HOWES v. FIELDS

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus HOWES, WARDEN v. FIELDS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 10–680. Argued October 4, 2011—Decided February 21, 2012 Respondent Fields, a Michigan state prisoner, was escorted from his prison cell by a corrections officer to a conference room where he was questioned by two sheriff’s deputies about criminal activity he had al- legedly engaged in before coming to prison. At no time was Fields given Miranda warnings or advised that he did not have to speak with the deputies. As relevant here: Fields was questioned for be- tween five and seven hours; Fields was told more than once that he was free to leave and return to his cell; the deputies were armed, but Fields remained free of restraints; the conference room door was sometimes open and sometimes shut; several times during the inter- view Fields stated that he no longer wanted to talk to the deputies, but he did not ask to go back to his cell; after Fields confessed and the interview concluded, he had to wait an additional 20 minutes for an escort and returned to his cell well after the hour when he gener- ally retired. The trial court denied Fields’ motion to suppress his confession under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and he was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Fields’ contention that his statements should have been suppressed because he was subject- ed to custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. The Unit- ed States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan subse- quently granted Fields habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Affirming, the Sixth Circuit held that the interview was a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, reasoning that Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1, “clearly established,” §2254(d)(1), that isolation from the general prison population, combined with question- ing about conduct occurring outside the prison, makes any such in- terrogation custodial per se. 2 HOWES v. FIELDS Syllabus Held: 1. This Court’s precedents do not clearly establish the categorical rule on which the Sixth Circuit relied. The Court has repeatedly de- clined to adopt any such rule. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U. S. 292. The Sixth Circuit misread Mathis, which simply held, as rele- vant here, that a prisoner who otherwise meets the requirements for Miranda custody is not taken outside the scope of Miranda because he was incarcerated for an unconnected offense. It did not hold that imprisonment alone constitutes Miranda custody. Nor does the statement in Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U. S. ___, ___, that “[n]o one questions that [inmate] Shatzer was in custody for Miranda purpos- es” support a per se rule. It means only that the issue of custody was not contested in that case. Finally, contrary to respondent’s sugges- tion, Miranda itself did not hold that the inherently compelling pres- sures of custodial interrogation are always present when a prisoner is taken aside and questioned about events outside the prison walls. Pp. 4–7. 2. The Sixth Circuit’s categorical rule—that imprisonment, ques- tioning in private, and questioning about events in the outside world create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes—is simply wrong. Pp. 8–13. (a) The initial step in determining whether a person is in Miran- da custody is to ascertain, given “all of the circumstances surround- ing the interrogation,” how a suspect would have gauged his freedom of movement. Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318, 322, 325. How- ever, not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to Miranda custody. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 423. Shatzer, distinguishing between restraints on freedom of movement and Mi- randa custody, held that a break in Miranda custody between a sus- pect’s invocation of the right to counsel and the initiation of subse- quent questioning may occur while a suspect is serving an uninterrupted term of imprisonment. If a break in custody can occur, it must follow that imprisonment alone is not enough to create a cus- todial situation within the meaning of Miranda. At least three strong grounds support this conclusion: Questioning a person who is already in prison does not generally involve the shock that very often accom- panies arrest; a prisoner is unlikely to be lured into speaking by a longing for prompt release; and a prisoner knows that his questioners probably lack authority to affect the duration of his sentence. Thus, service of a prison term, without more, is not enough to constitute Miranda custody. Pp. 8–12. (b) The other two elements in the Sixth Circuit’s rule are like- wise insufficient. Taking a prisoner aside for questioning may neces- sitate some additional limitations on the prisoner’s freedom of move-  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 Syllabus ment, but it does not necessarily convert a noncustodial situation into Miranda custody. Isolation may contribute to a coercive atmosphere when a nonprisoner is questioned, but questioning a prisoner in pri- vate does not generally remove him from a supportive atmosphere and may be in his best interest. Neither does questioning a prisoner about criminal activity outside the prison have a significantly greater potential for coercion than questioning under otherwise identical cir- cumstances about criminal activity within the prison walls. The co- ercive pressure that Miranda guards against is neither mitigated nor magnified by the location of the conduct about which questions are asked. Pp. 12–13. 3. When a prisoner is questioned, the determination of custody should focus on all of the features of the interrogation. The record in this case reveals that respondent was not taken into custody for Mi- randa purposes. While some of the facts lend support to his argu- ment that Miranda’s custody requirement was met, they are offset by others. Most important, he was told at the outset of the interroga- tion, and reminded thereafter, that he was free to leave and could go back to his cell whenever he wanted. Moreover, he was not physical- ly restrained or threatened, was interviewed in a well-lit, average- sized conference room where the door was sometimes left open, and was offered food and water. These facts are consistent with an envi- ronment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to termi- nate the interview and leave, subject to the ordinary restraints of life behind bars. Pp. 13–16. 617 F. 3d 813, reversed. ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 10–680 _________________ CAROL HOWES, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. RANDALL LEE FIELDS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [February 21, 2012] JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that our precedents clearly establish that a prisoner is in custody within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), if the prisoner is taken aside and questioned about events that occurred outside the prison walls. Our decisions, however, do not clearly establish such a rule, and therefore the Court of Appeals erred in holding that this rule provides a permissible basis for federal habeas relief under the relevant provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Indeed, the rule ap- plied by the court below does not represent a correct inter- pretation of our Miranda case law. We therefore reverse. I While serving a sentence in a Michigan jail, Randall Fields was escorted by a corrections officer to a conference room where two sheriff’s deputies questioned him about allegations that, before he came to prison, he had engaged in sexual conduct with a 12-year-old boy. In order to get to the conference room, Fields had to go down one floor and 2 HOWES v. FIELDS Opinion of the Court pass through a locked door that separated two sections of the facility. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a, 69a. Fields arrived at the conference room between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m.1 and was questioned for between five and seven hours.2 At the beginning of the interview, Fields was told that he was free to leave and return to his cell. See id., at 70a. Later, he was again told that he could leave whenever he wanted. See id., at 90a. The two interviewing deputies were armed during the interview, but Fields remained free of handcuffs and other restraints. The door to the confer- ence room was sometimes open and sometimes shut. See id., at 70a–75a. About halfway through the interview, after Fields had been confronted with the allegations of abuse, he became agitated and began to yell. See id., at 80a, 125a. Fields testified that one of the deputies, using an expletive, told him to sit down and said that “if [he] didn’t want to coop- erate, [he] could leave.” Id., at 89a; see also id., at 70a– 71a. Fields eventually confessed to engaging in sex acts with the boy. According to Fields’ testimony at a suppres- sion hearing, he said several times during the interview that he no longer wanted to talk to the deputies, but he did not ask to go back to his cell prior to the end of the interview. See id., at 92a–93a. When he was eventually ready to leave, he had to wait —————— 1 Fields testified that he left his cell around 8 p.m. and that the in- terview began around 8:30 p.m. App. to Pet. for Cert. 77a. Both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit stated that the inter- view began between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. See id., at 4a, 54a. 2 The Court of Appeals stated that the interview lasted for approxi- mately seven hours, see id., at 4a, a figure that appears to be based on the testimony of one of the interviewing deputies, see id., at 123a. Fields put the number of hours between five and five and a half, saying the interview began around 8:30 p.m. and continued until 1:30 a.m. or 2 a.m. See id., at 77a. The Michigan Court of Appeals stated that the interview ended around midnight, which would put the length of the interview at between three and five hours.  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 Opinion of the Court an additional 20 minutes or so because a corrections of- ficer had to be summoned to escort him back to his cell, and he did not return to his cell until well after the hour when he generally retired.3 At no time was Fields given Miranda warnings or advised that he did not have to speak with the deputies. The State of Michigan charged Fields with criminal sexual conduct. Relying on Miranda, Fields moved to suppress his confession, but the trial court denied his motion. Over the renewed objection of defense counsel, one of the interviewing deputies testified at trial about Fields’ admissions. The jury convicted Fields of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, and the judge sentenced him to a term of 10 to 15 years of impris- onment. On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Fields’ contention that his statements should have been suppressed because he was subjected to custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. The court ruled that Fields had not been in custody for pur- poses of Miranda during the interview, so no Miranda warnings were required. The court emphasized that Fields was told that he was free to leave and return to his cell but that he never asked to do so. The Michigan Su- preme Court denied discretionary review. Fields then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court, and the court granted relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the interview in the conference room was a “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda because isolation from the general prison population combined with questioning about con- duct occurring outside the prison makes any such interro- gation custodial per se. The Court of Appeals reasoned that this Court clearly established in Mathis v. United —————— 3 Fields testified that his normal bedtime was 10:30 p.m. or 11 p.m. See id., at 78a. 4 HOWES v. FIELDS Opinion of the Court States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968), that “Miranda warnings must be administered when law enforcement officers remove an inmate from the general prison population and interrogate him regarding criminal conduct that took place outside the jail or prison.” 617 F. 3d 813, 820 (CA6 2010); see also id., at 818 (“The central holding of Mathis is that a Miranda warning is required whenever an incarcerated individual is isolated from the general prison population and interro- gated, i.e.[,] questioned in a manner likely to lead to self- incrimination, about conduct occurring outside of the prison”). Because Fields was isolated from the general prison population and interrogated about conduct occur- ring in the outside world, the Court of Appeals found that the state court’s decision was contrary to clearly estab- lished federal law as determined by this Court in Mathis. 617 F. 3d, at 823. We granted certiorari. 562 U. S. ___ (2011). II Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant a state pris- oner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state- court adjudication pursuant to which the prisoner is held “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). In this context, “clearly established law” signifies “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000). In this case, it is abundantly clear that our precedents do not clearly establish the categorical rule on which the Court of Appeals relied, i.e., that the questioning of a prisoner is always custodial when the prisoner is removed from the general prison population and questioned about events that occurred outside the prison. On the contrary, we have repeatedly declined to adopt any categorical rule  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 5 Opinion of the Court with respect to whether the questioning of a prison inmate is custodial. In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U. S. 292 (1990), where we upheld the admission of un-Mirandized statements elicit- ed from an inmate by an undercover officer masquerading as another inmate, we noted that “[t]he bare fact of cus- tody may not in every instance require a warning even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an official, but we do not have occasion to explore that issue here.” Id., at 299 (emphasis added). Instead, we simply “reject[ed] the argument that Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is in custody in a technical sense and converses with someone who happens to be a government agent.” Id., at 297. Most recently, in Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U. S. ___ (2010), we expressly declined to adopt a bright-line rule for determining the applicability of Miranda in prisons. Shatzer considered whether a break in custody ends the presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), and, if so, whether a prison- er’s return to the general prison population after a custo- dial interrogation constitutes a break in Miranda custody. See 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3–4). In considering the latter question, we noted first that “[w]e have never decid- ed whether incarceration constitutes custody for Miranda purposes, and have indeed explicitly declined to address the issue.