 2' 40.9992" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-846

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tohono O'odham Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, April 19, 2010

Argued

Monday, November 1, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Advocates

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Danielle Spinelli (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2006, the Tohono O’odham Nation of Southern Arizona filed a complaint against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the United States government handled $2.1 billion in transactions for the nation between 1972 and 1992 and "has never fulfilled its duty to provide a true and adequate accounting' of the trust funds. The lawsuit also alleged "gross mismanagement" by the federal government. One day later, the tribe filed a similar complaint against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary damages for the earnings shortfall in its trust accounts. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the lawsuit because a similar claim was being heard by a different court in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1500. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the CFC's dismissal of the case, concluding, "the Nation’s complaint in the Court of Federal Claims seeks relief that is different from the relief sought in its earlier-filed district court action."

Question

A federal statute provides that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear a suit against the federal government raising a claim that is already being litigated against the government in another court. Does this provision apply when the plaintiff brings a lawsuit in both the Court of Federal Claims and another court based on the same set of facts, but seeks different forms of relief in the two cases?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC §1500

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "The Court of Appeals was wrong to allow its precedent to suppress the statute's aims," Kennedy wrote for the majority. "The conclusion that two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based on substantially the same operative facts allows the statute to achieve its aim." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which she argued: "To avoid both duplication and the running of the statute of limitations, the CFC suit could be stayed while the companion District Court action proceeds." Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case.

Staub v. Proctor Hospital

jgoldman — Tue, 02 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 41' 37.1364" N, 89° 35' 20.3496" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-400

Petitioner

Vincent E. Staub

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Proctor Hospital

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, April 19, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2011

Advocates

Eric Schnapper (for the petitioner)

Eric D. Miller (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

Roy G. Davis (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

As a member of the U.S. Army Reserves, Vincent Staub was required to attend occasional weekend training as well as a two-week training program during the summer. Staub was also a lab technician at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Ill. He was fired in 2004 and later filed a lawsuit claiming that his supervisor was out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military service. He won $57,640 in damages at trial. But a more senior executive, not the supervisor, ultimately decided to fire Staub. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the decision-maker shared the supervisor's anti-military bias.

Question

Can an employer be found liable for the discriminatory acts of supervisors, who do not themselves, make employment decisions but do influence the employment decision-makers?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Staub, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous decision announced by Justice Antonin Scalia. "If a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable," wrote Scalia. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in the judgment but wrote that he would hold employers liable if the person making the firing decision "merely rubberstamps" a biased supervisor's recommendation or when the decision-maker is "put on notice that adverse information about an employee may be based on antimilitary animus but does not undertake an independent investigation of the matter."

Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega, S.A.

jgoldman — Mon, 08 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

47° 31' 48.3636" N, 122° 1' 57.4284" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1423

Petitioner

Costco Wholesale Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Omega, S.A.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, April 19, 2010

Argued

Monday, November 8, 2010

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2010

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (for the petitioner)

Aaron M. Panner (for the respondent)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Watchmaker Omega S.A. sued Costco Wholesale Corp. when it bought a shipment of the Swiss-made watches from another importer and sold them for below Omega's suggested retail price. Omega contends that Costco's sale infringes on their copyright of the Omega logo on the back face of the watch. Meanwhile, Costco argues that Omega is precluded from bringing a copyright action after a sale due to the Doctrine of Exhaustion, or "first sale" rule, under which certain rights are "exhausted" after a sale of the copyrighted good.

A judge on the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California backed Costco, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the first-sale doctrine did not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.

Question

Under the first-sale doctrine of copyright law, someone who purchases a copyrighted work (like a book) can later sell the work to someone else without the permission of the copyright holder (the book's author). Does the "first- sale doctrine" apply to imported works manufactured abroad?

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Omega, S.A., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Copyright Act

The Court deadlocked 4-4, which means that the appeals court ruling against Costco stays in place, though the case sets no new high court precedent because it ended in a tie. The tie was possible because Justice Elena Kagan recused herself in the case.

Turner v. Rogers

jgoldman — Wed, 23 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

34° 44' 57.282" N, 82° 59' 35.3796" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-10

Petitioner

Michael D. Turner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rebecca L. Rogers, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, November 1, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2011

Advocates

Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioner)

Leondra R. Kruger (Acting Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, for the United States)

Stephanos Bibas (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In January 2007, Michael Turner appeared in Oconee County, S.C., Family Court because he was behind in his child support obligation. He did not have an attorney, and he was not asked whether he needed or wanted representation. He presented some evidence of his inability to work, but the court made no finding as to Turner's indigent status. The judge held him in contempt and sentenced him to one year in jail. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Turner's argument for court-appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Question

Do poor people who face incarceration for civil contempt have a Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney as protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Turner, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause

No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Stephen Breyer. "We conclude that where as here the custodial parent (entitled to receive the support) is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to the noncustodial parent (required to provide the support), " Breyer wrote for the 5-4 majority. "But we attach an important caveat, namely, that the State must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order." Meanwhile, Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined in full by Justice Antonin Scalia and in part by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings."

Davis v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 21 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

35° 54' 47.52" N, 79° 3' 21.0384" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-11328

Petitioner

Willie Gene Davis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, November 1, 2010

Argued

Monday, March 21, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Advocates

Orin S. Kerr (for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Police arrested Willie Gene Davis after a traffic stop. He subsequently gave a false name to the officers. After discovering his real name, the officers arrested him, handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false information to a police officer. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun in his jacket. He was charged and convicted for possession of an illegal weapon. Following a jury trial, Davis was convicted and sentenced to 220 months in prison. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that while the search was illegal the evidence found in the vehicle was still admissible.

Question

Does the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply to a search that was authorized by precedent at the time of the search but is subsequently ruled unconstitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 4th Amendment, Exclusionary Rule

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule," Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the judgment only. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Court finds a new 'good faith' exception which prevents application of the normal remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, namely, suppression of the illegally seized evidence," Breyer notes, adding: "At this point I can no longer agree with the Court. A new 'good faith' exception and this Court's retroactivity decisions are incompatible."

