Cases - 2009 term

Maryland v. Shatzer

jgoldman — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Roxbury Correctional Institute

United States

39° 33' 50.1732" N, 77° 43' 16.7952" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-680

Petitioner

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Blaine Shatzer, Sr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, January 26, 2009

Argued

Monday, October 5, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Advocates

Douglas F. Gansler (Attorney General of Maryland argued the cause for the petitioner)

Toby J. Heytens (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Celia A. Davis (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In August 2003, a detective from the Hagerstown, MD Police Department interviewed Michael Blain Shatzer Sr. regarding allegations that he had sexually abused his three-year old child. At the time, Mr. Shatzer was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual abuse of another child. After Mr. Shatzer invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, the interview was terminated. The investigation was subsequently closed, only to be reopened in January 2006 on the prompting of Mr. Shatzer's wife, when she recognized her child could make more specific allegations about Mr. Shatzer's alleged sexual abuse. Thereafter in March 2006, another detective from the Hagerstown Police Department, who was aware that Mr. Shatzer had been under investigation, but was not aware that Mr. Shatzer had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, interviewed him. At this interview, Mr. Shatzer was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, which he waived, and then confessed to specific instances of sexual abuse involving his child.

Prior to trial, Mr. Shatzer moved to suppress the confessions he made in the March 2006 interview arguing that his 2003 invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights was still applicable. Under Edwards v. Arizona rendered the confession inadmissible. The motion was denied and a Maryland trial court convicted him of sexual child abuse. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the protections of Edwards applies for an inmate who has been continually incarcerated and had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, until either counsel is made available or the inmate initiates further conversation with police. Therefore, under the circumstances, Mr. Shatzer's confession was inadmissible.

Question

Does Edwards v. Arizona prohibit the re-interrogation of a suspect, who has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, after a substantial amount of time has elapsed between the invocation of rights and the subsequent interrogation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Maryland, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Miranda warnings

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals of Maryland, holding that because Mr. Shatzer experienced a break in Miranda custody lasting more than two weeks between the first and second attempts at interrogation, Edwards does not mandate suppression of his 2006 statements. Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority reasoned that when a suspect has been released from custody and returned to normal life before the police later attempt interrogation, there is little reason to believe that the suspect's change of heart was coerced. The Court then stated that the appropriate period of time for a person to be re-acclimated to normal life was 14 days. Here, even though Mr. Shatzer was released back into the general prison population, he entered back into his normal life and was free of the pressures of investigative custody; thus, the Edwards presumption was no longer warranted.

Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter

jgoldman — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Mohawk Industries-Corporate Offices

United States

34° 28' 33.0456" N, 84° 56' 29.5944" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-678

Petitioner

Mohawk Industries, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Norman Carpenter

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, January 26, 2009

Argued

Monday, October 5, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Advocates

Randall L. Allen (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Judith Resnik (argued the cause for the respondent)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2006, Norman Carpenter, a Shift Supervisor at a Mohawk Industry manufacturing facility, was fired after violating Mohawk's Code of Ethics. He subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination in a Georgia federal district court. He argued that he was fired, not for violating company protocols, but for reporting immigration violations to Mohawk's human resources department. Mr. Carpenter stated that after filing his report, a Mohawk company attorney met with him and attempted to persuade him to recant. The report would have been detrimental to Mohawk as it was then involved in a class action lawsuit which charged the company with conspiring to hire illegal immigrants.

Before trial and as part of discovery, Mr. Carpenter requested information from Mohawk related to his meeting with its attorney. Mohawk contended that the information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The federal district court ordered Mohawk to disclose the information, but permitted the company to appeal. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order for discovery. It reasoned that while the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. provided an exception to the finality requirement necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over appeals, the appeal of a discovery order involving attorney-client privilege did not qualify for exception.

Question

Is an order for discovery involving attorney-client privilege eligible for immediate appeal under the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mohawk Industries, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. The Supreme Court held that disclosure orders that are adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that postjudgment appeals, "together with other review mechanisms," suffice to protect the rights of litigants.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that the Eleventh Circuit should have been affirmed on the ground that any "avenue for immediate appeal" should be left to the "rulemaking process." Instead, the Court "subordinated what the appellate jurisdiction statute says to what the Court thinks is a good idea."

McDaniel v. Brown

jgoldman — Thu, 17 May 2012 03:39:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-559

Petitioner

E. K. McDaniel, Warden, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Troy Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, January 26, 2009

Facts of the Case

Troy Brown was convicted in a Nevada state court on two counts of sexual assault on a child and one count of abuse or neglect of a child. He was subsequently denied post-conviction relief by the Nevada Supreme Court.

In 2004, Mr. Brown filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the federal district court of Nevada arguing that DNA evidence was improperly admitted at his trial, thus violating his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. The federal district court agreed and granted his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that Mr. Brown's Due Process rights were violated when DNA evidence was improperly admitted at trial and that in its absence "no rational trier of fact" could have found "beyond a reasonable doubt" that he committed the crime with which he was charged. The court noted that the Nevada Supreme Court erred in applying a "reasonable trier of fact" standard as opposed to the more appropriate "rational trier of fact" standard as illustrated by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia when reviewing Mr. Brown's case.

Question

What is the appropriate standard of review in a petition for federal habeas corpus relief when the petitioner's argument rests on whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to convict?

Alvarez v. Smith

jgoldman — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

City of Chicago-Police Department

3510 S Michigan Ave Chicago

Chicago, IL 60653

United States

41° 49' 50.2896" N, 87° 37' 25.6188" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-351

Petitioner

Anita Alvarez, Cook County State's Attorney

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chermane Smith, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Advocates

Paul Castiglione (argued the cause for the petitioner)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae)

Thomas Peters (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Chicago Police Department seized property belonging to the plaintiffs, using the power granted it by the Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (DAFPA). The plaintiffs filed suit in an Illinois federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 arguing that when property is seized under the DAFPA, due process requires a prompt, postseizure, probable cause hearing. The district court dismissed, but the plaintiffs asked for a rehearing in light of Mathews v. Eldridge, which prohibited the seizure of real property without a prior hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted review.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the DAFPA did not provide adequate due process for an owner to contest the seizure of his property, reasoning the length of time between seizure and contest was too long (a maximum of 97 to 187 days). The court remanded the case and instructed the district court to devise a mechanism by which an owner can contest the validity of the retention of his property.