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (citing Perkins, supra, at 299; emphasis added). The answer to this ques- tion, we noted, would “depen[d] upon whether [incar- ceration] exerts the coercive pressure that Miranda was designed to guard against—the ‘danger of coercion [that] results from the interaction of custody and official inter- rogation.’ ” 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (quoting Perkins, supra, at 297). In concluding that our precedents establish a categorical rule, the Court of Appeals placed great weight on the 6 HOWES v. FIELDS Opinion of the Court decision in Mathis, but the Court of Appeals misread the holding in that case. In Mathis, an inmate in a state prison was questioned by an Internal Revenue agent and was subsequently convicted for federal offenses. The Court of Appeals held that Miranda did not apply to this interview for two reasons: A criminal investigation had not been commenced at the time of the interview, and the prisoner was incarcerated for an “unconnected offense.” Mathis v. United States, 376 F. 2d 595, 597 (CA5 1967). This Court rejected both of those grounds for distinguish- ing Miranda, 391 U. S., at 4, and thus the holding in Mathis is simply that a prisoner who otherwise meets the requirements for Miranda custody is not taken outside the scope of Miranda by either of the two factors on which the Court of Appeals had relied. Mathis did not hold that imprisonment, in and of itself, is enough to constitute Miranda custody.4 Nor, contrary to respondent’s submis- sion, see Brief for Respondent 14, did Oregon v. Mathia- son, 429 U. S. 492, 494 (1977) (per curiam), which simply restated in dictum the holding in Mathis. The Court of Appeals purported to find support for its per se rule in Shatzer, relying on our statement that “[n]o one questions that Shatzer was in custody for Miranda purposes” when he was interviewed. 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13). But this statement means only that the issue of custody was not contested before us. It strains credulity to read the statement as constituting an “unambiguous conclusion” or “finding” by this Court that Shatzer was in custody. 617 F. 3d, at 822. Finally, contrary to respondent’s suggestion, see Brief for Respondent 12–15, Miranda itself did not clearly es- —————— 4 Indeed, it is impossible to tell from either the opinion of this Court or that of the court below whether the prisoner’s interview was routine or whether there were special features that may have created an especially coercive atmosphere.  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 7 Opinion of the Court tablish the rule applied by the Court of Appeals. Miranda adopted a “set of prophylactic measures” designed to ward off the “ ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial interrogation,” Shatzer, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 4) (quot- ing Miranda, 384 U. S., at 467), but Miranda did not hold that such pressures are always present when a prisoner is taken aside and questioned about events outside the prison walls. Indeed, Miranda did not even establish that police questioning of a suspect at the station house is always custodial. See Mathiason, supra, at 495 (declining to find that Miranda warnings are required “simply be- cause the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect”). In sum, our decisions do not clearly establish that a prisoner is always in custody for purposes of Miranda whenever a prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct outside the prison.5 —————— 5 The state-court decision applied the traditional context-specific analysis to determine whether the circumstances of respondent’s interrogation gave rise to “the coercive pressure that Miranda was designed to guard against.” Shatzer, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13). The court first observed: “That a defendant is in prison for an unrelated offense when being questioned does not, without more, mean that he was in custody for the purpose of determining whether Miranda warn- ings were required.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). In this case, the court noted, the “defendant was unquestionably in custody, but on a matter unrelated to the interrogation.” Ibid. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the state court thereby limited Miranda in a way rejected by Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968), and “curtail[ed] the warnings to be given persons under interrogation by officers based on the reason why the person is in custody.” Id., at 4–5. We think the better reading is that the state court merely meant to draw a distinction between incarcera- tion and Miranda custody. This reading is supported by the state court’s subsequent consideration of whether the facts of the case were likely to create an atmosphere of coercion. App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a. 8 HOWES v. FIELDS Opinion of the Court III Not only does the categorical rule applied below go well beyond anything that is clearly established in our prior decisions, it is simply wrong. The three elements of that rule—(1) imprisonment, (2) questioning in private, and (3) questioning about events in the outside world—are not necessarily enough to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes. A As used in our Miranda case law, “custody” is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of “the objective cir- cumstances of the interrogation,” Stansbury v. Califor- nia, 511 U. S. 318, 322–323, 325 (1994) (per curiam), a “reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thomp- son v. Keohane, 516 U. S. 99, 112 (1995). And in order to determine how a suspect would have “gauge[d]” his “free- dom of movement,” courts must examine “all of the cir- cumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Stansbury, supra, at 322, 325 (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant factors include the location of the questioning, see Shatzer, supra, at ___–___ (slip op., at 13–16), its duration, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 437–438 (1984), statements made during the interview, see Mathi- ason, supra, at 495; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 665 (2004); Stansbury, supra, at 325, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, see New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 655 (1984), and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning, see California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1122–1123 (1983) (per curiam). Determining whether an individual’s freedom of move-  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 9 Opinion of the Court ment was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last. Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda. We have “decline[d] to accord talismanic power” to the freedom-of-movement inquiry, Berkemer, supra, at 437, and have instead asked the additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda. “Our cases make clear . . . that the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Shatzer, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). This important point is illustrated by our decision in Berkemer v. McCarty, supra. In that case, we held that the roadside questioning of a motorist who was pulled over in a routine traffic stop did not constitute custodial inter- rogation. Id., at 423, 441–442. We acknowledged that “a traffic stop significantly curtails the ‘freedom of action’ of the driver and the passengers,” and that it is generally “a crime either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having stopped, to drive away without permis- sion.” Id., at 436. “[F]ew motorists,” we noted, “would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so.” Ibid. Nevertheless, we held that a person detained as a result of a traffic stop is not in Miranda custody because such detention does not “sufficiently impair [the detained person’s] free exercise of his privilege against self- incrimination to require that he be warned of his consti- tutional rights.” 468 U. S., at 437. As we later put it, the “temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention in- volved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody,” Shatzer, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14) (citation omitted). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). It may be thought that the situation in Berkemer—the questioning of a motorist subjected to a brief traffic stop— 10 HOWES v. FIELDS Opinion of the Court is worlds away from those present when an inmate is questioned in a prison, but the same cannot be said of Shatzer, where we again distinguished between restraints on freedom of movement and Miranda custody. Shatzer, as noted, concerned the Edwards prophylactic rule, which limits the ability of the police to initiate further question- ing of a suspect in Miranda custody once the suspect invokes the right to counsel. We held in Shatzer that this rule does not apply when there is a sufficient break in custody between the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel and the initiation of subsequent questioning. See 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13-16). And, what is signifi- cant for present purposes, we further held that a break in custody may occur while a suspect is serving a term in prison. If a break in custody can occur while a prisoner is serving an uninterrupted term of imprisonment, it must follow that imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda. There are at least three strong grounds for this conclu- sion. First, questioning a person who is already serving a prison term does not generally involve the shock that very often accompanies arrest. In the paradigmatic Miranda situation—a person is arrested in his home or on the street and whisked to a police station for questioning— detention represents a sharp and ominous change, and the shock may give rise to coercive pressures. A person who is “cut off from his normal life and companions,” Shatzer, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7), and abruptly transported from the street into a “police-dominated atmosphere,” Miranda, 384 U. S., at 456, may feel coerced into answering questions. By contrast, when a person who is already serving a term of imprisonment is questioned, there is usually no such change. “Interrogated suspects who have previously been convicted of crime live in prison.” Shatzer, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). For a person serving a term of  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 11 Opinion of the Court incarceration, we reasoned in Shatzer, the ordinary re- strictions of prison life, while no doubt unpleasant, are expected and familiar and thus do not involve the same “inherently compelling pressures” that are often present when a suspect is yanked from familiar surroundings in the outside world and subjected to interrogation in a police station. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4). Second, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured into speaking by a longing for prompt release. When a person is arrested and taken to a station house for inter- rogation, the person who is questioned may be pressured to speak by the hope that, after doing so, he will be al- lowed to leave and go home. On the other hand, when a prisoner is questioned, he knows that when the question- ing ceases, he will remain under confinement. Id., at ___– ___, n. 8 (slip op., at 14–15, n. 8). Third, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been convicted and sentenced, knows that the law enforcement officers who question him probably lack the authority to affect the duration of his sentence. Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 14–15). And “where the possibility of parole exists,” the interrogating officers probably also lack the power to bring about an early release. Ibid. “When the suspect has no reason to think that the listeners have official power over him, it should not be assumed that his words are motivated by the reaction he expects from his listeners.” Perkins, 496 U. S., at 297. Under such circumstances, there is little “basis for the assumption that a suspect . . . will feel compelled to speak by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of [a] more lenient treat- ment should he confess.” Id., at 296–297. In short, standard conditions of confinement and associ- ated restrictions on freedom will not necessarily implicate the same interests that the Court sought to protect when it afforded special safeguards to persons subjected to 12 HOWES v. FIELDS Opinion of the Court custodial interrogation. Thus, service of a term of impris- onment, without more, is not enough to constitute Miran- da custody. B The two other elements included in the Court of Ap- peals’ rule—questioning in private and questioning about events that took place outside the prison—are likewise insufficient. Taking a prisoner aside for questioning—as opposed to questioning the prisoner in the presence of fellow in- mates—does not necessarily convert a “noncustodial situa- tion . . . to one in which Miranda applies.” Mathiason, 429 U. S., at 495. When a person who is not serving a prison term is questioned, isolation may contribute to a coercive atmosphere by preventing family members, friends, and others who may be sympathetic from providing either advice or emotional support. And without any such assis- tance, the person who is questioned may feel overwhelm- ing pressure to speak and to refrain from asking that the interview be terminated. By contrast, questioning a prisoner in private does not generally remove the prisoner from a supportive atmos- phere. Fellow inmates are by no means necessarily friends. On the contrary, they may be hostile and, for a variety of reasons, may react negatively to what the ques- tioning reveals. In the present case, for example, would respondent have felt more at ease if he had been ques- tioned in the presence of other inmates about the sexual abuse of an adolescent boy? Isolation from the general prison population is often in the best interest of the inter- viewee and, in any event, does not suggest on its own the atmosphere of coercion that concerned the Court in Miranda. It is true that taking a prisoner aside for questioning may necessitate some additional limitations on his free-  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 13 Opinion of the Court dom of movement. A prisoner may, for example, be re- moved from an exercise yard and taken, under close guard, to the room where the interview is to be held. But such procedures are an ordinary and familiar attribute of life behind bars. Escorts and special security precautions may be standard procedures regardless of the purpose for which an inmate is removed from his regular routine and taken to a special location. For example, ordinary prison procedure may require such measures when a prisoner is led to a meeting with an attorney. Finally, we fail to see why questioning about criminal activity outside the prison should be regarded as having a significantly greater potential for coercion than question- ing under otherwise identical circumstances about crimi- nal activity within the prison walls. In both instances, there is the potential for additional criminal liability and punishment. If anything, the distinction would seem to cut the other way, as an inmate who confesses to miscon- duct that occurred within the prison may also incur ad- ministrative penalties, but even this is not enough to tip the scale in the direction of custody. “The threat to a citizen’s Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda was de- signed to neutralize” is neither mitigated nor magnified by the location of the conduct about which questions are asked. Berkemer, 468 U. S., at 435, n. 22. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals’ categorical rule is unsound. IV A When a prisoner is questioned, the determination of custody should focus on all of the features of the interroga- tion. These include the language that is used in summon- ing the prisoner to the interview and the manner in which the interrogation is conducted. See Yarborough, 541 U. S., at 665. An inmate who is removed from the general prison 14 HOWES v. FIELDS Opinion of the Court population for questioning and is “thereafter . . . subjected to treatment” in connection with the interrogation “that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes . . . will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.” Berkemer, 468 U. S., at 440. “Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situa- tions in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated.” Id., at 437; see Shatzer, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9); Mathiason, supra, at 495. Confessions voluntar- ily made by prisoners in other situations should not be suppressed. “Voluntary confessions are not merely a proper element in law enforcement, they are an unmiti- gated good, essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.” Shatzer, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 9) (internal quota- tion marks and citations omitted). B The record in this case reveals that respondent was not taken into custody for purposes of Miranda. To be sure, respondent did not invite the interview or consent to it in advance, and he was not advised that he was free to de- cline to speak with the deputies. The following facts also lend some support to respondent’s argument that Miran- da’s custody requirement was met: The interview lasted for between five and seven hours in the evening and con- tinued well past the hour when respondent generally went to bed; the deputies who questioned respondent were armed; and one of the deputies, according to respondent, “[u]sed a very sharp tone,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 76a, and, on one occasion, profanity, see id., at 77a. These circumstances, however, were offset by others. Most important, respondent was told at the outset of the interrogation, and was reminded again thereafter, that he could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted.  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 15 Opinion of the Court See id., at 89a–90a (“I was told I could get up and leave whenever I wanted”); id., at 70a–71a. Moreover, respond- ent was not physically restrained or threatened and was interviewed in a well-lit, average-sized conference room, where he was “not uncomfortable.” Id., at 90a; see id., at 71a, 88a–89a. He was offered food and water, and the door to the conference room was sometimes left open. See id., at 70a, 74a. “All of these objective facts are consistent with an interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave.” Yarborough, supra, at 664–665. Because he was in prison, respondent was not free to leave the conference room by himself and to make his own way through the facility to his cell. Instead, he was es- corted to the conference room and, when he ultimately decided to end the interview, he had to wait about 20 minutes for a corrections officer to arrive and escort him to his cell. But he would have been subject to this same restraint even if he had been taken to the conference room for some reason other than police questioning; under no circumstances could he have reasonably expected to be able to roam free.6 And while respondent testified that he —————— 6 Respondent did not testify to the contrary. The following colloquy occurred at his Miranda hearing: “Q. You’re not generally allowed to just roam around Lenawee County Jail on your own, are you? “A. No, I never have. “Q. So wouldn’t it make sense to you, since you had that experience, that in fact you would have been escorted just like you were escorted . . . into this conference room? “A. That makes common sense. “Q. So when they said that you were free to leave and you get up— could get up and go and all you had to do was tell them you wanted to go, in your mind, did you understand that to mean that somebody would come get you and take you back to your cell? “A. But that doesn’t give me freedom to just get up and walk away. “Q. I understand it doesn’t— “A. So, no. 16 HOWES v. FIELDS Opinion of the Court “was told . . . if I did not want to cooperate, I needed to go back to my cell,” these words did not coerce cooperation by threatening harsher conditions. App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a; see id., at 89a (“I was told, if I didn’t want to cooperate, I could leave”). Returning to his cell would merely have returned him to his usual environment. See Shatzer, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14) (“Interrogated suspects who have previously been convicted of crime live in prison. When they are released back into the general prison popu- lation, they return to their accustomed surroundings and daily routine—they regain the degree of control they had over their lives prior to the interrogation”). Taking into account all of the circumstances of the questioning—including especially the undisputed fact that respondent was told that he was free to end the question- ing and to return to his cell—we hold that respondent was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. —————— “Q. The question is this, sir, not whether you had freedom to get up and walk away, but did you understand that what that meant was that a jailer would come get you and— “A. No— “Q. —take you back to your cell? “A. I did not understand that. “Q. You didn’t? “A. No. “Q. Why not? That’s how you got there. “A. Because I did not know if a jailer would take me back or if one of those gentlemen would take me back. “Q. But you understood that, if you asked, one of them or a jailer would take you back to your cell? “A. I assumed that. “Q. And you believed that to be true? “A. I assumed that.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 91a–92a.  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 10–680 _________________ CAROL HOWES, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. RANDALL LEE FIELDS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT [February 21, 2012] JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, concurring in part and dissent- ing in part. Given this Court’s controlling decisions on what counts as “custody” for Miranda purposes, I agree that the law is not “clearly established” in respondent Fields’s favor. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 13–16); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U. S. 99, 112 (1995). But I disagree with the Court’s further determina- tion that Fields was not in custody under Miranda. Were the case here on direct review, I would vote to hold that Miranda precludes the State’s introduction of Fields’s confession as evidence against him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), reacted to police interrogation tactics that eroded the Fifth Amend- ment’s ban on compulsory self-incrimination. The opinion did so by requiring interrogators to convey to suspects the now-familiar warnings: The suspect is to be informed, prior to interrogation, that he “has a right to remain si- lent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the pres- ence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id., at 444. Under what circumstances are Miranda warnings re- quired? Miranda tells us “in all settings in which [a per- 2 HOWES v. FIELDS Opinion of GINSBURG, J. son’s] freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way.” Id., at 467. Given the reality that police interroga- tors “trad[e] on the weakness of individuals,” i.e., their “insecurity about [themselves] or [their] surroundings,” id., at 455, the Court found the preinterrogation warnings set out in the opinion “indispensable,” id., at 469. Those warnings, the Court elaborated, are “an absolute prerequi- site in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interroga- tion atmosphere,” id., at 468; they “insure” that the sus- pect is timely told of his Fifth Amendment privilege, and his freedom to exercise it, id., at 469. Fields, serving time for disorderly conduct, was, of course, “i[n] custody,” but not “for purposes of Miranda,” the Court concludes. Ante, at 14. I would not train, as the Court does, on the question whether there can be custody within custody. Instead, I would ask, as Miranda put it, whether Fields was subjected to “incommunicado interro- gation . . . in a police-dominated atmosphere,” 384 U. S., at 445, whether he was placed, against his will, in an inher- ently stressful situation, see id., at 468, and whether his “freedom of action [was] curtailed in any significant way,” id., at 467. Those should be the key questions, and to each I would answer “Yes.” As the Court acknowledges, Fields did not invite or consent to the interview. Ante, at 14. He was removed from his cell in the evening, taken to a conference room in the sheriff ’s quarters, and questioned by two armed depu- ties long into the night and early morning. Ibid. He was not told at the outset that he had the right to decline to speak with the deputies. Ibid. Shut in with the armed officers, Fields felt “trapped.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a. Although told he could return to his cell if he did not want to cooperate, id., at 71a–72a, Fields believed the deputies “would not have allowed [him] to leave the room,” id., at 72a. And with good reason. More than once, “he told the officers . . . he did not want to speak with them anymore.”  Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 617 F. 3d 813, 815 (CA6 2010). He was given water, App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a, but not his evening medications, id., at 79a.* Yet the Court concludes that Fields was in “an interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave.” Ante, at 15 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 665 (2004)). Critical to the Court’s judgment is “the undisputed fact that [Fields] was told that he was free to end the question- ing and to return to his cell.” Ante, at 17. Never mind the facts suggesting that Fields’s submission to the over- night interview was anything but voluntary. Was Fields “held for interrogation”? See Miranda, 384 U. S., at 471. Brought to, and left alone with, the gun-bearing deputies, he surely was in my judgment. Miranda instructed that such a person “must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” Ibid. Those warnings, along with “warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against [the speaker],” Miranda explained, are necessary “prerequisite[s] to [an] interrogation” compati- ble with the Fifth Amendment. Ibid. Today, for people already in prison, the Court finds it adequate for the police to say: “You are free to terminate this interrogation and return to your cell.” Such a statement is no substitute for one ensuring that an individual is aware of his rights. For the reasons stated, I would hold that the “incommu- nicado interrogation [of Fields] in a police-dominated atmosphere,” id., at 445, without informing him of his rights, dishonored the Fifth Amendment privilege Miran- da was designed to safeguard. —————— * Each night, Fields took an antidepressant and, due to his kidney transplant surgery, two antirejection medications. App. to Pet. for Cert. 79a. 