J.D.B. v. North Carolina

jgoldman — Wed, 23 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

32° 22' 0.498" N, 86° 17' 59.8884" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-11121

Petitioner

J.D.B.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

North Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, November 1, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Advocates

Barbara S. Blackman (for the petitioner)

Roy A. Cooper III (Attorney General of North Carolina, for the respondent)

Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A North Carolina boy identified as J.D.B. was 13-year-old special education student in 2005 when the police showed up at his school to question him about a string of neighborhood burglaries. The police had learned that the boy was in possession of a digital camera that had been reported stolen.The boy was escorted to a school conference room, where he was interrogated in the presence of school officials. J.D.B.'s parents were not contacted, and he was not given any warnings about his rights under the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, such as the right to remain silent or to have access to a lawyer. J.D.B. confessed to the crimes, but later sought to have his confession suppressed on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights. He argued that because he was effectively in police custody when he incriminated himself, he was entitled to Miranda protections. In December 2009, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it could not consider the boy's age or special education status in determining whether he was in custody, and because he was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings.

Question

Should courts consider the age of a juvenile suspect in deciding whether he or she is in custody for Miranda purposes?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for J.D.B., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Miranda Rights

Yes. A divided Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the state court to determine whether the youth was in custody when he was interrogated. (1966). "It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis," Sotomayor wrote for the majority. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. "The Court's decision in this case may seem on first consideration to be modest and sensible, but in truth it is neither, Alito writes. "It is fundamentally inconsistent with one of the main justifications for the Miranda rule: the perceived need for a clear rule that can be easily applied in all cases. And today's holding is not needed to protect the constitutional rights of minors who are questioned by the police."

Stanford University v. Roche Molecular Systems

jgoldman — Mon, 28 Feb 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 26' 30.7788" N, 122° 8' 34.8" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1159

Petitioner

Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., Roche Diagnostics Corp., Roche Diagnostics Operation Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Monday, November 1, 2010

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 6, 2011

Advocates

Donald B. Ayer (for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Mark C. Fleming (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The case arose over a licensing dispute between Stanford University and pharmaceutical firm Roche Molecular System over the ownership of patents used in the company’s HIV test kits. Stanford School of Medicine professor Mark Holodniy developed the technology behind the kits. As a researcher at the university, patents from his work would normally be automatically assigned to Stanford. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to retain the rights to research funded by federal grants. But Holodniy also signed a contract with Cetus Corp., a company that later sold its line of business to Roche, that give the company the patent to anything that resulted from their collaboration. In February 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the university lacked standing to maintain patent infringement claims against Roche.

Question

Must patents on inventions that arise from federally-funded research go to the university where the inventor worked?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Roche Molecular Systems, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bayh-Dole Act, patent infringement

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts. "The Bayh-Dole Act does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions," Roberts wrote for the majority. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, noting that while she agrees with them majority that "the appropriate disposition is to affirm. Like the dissent, however, I understand the majority opinion to permit consideration of these arguments in a future case." Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the case should have been remanded to the Federal Circuit for further argument.

Fox v. Vice

jgoldman — Tue, 22 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

30° 11' 26.7468" N, 93° 34' 52.5792" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-114

Petitioner

Ricky D. Fox

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Billy Ray Vice, chief of police for the town of Vinton; Troy Cary, police officer for town of Vinton; Town of Vinton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Monday, November 1, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 6, 2011

Advocates

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the petitioner)

Mark T. Stancil (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In January 2005, Vinton, Louisiana Police Chief Billy Ray Vice, who was seeking re-election to his post, sent fellow candidate Ricky Fox an “anonymous” letter trying to blackmail him into dropping out of the race. A month later, someone accused Fox of uttering a racial slur and, at Vice's instigation, filed a false police report regarding Fox's alleged use of the term. Fox brought a civil rights suit against Vice and the town in state court in December 2005, asserting both state and federal claims, and the case was removed to federal court in January 2006. Separately, in April 2007, Vice was tried and found guilty of extortion in state criminal court for the anonymous letter. In 2007, in response to a motion filed by the defendants, Fox admitted that he had failed to properly present any federal cause of action, so the district court dismissed Fox's federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. The district court then granted the defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, finding that Fox's federal claims were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Fox appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and in a split decision the appeals court affirmed the district court's order.

Question

Can a court award attorneys' fees to civil rights defendants based on a dismissal of a claim when the plaintiff has asserted other nonfrivolous claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fox, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. §1983

Yes. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. "When a plaintiff's suit involves both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a court may grant reasonable fees to the defendant, but only for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims," Kagan wrote.

CIGNA v. Amara

jgoldman — Tue, 30 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 36' 11.5956" N, 73° 5' 15.8964" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-804

Petitioner

CIGNA Corp. and CIGNA Pension Plan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Janice C. Amara, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Decided

Monday, May 16, 2011

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (for the petitioners)

Stephen R. Bruce (for the respondents)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), plan administrators must provide all plan participants with a "summary plan description" (SPD), as well as a "summary of material modifications" when material changes are made to the plan. After CIGNA converted its traditional defined benefit pension plan to a cash balance plan, it issued a summary plan description to plan participants. In 2001, Janice Amara, one of the participants, filed a class- action lawsuit, claiming that CIGNA failed to comply with ERISA's notice requirements and SPD provisions. The U.S. District Court for the District Connecticut found for Amara, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the SPD misrepresented the terms of the plan itself.

Question

Did the district court have authority under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA to reform CIGNA’s pension plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for CIGNA, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: ERISA §502(a)(3)

No. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order, finding that while the district court did not have authority under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA to reform CIGNA’s pension plan, it did have authority to do so under another provision, Section 502(a)(3). In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court noted that "although §502(a)(1)(B) did not give the District Court authority to reform CIGNA's plan, relief is authorized by §502(a)(3), which allows a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 'to obtain other appropriate equitable relief' to redress violations of ERISA 'or the [plan's] terms.'" Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas concurred only in the judgment. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not take part in consideration of the case.

Brown v. Plata

jgoldman — Tue, 30 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 34' 53.6592" N, 121° 29' 39.84" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1233

Appellant

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California, et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Marciano Plata, et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 14, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2011

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (for the appellants)

Donald Specter (for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

The Prison Law Office in Berkeley, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit in April 2001 on behalf of Marciano Plata and several other prisoners, alleging that California prisons were in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which bans "cruel and unusual punishment." Following a lengthy trial, a special panel of three federal judges determined that serious overcrowding in California's 33 prisons was the "primary cause" for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court ordered the release of enough prisoners so the inmate population would come within 137.5 percent of the prisons' total design capacity. That amounts to between 38,000 and 46,000 inmates being released.