Question

In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a postseizure, probable cause hearing, prior to a forfeiture of property, should the district court apply the test employed in United States v. $8,850 or that in Mathews v. Eldridge?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Alvarez, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Unanswered. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen J. Breyer, the court dismissed the case as moot. At oral argument, the parties confirmed that there was no longer any dispute about the ownership or possession of the property in question. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part but opposed vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Salazar v. Buono

jgoldman — Wed, 07 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

35° 0' 39.5676" N, 115° 28' 24.078" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-472

Petitioner

Ken L. Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Frank Buono

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Advocates

Elena Kagan (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Peter J. Eliasberg (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars built a wooden cross on top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) as a memorial to those who died in World War I. The original cross no longer exists, but has been rebuilt several times. Frank Buono, a former Preserve employee, filed suit in a California federal district court seeking to prevent the permanent display of the cross. The genesis of his suit occurred in 1999 when a request to build a Buddhist shrine in the Preserve, near the cross, was denied. He argued that the cross' display on federal property violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court agreed and the cross was covered.

While the case was pending, Congress designated Sunrise Rock a national memorial and barred its dismantling with the use of federal funds. One year later, by land swap, Congress made Sunrise Rock private property in exchange for another parcel of land. Mr. Buono moved to not only enforce the previous court order preventing the display of the cross, but also to prohibit the land swap. The district court granted both motions. The Secretary of the Interior appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that the government failed to show that the district court's fact findings or legal standards were clearly erroneous, nor did it show that the district court made an error in judgment.

Question

1) Can Mr. Buono's suit be maintained when he is merely offended by the fact that public land on which a cross is displayed is not a forum for other religious symbols?

2) Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err in not giving effect to Congress's land swap where Sunrise Rock was made private land?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Salazar, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment Clause, Amendment 1

Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the plurality, the Court held that Mr. Buono has standing to maintain this action. Justice Kennedy reasoned that when a party obtains a judgment in its favor, like Mr. Buono, it acquires a "judicially cognizable" interest in ensuring compliance with that judgment. The plurality also held that the district court erred in preventing the government from implementing the land-transfer statute in order to protect Mr. Buono's rights. A court may not order an injunction when it fails to consider all the circumstances bearing on the need for preventive relief. The district court failed to consider the context in which the land-transfer statute was enacted. Justice Kennedy concluded that upon remand the court should conduct a proper inquiry into the continued need for preventive relief in light of the statute.

Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. The district court should not reach the issue whether the implementation of the land-transfer statute would violate the district court's injunction or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. Mr. Buono lacked standing; and therefore, the Supreme Court should not have addressed the merits of his claim. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotamayor, dissented. The district court was correct in preventing the enforcement of Congress' land-transfer statute because the statute was designed to leave the cross in place thus violating the Establishment Clause.

Padilla v. Kentucky

jgoldman — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 39' 23.6556" N, 86° 0' 43.7652" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-651

Petitioner

Jose Padilla

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kentucky

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Advocates

Stephen B. Kinnaird (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Wm. Robert Long Jr. (argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Jose Padilla was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on counts of trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number. On advice from his lawyer, he entered a guilty plea with respect to the three drug charges in exchange for dismissal on the final charge. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief arguing that he was misadvised about the potential for deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Padilla's conviction and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. Fuartado, reversed the court of appeals. It held that collateral consequences of advice by counsel is outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. It reasoned that counsel's advice on the consequences of a plea with respect to immigration is not required and therefore cannot constitute ineffectiveness.

Question

1) Is the mandatory deportation that results from a guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana a "collateral consequence" that relieves counsel of an affirmative duty to advise his client per the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment?

2) Assuming deportation is a "collateral consequence", can counsel's gross misadvice about deportation constitute a ground for setting aside a guilty plea that is induced by that advice?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Padilla, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment: Right to Counsel

No. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that counsel's advice with respect to deportation is not categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment. Here, Mr. Padilla's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because counsel could have easily determined that a guilty plea would make Mr. Padilla eligible for deportation. The Court did not address whether Mr. Padilla was prejudiced by his counsel's deficiency and entitled to relief. The Court then remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Kentucky for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, wrote separately, concurring. He criticized the Court for adopting a halfway standard where defense counsel must advise a client on immigration law when it is "succinct and straightforward" but not necessarily in other situations. He predicted that this instruction would lead to confusion and needless litigation. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, also wrote separately, dissenting. He criticized the majority for expanding the text of the Sixth Amendment beyond merely providing the defendant counsel to providing him "sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction." He mused that the Constitution is not an "all-purpose tool" to create a perfect world.

Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers

jgoldman — Wed, 07 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

National Railroad Adjustment Board

United States

41° 53' 52.7712" N, 87° 37' 34.32" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-604

Petitioner

Union Pacific Railroad Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Advocates

J. Scott Ballenger (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Thomas H. Geoghegan (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad (UPR), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), contesting their discharge or discipline imposed by the UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET failed to submit conclusive evidence that the aggrieved parties had held a conference with the UPR to attempt to resolve the disputes – a prerequisite to arbitration – though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by requiring evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively.

Question

1) Did the Seventh Circuit err in setting aside a final arbitration award for an alleged due process violation?

2) Are prearbitration settlement conferences a prerequisite for NRAB jurisdiction over a dispute?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes and No. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous bench, the Court held that the Seventh Circuit effectively resolved the Union's core complaint, but erred in doing so under a "constitutional, rather than statutory headline." The Court reasoned that there was no due process issue "alive" in the case. The Court further held that prearbitration settlement conferences are not a prerequisite for NRAB jurisdiction over a dispute. The Court reasoned that prearbitration conference requirements set out by the NRAB run independent of the collective bargaining process and do not bear on the merits of an actual grievance.

Smith v. Spisak

jgoldman — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-724

Petitioner

Kevin Smith, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Frank G. Spisak, Jr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Advocates

Richard Cordray (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael J. Benza (argued the cause for the respondent (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

Frank Spisak was convicted of murder in an Ohio state court and sentenced to death. Subsequently, he was granted partial habeas corpus relief by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court held that Mr. Spisak received ineffective counsel at sentencing and the jury instructions at this phase unconstitutionally required the jury to be unanimous when finding mitigating evidence to his sentence. The court ordered a new sentencing trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Musladin and Landrigan.