Print this transcript Transcript: 

ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN J. BURSCH ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: We will hear argument next in Case 10-680, Howes v. Fields.

Mr. Bursch.

Mr. Bursch: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

This case raises two issues.

The first is whether the right against self-incrimination requires that a prisoner always be Mirandized before being interviewed in isolation about conduct that occurred outside the prisoner.

The second is an AEDPA question, whether this Court in Mathis clearly established such a per se rule.

For three reasons, the answers to both questions is no.

First, for nearly 50 years this Court has declined to adopt any new per se rule that always requires a Miranda warning, instead considering all the circumstances.

Lower court--

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: Don't you think being in custody itself is a circumstance?

Mr. Bursch: --Sure, it's a circumstance that goes into the all-the-circumstances missed.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: What's all this

"all-circumstances mix? "

"I thought that our case law was fairly clear that all circumstances is a test for voluntariness. "

"I thought the issue has always been under Miranda: Is the person free to go or not? "

Mr. Bursch: That's correct, we agree that that--

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: So since when have we imported of the language of voluntariness into the Miranda test?

Should we be creating yet another test?

Mr. Bursch: --Justice Sotomayor, there are two separate tests.

And I go back just to last term in the J.D.B. case.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: So go to the test of freedom to leave.

Mr. Bursch: Yes.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: You're taken from your cell and locked into a room -- and let's change the facts--

Mr. Bursch: Yes.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: --and locked in a room and said: Talk to me; you have to tell me what happened.

Is that person free to go?

Mr. Bursch: It would be much more difficult, but the test would be whether a reasonable person in the prisoner's position felt that they were free to go back to their cell in accord with reasonable ordinary prison procedures.

And that would be the test that's consistent with J.D.B. and I submit with every Miranda case that this Court has issued in the last--

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: All right.

So what makes this case different?

He's taken from a -- Except being told that he could leave.

If he had been taken from his cell, removed from the prison, his normal setting, taken by armed guards to another building, and with guards at the door, sat down and told: Talk to us about this incident.

Why would he think he was free to leave?

There is one fact I'm taking out of it, which is that he was told he was free to go.

Mr. Bursch: --Right.

There are a number of circumstances that kind of culminate in what I consider to be the two most important.

Remember the background circumstances: He was in a room that was not locked.

It was a conference room, not an interrogation room with a bright light.

He was not shackled.

He was not threatened.

He was not physically harmed in any way.

The two big ones are: One, that when he started to become belligerent, the guards told him that: If you don't want to cooperate, then you will have to go back to your cell; you will have to leave.

And that is the exact opposite of Miranda custody, where--

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: As I see the record, he claims twice he said: I don't want to talk to you.

And when he asked to leave at the end, it took 20 minutes, and they continued the questioning.

Doesn't that counter the rest of what you are saying?

Mr. Bursch: --There are two factors that go into the mix, and I will discuss each one in turn.

When he says, I don't want to talk any more, then he went on and kept talking.

You have to consider, well, why does he keep talking?

Well, the record shows, I think a fair reading of it anyway, that he was trying to explain to the officers this timeline he keeps talking about.

At the end, when it was a 20-minute delay, there is no contention that that was anyhow inconsistent with reasonable prison procedures.

And the fact that it could have been 20 minutes, it could have been 30 seconds, it could have been an hour, depending on procedures, demonstrates why a per se rule doesn't make sense.

We should look at all the circumstances.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Why is per se rule necessarily what is being argued here?

For one thing, he had no choice but to go with the police, right?

Mr. Bursch: That's correct.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: So it's different from some cases where the prisoner initiates the conversation.

Mr. Bursch: That is a little bit different.

But the key facts here are, one, at the beginning, the questioning officers say: You're free to stop this and go back to your cell.

Then in the middle, he gets belligerent, and they say: If you don't want to cooperate, you have to leave, you have to go back to your cell, which is, I submit, the opposite of Miranda custody.

And then when he finally invokes his right to go back to his cell, it is immediately honored, with of course the 20-minute delay due to prison procedures.

And so from beginning to end, a reasonable person in his position could have believed they were free to return.

And that is all that Miranda requires.

In fact, we have a trial court finding on that, on three of them: One, that he was told he was free to go; second, that he understood he was free to go; and third, that he was free to go, and that's all--

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: And it doesn't make any difference that they took him from his cell, he was under compulsion to leave with them and interrogated during the hours when prisoners are ordinarily sleeping?

Mr. Bursch: --Again, I would submit those are all circumstances that should go into this "all the circumstances" consideration.

You know, there were also other things that militated in favor of the trial court findings, such as the explicit instruction that he was free to leave; that he would have to go back if he didn't cooperate; that they did honor his request to leave, once made.

So these are all the things that the Court should look at.

And you can imagine the number of other situations, maybe with facts different than these, where a per se rule would be wholly inappropriate.

You know, what if they had invited him to come down and he had the choice at the beginning?

What if someone was stationed outside the door and took him immediately as soon as he said: I'm ready to go back.

It just demonstrates that this isn't the place for a per se rule; that we should just follow the same Miranda test that has been applied for 50 years, and that's all the circumstances.

Justice Elena Kagan: General, when you say that, I took sometimes your brief and the U.S. Government's brief to be saying something more, which is that it's not all the circumstances; it's all the circumstances minus circumstances that are attendant upon normal prison living.

So are you still arguing that, or are you really arguing an all-the-circumstances test?

Mr. Bursch: We are not taking quite that strong a position.

We are arguing all the circumstances.

And the analogy that I would draw is just like in the J.D.B. case last term, that you would consider not only the age of the suspect, but also the school environment.

So I'm not saying the prison environment is taken out of the equation, just that it's not dispositive in and of itself, just like this Court held in Shatzer.

Justice Elena Kagan: So a court can still think, when it's doing an all-the-circumstances inquiry, it can still factor in something like, you know, it just -- it was going to take him an hour to get back to his cell?

That's still something that the court can consider along with everything else.

Is that right?

Mr. Bursch: Not only can, but should, absolutely.

And, you know, one of the benefits of having a per se -- I'm sorry -- of having an all-the-circumstances rule, rather than a per se rule, is that it encourages truthful, voluntary confession.

And this Court has repeatedly recognized that such confessions are an unmitigated social good.

That's something that we want.

And you can imagine again that there are a variety of non-prison contexts where it would certainly be easier to have a per se rule.

You could have done that in J.D.B.--

You know, it's so coercive to take an 8-year-old child to the principal's office with an officer to question him, that per se is always going to be some child version of the Miranda rule.

But we don't do that.

Or if you had someone in the hospital and they were in such a position that they were physically unable to leave.

We don't have a hospital Miranda rule.

There shouldn't be one in prison, either.

We should just take all the circumstances into account.

And I think really the lesson of Shatzer is that we start, Justice Kagan, right where you did, that just simply being in prison, being interrogated -- I'm sorry -- being in jail alone is not enough.

But it's going to become one factor that we consider in this larger test.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Which way do you think that factor cuts?

Mr. Bursch: In this particular situation?

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Yes.

Mr. Bursch: I think it cuts in our favor, as the trial court found, and the court should defer to that, for all the reasons I just stated: That he was not threatened; not physically harmed, he was in a conference room; door wasn't locked.

Of course, the big two: That when he got belligerent they told him: If you don't want to cooperate, you have to leave, the opposite of Miranda custody when you say, if you don't cooperate, you will not be permitted to leave; and also that when he made the request to go, it was honored within the amount of time that they would have expected per prison policy.

So--

Justice Anthony Kennedy: Except when they say you have to leave, one way to interpret that or to analyze that might be to say: You are in custody no matter.

Mr. Bursch: --Justice Kennedy, I don't think that's the case because--

Justice Anthony Kennedy: And when you say: You have to leave, that's almost coercive, coercive of him to say, because he doesn't want to have to go back in the cell.

Mr. Bursch: --I don't think that's the case because under Shatzer there's nothing Miranda custodial about simply being in his cell.

And if he wants to stay away from his cell, as it appears to here because he was trying to explain himself, that's one of those factors that militates against a finding of--

Justice Anthony Kennedy: But I think it makes your case weaker, not stronger, that statement.