Question

Does a court order requiring California to reduce its prison population to remedy unconstitutional conditions in its correctional facilities violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Plata, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of special panel in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "The court-mandated population limit is necessary to remedy the violation of prisoners' constitutional rights and is authorized by the PLRA," Kenney wrote for the 5-4 majority. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which he admonished the majority for affirming "what is perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history: an order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000 convicted criminals." Justice Samuel Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, in which he wrote that the "Constitution does not give federal judges the authority to run state penal systems."

Wall v. Kholi

jgoldman — Mon, 29 Nov 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 49' 26.3604" N, 71° 24' 46.2024" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-868

Petitioner

A.T. Wall, Director of Rhode Island Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Khalil Kholi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Monday, May 17, 2010

Argued

Monday, November 29, 2010

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2011

Advocates

Aaron L. Weisman (for the petitioner)

Judith H. Mizner (for the respondent (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

In December 1993, a Rhode Island jury convicted Khalil Kholi on 10 counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from the alleged molestation of his two step-daughters. A judge on the state superior court sentenced Kholi to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, and the state supreme court affirmed the conviction in February 1996. Kholi did not file a federal writ of habeas corpus at that time. Instead, he filed a motion seeking sentence reduction as a form of post-conviction relief, which was denied. Kholi exhausted his procedural options regarding sentence reduction in 2007, at which time he began his appeal for federal writ of habeas corpus, which was well beyond the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s standard one-year limitation on filing. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's judgment that a petition for leniency is different from an appeal to correct legal errors and therefore does not result in a tolling of the statute of limitations under AEDPA. A circuit split exists on the issue. The First Circuit's decision was in line with a Tenth Circuit ruling on the same issue, but the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have previously ruled that a petition for leniency does not toll the statute of limitations under AEDPA.

Question

Inmates have one year to file a habeas challenge to their sentence in federal court after conviction. The running of that time is delayed while the conviction is under review in state court. Is the time also tolled while a state court considers an inmate’s request for a sentence reduction?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kholi, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: habeas corpus

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito. "Because the parties agree that a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law is not part of the direct review process, we hold that respondent's motion tolled the AEDPA limitation period and that his federal habeas petition was therefore timely," Alito wrote for the court.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but disagreeing with "Footnote 3 of the Court's opinion, which declines to decide whether a Rule 35 motion seeks direct review."

Tolentino v. New York

jgoldman — Mon, 21 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 42' 51.6708" N, 74° 0' 21.5028" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-11556

Petitioner

Jose Tolentino

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, November 15, 2010

Argued

Monday, March 21, 2011

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Advocates

Kristina Schwarz (for the petitioner)

Caitlin J. Halligan (for the respondent)

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Jose Tolentino was pulled over for playing his music too loudly. The officer ran a check on Tolentino's DMV files and discovered that not only was his license suspended, but it had also been suspended at least 10 times prior. Tolentino was arrested and charged with first-degree aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. He pleaded guilty in exchange for five years' probation. He later appealed, claiming his driving record should have been suppressed, because the police stop and subsequent DMV record search were illegal. The Court of Appeals of New York, the state’s highest court, disagreed and upheld his sentence.

Question

Can an individual's motor vehicle records be used as evidence if the police consulted those records only after making an illegal stop of the individual's vehicle?

Conclusion

In a per curiam opinion, the case was dismissed as improvidently granted.

Fowler v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 29 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

28° 33' 18.0036" N, 81° 37' 59.268" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-5443

Petitioner

Charles Andrew Fowler, aka Man

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, November 15, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Decided

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Advocates

Stephen M. Crawford (for the petitioner)

Sarah E. Harrington (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Charles Andrew Fowler shot and killed Christopher Todd Horner for trying to interfere with his plan to rob a bank with four other men. Horner had approached Fowler's accomplices as they sat in a stolen Oldsmobile, decked out in black clothes and gloves. Fowler, who had stepped out of the car to use cocaine, snuck up behind Horner, grabbed his gun, forced him to get on his knees and shot him in the back of the head. One of Fowler's accomplices later implicated him in the murder, and a jury convicted Fowler of killing Horner with the intent to prevent him from communicating information about a federal offense. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus 10 years. Fowler claimed the government failed to prove that a federal investigation would have been likely, and that Horner would have transferred the information to a federal officer or judge. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling.

Question

To prove a criminal violation of the federal witness tampering statute when a defendant allegedly kills a witness, must the government prove that the victim would have provided information regarding a crime to a court or a law enforcement officer?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Fowler, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: federal witness tampering conviction, 18 U.S.C. §1512(a)(1)(C)

Yes. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Stephen Breyer. "The Government must show that there was a reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer," Breyer wrote. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he wrote that "although I agree the case should be remanded for the Eleventh Circuit to consider whether the objection to sufficiency of the evidence was preserved or whether the District Court committed plain error, I would hold that there was insufficient evidence to support Fowler’s conviction." Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. The majority opinion " veers off course when it goes on to hold that the prosecution was required to show that, if Officer Horner had not been killed, there was a 'reasonable likelihood' that his information would have reached a federal officer," Alito wrote.

Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting

jgoldman — Wed, 08 Dec 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

33° 26' 54.1572" N, 112° 4' 26.5332" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-115

Petitioner

Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael B. Whiting, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 2010

Decided

Thursday, May 26, 2011

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners)

Neal Kumar Katyal (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Various business and civil-rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act ("LAWA") in an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E-Verify employment verification system and revokes business licenses of those who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute.

On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring or recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing laws – like LAWA – from preemptive reach. The court also reasoned that mandating the use of E-Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states form requiring E-Verify participation.