On remand, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its original holding. It reasoned that Musladin and Landrigan were readily distinguishable from Mr. Spisak's case and therefore he was still entitled to habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the court noted that although the Supreme Court had not ruled on a set of facts identical to those in Mr. Spisak's case, the court of appeals was not precluded from finding that the Ohio state court had unreasonably applied federal law.

Question

1) Did the Sixth Circuit disobey the directives of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Musladin when it resolved questions in Mr. Spisak's favor that were not decided in Musladin?

2) Did the Sixth Circuit exceed its authority when it presumed that Mr. Spisak suffered prejudice by allegedly deficient statements made by his counsel at sentencing and ignored the Ohio Supreme Court's standard for prejudice?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Smith, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. Yes. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Samuel A. Alito, and Sonia Sotamayor, and Justice John Paul Stevens in part, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that the jury instructions in Mr. Spisak's trial were not "contrary to" and did not "involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." The Court further held that even though Mr. Spisak's counsel's closing argument was inadequate, it reasoned that there was no "reasonable probability" that a better closing argument would have made a significant difference in Mr. Spisak's sentence.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that errors occurred during Mr. Spisak's trial that violated clearly established federal law. However, Justice Stevens agreed that those errors did not entitle Mr. Spisak to relief as his own conduct "alienated and ostracized the jury" and "his crimes were monstrous."

Johnson v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

30° 19' 55.8624" N, 81° 39' 20.3436" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-6925

Petitioner

Curtis Darnell Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Advocates

Lisa Call (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Leondra R. Kruger (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Curtis Johnson was convicted in a Florida federal district court for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the district court determined that his three earlier convictions constituted "violent felonies." Mr. Curtis appealed arguing that one of his prior convictions was for battery and the Florida Supreme Court had held the Florida battery law did not constitute a "violent felony."

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Johnson's prior battery conviction under Florida law constituted a "violent felony" under the ACCA. The court reasoned that the force requirement of the definition for a "violent felony" was satisfied by the "touching or striking" element under the state battery law.

Question

1) Was the Eleventh Circuit bound by the Florida Supreme Court's holding that its state battery law did not have, as an element, the "use or threatened use of physical force?"

2) Is a prior state conviction for battery in all cases a "violent felony?"

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Johnson, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Armed Career Criminal Act

Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that while the meaning of "physical force" in the ACCA is a question of federal law, not state law, the Court was bound by the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements of a Florida statute. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia held that the Florida felony offense of battery by "actually and intentionally touching" another person does not have "as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person of another." The Court reasoned that within the context of the ACCA "physical force" means violent force, which rises beyond mere actual and intentional touching. Consequently, the Florida offense of battery does not constitute a "violent felony" under the ACCA.

Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. Justice Alito stated that the classic definition of the crime of battery is the "intentional application of unlawful force against the person of another." He argued that under such a definition, battery falls squarely within the plain language of the ACCA.

Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.

jgoldman — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 51' 0.1188" N, 87° 39' 0.1872" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-586

Petitioner

Jerry N. Jones, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harris Associates L.P.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, March 9, 2009

Argued

Monday, November 2, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Advocates

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

John D. Donovan Jr. (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Plaintiffs were investors in several mutual funds managed by Harris Associates. They filed suit in an Illinois federal district court arguing Harris' fees were too high and thus violated Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court dismissed the case.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Section 36(b) did not permit judicial regulation of mutual fund management fees. It acknowledged that management had a fiduciary duty to investors, but that did not imply judicial regulation of management's fees was appropriate. Rather, the court stated that market forces were best able to determine the appropriateness of fees.

Question

Did the Seventh Circuit err in holding that claims alleging mutual fund management's fees were too high is not cognizable under Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, when that holding is in conflict with those in three other circuits?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Harris Associates, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: §36(b)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Circuit erred by not applying the Court's standard enunciated in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.. There, the Court held that in determining whether a claim is cognizable under Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act requires a determination that the adviser charge a fee that is "so disproportionately large it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered." With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for unanimous Court, it reasoned that the Gartenberg standard reflected the importance of determining whether a fee structure was the result of "arm's length bargaining" while also understanding that the Act provided other avenues to protect investors.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, concurring. He disagreed that the Court was simply endorsing a Gartenberg standard. Rather, he noted that the Court did not endorse a "free-ranging judicial fairness review of fees" that Gartenberg, itself, might endorse.

Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick

jgoldman — Wed, 07 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 42' 51.3684" N, 74° 0' 21.5028" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-103

Petitioner

Reed Elsevier, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Irvin Muchnick, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, March 2, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Advocates

Charles S. Sims (argued the cause for the petiioners)

Ginger D. Anders (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae)

Deborah Jones Merritt (argued the cause for amicus curiae in support of the judgment below (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

A federal district court in New York approved an $18 million settlement in a class-action brought by freelance writers who had contracted with the defendant publishers to publish their works in print. Without authorization, the publishers reproduced the works for electronic distribution. Muchnick and others objected to the settlement.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit overturned the settlement on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over claims relating to unregistered works. The court stated that the Copyright Act grants the federal district courts jurisdiction only over those claims that arise from registered works. Since the vast majority of the claimants in the litigation based their claims on unregistered works, the federal district court did not have the power to certify a class in the litigation.

Question

Does Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act restrict subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts over copyright infringement actions?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Reed Elsevier, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Copyright Act §411(a)

No. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas held that Section 411(a)'s registration requirement is a precondition to filing a copyright infringement claim. The Court further held that a copyright holder's failure to comply with the registration requirement does not restrict a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction over infringement claims involving unregistered works. The Court declined to address whether Section 411(a)'s registration requirement is a mandatory precondition to suit that district courts may or should enforce on their own initiative by dismissing copyright infringement claims involving unregistered works.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Ginsburg agreed that Section 411(a)'s registration requirement does not restrict a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. However, she noted that tension remained between the Court's prior holdings in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. and Bowles v. Russell. In an attempt to stave off confusion, she attempted to reconcile the two decisions by distinguishing the cases.