Mr. Bursch: --I think it makes it stronger, because in the typical Miranda case you would say to someone: If you don't cooperate, we are going to keep you here as long as it takes.

And here they were saying just the opposite.

And the message they sent was sent was consistent with the instructions they gave him at the beginning: If you tell us you want to leave, we will honor that request, and consistent with what actually happened at the end.

He said, I want to go back, and they honored that request.

And I think one of the other factors that you put in the mix here is that we were dealing with outside officers, not inside prison officers.

These outside officers did not have the ability to impact his day-to-day prison life the way someone inside the prison would.

Now, one other point I want to make about in and out of prison is this artificial line that the Sixth Circuit drew to cabin its per se rule.

They said that if the conduct takes place outside the prison per se you get Miranda; if the conduct that they are questioning talking about was inside the prison walls, we are not going to do that.

And the Sixth Circuit was forced to make that policy decision because otherwise prison administration becomes very difficult.

But under this Court's precedent and under the Fifth Amendment itself, there is nothing that would suggest that there should be a distinction in the Miranda analysis as to the locus of the conduct that is being questioned about.

And it's possible to have a very serious in-prison crime, a murder of another inmate, and a very nominal outside crime, petty theft, and yet the Sixth Circuit would give pure Miranda protection to that petty theft questioning and no protection at all to the person who murdered someone inside the prison walls.

And that just demonstrates where the Sixth Circuit rule starts to fall apart.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: The Chief asked you in his question which way does it cut, meaning you seem to be advocating a rule that says merely because he's in prison is irrelevant, standing alone.

I think your adversary is saying you can't take out the fact that this person's liberty is restrained from the equation.

So going back to my hypothetical, if you are forced to leave the prison, as this gentleman was, and put in another room, what presumption should you start with?

Shouldn't the presumption be that if you are forced to go to another place that you are in custody?

Mr. Bursch: Justice Sotomayor, I'm going to start with the premise we are not advocating that the prison conditions fall out of the equation entirely.

They are simply part of the mix that you consider, just like you would consider the school environment or the hospital environment or a customs environment.

With respect to being taken out to another building, so long as a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to go back, that is ultimately the dispositive inquiry.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: What -- what would make someone who is forced to go somewhere think that they are free to go back, absent being told?

But what -- what would make any reasonable prisoner who can't move without an escort believe that they are always free to go back?

Mr. Bursch: Well, there are--

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: Once they are forced to go from point A to point B.

Mr. Bursch: --Right.

There are three factors here, and I'll quibble just a little bit with the assumption that he was somehow forced to go.

It's true they didn't ask him if he wanted to go, but there is also no contention that he resisted going and they made him go anyway.

What he said is:

"I didn't know where we were going. "

"I felt like I was in a safe environment so I didn't object. "

Then once he got to the room, here are the three that I think are the most critical facts: That he was told right at the beginning: Just tell us; we'll take you back to your cell when you want to do that.

Second, when he got belligerent they said: If you don't want to cooperate, you will go back to your cell.

And third, when he asked to go back to his cell that request is honored within the context of the typical prison administration.

And it's very possible that in his everyday prison life he could be taken over next door for a medical exam, he could be taken over next door for a visitor if that was county policy.

But there is nothing inherent about the walk into the next building that means per se he has to be Mirandized.

Again, it's just one factor that should go into the mix, just like this Court has always done in Miranda cases.

Unless the Court has any further questions, I will reserve the balance of my time.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Thank you, counsel.

Mr. Bursch: Thank you.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Ms. Anders.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF GINGER D. ANDERS, ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE, SUPPORTING THE RESPONDENT

Ms Anders: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

The Sixth Circuit has imposed a per se role that whenever a prison inmate is isolated for questioning about conduct that occurred outside the prison, that inmate is in custody for Miranda purposes, regardless of the circumstances of the interrogation.

But in the prison context, as in any other, the traditional Miranda custody tests should apply and the question should be whether, in light of all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave.

That is so for three reasons.

The first is that the Court reaffirmed in Maryland v. Shatzer that restraints on a suspect's freedom of movement are a necessary but not sufficient condition for Miranda custody.

In other words, a reasonable suspect whose freedom of movement is restrained may nonetheless feel that he is free to terminate the questioning.

Second, there are in fact many situations in which a reasonable inmate isolated for questioning would feel free to terminate the interrogation despite being subject to background prison restrictions.

And third, the Sixth Circuit's per se rule here requires Miranda warnings to be given in situations in which the concerns about custodial interrogation that drove Miranda are simply not present.

That holding impairs the important truth-seeking function of investigations by requiring the suppression of voluntary confessions made in noncustodial situations.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: Suppose the policeman said: I'm taking you away with me for 20 minutes, period.

Takes him away, puts him in a place, asks him questions for 20 minutes.

Does he have to Mirandize him?

Ms Anders: You have to look to the totality of the circumstances in that--

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: Those are the totality.

Ms Anders: --in that case.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: I just gave you the totality.

Ms Anders: In that situation they may not be in custody, because Shatzer established that simply being in prison and subject to normal prison--

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: No, no, no.

I'm taking you to a special room and in this special room I'm going to ask you questions for 20 minutes.

Ms Anders: --You would look to--

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: There is no other circumstance.

That's it.

Everything else is the same as here, except he added those words.

Now what?

Ms Anders: --I think he may not be in custody, because--

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: Not in custody.

Ms Anders: --because again you have to--

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: He's only going to be there for 20 minutes.

Ms Anders: --You look to what the reasonable inmate in that situation would feel--

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: He would have thought he could leave after 20 minutes.

Ms Anders: --You would look to what the reasonable inmate would feel, and in that situation you would look to his experience with the prison, you would look to the circumstances of the questioning, whether they are accusatorial, whether they are pleasant.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: Okay.

Ms Anders: The location of the room.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: Now, outside.

We walk outside and there's a policeman in the street and he says to someone who is a suspect: Come with me; I'm taking you to jail; I'm going to ask you questions for 20 minutes.

He takes him to a barred room, he can't get out for 20 minutes.

He has to Mirandize him?

Ms Anders: You may have to in that situation.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer: What's the difference?

Ms Anders: The difference is that the person who is on the street, their baseline is that they have complete free will, they have freedom of movement.

But when you look at the prison situation, the ultimate question is whether the reasonable inmate would feel free to terminate the questioning and one situation you look to in determining are the physical restraints on that person.

And when you look at the restraints you have to take into account the fact that the prisoner has a baseline, which is that he has some restrictions on his movement.

That's what the Court said in Shatzer.

So when you look at the totality of the circumstances, you consider the restraints and the prisoner's baseline, but you also consider everything else that happens during the questioning.

So there could be many situations in which the questioning will go in a manner that tells the reasonable inmate that he is free to leave.

For instance, the most clear example is when someone is actually told that they can leave.

But there could be many other examples as well.

Justice Elena Kagan: Could I ask you a different sort of question, Ms. Anders.

Putting aside what the Sixth Circuit did here, if you look back at the initial State Court opinion, do you read the State court -- do you think the State court is fairly read, could the Sixth Circuit have fairly read it, as establishing its own per se rule, which was the per se rule that we rejected in Mathis?

In other words, that the State supreme court required some kind of nexus between the prison custody and the interrogation?

Ms Anders: I think the State court opinions are somewhat unclear.

There some statements that could be taken to be inconsistent with Mathis, but immediately after those statements the state Court said: Well, it's not enough alone for custody that someone is incarcerated on a conviction that's unrelated to their questioning; and we look to the fact that the inmate was told that he was free to leave and he actually felt free to leave.

So I think the best reading of the State court's opinions is that they did go through the totality of the circumstances and they did conclude that the Respondent reasonably felt that he was free to leave in this interview.

But more importantly, I think the Sixth Circuit went much further than that and established a per se rule that says, no matter what the questioners do, no matter what a prisoner is told -- told, no matter how free he feels to leave, that person always has to be Mirandized.

And that extends Miranda way beyond its initial concerns.

Voluntary confessions, this Court has recognized, are an unmitigated good.

So any time someone confesses voluntarily in a noncustodial situation, the Sixth Circuit's rule applied to prisons would say that that person's confession would has to be suppressed, even though it was given in a situation that doesn't implicate Miranda's concerns at all.

I think the Sixth Circuit's rule really arose from two assumptions.

One was that isolation alone is sufficient to create custody in all circumstances.

And that can't be the case, because we know that an inmate can be told that he can leave, he can be given an initial choice before he comes along for questioning, he can be interrogated in isolation purely because he is waiting to be treated in an infirmary.

There are any number of situations, I think, where an inmate could be isolated for questioning, but he would still feel free to leave.

Going to Justice Sotomayor's question about whether someone in prison necessarily feels coerced, I think that the Court in Shatzer established that background restrictions incident to being incarcerated are not in themselves sufficient to create Miranda custody.

So in other words, they don't create such a huge coercive impact that nobody would feel free to terminate questioning.

So I think accepting the proposition that someone in prison is always coerced would lead to a per se rule that says, no matter how non-accusatorial, no matter how non-coercive that situation is, that person would always be in custody.

So--

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: Well, going back to confusing coercion issues with custody issues, and -- I don't know that you have really answered Justice Breyer's question.

Someone's picked off the street and told, you have to go into this room, and questions are asked.

Wouldn't we assume that that person is in custody?

Ms Anders: --I think in either situation, you have to look to the totality of the circumstances.

And so we know that restraints alone -- the restraints of prison aren't enough alone.

And so when you consider the restraints -- when you consider the -- the fact that a prisoner is told he has to go into a room, you would look not only to that fact, but you'd also look to everything that happens in the questioning.