Question

An Arizona law requires state employers to check the immigration status of job applicants through a federal computer database, although the federal law creating the database makes its use voluntary. Arizona also revokes the business license of state companies that hire undocumented workers. Are these provisions pre-empted by federal immigration laws?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Whiting, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration Reform and Control Act

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court holding in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Arizona's licensing law falls well within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the States and therefore is not expressly preempted." All five members of the majority did not join the chief justice's opinion in full. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "Congress did not intend its 'licensing' language to create so broad an exemption, for doing so would permit States to eviscerate the federal Act's preemption provision," Breyer wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a separate dissent in which she contended that she "would also hold that federal law pre-empts the provision of the Arizona Act making mandatory the use of E-Verify, the federal electronic verification system." The Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders

jgoldman — Tue, 07 Dec 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 44' 20.9544" N, 104° 59' 4.9308" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-525

Petitioner

Janus Capital Group, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

First Derivative Traders

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2011

Advocates

Mark A. Perry (for the petitioners)

David C. Frederick (for the respondent)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

First Derivative Traders, individually, and on behalf of various Janus Capital Group ("JCG") shareholders sued JCG and its investment advisor subsidiary Janus Capital Management ("JCM") in the Colorado federal district court (subsequently transferred to the Maryland federal district court) alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. They argued that JCG and JCM unlawfully made misleading statements in prospectuses about various Janus funds, most notably that it did not permit "market timing" of the funds – the practice of rapidly trading in and out of a mutual fund to take advantage of inefficiencies in the way the funds are valued. The district court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that investors stated a claim against JCG and JCM by asserting that both were responsible for making misleading statements about the funds' prohibition of market timing. The court reasoned that JCG investors would have inferred that, even if JCM had not itself written the alleged misstatements about JCG's practice of market timing, JCM must have at least approved of the statements.

Question

Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that a service provider – in this case JCM – can be held liable in a private securities fraud action for "helping or participating in" another company's misstatements?

Did the Fourth Circuit err in concluding that a service provider – in this case JCM – can be held liable in a private securities fraud action for statements that were not directly and contemporaneously attributable to the service provider?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Janus Capital Group, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. "Because the false statements included in the prospectuses were made by Janus Investment Fund, not by JCM, JCM and JCG cannot be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b–5," Justice Thomas wrote. Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "The majority has incorrectly interpreted the Rule's word 'make,'" Breyer argued. "Both language and case law indicate that, depending upon the circumstances, a management company, a board of trustees, individual company officers, or others, separately or together, might 'make' statements contained in a firm's prospectus—even if a board of directors has ultimate content-related responsibility."

Henderson v. Shinseki

jgoldman — Mon, 06 Dec 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 44' 20.9544" N, 104° 59' 4.9308" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1036

Petitioner

Doretha H. Henderson, Authorized Representative of David L. Henderson, Deceased

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2010

Argued

Monday, December 6, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2011

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (for the petitioner)

Eric D. Miller (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

David Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office based on his need for in-home care. The Regional Office denied the claim. Mr. Henderson appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Office. He then filed a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims fifteen days after the expiration of the 120-day appeal period set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). The court of appeals denied the claim. The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Henderson's notice of appeal was out of time and was not subject to equitable tolling.

Question

Is the time limit in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) subject to equitable tolling?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Henderson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Veterans’ Judicial Review Act

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. The majority held that the deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court does not have jurisdictional consequences. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Milner v. Department of the Navy

jgoldman — Wed, 01 Dec 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

48° 3' 12.5604" N, 122° 43' 38.1396" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1163

Petitioner

Glen Scott Milner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department of the Navy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 2010

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2011

Advocates

David S. Mann (for the petitioner)

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Glen Milner, a member of an organization dedicated to raising community awareness about the dangers of Navy training exercises near Puget Sound, sued the Department of the Navy in a Washington federal district court under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") to obtain the release of Navy documents relating to the effects of explosions at several locations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that documents relating to the effects of explosions constituted internal personnel rules and regulations of the agency which are subject to exemption from disclosure by the FOIA. The court reasoned that such documents are "predominantly" for internal agency use that present a risk, that if disclosed, would circumvent agency regulation.

Question

Did the Ninth Circuit err by exempting documents relating to the effects of explosions from disclosure under the FOIA because they are "predominantly" for internal use and present a risk of circumventing agency regulation?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Milner, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: FOIA

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in an 8-1 opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. The majority opinion held that "because Exemption 2 encompasses only records relating to employee relations and human resources issues, the explosives maps and data requested here do not qualify for withholding under that exemption."

Justice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which he agreed with the judgment but noted: "I write separately to underscore the alternative argument that the Navy raised below, which rested on Exemption 7(F) and which will remain open on remand. " Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, backing the decision of the appeals court and writing that in this case, "I would let sleeping legal dogs lie."

Pepper v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 06 Dec 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

42° 29' 59.9784" N, 96° 24' 1.1052" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-6822

Petitioner

Pason Pepper

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2010

Argued

Monday, December 6, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Advocates

Alfredo Parrish (for the petitioner (appointed by the Court))

Roy W. McLeese (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Adam G. Ciongoli (for amicus curiae in support of the judgment below (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

Jason Pepper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in an Iowa federal district court. In the latest of a long-running series of appeals and remands, a newly assigned Iowa federal district court sentenced Mr. Pepper to 77 months imprisonment and 12 months supervised release – a 20% downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory range. Thereafter, the district court granted the government's motion to reduce Mr. Pepper's sentence further to 65 months imprisonment because of the assistance Mr. Pepper provided after he was initially sentenced. Mr. Pepper appealed arguing in part that the district court should consider evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation to reduce his sentence further.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Pepper's sentence, holding in part that evidence of a defendant's post- sentence rehabilitation was not relevant at resentencing. The court reasoned that Eighth Circuit precedent was clear that such evidence was not relevant.

Question

1) Can a federal district judge consider a defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation as a permissible factor supporting a sentencing variance?

2) As a sentencing consideration, should post-sentencing rehabilitation be treated the same as post-offense rehabilitation

3) When a federal district judge is removed from resentencing a defendant after remand and a new judge is assigned, is the new judge obligated to follow sentencing findings issued by the original judge?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Pepper, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sentencing Guidelines

Yes and no. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the case back to the lower court in a majority opinion written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The Court held that when the defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant's rehabilitation after the initial sentences; and, that evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines.

Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurrence in which he agreed with the majority that the "law does not require a sentencing court to follow a Guideline policy statement that forbids taking account of post-sentencing rehabilitation." He went on, however, to suggest: "this conclusion does not leave a sentencing court free to disregard the Guidelines at will." Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito filed a partial concurrence and partial dissent, contending that "requiring judges to give significant weight to the Commission's policy decisions does not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment right that the mandatory Guidelines system was found to violate, i.e., the right to have a jury make certain factual findings that are relevant to sentencing." Justice Clarence Thomas dissented in full, writing that he would have affirmed the lower court's decision and upheld Pepper's sentence. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

Thompson v. North American Stainless

jgoldman — Tue, 07 Dec 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 40' 29.4096" N, 85° 3' 53.6652" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-291

Petitioner

Eric Thompson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

North American Stainless LP

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, June 29, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2011

Advocates

Eric Schnapper (for the petitioner)

Leondra R. Kruger (Acting Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Leigh Gross Latherow (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Eric Thompson and his fiancée-then-wife, Miriam Regalado, worked for North American Stainless, the owner and operator of a stainless steel manufacturing facility in Carroll County, KY. Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in September 2002, alleging that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her gender. On February 13, 2003, the EEOC notified North American Stainless of the charge. Slightly more than three weeks later, North American Stainless terminated Thompson's employment. Thompson filed a complaint, which alleged that he was fired in retaliation for Regalado's EEOC charge. Retaliating in that way, Thompson asserted, violated section 704(a) of Title VII, which forbids an employer to "discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has... made a charge ... under this title." The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Thompson's complaint, holding that Title VII "does not permit third party retaliation claims." A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court order. But the court of appeals granted the employer's petition for rehearing en banc. A splintered en banc court upheld the dismissal of Thompson's complaint.

Question

Does an employer violate an anti-retaliation provision of a federal civil rights statute by firing the fiancée of the employee who complained about discrimination? Can the fired employee sue, or only the employee who filed the complaint?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Thompson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Title VII 1964 Civil Rights Act

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, which held that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct, including Thompson's cause of action. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.

Wal-Mart v. Dukes

jgoldman — Tue, 29 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 1' 40.7136" N, 121° 53' 4.848" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-277

Petitioner

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Betty Dukes, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, December 6, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2011

Advocates

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the petitioner)

Joseph M. Sellers (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Betty Dukes, a Wal-Mart "greeter" at a Pittsburg, Calif., store, and five other women filed a class-action lawsuit in which they alleged that the company's nationwide policies resulted in lower pay for women than men in comparable positions and longer wait for management promotions than men. The certified class, which in 2001 was estimated to comprise more than 1.5 million women, includes all women employed by Wal-Mart nationwide at any time after December 26, 1998, making this the largest class action lawsuit in U.S. history. Wal-Mart has argued that the court should require employees to file on an individual basis, contending that class actions of this size – formed under Rule 23(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure — are inherently unmanageable and unduly costly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has three times upheld the class certification.

Question

Can the small group of women who began the case represent a gigantic class of women?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wal-Mart, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2)

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Here, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents' merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination. The crux of a Title VII inquiry is 'the reason for a particular employment decision,' and respondents wish to sue for millions of employment decisions at once," Scalia wrote. "Without some glue holding together the alleged reasons for those decisions, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims will produce a common answer to the crucial discrimination question." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "Whether the class the plaintiffs describe meets the specific requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) is not before the Court, and I would reserve that matter for consideration and decision on remand," Ginsburg wrote.

American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut

jgoldman — Tue, 19 Apr 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 42' 49.95" N, 74° 0' 2.9376" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-174

Petitioner

American Electric Power Company Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Connecticut, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, December 6, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, April 19, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2011

Advocates

Peter D. Keisler (for the petitioners)

Neal Kumar Katyal (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent Tennessee Valley Authority in support of the petitioners)

Barbara D. Underwood (Solicitor General of New York, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Eight states, New York City and three land conservation groups filed suit against four electric power companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, five entities that they claimed were the largest sources of greenhouse gases. The lawsuit alleged that the utility companies, which operate facilities in 21 states, are a public nuisance because their carbon-dioxide emissions contribute to global warming. American Electric Power Co. and the other utilities argued that the courts should not get involved in the issue. The companies contended that only the Environmental Protection Agency can set emissions standards. A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially threw out the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said it could continue.

The states in the lawsuit are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. The Open Space Institute, the Open Space Conservancy and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire also are plaintiffs. The other utilities are Cinergy Co., Southern Co. Inc. of Georgia, and Xcel Energy Inc. of Minnesota.

Question

(1) Can states and private parties seek to curb emissions on utilities for their alleged contribution to global climate change?

(2) Can a cause of action to reduce carbon dioxide emissions be implied under federal common law?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for American Electric Power Co., Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Air Act

No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Clean Air Act and the EPA action the Act authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants." Justice Samuel Alito concurred in part and in the judgment, writing: " I agree with the Court's displacement analysis on the assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party contends otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA is correct." Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not take part in consideration of the case.

Tapia v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 18 Apr 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

32° 42' 55.1844" N, 117° 9' 26.1" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-5400

Petitioner

Alejandra Tapia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2010

Argued

Monday, April 18, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Advocates

Reuben C. Cahn (for the petitioner)

Matthew D. Roberts (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent in support of vacatur)

Stephanos Bibas (for amicus curiae (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

Alejandra Tapia was convicted of bringing illegal aliens into the United States and of jumping bail after being charged with immigration crimes. Following the jury trial, a judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced Tapia to 51 months in prison, noting that one factor in giving her a longer sentence was to make sure she remained confined long enough to take part in a drug rehab program.

Tapia appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court committed plain error by basing her sentence on speculation about whether and when she could enter and complete the Bureau of Prison's 500-hour drug abuse treatment program. But in April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.

Question

Can a district court give a defendant a longer prison sentence to promote rehabilitation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Tapia, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. §3582(a)

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court holding in a unanimous decision by Justice Elena Kagan. "Section 3582(a) does not permit a sentencing court to impose or lengthen a prison term in order to foster a defendant's rehabilitation," Kagan wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Samuel Alito in which she wrote: "I agree with the Court's conclusion that 18 U. S. C. §3582(a) 'precludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant's rehabilitation. ' I write separately to note my skepticism that the District Judge violated this proscription in this case."

Talk America Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.

jgoldman — Wed, 30 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

42° 43' 57.126" N, 84° 33' 19.9224" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-313

Petitioner

Talk America, Incorporated

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Bell Telephone Company, dba AT&T Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

10-329, Orjiakor Isiogu, et al., Petitioners v. Michigan Bell Telephone Company, dba AT&T Michigan

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, March 30, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 9, 2011

Advocates

John J. Bursch (for the petitioner)

Eric D. Miller (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

Scott H. Angstreich (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress sought to open up the local telephone markets to competition by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share their equipment and services with competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). Under early interpretations of the law, incumbent-constructed entrance facilities had to provide at-cost access to the competitors. In AT&T Inc. unit Michigan Bell Telephone Co.'s interpretation, the FCC's Triennial Review Remand Order in 2005 created a means to charge for the use of the facilities, and the company announced plans to do so.