Perdue v. Kenny A.

jgoldman — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

33° 44' 56.382" N, 84° 23' 16.7352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-970

Petitioner

Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kenny A., By His Next Friend Linda Winn, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, April 6, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

Advocates

Mark H. Cohen (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae)

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2005, the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) and related state agencies settled a class action lawsuit with plaintiff foster children under the care of the DHR. However, the parties could not agree on the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be included in the settlement. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion in a Georgia federal district court for that court to make a fee determination and award. The plaintiffs argued that they were owed over $7 million for services rendered and also deserved a $7 million fee enhancement for a job well done. The district court largely agreed with the plaintiffs and awarded $10,522,405.08 in compensation, over $4 million of which was a fee enhancement. The district court reasoned that "the superb quality of counsel's representation far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the standard hourly rates used to calculate the fee" and thus justified the enhancement.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced the lodestar figure (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) because of counsel's skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism. The Court reasoned that the enhancement of the lodestar amount of attorney's fees may be allowed for superior representation coupled with the exceptional nature of results.

Question

Can the reasonable attorneys' fee award under a federal fee-shifting statute ever be enhanced based solely on the quality of performance and results obtained?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Perdue, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U. S. C. §1988

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the calculation of an attorney's fee based on the lodestar may be increased due to superior performance, but only in extraordinary circumstances. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court rejected the contention that a fee determined by the lodestar method may not be enhanced in any situation. The Court then explained that there were circumstances where superior attorney performance is not adequately taken into account by the lodestar. However, the Court counseled that such enhancements should not be awarded without specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been "adequate to attract competent counsel."

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote separately, concurring. He lauded the Court for rejecting that all enhancements under the lodestar method should be barred. Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote separately, concurring. He was careful to note that the majority opinion placed precise limitations on the availability of lodestar enhancements. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that lodestar enhancements may sometimes be permissible. However, he would have affirmed the Eleventh Circuit because the Supreme Court was too far removed from the fact intensive inquiry as to whether a fee enhancement in this case was warranted.

Bloate v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 38' 49.1676" N, 90° 13' 29.8812" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-728

Petitioner

Taylor James Bloate

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, April 20, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

Decided

Monday, March 8, 2010

Advocates

Mark T. Stancil (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Matthew D. Roberts (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Taylor James Bloate was convicted in a Missouri federal district court on counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. In a pretrial motion, Mr. Bloate moved to dismiss arguing that there had been a Speedy Trial Act violation. It was denied. The Act requires that a defendant's trial begin within "70 days after the indictment or the defendant's initial appearance, whichever is later." However, it excludes "any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant." Following his conviction, Mr. Bloate appealed, arguing that his motion to dismiss was improperly denied as the court excluded too many days in its calculation.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Bloate's conviction. It recognized that six circuits hold that "pretrial motion preparation may be excluded, if the court specifically grants time for that purpose" and that two do not. Here, the Eighth Circuit sided with the majority in holding that the district court properly excluded days from the time of Mr. Bloate's indictment to his trial and therefore there was no violation to the Speedy Trial Act.

Question

Is time granted to prepare pretrial motions automatically excludable under 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(1)?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bloate, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Speedy Trial Act of 1974

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable from the 70-day limit under subsection (h)(1). Rather, with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court stated that such time may be excluded only when a district court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under subsection (h)(7). The Court reasoned that the period of time sought to be excluded by the government preceded the first day upon which Congress specified that such delay may be automatically excluded. Thus, in this case, the pretrial preparation time was not automatically excludable.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion. She highlighted that nothing in the majority decision prevents the Eight Circuit upon remand from considering the government's argument that Mr. Bloate's indictment and conviction remain valid. Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. He argued that the neither the text nor legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act support the majority decision. Instead, he criticized the majority for creating a rule that would entitle Mr. Bloate to dismissal of his charge because his attorney persuaded a Magistrate Judge to give him more time to prepare pretrial motions.

United States v. Stevens

jgoldman — Tue, 06 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 53' 42.4032" N, 77° 2' 10.9176" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-769

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert J. Stevens

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, April 20, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Advocates

Neal Kumar Katyal (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Robert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for "knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain." His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest.

Question

Is 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that depictions of animal cruelty are not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court further reasoned that because a "substantial number" of § 48's applications are unconstitutional, the law is overbroad and, thus, invalid.

Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented. He disagreed with the majority opinion arguing that § 48 was not intended to suppress speech, but rather to "prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty." He was concerned that the majority holding will practically legalize the sale of such videos and spur the resumption of their production.

Pottawattamie County v. McGhee

jgoldman — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1065

Petitioner

Pottawattamie County, Iowa, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Curtis W. McGhee, Jr., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Monday, April 20, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, November 4, 2009

Decided

Monday, January 4, 2010

Advocates

Stephen Sanders (pro hac vice, for the petitioners)

Neal Kumar Katyal (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Paul D. Clement (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1978, Curtis W. McGhee Jr. and Terry Harrington were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Iowa state court. In 2002, Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's convictions were reversed because the prosecutor at their trial improperly withheld evidence of an alternative suspect. Subsequently, Mr. McGhee and Mr. Harrington filed civil claims in an Iowa federal court against Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and the prosecutors and officers involved in their prosecution. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were absolutely immune to civil prosecution. The district court found some defendants immune to certain claims, but denied immunity to other defendants on the other claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the prosecutors were absolutely immune to civil prosecution.

The Eighth Circuit held that the prosecutors were not immune from claims that they violated Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's due process rights. The court reasoned that allegations that prosecutors obtained, manufactured, coerced, and fabricated evidence did not fall within "a distinctly prosecutorial function" and thus the prosecutors were not immune to the claims.

Question

May a prosecutor be subject to civil prosecution when he allegedly violated the criminal defendants' substantial due process rights by fabricating evidence and then introducing it at trial against the defendants?

Conclusion

Dismissed pursuant to the Court's Rule 46.

Hemi Group LLC v. City of New York

jgoldman — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

4909 Paseo Del Norte NE # E

Albuquerque, NM 87113-1527

United States

35° 10' 33.3408" N, 106° 35' 25.7784" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-969

Petitioner

Hemi Group, LLC and Kai Gachupin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, May 4, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Decided

Monday, January 25, 2010

Advocates

Randolph H. Barnhouse (for the petitioners)

Leonard J. Koerner (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The City of New York sued several out-of-state cigarette vendors under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failing to report sales made to individuals over the Internet as required by the federal Jenkins Act. The State of New York and City of New York rely on this information to collect taxes imposed on cigarettes sold in the state and city. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the City of New York's suit, holding that its claim did not meet the "causation" requirements set forth under RICO. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the City of New York met the RICO "causation" requirements and thus maintained a cause of action. The court reasoned that the defendants' conduct prevented the City from collecting taxes and thus directly injured it. Moreover, the court reasoned that the loss of taxes injured the City's "business or property."