But then when you go back to consider the fact that the prisoner was told that he has to come to the room, you would -- you would look to whether it's a normal prison policy that prisoners always have to be escorted places, and so that would help the Court determine whether--

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: Well, but he didn't choose to go in that room.

He was placed in that room.

What makes him think that if his jailers were walking him somewhere, that he was free to leave?

Ms Anders: --Well, I think two points.

One is that -- the fact that he is asked to -- the fact that he is told he has to go to this room is not the only circumstance of the interrogation.

So certainly what happens in the questioning can lead a reasonable prisoner to believe that he is free to go, even though he has been told he has to go to the questioning.

So if he is told he can leave, if it becomes clear from experience, if there's a prison policy saying that inmates can always leave, if he sees that he can summon the guards.

All of those circumstances have to be taken into account in addition to the fact that he was told initially that he has to go with the guard.

And the second thing--

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: If he were and the police officer said, come along with us, okay, he could say, no.

But here he didn't have that choice.

Ms Anders: --That's right.

He didn't have that initial choice.

But once he got into the questioning, I think this case is a good example of what can happen where the inmate here was told that he could end the questioning.

So the ultimate question for Miranda custody is whether the reasonable person would feel free to terminate the interrogation.

And so in considering all the circumstances, one circumstance would be that the inmate was told he has to come to the questioning, but another circumstance would be that he was then told once he got there that he could end the questioning.

So there are -- there are other factors like that that--

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Is the -- is the time relevant that this was done?

They took him away at 7:00 in the evening and kept him for 7 hours.

Ms Anders: --I think that would be a relevant factor here, too, as would the fact that the door was partially open, the questioning was not threatening, there were only two officers--

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: That didn't do him any good, because he couldn't get back to his cell without being escorted there.

Ms Anders: --That's correct.

That -- that is a -- that's a background restraint of incarceration, and in looking at whether that particular restraint made the inmate feel that he couldn't terminate the questioning, you would look both to the fact that, as he himself said, it's common sense that inmates have to be escorted to and from places in the prison.

And also--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Counsel, I wonder why you just agreed that the 7 hours would be a pertinent circumstance.

It strikes me that that would be a pertinent circumstance on overall voluntariness, perhaps, but once you are told you can leave whenever you want, I don't see why it matters at all how long he is kept there.

Ms Anders: --I think that's exactly right, that--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: So it is not a relevant circumstance on the custody question.

Ms Anders: --It is a circumstance within the totality of the circumstances here, but any kind of effect that it had on making the inmate feel that he couldn't terminate the question was entirely offset by the fact that he was told that he could leave multiple times.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Thank you, counsel.

Now Ms. Jacobs.

ORAL ARGUMENT BY ELIZABETH L. JACOBS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Ms Jacobs: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

I want to address the issue of whether someone is free to leave.

Recently, there have been several cases, and Cervantes is one -- and I can't remember whether it was Alvardo -- Alvarado or J.D.B. -- where the courts have said that in a prison setting the statement that you are free to leave has less significance than if you are in the free world.

So I would suggest that when you look at this, that that particular issue, or that particular statement, should not be given the same weight in prison as out.

And one of the reasons I suggest is because if a prisoner is told he is free to leave and he's in custody and we know he's in custody because he's in prison, he really under these facts does not have the capability of getting up and leaving--

Justice Antonin Scalia: Well, it certainly -- it certainly doesn't mean he can leave the prison, right?

Ms Jacobs: --Right.

Justice Antonin Scalia: That's clear, but -- but isn't that the only difference?

It certainly at a minimum means that he can leave this interrogation.

Ms Jacobs: Prisoners--

Justice Antonin Scalia: But what could it possibly mean if it didn't mean you could leave this room where you are now being questioned?

Ms Jacobs: --Let me answer that question by pointing out that in -- I believe it's Georgison and Cervantes where there is a button, and the prisoner has the ability to go and press the button and call his own jailers.

In this case, the prisoner had to rely on the sheriff's deputies that were interrogating in order to effectuate his freedom.

And in fact, he has testified that he said he wanted to -- I think he said that he didn't want to answer any questions, or he wanted to leave, and we don't hear any more about it -- about that.

Why not?

Because at that point, no one allowed him to leave because the officers hadn't gotten the answers they wanted.

Justice Samuel Alito: What is the rule that you want us to adopt?

Ms Jacobs: The rule I want you to adopt is the rule in Mathis.

And it seems that it has already been adopted, but I think that based on what the--

Justice Samuel Alito: So everybody in prison is in custody at all times.

Ms Jacobs: --Right.

But if--

Justice Samuel Alito: So if you want to question anybody in prison about anything, you have to give them Miranda warnings.

Ms Jacobs: --No.

And I don't think that's what Mathis said.

I think Mathis was very specific, that a police officer coming from the outside to the inside to talk about a crime occurring on the outside must be given a Miranda warning.

Justice Samuel Alito: What sense does that make?

Why is one more in custody depending on the subject that the police want to question the person about?

Ms Jacobs: And in certain circumstances, I agree with you, that in fact, this Court should hold that when the correction officers are investigating a crime within the prison, then -- and they remove the prisoner and they isolate him, take him out of the general population, that this Court should then hold Miranda is applicable.

But when it's voluntary--

Justice Samuel Alito: So whenever -- so whenever a prisoner is isolated and questioned about a crime, no matter where it occurs, the Miranda warning has to be given?

Ms Jacobs: --Yes.

Justice Samuel Alito: About a possible crime?

Ms Jacobs: Yes.

I mean -- there doesn't seem to me to be possible crimes.

They always turn out to be crimes.

Justice Elena Kagan: Well, how is that consistent with the totality of circumstances test that we've always insisted upon in Miranda cases?

Ms Jacobs: Well, Miranda -- not all the -- there are bright-line rules attached to Miranda, so that Miranda itself is a bright-line rule.

So to stay a bright-line rule I don't think is outside the purview of Miranda -- of Miranda law.

And it's easier for the officers to apply; it's easier for the courts to apply; and there would be more consistency.

But, Justice Alito, I want to make sure that you understand that I think if it's on-the-scene questioning about a crime occurring on prison, that I don't think he has to give Miranda rights; that if it's voluntary, if the officer -- if the defendant comes up to an officer and starts chatting away and starts mentioning a crime, that's voluntary.

And that is consistent with Miranda.

I don't think you really have to break new ground--

Justice Samuel Alito: If the prisoner is stabbed in the yard, and there are 50 prisoners in the yard at the time and the prison guards want to question everybody to see what they saw, they all have to be given Miranda warnings?

Ms Jacobs: --Well, that's an interesting fact situation, because some of those people are just witnesses and they are not necessarily suspects.

And a guard might be able to say: Well, the people that were in this narrow area, they are possible suspects.

They're going to get--

Justice Anthony Kennedy: No, no.

No, no, that's not the way Miranda works.

Miranda suppresses a statement that is adverse to the person who was questioned.

And the police doesn't know when the adverse statement's going to come.

So you are running away from the hypothetical.

It just doesn't work.

Ms Jacobs: --I -- I'm sorry, but I had thought that what Miranda also said is if it's a witness, and you know -- you believe that it's a witness, and that you are not asking questions that are going to incriminate them, that then you don't have to give Miranda.

Once the point it becomes -- thank you.

Justice Anthony Kennedy: Well--

Ms Jacobs: Once the point it becomes incriminating, then you give them Miranda rights.

Justice Samuel Alito: If it's a witness in the outside world, the witness is unlikely to be in custody.

Ms Jacobs: I understand, but I thought your hypothetical had to do with being stabbed in the yard.

Justice Samuel Alito: It does.

Ms Jacobs: Okay.

Justice Samuel Alito: So these -- all these people in your view are in custody, and they all are being asked questions that may incriminate them--

Ms Jacobs: If they--

Justice Samuel Alito: --and they don't have to be given Miranda warnings unless they are suspects.

Ms Jacobs: --If they are removed from the general population, if they are taken by a corrections officer to a cell where they are going to be interrogated; they are isolated; it is incommunicado; they are being interrogated by officers; they know they are officers -- they have some Miranda choices--

Justice Samuel Alito: When will that not occur?

In my hypothetical, the stabbing in the yard, you mean you think the guards are going to say,

"Okay, all you guys stay here, now we're all -- we're going to question each of you individually with everybody else, the other prisoners present? "

Ms Jacobs: --I think -- I think at that point they are going to put the people that were in the yard back in their cells.

And then they are going to take them out.

Justice Samuel Alito: And then they will be isolated.

Ms Jacobs: Yes.

Justice Samuel Alito: So they all will get Miranda warnings.

Ms Jacobs: So they will get Miranda.

You're -- you know.

And I understand the Court's concern that you might lose, you might lose evidence; but Miranda is going to protect us from false confessions, which is even a greater cost to society than -- than having to give the Miranda rights.

Justice Elena Kagan: And where do you get this focus on isolation from?

I mean, it's never mentioned in Mathis.

You said let's go back to Mathis, but that's not a part of Mathis, is it?

Ms Jacobs: It's -- well, I've got two answers for that.

One, it's -- it's the basis of Miranda, that when you isolate someone, when you talk to them incommunicado, that that -- there are compelling pressures that only Miranda rights will dispel.

Such as -- and -- let me just answer one other question.

Telling someone they have got the freedom to leave is not a substitute for Miranda.

But now let me go back to Mathis.

In Mathis the court said he was in a cell.

So I draw that -- the inference that he was isolated, that he's in a cell, he's got agents with him, and that that's isolation.

He's not in a prison library--

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: I thought that there was no discussion of the "in custody" point in Mathis.

It was assumed that they were in custody, and the issue was whether he could be questioned about a crime other than the one for which he was being held.