Competitor carriers complained to the Michigan Public Service Commission, and it ruled that the entrance facilities should still be provided at cost. Michigan Bell sued in federal court and won. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does federal law require local telephone companies, already established, to allow new competitors in their markets to link to the existing networks through connecting wires at low, government-regulated rates?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Talk America Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U. S. C. §251(c)(3)

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the lower court in a decision by Justice Clarence Thomas. "The FCC has advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations — i.e., that to satisfy its duty under §251(c)(2), an incumbent LEC must make its existing entrance facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates if the facilities are to be used for interconnection — and this Court defers to the FCC’s views," Thomas wrote. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, noting: "I would reach the same result even without benefit of the rule that we will defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations." Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.

PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing

jgoldman — Wed, 30 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

44° 58' 47.874" N, 93° 15' 49.788" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-993

Petitioner

PLIVA, Inc. et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gladys Mensing

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

09-1501, Actavis, Inc. v. Julie Demahy

09-1039, Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Gladys Mensing

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, March 30, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Advocates

Jay P. Lefkowitz (for the petitioners)

Louis M. Bograd (for the respondents)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Gladys Mensing took the drug metoclopramide for four years to help fight diabetic gastroparesis. She filed a lawsuit against the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors, contending that the drug gave her a severe neurological movpent disorder, tardive dyskinesia, but none of the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors made any effort to include warnings on the label.

Metoclopramide manufacturers Pliva Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth LLC asked for the lawsuit to be thrown out, arguing that government regulations require thp to have the same label on metoclopramide as is on its brand-name equivalent, Reglan. Reglan did not have a warning about tardive dyskinesia while Mensing was taking metoclopramide.

A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota agreed, saying the lawsuit was pre-ppted by the federal regulations requiring the two labels to match. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit overturned that ruling, holding that more should have been done to warn consumers about possible risks.

Question

Can generic drug makers be sued for not warning about potentially dangerous side effects on their drug labels even when they follow federal rules that only require their labels to match those of their brand-name equivalents?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for PLIVA, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: pre-emption, federal drug regulations

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion in part. "We defer to the FDA's interpretation of its CBE and generic labeling regulations," Justice Thomas wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan. "We have traditionally held defendants claiming impossibility to a demanding standard: Until today, the mere possibility of impossibility had not been enough to establish pre-emption," Sotomayor wrote.

J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro

jgoldman — Tue, 11 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 25' 40.3824" N, 74° 24' 57.528" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1343

Petitioner

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert Nicastro, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2011

Advocates

Arthur F. Fergenson (for the petitioner)

Alexander W. Ross Jr. (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

An accident severed four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro who was operating a recycling machine used to cut metal. A British company manufactured the machine and sold it through its exclusive U.S. distributor. Nicastro sued J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., in New Jersey state court for product liability. The state supreme court reversed a trial court's dismissal, finding that the foreign company had sufficient contacts with the state.

Question

May a consumer sue a foreign manufacturer in state court over a product that the foreign company marketed and sold in the United States?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for McIntyre, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: jurisdiction

No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court in a plurality opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Although the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an extensive opinion with careful attention to this Court's cases and to its own precedent, the 'stream of commerce' metaphor carried the decision far afield," Kennedy wrote. "Due process protects the defendant's right not to be coerced except by lawful judicial power." Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, concurred in the judgment, writing: "I do not doubt that there have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case does not present any of those issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences." Meanwhile, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered majority today 'turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.'"

Goodyear v. Brown

jgoldman — Tue, 11 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

34° 39' 14.4324" N, 77° 28' 12.684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-76

Petitioner

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Edgar D. Brown, et ux., Co-Administrators of the Estate of Julian David Brown, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2011

Advocates

Meir Feder (for the petitioners)

Benjamin J. Horwich (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The families of two North Carolina teenagers killed in a bus crash in France brought suit in North Carolina state court, alleging faulty tires. The tires were made in Turkey, and the plaintiffs sued Goodyear's Luxembourg affiliate and its branches in Turkey and France. A North Carolina appeals court held that the foreign defendants had sufficient contacts in the state to support general personal jurisdiction.

Question

May a consumer sue a foreign manufacturer in a U.S. court when the manufacturer’s only connection with the United States is that another company sells its products in this country?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Goodyear, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "A connection so limited between the forum and the foreign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction," Ginsburg wrote. "Such a connection does not establish the 'continuous and systematic' affiliation necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain claims unrelated to the foreign corporation's contacts with the State."

General Dynamics Corp. v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 18 Jan 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 52' 56.4024" N, 77° 10' 15.924" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1298

Petitioner

General Dynamics Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

09-1302, The Boeing Company, Successor to McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. United States

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2011

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (for the petitioners)

Neal Kumar Katyal (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

More than 20 years ago, General Dynamics Corp. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. signed a contract to build eight A- 12 Avenger stealth fighters for the U.S. Navy at a total estimated cost of more than $4 billion. Three years later, the Navy and then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared the company in default and canceled the contract. The government has argued that the companies weren't able to produce the aircraft as designed on schedule and is seeking repayment of $1.35 billion, plus more than $2.5 billion in accumulated interest, arguing that the companies failed to meet the terms of the contract. Meanwhile, General Dynamics Corp. and Boeing Co., which inherited the litigation through its purchase of McDonnell Douglas, contend that the delay was caused by the government's refusal to share essential stealth technology.

The government has argued that the companies couldn't press that argument because litigating the issue would require the disclosure of military secrets and jeopardize national security. Two lower courts agreed.

Question

The "state secrets" doctrine prevents disclosure of important state secrets in litigation. Can the government sue a federal contractor for breach of contract then use the state secrets doctrine to prevent the contractor from raising a defense that would require the contractor to disclose secret information?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for General Dynamics, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: state secrets

No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Antonin Scalia. The court held that neither the government nor the defense contractors could pursue the long-running dispute because of the possibility that state secrets might be revealed. "Suit on the contract, or for performance rendered or funds paid under the contract, will not lie, and the parties will be left where they are,” Scalia wrote. "Both parties—the government no less than petitioners—must have assumed the risk that state secrets would prevent the adjudication of claims of inadequate performance."