Question

Does the City of New York meet the RICO "causation" requirements in its suit against out-of-state cigarette vendors that the plaintiff be directly injured in its "business or property" when the City merely alleges an injury from the nonpayment of taxes by non-litigant third-parties?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Hemi Group, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit holding that because the City of New York cannot show that it lost revenue "by reason of" the alleged RICO violation, it cannot state a RICO claim. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in part, the Court reasoned that to establish that an injury came about "by reason of" a RICO violation, a plaintiff must show both, "but for" and "proximate" causation. Here, the Court concluded that the City's causal theory was even more remote than in cases where the Court had failed to find proximate cause.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. She criticized the City for attempting to bring a claim for fraud that arose under violations of the Jenkins Act, but failed to actually bring a claim for violations under the Jenkins Act. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Anthony M. Kennedy, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. In contrast to the majority, he argued that Hemi Group's failure to provide New York State with the names and addresses of its New York City cigarette customers proximately caused New York City to lose tobacco tax revenue.

Graham v. Florida

jgoldman — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

30° 26' 17.7216" N, 84° 16' 50.6388" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-7412

Petitioner

Terrance Jamar Graham

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, May 4, 2009

Argued

Monday, November 9, 2009

Decided

Monday, May 17, 2010

Advocates

Bryan S. Gowdy (for the petitioner)

Scott D. Makar (Solicitor General of Florida, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

When Terrence Graham was 16 years old he was convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery. He served a 12 month sentence and was released. Six months later Mr. Graham was tried and convicted by a Florida state court of armed home robbery and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, he argued that the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile, on its face, violated the Eighth Amendment and moreover constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court of Appeal of Florida disagreed. It held that Mr. Graham's sentence neither was a facial violation of the Eighth Amendment nor constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

Question

Does the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile convicted of a non-homicidal offense violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment?"

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Graham, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Eight Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicidal crime. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that because this case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders (juveniles), the categorical analysis under Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy governs. Under this approach, the Court must: (1) consider objective indicia of society's standards and (2) determine whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution guided by the standards elaborated by controlling precedents. Here, the Court concluded that both (1) and (2) indicated that the punishment in question for the class in question was unconstitutional. The Court made a point to note that life sentences for juveniles for non-homicidal crimes has been "rejected the world over."

Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He disagreed with the manner in which the majority reached its conclusion. Instead, he made his conclusion based on: (1) Supreme Court cases requiring "narrow proportionality" review of noncapital sentences and (2) the Supreme Court's conclusion in Roper that juvenile offenders are generally less culpable than adults who commit the same crimes. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, and in part by Justice Samuel A. Alito, dissented. Justice Thomas reprimanded the majority for replacing its own moral judgment for that of American citizens who up to this point had been charged with making the moral distinction as to whether this sentence could ever be imposed. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He departed from Justice Thomas's dissent to note that "[n]othing in the Court's opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole." He also would not have reached the issue as to whether Mr. Graham's sentence as-applied violated the Eighth Amendment. He would only have reached the question of whether such sentences categorically violate the Eighth Amendment.

Sullivan v. Florida

jgoldman — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-7621

Petitioner

Joe Harris Sullivan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, May 4, 2009

Argued

Monday, November 9, 2009

Decided

Monday, May 17, 2010

Advocates

Bryan Stevenson (for the petitioner)

Scott D. Makar (Solicitor General of Florida, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

When Joe Sullivan was 13 years old, he was convicted of sexual battery by a Florida state court and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Mr. Sullivan argued that his sentence was cruel and unusual and thus violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court of appeals affirmed Mr. Sullivan's sentence without comment.

Question

Does the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a 13 year old convicted of a non-homicidal offense violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment?"

Conclusion

The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Oversight Board

jgoldman — Mon, 07 Dec 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 53' 42.4032" N, 77° 2' 10.9176" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-861

Petitioner

Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

561 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, May 18, 2009

Argued

Monday, December 7, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 28, 2010

Advocates

Michael A. Carvin (for the petitioners)

Elena Kagan (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (for respondents Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.)

Facts of the Case

The Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit organization, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It alleged that the creation of the Public Company Oversight Board (the Board) by the Act violated the Appointments Clause because it deprived the President from exercising adequate control over the Board. However, the Board itself was under the direct supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), all of whose commissioners are appointed by and can be removed by the President.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board did not violate either the Appointments Clause or the separation of powers principle. It reasoned that the Board’s members were inferior officers under the supervision of the SEC and thus were not obligated to be appointed by the President. Also, the court noted that the President’s ability to remove members of the SEC, who in turn could remove members of the Board, preserved the Constitution’s separation of powers.

Question

1) Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act violate the the separation of powers doctrine by giving broad powers to the Board while simultaneously preventing the President of the power to appoint or remove Board members?

2) Did the court of appeals correctly hold that the Board members were inferior officers under the direct supervision of the SEC even though the SEC cannot supervise those members individually and can only remove them for just cause?

3) Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act violate the Appointments Clause even if the Board’s members are inferior because the SEC is not an official department or because the commissioners are not the head of the SEC?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for , 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, Separation of Powers

Yes. Yes. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the "for-cause" limitation on the removal of Board members is unconstitutional because it contravenes the Constitution's separation of powers. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for the majority, the Court reasoned because the Act protects Board members from removal except for good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether good cause exists, the Act deprives the President the power to hold Board members accountable. Such an arrangement contradicts Article II's vesting of the executive power in the president. The Court further held that the unconstitutionality of the removal provision did not make unconstitutional the entire Board. The Court concluded that the Board may continue to function as before, but its members may be removed at will by the Commission. Lastly, the Court held that the Board's appointment is consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that Board members are inferior officers, and, thus, their appointment may permissibly be vested in the "Head of the Department." Here, the Commission constitutes the "Head of the Department."

Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor, dissented. He agreed that the members of the Board are inferior officers. However, he disagreed that the Act unconstitutionally interferes with the President's executive power.

Shady Grove Orthopedics Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.

jgoldman — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

42° 39' 9.2844" N, 73° 45' 22.4352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1008

Petitioner

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Allstate Insurance Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, May 4, 2009

Argued

Monday, November 2, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Advocates

Scott L. Nelson (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Christopher Landau (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Shady Grove Orthopedics Associates (Shady Grove), on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, sued Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) in part for Allstate's alleged failure to pay interest penalties on overdue insurance payments as prescribed by New York statute. Allstate moved to dismiss relying on New York's rules of civil procedure which instruct that class action lawsuits are inappropriate unless specifically prescribed by statute. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed that Shady Grove's class action claim was not authorized and thus dismissed its claim.

On appeal, Shady Grove argued that the New York rules of civil procedure conflict with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus were not applicable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with Shady Grove and affirmed the district court. The Second Circuit, reasoning from the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins, stated that the New York rules of civil procedure did not conflict with Rule 23 and thus Rule 23 did not control.

Question

1) Can a state legislature prohibit federal courts from using a federal class action rule for a state law claim?

2) Can a state legislature dictate civil procedure in federal courts?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Shady Grove, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23

No. No. The Supreme Court held that §901(b) of the New York rules of civil procedure does not preclude a federal court sitting in diversity from entertaining a class action under Rule 23 of the federal rules of civil procedure. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority as to Parts I and II-A, the Court stated that if Rule 23 answers the question in dispute, it governs, unless it exceeds its statutory authorization or Congress' rulemaking power. Here, the Court reasoned that Rule 23 answers the question in dispute – whether Shady Grove's suit may proceed as a class action – and is therefore controlling. With Justice Scalia writing for a plurality as to Parts II-B and II-D, he stated that the Rules Enabling Act, not Erie controls the validity of a federal rule of civil procedure, even if that results in opening the federal courts to class actions that cannot proceed in state court. With Justice Scalia writing for a distinct plurality as to Part II-C, he concluded that the concurrence's analysis conflicted with the Court's precedent in Sibbach – that the federal rules "really regulate procedure."

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote separately, concurring. He agreed that Rule 23 applies in this case, but also recognized that in some cases federal courts should apply state procedural rules in diversity cases because they function as part of the state's definition of substantive rights and remedies. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, dissented. She criticized the majority opinion for using Rule 23 to override New York's statutory restriction on the availability of damages and consequently turning a $500 case into a $5,000,000 one. She cautioned that it is important to interpret the federal rules with sensitivity to state regulatory policies.

Black v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 08 Dec 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 51' 0.1188" N, 87° 39' 0.1872" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-876

Petitioner

Conrad M. Black, John A. Boultbee, and Mark S. Kipnis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

561 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, May 18, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (for the petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Four former executives of Hollinger International were convicted of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 by an Illinois federal district court. In part, they had paid themselves $5.5 million in fees without the knowledge of the company's audit committee or board of directors. At trial, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendants guilty if it deemed they had schemed to deprive Hollinger and its shareholders "of their intangible right to the honest services of the corporate officers, directors, or controlling shareholders of Hollinger," and if the objective of the scheme was "private gain." On appeal, the defendants explained that while their objective was "private gain," the compensation had been crafted in order to avoid paying taxes to the Canadian government. Therefore, they argued that because their "private gain" was intended to be purely at the expense of the Canadian government and not the company, their actions did not violate the intent of Section 1346.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. It held that the deprivation of honest services owed to an employer is not mitigated simply because the inducement was a tax benefit obtained from a third party. The court reasoned that had the defendants disclosed to Hollinger's audit committee and board of directors that the compensation was meant to bring about tax benefits, the committee and board very well may have reduced the pay-out in light of the tax benefits.

Question

1) Does 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 apply to private individuals whose alleged "scheme to defraud" did not intend harm to the private party to whom "honest services" were owed?

2) May a court of appeals avoid review of a prejudicial jury instruction by retroactively imposing a verdict preservation requirement that is not found in the federal rules?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Black, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Not answered. No. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that based on its decision in Skilling v. United States, Section 1346 criminalizes only schemes to defraud that involve bribes or kickbacks. Therefore, the "honest services fraud" instruction given in this case was incorrect. The Court further held that Mr. Black and his co- defendants secured their right to challenge the "honest services fraud" jury instructions on appeal because they properly objected to the instructions at trial. The Court noted that it expressed no opinion as to whether the jury instruction prejudiced the defendants and left it for the district court to determine.

Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed that the Court used the Notes of the Advisory Committee in rendering its decision. He also viewed the "honest services fraud" jury instruction to be error because it was given at all. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He viewed Section 1346 as being unconstitutionally vague.

Wood v. Allen

jgoldman — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

31° 50' 22.2576" N, 86° 0' 43.7652" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-9156

Petitioner

Holly Wood

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richard F. Allen, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, May 18, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, November 4, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Advocates

Kerry A. Scanlon (for the petitioner)

Corey L. Maze (Solicitor General of Alabama, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Holly Wood was convicted in an Alabama state court of capital murder during a first-degree burglary and sentenced to death. Both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Mr. Wood subsequently filed for post-conviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, arguing that he was mentally retarded and thus not eligible for a death sentence and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Rule 32 court disagreed and denied his petition. Mr. Wood then filed for federal habeas corpus relief in an Alabama federal district court. The district court granted relief, agreeing that Mr. Wood's counsel was ineffective at sentencing because they failed to present evidence of Mr. Wood's deficient intellectual deficiencies.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that Mr. Wood's counsel was not ineffective. The court reasoned that Mr. Wood's attorneys acted reasonably when they decided it was in Mr. Wood's best interest to leave out information that illustrated his mental deficiencies. Moreover, the court recognized that while Mr. Wood's counsel included an inexperienced attorney, he merely acted as an assistant to the two experienced attorneys chiefly responsible for the case.

Question

1) Is a state court's decision on post-conviction relief unreasonable when it concludes that during the sentencing phase of a capital case that an inexperienced attorney's decision not to present evidence of the defendant's intellectual deficiencies was strategic, while ignoring evidence that demonstrated otherwise?