Ms Jacobs: --I read Mathis as to say that he was in custody for the -- for the question of the crime.

The police officers came in, they have him in a cell; it's a police-dominated atmosphere; and that they're questioning about a crime that occurred outside the prison.

To me, that's Miranda.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Well, Justice Ginsburg is quite right.

That -- that was not the issue in Mathis.

The argument in Mathis was: We're questioning him about something else, so we don't have to give him Miranda warnings.

And that's the question that the Court decided.

I don't think it had any discussion about whether -- there was certainly not the argument of whether he was in custody or not.

The argument was this is a different crime, so we don't have to give you Miranda, and the Court rejected that.

So how does that clearly establish the law on which the court relied in this case?

Ms Jacobs: In Mathis, because he was -- I guess it was the lower court thought that because he was not in custody on the crime of which they were going to ask questions--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Right.

Ms Jacobs: --that therefore you didn't have to give him Miranda.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Right.

Ms Jacobs: But I think what the Supreme Court was implying is that it doesn't matter what -- what you are in -- in prison for; you are in custody at that point that you are in the cell with these officers.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Do you know, where exactly in Mathis?

Ms Jacobs: I'm saying--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: It's only about five pages long.

Can you show me where they have that discussion about custody, as opposed to a discussion about what crime is being discussed.

Ms Jacobs: --What I'm saying is that it is implied by Mathis.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Exactly.

Ms Jacobs: You can infer it from Mathis.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Exactly.

It's implied.

Inferred.

How--

Ms Jacobs: But that--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: --Is that clearly established law?

Ms Jacobs: --Yes.

I think it is clearly established law; it does not break any new ground for us to apply it.

It does not break any new ground.

I think Mathis is a very limited case.

The holding applies to police by officers only, not to corrections officers, and I think that it does stand for the principle that if you are in custody, and they are talking to you about--

Justice Elena Kagan: Well, do you agree--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Do you agree that this is not -- what you want to derive from Mathis is not part of the holding of Mathis?

Ms Jacobs: --I think it's a rational -- I think it's a rational extension.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: It's an extension.

Ms Jacobs: But that doesn't necessarily mean that it's new law.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: I thought you were going back to Miranda itself, which says in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

Ms Jacobs: Yes.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: So -- and I think you've repeated the phrase from -- from Miranda that what the -- what it was aiming at was incommunicado interrogation of an individual in a police-dominated atmosphere.

The question is whether the Court has modified what Miranda said in -- in that regard.

Ms Jacobs: Which court?

This Court, or the Sixth Circuit?

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: This Court, this Court, because this Court now seems to assume that it must be in custody and not -- not otherwise deprived of action, that being in custody is essential.

Ms Jacobs: I -- I read that as still being the law, that there are the two clauses; one is you are under arrest, and the other is your freedom of movement is restricted such that a reasonable person would think that you were not -- that you were not free to leave.

I'm sorry, Justice Ginsburg; have I answered your question?

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Yes, I think you did.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: I'm not sure you answered mine from before.

Ms Jacobs: I'm sorry.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: How do you think that your argument or the decision of the court below was implicit in or an extension of Mathis?

Mathis says you don't -- you're -- you are not free of Miranda just because it's a different crime.

How does that answer the issue before the Sixth Circuit in this case?

Ms Jacobs: I think that when -- when the Sixth Circuit is analyzing the State court decision, they are looking at the State court decision, and that decision says if there's no nexus between what you are being questioned about and what you are in custody for, then you don't have to get Miranda.

So I think the Sixth Circuit found that to be contrary to the language in Mathis.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Well, I thought what we have been arguing about is not the nexus issue, but instead whether in light of the circumstances or under an absolute rule there is custody.

Ms Jacobs: I think we are arguing about two things.

I think the Court is going to have to decide two things, and one is whether the Sixth Circuit's decision about whether the State court's decision was contrary to clearly established law, I think that's one decision.

And the other decision is whether there is going to be this per se rule about whether if you're -- whether you're in custody or not and under what circumstances there might be a per se 7 rule.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: And what is the clearly established law set forth in our cases that answers that latter question?

Ms Jacobs: Whether -- if there is a per se rule?

There is not a clearly established law.

There could be -- under a rational extension issue, but it's a little more attenuated.

But I don't think that I -- that there -- that the Respondent would lose on that issue.

He would still win, because the Sixth Circuit's decision is not wrong; the State court's decision is contrary to the clearly-established law of Mathis.

Justice Samuel Alito: Can I can you this?

Suppose you have this situation: the police officers go to a prison.

The -- a prisoner is brought to an interview room, and the police officers are there with that prisoner in the interview room.

They say to him: We are investigating allegations that you committed child abuse.

Now, you are free to leave if you want to, and we will see that you go back to your cell right away.

He says, No, no, I want to explain this; I welcome this opportunity to speak to you.

Do they have to give him Miranda warnings?

Ms Jacobs: I think they do, because I think that telling him that he is free to go is not a substitute for Miranda.

It does not protect the Fifth Amendment right, and I think we look to Dickerson, which said that, even though section 3501 said that you had to inform defendants of certain rights, it didn't cover all of the Miranda rights.

And they said you had to cover.

It doesn't necessarily have to be in the same language, but you have to cover those rights.

I think what the Petitioner wants you to adopt is a -- is a rule that says telling someone they're free to go is a substitute for Miranda; and it isn't.

It does not protect the Fifth Amendment right.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Well, their question -- the question is, is the person entitled to Miranda warnings?

And the argument has been that they're not entitled to Miranda warnings unless you are in custody.

They say: We want to have a per se rule for "in custody", that is, if you are taken out of your cell and put in another place under police guard and questioned.

Ms Jacobs: That's correct.

They have taken him from his normal routine.

They have exercised control over him.

They've moved him to another location where I'm assuming from Justice Alito's hypothetical that he is isolated from the general prison population.

And they are starting to tell him they are going to question him about child sexual abuse charges.

I don't see how you can't--

Justice Samuel Alito: But they said: We would like to talk to you about it; but you don't have to talk to us; you are free to go.

And he says immediately: No, no, there is a misunderstanding here; I want to explain this; I am glad you came and asked me about this; I don't want to go back to my cell.

And you say that's coercive.

Ms Jacobs: --I think -- I think you are now describing him as being much nicer than I had assumed he was the first time around.

If the officer is not being confrontational, I think maybe that's one thing that has to be considered.

I would think that you have to give him Miranda rights.

Let me just go over a few issues that I wanted to make sure got mentioned.

The Sixth Circuit decision, I got kind of, I think, carried away in my brief.

The Sixth Circuit decision very clearly rests on the contrary clause.

On page 10 A of the Petitioner's appendix, they state what their decision is going to be, that is, that it's contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law.

Then they do four more pages to page 14 A in which they talk about why the State court's decision was contrary.

And it's only after they say that -- They give their reasoning.

They state their rule that they say: But if there's any doubt, then let's look at Shatzer, which was not clearly established law at the time of this case.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Can I -- Since we are talking about the Sixth Circuit decision, what it says is, this is on page 10 A,

"The central holding of Mathis is that a Miranda warning is required whenever an incarcerated individual is isolated from the general prison population and interrogated, i.e., questioned in a manner likely to lead self-incrimination about conduct occurring outside of the prison. "

Is that a correct description of Mathis?

Ms Jacobs: Yes.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: I thought Mathis rejected the argument that it depends on whether the crime is the one you are in prison for or something else.

Ms Jacobs: I'm sorry.

I thought that that was what you said at the end.

I apologize.

I think that the Sixth Circuit decision makes it very clear that they are talking about crimes occurring outside the prisons; that they have draw on that kind of dichotomy.

So--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Well, the first part, Miranda warning is required whenever an incarcerated individual is isolated from the general prison population, okay?

And interrogated, i.e., questioned or whatever.

Now does that address all of the issues?

Is that -- Where in Mathis is the discussion about whenever an incarcerated individual is isolated from the general prison population?

Ms Jacobs: --I thought that it was between 10 A, page 10 A and page 14 A.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: No, no, where in Mathis?

Ms Jacobs: This was the question that we talked about before, and what I'm saying is that I believe that they are implying that and were inferring that.

And that it might not be a clearly stated principle that it's from outside the prison, but that it certainly foreshadows -- that that rule is foreshadowed so it's not unusual that--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: If the argument were that Miranda was not required because this concerns a different crime than what you are in prison for here.

I understand the idea that under AEDPA that Mathis is clearly established law.

The issue here, however, as the Sixth Circuit put it is a warning is required whenever an incarcerated individual is isolated from the general prison population.

And I jut don't see that anywhere in Mathis.

Ms Jacobs: --I again say that this is what one infers from Mathis.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Okay.

Ms Jacobs: That's the general principle.

Justice Anthony Kennedy: --And what you infer is the rule that incarceration constitutes custody.

Ms Jacobs: No.

Custody is when the prisoner is isolated, incommunicado, outside the general prison population, and he is being asked questions by law enforcement officers designed -- that are designed to incriminate him.

I think it's the traditional Miranda--

Justice Anthony Kennedy: That is Shatzer, and Shatzer was careful to say we've never decided that issue.

Ms Jacobs: --I think what Shatzer was saying, and I know it's hard for me to tell you what Shatzer is saying since you decided Shatzer, but I think that Shatzer seems to be aimed at correction officials, that whether correction officials -- I think Shatzer is saying we never decided the whole issue.

And I think that Mathis--

Justice Anthony Kennedy: Well, it states in broader terms.

It says we've never decided whether incarceration constitutes custody for Miranda purposes.

And indeed they explicitly declined to address the issue.

Ms Jacobs: --But I think--

Justice Anthony Kennedy: It talks about Bradley, which was definitely litigation.