CSX Transportation v. McBride

jgoldman — Mon, 28 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 58' 29.1504" N, 87° 33' 21.0528" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-235

Petitioner

CSX Transportation, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert McBride

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, November 29, 2010

Argued

Monday, March 28, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (for the petitioner)

David C. Frederick (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Locomotive engineer Robert McBride filed suit after contending that he injured his hand while adding and removing railroad cars for his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a rail carrier is liable for worker injuries that result from negligence by the carrier. A trial judge instructed the jury that CSX caused or contributed to McBride's injury if its negligence "played a part, no matter how small, in bringing about the injury." The jury found for McBride and awarded him $184,250.

CSX argued that McBride should have been required to prove that the company's alleged negligence was a cause of the injury. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed, affirming the verdict.

Question

Does the Federal Employers' Liability Act require proof of proximate causation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for McBride, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Employers' Liability Act

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The charge proper in FELA cases, we hold, simply tracks the language Congress employed, informing juries that a defendant railroad caused or contributed to a plaintiff employee's injury if the railroad's negligence played any part in bringing about the injury," Ginsburg wrote for the majority. Meanwhile, Chief Justice John Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and Samuel Alito. "The Court is wrong to dispense with that familiar element of an action seeking recovery for negligence, an element 'generally thought to be a necessary limitation on liability,'" Roberts wrote.

Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership

jgoldman — Mon, 18 Apr 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

29° 45' 46.3824" N, 95° 22' 59.0196" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-290

Petitioner

Microsoft Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

I4I Limited Partnership, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, November 29, 2010

Argued

Monday, April 18, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 9, 2011

Advocates

Thomas G. Hungar (for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (for the respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The owner of a patent for a computer language, i4i Limited Partnership brought suit against Microsoft Corp., alleging that the custom XML editor in certain versions of Microsoft Word, Microsoft's word-processing software, infringed i4i's patent. The jury found Microsoft liable for willful infringement, rejecting the company's argument that the patent was invalid, and awarded $200 million in damages to i4i.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Microsoft's motions for a new trial. And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court order, finding that Microsoft needed to offer "clear and convincing evidence" to overcome the traditional presumption that patents approved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are valid.

Question

Must a challenge to a patent's validity offer clear and convincing evidence as proof

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for i4i Limited Partnership, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Patent invalidity

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. "Section 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence," Sotomayor wrote. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito, in which he "join[s] the Court's opinion in full" but added that "I write separately because, given the technical but important nature of the invalidity question, I believe it worth emphasizing that in this area of law as in others the evidentiary standard of proof applies to questions of fact and not to questions of law."

Arizona Free Enterprise Club Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett

jgoldman — Mon, 28 Mar 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 58' 29.1504" N, 87° 33' 21.0528" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-238

Petitioner

Arizona Free Enterprise Club Freedom Club PAC, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ken Bennett, in His Official Capacity as Arizona Secretary of State, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

10-239, McComish v. Bennett

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, November 29, 2010

Argued

Monday, March 28, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2011

Advocates

William R. Maurer (for the petitioners)

Bradley S. Phillips (for the respondents)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Arizona enacted a campaign finance law that provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing. The law, passed in 1998, gives an initial sum to candidates for state office who accept public financing and then provides additional matching funds based on the amounts spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups. In 2008, some Republican candidates and a political action committee, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, filed suit arguing that to avoid triggering matching funds for their opponents, they had to limit their spending and, in essence, their freedom of speech.

The U.S. District Court for District of Arizona found the matching-funds provision unconstitutional. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the case, saying it found "minimal" impact on freedom of speech.

Question

Does the First Amendment prohibit linking the funds participating candidates receive in an election to the amount of money raised by or spent on behalf of their opponents?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Arizona's matching funds scheme substantially burdens political speech and is not sufficiently justified by a compelling interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny," the chief justice writing for the majority, noted that the holding does not contend that the First Amendment forbids all public financing. Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. "The First Amendment’s core purpose is to foster a healthy, vibrant political system full of robust discussion and debate," Kagan argued, adding: "Nothing in Arizona's anti-corruption statute, the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, violates this constitutional protection. To the contrary, the Act promotes the values underlying both the First Amendment and our entire Constitution by enhancing the 'opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.'"

Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.

jgoldman — Mon, 25 Apr 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

29° 45' 46.3824" N, 95° 22' 58.8" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-1403

Petitioner

Erica P. John Fund, Inc., fka Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Halliburton Co., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2011

Argued

Monday, April 25, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 6, 2011

Advocates

David Boies (for the petitioner)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A group of Halliburton Co. shareholders, led by the Erica P. John Fund, filed a lawsuit that contends that from 1999 to 2001, the Houston-based company falsified earnings reports, played down estimated asbestos liability and overstated the benefits of a merger. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the investors' motion for class certification in the case, holding that they couldn't sue as a group because they hadn't established that they lost money as a result of the alleged fraud. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.

Question

In a securities fraud action, must plaintiffs prove that the alleged fraud caused a drop in stock prices in order to get class certification?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Erica P. John Fund, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

No. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Securities fraud plaintiffs need not prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification," the Chief Justice wrote.

United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation

jgoldman — Wed, 20 Apr 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

36° 36' 58.6404" N, 106° 43' 24.4704" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-382

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jicarilla Apache Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2011

Advocates

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

Steven D. Gordon (For the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2002, the Jicarilla Apache Nation of New Mexico sued the federal government for allegedly mismanaging financial interests and funds, which are held in trust for the tribe's benefit. The tribe is seeking access to attorney-client communications about the trust operation. The Court of Federal Claims denied a petition by the United States to vacate its orders requiring the government to produce the documents.

Question

Does the attorney-client privilege entitle the United States to withhold from an Indian tribe confidential communications between the government and government attorneys implicating the administration of statutes pertaining to property held in trust for the tribe?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Attorney-Client Privilege

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "The fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege does not apply to the general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes," Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the majority decision "rests on false factual and legal premises and deprives the Nation and other Indian tribes of highly relevant evidence in scores of pending cases seeking relief for the Government's alleged mismanagement of their trust funds." Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.

Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan

jgoldman — Wed, 27 Apr 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

39° 32' 5.6796" N, 119° 45' 9.6804" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-568

Petitioner

Nevada Commission on Ethics

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael A. Carrigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, April 27, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2011

Advocates

John P. Elwood (for the petitioner)

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Nevada law requires elected officials to disqualify themselves when they are asked to vote on matters that touch on ''commitments in a private capacity.'' In 2006, a member of the Sparks City, Nevada Council, Michael A. Carrigan, disclosed that his campaign manager was a consultant to a business seeking to develop a casino, before voting its way in a land-use matter. The Nevada Commission on Ethics later ruled that the vote was improper and censured Carrigan.

The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision, saying it violated the First Amendment and citing the Supreme Court's decision last year in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. ''Voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech under the First Amendment, '' Justice Michael Douglas wrote for the majority.

Question

Does the First Amendment subject state restrictions on voting by elected officials to strict scrutiny?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nevada Commission on Ethics, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "The Nevada Ethics in Government Law is not unconstitutionally overbroad," Scalia wrote for the unanimous court. Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which he noted: "the opinion does not, and on this record should not, consider a free speech contention that would have presented issues of considerable import, were it to have been a proper part of the case." Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing: "I concur in the judgment, but I do not agree with the opinion of the Court insofar as it suggests that restrictions upon legislators' voting are not restrictions upon legislators' speech."

Sorrell v. IMS Health

jgoldman — Tue, 26 Apr 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

44° 15' 36.2124" N, 72° 34' 31.3932" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-779

Petitioner

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

IMS Health Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2011

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Advocates

Bridget C. Asay (for the petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Thomas C. Goldstein (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2007, the Vermont legislature passed a law that banned the sale, transmission or use of prescriber-identifiable data (''PI data'') for marketing or promoting a prescription drug without the consent of the prescriber. The law also prohibited the sale, license or exchange for value of PI data for marketing or promoting a prescription drug.

Three companies -- IMS Health, Verispan and Source Healthcare Analytics, a unit of Dutch publisher Wolters Kluwer -- that collect and sell such data and by a trade group for pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit struck down the measure, holding that it violated the First Amendment because it restricts the speech rights of data miners without directly advancing legitimate state interests.

Question

Does a Vermont state statute banning the sale, transmission or use of prescriber-identifiable data, absent prescriber consent, unconstitutionally restrict the free speech rights of pharmaceutical research companies, manufacturers and others to use that data?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for IMS Health, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: first amendment

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Vermont's statute, which imposes content- and speaker-based burdens on protected expression, is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny," Kennedy wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan. "The First Amendment does not require courts to apply a special 'heightened' standard of review when reviewing such an effort," Breyer wrote. "And, in any event, the statute meets the First Amendment standard this Court has previously applied when the government seeks to regulate commercial speech."

McNeill v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 25 Apr 2011 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

35° 46' 19.5456" N, 78° 38' 19.014" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-5258

Petitioner

Clifton Terelle McNeill

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2011

Argued

Monday, April 25, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 6, 2011

Advocates

Stephen C. Gordon (for the petitioner)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Clifton Terelle McNeill was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment after he was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and 240 months imprisonment for unlawful possession with intent to distribute approximately 3.1 grams of crack cocaine.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina determined McNeill to be an armed career criminal and then departed upward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines to sentence McNeill to the maximum sentence applicable. McNeill contends that he is not eligible for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the drug-related convictions upon which the district court relied do not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit affirmed the district court order.

Question

Can a conviction under state law be treated as a serious drug offense for purposes of a longer sentence under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act, if the state law violated did not at the time of federal sentencing set a maximum prison term of at least 10 years, but had done so at the time the crime was committed?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Armed Career Criminal Act

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. "A federal sentencing court must determine whether 'an offense under State law' is a 'serious drug offense' by consulting the 'maximum term of imprisonment' applicable to a defendant's prior state drug offense at the time of the defendant's conviction for that offense," Thomas wrote.

Stok & Assoc. v. Citibank, N.A.

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:22:42 +0000

Location

United States

25° 47' 20.2884" N, 80° 13' 35.1804" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-514

Petitioner

Stok & Associates, P.A.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citibank, N.A.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Decided

Thursday, June 2, 2011

Facts of the Case

In November 2008, Stok & Associates, a Florida law firm, deposited a cashier's check for $173,015 from someone the firm thought was a client into its Citibank trust account. After Citibank accepted the check and made the funds available, the bank discovered the check was counterfeit and restricted Stok's use of the funds. The problem was the firm had already wired the money to the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. Stok said Citibank then removed $173,015 from his trust account and notified the Florida Bar of the deficiency in the trust account.

The firm filed a lawsuit in Florida state court, alleging fraud and breach of contract, among other things. Citibank meanwhile filed a petition in federal court to compel arbitration and stay the state court proceedings, pursuant to an arbitration clause that appears in the contract governing the parties' relationship. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.

Question

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, should a party be required to demonstrate prejudice after the opposing party waives its contractual right to arbitrate by participating in litigation?

Conclusion

Decision: 0 votes for None, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Not decided. Prior to arguments, the Court dismissed this case via Court Rule 46.

Bobby v. Mitts

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:22:42 +0000

Location

United States

39° 57' 40.2336" N, 82° 59' 55.6584" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-1000

Petitioner

David Bobby, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harry Mitts

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

563 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, May 2, 2011

Decided

Monday, May 2, 2011

Facts of the Case

Harry Mitts drank bourbon until he became intoxicated and then shot and killed an African American man, while speaking racial epithets. During the police shoot-out that followed, Mitts shot and killed one police officer and wounded two others before being apprehended. At trial, Mitts did not contest the evidence proving that he had killed two men, but he instead attempted to establish that he was too intoxicated to form the required intent to kill. After a penalty hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty on both aggravated murder counts and terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders.

The trial court sentenced Mitts to death for the aggravated murders and to terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Mitts' convictions and sentences, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences and denied rehearing, ruling that the trial court should have instructed the jury to merge duplicative death penalty specifications, but holding that the error did not influence the jury and was resolved by re-weighing on appeal.

Mitts filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A federal judge in Cleveland affirmed the sentence, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided to vacate.

Question

Were the jury instructions given at the penalty phase of the murder trial contrary to clearly established law for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bobby, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

No. The Supreme Court summarily reversed the appellate court ruling in an unsigned per curiam opinion.

United States v. Juvenile Male

mgruhn — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 06:22:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-940

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Juvenile Male

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2011

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2011

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

None