2) Did the rule followed by the Eleventh Circuit in this case abdicate its judicial review function under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act by failing to determine whether the state court decision was unreasonable in light of the entire state court record?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Allen, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the state court's conclusion that counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue or present evidence of Mr. Wood's mental deficiencies was not an unreasonable determination under the facts. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the state court's conclusion was not unreasonable merely because a federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion. Moreover, the evidence in the record indicated that counsel's failure to pursue or present evidence of the defendant's mental deficiencies was the result of a deliberate decision to focus on other defenses.

Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens noted that the majority failed to distinguish between a decision not to introduce evidence at the guilt phase of trial and a failure to investigate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. He argued that, contrary to the majority's conclusion, the evidence indicated that the decision of Mr. Wood's counsel was the result of "inattention and neglect," rather than strategy.

Beard v. Kindler

jgoldman — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

State Correctional Institution - Graterford PA

United States

40° 13' 45.3972" N, 75° 26' 19.5432" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-992

Petitioner

Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joseph Kindler

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, May 18, 2009

Argued

Monday, November 2, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Advocates

Ronald Eisenberg (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Matthew C. Lawry (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Joseph Kindler was convicted of first degree murder in a Pennsylvania state court and sentenced to death. He subsequently filed motions for post- conviction relief, but while the motions were pending, he escaped from prison. Pennsylvania immediately moved to dismiss the motions arguing that Mr. Kindler had waived any right to have his post-conviction motions considered because he was a fugitive. The trial court agreed and dismissed them. After recapture, Mr. Kindler moved to reinstate his post-conviction motions, which was denied. Both the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

In 2000, Mr. Kindler filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief in a Pennsylvania federal district court. The State of Pennsylvania argued that habeas corpus relief was unavailable to Mr. Kindler because Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was an "independent and adequate" state ground that precluded federal habeas review. The district court disagreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Relying on its decision in Doctor v. Walters, it held that Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was not an independent and adequate state ground that precluded federal habeas review.

Question

Under the adequate-state-ground doctrine, does a state procedural rule like Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule preclude federal habeas corpus review even though the state procedural rule is discretionary?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Beard, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Maybe. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Third Circuit holding that a discretionary state procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would pose an unnecessary dilemma for the states: "States could preserve flexibility by granting courts discretion to excuse procedural rules, but only at the cost of undermining the finality of state court judgments. Or States could preserve the finality of their judgments by withholding such discretion, but only at the cost of precluding any flexibility in applying the rules."

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a separate concurring opinion. He noted that while the Court did not have the opportunity to address the matter, "[i]n a proper case," "[i]t seems most doubtful that this Court can or should require federal courts to disregard a state procedural ground that was not in all respects explicit before the case when it was first announced, absent a showing of a purpose or pattern to evade constitutional guarantees."

Merck & Co. v. Reynolds

jgoldman — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 44' 8.3652" N, 74° 10' 20.5212" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-905

Petitioner

Merck & Co., Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richard Reynolds, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Argued

Monday, November 30, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Advocates

Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioners)

David C. Frederick (for the respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Investors brought a securities fraud class action suit against Merck & Co. in a New Jersey federal district court. They alleged the company had misled investors about the drug Vioxx's safety and commercial viability. Merck moved to dismiss the claim arguing that the investors had been put on "inquiry notice" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitations had run. The federal district court agreed and dismissed the suit.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It recognized that under the "inquiry notice" standard, plaintiffs are put on notice for the purpose of the statute of limitations in federal securities fraud litigation at the "possibility" of wrongdoing. Moreover, the court held that the investors had not been put on "inquiry notice" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitation had not run.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit err in its application of the "inquiry notice" standard?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Merck & Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Section 10(b)

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit, holding that the statute of limitations begins to run once the plaintiff actually discovered or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the facts constituting the violation – whichever comes first. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority, the Court noted that "inquiry notice" is only useful to the extent it describes the circumstances when a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have begun to investigate.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He stated that much of the discussion in Part II of the majority opinion was unnecessary. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority holding to the extent it adopted a reasonably diligent person standard for when the statute of limitations begins to run.

Bilski v. Kappos

jgoldman — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 48' 17.4096" N, 77° 2' 48.9156" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-964

Petitioner

Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

David J. Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

561 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 1, 2009

Argued

Monday, November 9, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 28, 2010

Advocates

J. Michael Jakes (for the petitioners)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Applicants were denied a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for claims pertaining to a process of managing risk in commodities trading. The PTO examiner deemed the invention not to be of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the decision.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The court relied on Supreme Court precedent stating that an invention is patentable if: "1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing." Reasoning from this, it held that the applicants' invention clearly failed this test (machine-or-transformation test) and therefore did not constitute patentable subject matter.

Question

1) Did the Federal Circuit err by using the machine-or-transformation test in determining patentable subject matter?

2) Does the machine-or-transformation test prevent patent protection for many business methods and thus contradict congressional intent that patents protect "methods of doing or conducting business."

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kappos, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Patent Act

No. No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit, holding that the applicants' claimed invention is not patent eligible. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the Federal Circuit did not err when it used the "machine-or-transformation test" to determine patentability. However, the Court noted, in contrast to the Federal Circuit, that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for determining patent eligibility.

Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority to the extent it suggested that any series of steps that is not itself an abstract idea or law of nature may constitute a "process" within Section 101. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, also concurred in the judgment. He noted his agreement with Justice Stevens' concurrence and also highlighted the extent to which the Court agreed on many fundamental issues of patent law raised by this case.

Hertz Corp. v. Friend

jgoldman — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

37° 46' 29.748" N, 122° 25' 9.8976" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1107

Petitioner

The Hertz Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Melinda Friend, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 8, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (for the petitioner)

Todd M. Schneider (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Hertz in a California state court. Hertz moved to remove the case to a California federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that there was no diversity jurisdiction as Hertz's principal place of business was California and not Florida. The federal district court agreed and remanded the case to the state court.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court. It held that the district court correctly applied the "place of operations test" to determine Hertz's principal place of business. Therefore, there was no diversity jurisdiction and the district court had no authority over the case.

Question

1) Does the Supreme Court retain jurisdiction over this case even though the court of appeals failed to render a decision within the 60 days required by 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)?