Ms Jacobs: --I think that Shatzer was referring to the whole umbrella of -- of people that would come into the prison, including people that would be in the prison and want to talk to -- to prisoners.

So I think Shatzer was talking about not just police officers, but correction officials.

I think Mathis clears up police officers, you come in, you are going to talk about something else, you are going to 21 interrogate -- Miranda.

Shatzer finishes this line of cases by saying it applies to -- it will apply to correction officials as long as you take the gentleman out of the general prison population and isolate him.

Justice Elena Kagan: --Ms. Jacobs, wouldn't it be fair to say -- it seems to be me that Shatzer must -- excuse me, Mathis must have found that Mr. Mathis -- the Court in Mathis must have found that Mr. Mathis was in custody.

That would be a fair inference for Mathis?

Ms Jacobs: Yes.

Justice Elena Kagan: But we have no idea why the Court thought that Mr. Mathis was in custody.

That wasn't at issue in the case.

The Court doesn't talk about any of the surrounding factual circumstances.

There might have been 1,000 things we don't know about that led everybody to assume -- that was -- that led everybody to assume that Mr. Mathis was in custody.

Not the particular things that the Sixth Circuit mentioned.

Ms Jacobs: I think that Mathis does mention factors that went into the decision about whether he was in custody.

They talk about him being in a cell, not in the prison law library, not in the conference room, not in the visitor's room -- being in the cell, with the officers and as being interrogated.

I think that they very clearly are saying, that this -- I think it's establishing this principle that Mathis -- that my case -- that Howes v. Fields applies.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Isn't the best you can say, not that Mathis found but perhaps that Mathis apparently assumed that he was in custody, because there is no discussion of it?

There is no discussion of the custody--

Ms Jacobs: I agree.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: --Yes, they give a factual recital, he was in his cell and all that.

Ms Jacobs: I just don't think -- I don't doubt that they thought that Mathis was in custody, which is why they were talking about Miranda to begin with.

He's in a cell.

Justice Elena Kagan: But we don't know why they thought Mathis was in custody.

It just wasn't an issue in the case.

Everybody had assumed it.

Ms Jacobs: And it's not dicta; as far as I can tell it becomes part of clearly established law.

It was a court--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: What is dicta?

Dicta is something that is said that is not necessarily to the holding.

Ms Jacobs: --Right.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: You don't have anything that is said about it here.

Ms Jacobs: But I -- my argument, Justice Roberts, is that saying that he is in a cell and that he is being questioned, by officers, that that is -- and he's being questioned about a crime, that that is custody; and from that there is a principle.

I would just like to close by saying again that I would ask you to reject the -- the Petitioner's proposition that saying someone is free to leave is a substitute for Miranda warning; that my client was very clearly in custody, that in fact -- and I think this is an interesting part of this case -- in a sense custody had been transferred.

That he really was no longer in custody of the jail, but that he had been -- once he went through the J door, was turned over to the sheriff's deputies, and the other guards left, that custody of him had been transferred.

So I think he is clearly in custody, and I think that's one of the things that this Court must look for or include in a per se rule, whether -- who is holding this man in custody?

Further, the fact that he was told that he could leave is not significant on the facts of this case.

The fact that the officers -- and I think Justice Kennedy made this point -- that the officers were yelling at him; they are the ones that have control over him.

He does not have the control.

The fact that he was missing his medication shows that he did not think that he had the power to change his situation.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: There is no indication that he told them -- that he told the--

Ms Jacobs: No, I agree there isn't.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: --officers that he needed medication.

Ms Jacobs: No, I agree that there isn't.

But I think that this is one of the things that -- that was playing on his mind, and although I understand that this is an objective test and not a subjective test, I think that that lends credibility to his testimony at the hearing.

Harrington versus--

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: The first Ohio court -- I'm sorry, the court below -- had its own -- seemingly had its own absolute rule, yet -- that if you are told you're free to go, that that breaks the chain of custody, whatever that might mean.

Assuming -- and the Sixth Circuit said if you are removed from the prison and questioned, you -- you absolutely must be given warnings.

Is there a middle ground, and what would that middle ground be?

And what -- how would that middle ground affect the outcome of this case?

Ms Jacobs: --I don't believe that telling a prisoner that he's free -- that he's free to leave -- is a substitute for Miranda.

I think you have to get back to what Miranda was trying to protect.

It was trying to protect systematic rights, and telling him he is free to leave does not do that.

So the facts are not enough, and that should be part of the equation.

Now, they--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Counsel, you mentioned several times, when we were talking about Mathis, that, you know, they mentioned he was in -- in a cell, right?

I've just been skimming it quickly.

I don't see where that's mentioned.

Do you know offhand?

Ms Jacobs: --No, I don't, but I really -- really did brief the case.

And I'm sure that it said that as well--

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: I did, too.

And -- and I -- well, I'll look at it again.

I'm sure it's -- I'm sure it's there--

Ms Jacobs: --Great.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: --All I see is noting that he was in prison serving a State sentence, but--

Ms Jacobs: But it definitely -- it should be talking about the officers, the agents in the cell with him.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: --Okay.

Ms Jacobs: Just as a -- as a final comment, I just want to say that Harrington v. Richter requires a finding before a writ can issue of an extreme malfunction in the justice system, that certainly where a State court has decided a constitutional issue -- under Supreme Court law and ignores Supreme Court law, that we really do have an extreme malfunction of the Supreme Court decision.

This Court should affirm the decision of the Sixth Circuit and send Mr. Fields back to Lenawee County for a new trial.

If there are no further questions, I cede the remainder of my time for the Court.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Thank you.

Mr. Bursch, you have six minutes remaining.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN J. BURSCH ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Mr. Bursch: I think the hypotheticals today demonstrate how quickly the logic of the Sixth Circuit's new per se rule falls apart when you test it with other facts.

Even in the Sixth Circuit's view, you would already would make exceptions to that new per se rule if it was in-prison conduct or if it was prison guards as opposed to outside guards.

In response to questions today, Mr. Fields' counsel admits that there must be an exception if you have a button that you can press to get out, like in Mr. Ellison's situation, the First Circuit case that Justice Souter wrote.

She admitted that if you are in a circle of proximity, or not in a circle of proximity, that that would make a difference.

No per se rule.

And that if the situation isn't confrontational, that you need to have an exception for that, or if the prisoner initiates questioning.

And you can imagine many other hypotheticals that would similarly create exceptions to what is supposedly a per se rule.

And -- and ultimately what this comes down to is Justice Alito's question: If he is under no pressure at all, the prisoner welcomes the questioning, and I would submit that a fair reading of the record here shows exactly that, that even then it would be required.

And that is a particularly strange rule.

But what we are talking about is not a constitutionally mandated protection but a prophylaxis, something that is supposed to protect a constitutional right, and where the protection isn't necessary, nor there should be a per se rule.

Counsel concedes that there isn't anything in Mathis that clearly establishes the rule that the Sixth Circuit applied.

Maybe it's an extension, maybe it's implied -- I think it's difficult to find either one of those -- but at a bare minimum, this requires reversal under the AEDPA standard.

I do want to emphasize that the Sixth Circuit's per se test does have societal cause; it impedes prison administration and eliminates potential for voluntary truthful confessions that we all want.

Finally, the test that we advocate for is not our own per se test, that simply saying you're free to leave is not the be-all, end-all.

Because it's possible that officers could say you are free to leave while doing something else nonverbally that indicates you are not free to leave.

That's why a totality of circumstances test makes the most sense.

We urge you to go past the AEDPA question and actually rule on the merits, because we think that would be good guidance for the lower courts and for law enforcement officials, and the test that we would propose is that a Miranda warning is not required when a reasonable person in the prisoner's position would have felt free to go back to his cell in accordance with ordinary reasonable prison procedures.

That is exactly what happened here.

We respectfully request that you reverse.

Unless there are further questions, I will cede my time.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts: Thank you, counsel.

The case is submitted.

Print this transcript Transcript: 

Justice Elena Kagan: Justice Alito has our opinion this morning in case 10-680, Howes verus Fields.

Justice Samuel Alito: This case which comes to us from the Sixth Circuit concerns the test for determining whether a prisoner is in custody within the meaning of the Miranda rule.

Respondent Fields was serving a sentence in the Michigan jail when he was taken from his cell to a conference room and questioned about the sexual abuse of a 12-year-old boy.

He was not given Miranda warnings or advised that he did not have to speak with the interviewing deputies, but he was told more than once that he was free to leave and return to his cell.

Fields confessed and he was later charged with criminal sexual conduct and convicted.

The state courts rejected Fields' contention that his confession should have been suppressed because he was subjected to custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning, but the Federal District Court granted habeas relief and the Sixth Circuit affirmed holding that our precedents clearly establish that a prisoner is always in custody within the meaning of Miranda when he is removed from general prison population and questioned about conduct that occurred outside the prison.

Our decisions, however, do not clearly establish such a categorical rule and therefore the Court of Appeals erred in holding that this rule provides a permissible basis for federal habeas relief under the relevant provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1986.

Indeed, the rule applied by the Sixth Circuit does not represent a correct interpretation of our Miranda case law.

Under Miranda, custody is a term of art, not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to Miranda custody and imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes.

Although taking a prisoner aside for questioning may necessitate some additional limitations on the prisoner's freedom of movement, it does not necessarily convert a noncustodial situation into Miranda custody and neither does questioning a prisoner about criminal activity that took place outside the prison have a greater potential for coercion than questioning under otherwise identical circumstances about criminal activity that took place within prison walls.

The record in this case reveals that respondent was not taken into custody for Miranda purposes.

For these reasons and others stated in our opinion, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Justice Ginsburg has filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor have joined.