2) For the purposes of determining a corporation's principal place of business, can a court disregard the location of the corporation's headquarters?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hertz Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1)

Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that it retained jurisdiction over the case. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) simply requires a court of appeals to reach a decision within a specified time and does not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction when a court of appeals fails to reach a decision within the prescribed amount of time. Here, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 still gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over any case it grants certiorari while that case is in the court of appeals.

The Supreme Court also held that the term "principal place of business" refers to the place where a corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities -- in other words its "nerve center." The Court stated that in practice, the nerve center is normally the corporation's headquarters -- provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination. The Court remanded the case to the district court in order to determine whether Hertz's headquarters in New Jersey was its nerve center.

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

44° 53' 22.8732" N, 93° 20' 59.8164" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1119

Petitioner

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 08-1125, United States v. Milavetz

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 8, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

Decided

Monday, March 8, 2010

Advocates

G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (for petitioners in No. 08–1119 and respondents in No. 08–1225)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondent in No. 08–1119 and petitioner in No. 08–1225)

Facts of the Case

In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was signed into law. In part, it added a new term to the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), "debt relief agency," and both restricted and proscribed actions by those groups falling under the definition. Subsequently, a Minnesota bankruptcy law firm sought a declaratory judgment against the United States, arguing that the BAPCPA did not apply to attorneys and law firms, and was unconstitutional as it applied to attorneys. The federal district court agreed and issued an order declaring that attorneys in the District of Minnesota were excluded from the Code's definition of "debt relief agency" and that the challenged provisions of the Code were unconstitutional as they applied to attorneys in the District of Minnesota.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit held that attorneys who provide "bankruptcy assistance" were included within the BAPCPA's definition of "debt relief agency." However, it also held that BAPCPA provisions that prohibited a debt relief agency from advising clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy was overbroad, and thus unconstitutional.

Question

1) Did the Eight Circuit's interpretation of attorneys as "debt relief agencies" contradict the plain meaning of the BAPCPA?

2) Does the BAPCA constitute a broad, content-based restriction on attorney- client communications that is not adequately tailored to constrain only speech the government has a substantial interest in restricting; and, thus violates the First Amendment?

3) Does the BAPCPA, as applied to attorneys, restrict commercial speech by requiring mandatory disclosures in advertisements, and thus violate First Amendment free speech rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for both parties, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005

No. No. No. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that attorneys who provide bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons are debt relief agencies under the BAPCPA. The Court further held that § 526(a)(4) of the BAPCPA is not an overly broad, content based restriction on attorney-client communications. Rather, the Court reasoned that it merely prohibits a debt relief agency only from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the debtor is filing for bankruptcy. Lastly, the Court held that § 528's disclosure requirements are valid as applied to Mr. Milavetz. The Court reasoned that the disclosure requirements do not act as an affirmative limitation on speech and are reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority's use of the BAPCPA's legislative history arguing that "legislative history is irrelevant when the statutory text is clear." Justice Clarence Thomas also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He noted his skepticism with Zauderer and its progeny, cases at the heart of the majority's reasoning. Justice Thomas wondered whether these precedents provide sufficient First Amendment protection against government-mandated disclosure requirements.

Mac's Shell Service v. Shell Oil Products Co.

jgoldman — Tue, 19 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Shell Oil Products

One Shell Plaza

Houston, TX

United States

29° 45' 32.724" N, 95° 22' 3" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-240

Petitioner

Mac's Shell Service et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shell Oil Products Co. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 08-372, Shell Oil Products Co. v. Mac's Shell Service

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 15, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Advocates

Jeffrey A. Lamken (for the Shell Oil Products Company)

David O'Neil (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Gas station franchisees won a verdict against franchisor Motiva in the Massachusetts federal district court for violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. The franchisees argued that new leases that changed the way rent was calculated and which amounted to increased rents were made in bad faith and meant to drive them out of business. They claimed that the new lease terms amounted to "constructive nonrenewal," prohibited by the PMPA, even though they signed the agreements. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the PMPA did not support a claim for constructive nonrenewal under the circumstances in the case. It reasoned that the PMPA requires franchisees faced with objectionable contract terms to refrain from ratifying those terms by executing the contract, as the franchisees did in this case.

Question

Does the PMPA encompass a claim for "constructive nonrenewal" of franchisee's lease when: i) franchisees filed suit prior to receiving new lease agreements that violated the act, ii) lease agreements were presented on a take-it-or- leave-it basis, iii) franchisor stated it would terminate the leases unless franchisees signed the new agreements, and iv) franchisees signed lease agreements under protest and pursued their legal claims against the franchisor?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for both parties, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Petroleum Marketing Practices Act

No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the court held that a franchisee cannot recover for constructive termination under the PMPA if the franchisor's allegedly wrongful conduct did not compel the franchisee to abandon its franchise. The Court further held that a franchisee who signs and operates a renewal agreement with a franchisor may not maintain a constructive nonrenewal claim under the PMPA. The Court reasoned when a franchisee signs a renewal agreement, there has been no "failure to renew," and, thus no violation.

United Student Aid Funds Inc. v. Espinosa

jgoldman — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

33° 26' 54.1572" N, 112° 4' 26.5332" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1134

Petitioner

United Student Aid Funds Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Francisco J. Espinosa

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 15, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, March 23, 2010

Advocates

Madeleine C. Wanslee (for the petitioner)

Toby J. Heytens (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Michael J. Meehan (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Francisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed a plan that provided for the repayment of student loans to United Student Aid Funds, Inc. ("Funds"). After Funds was notified, it filed a proof of claim roughly $4,500 greater than that was included in the plan. The bankruptcy court approved the original plan and Funds was notified it would be paid the lower figure. Mr. Espinosa subsequently completed the plan and his loans were discharged by the court. Three years later, Funds began intercepting Mr. Espinosa's income tax refunds to satisfy the unpaid portion of his student loans (the $4,500 figure). Mr. Espinosa petitioned the bankruptcy court for an order holding Funds in contempt for violating the discharge injunction. In response, Funds argued that Mr. Espinosa's student loans were improperly discharged because student loans cannot be discharged unless the debtor can show "undue hardship." This can only be shown in an adversary proceeding, which did not take place. Moreover, it argued the lack of an adversary proceeding denied Funds its Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. These arguments were rejected by the bankruptcy court, but, on appeal, were accepted by the Arizona federal district court.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that simply because Mr. Espinosa failed to comply with additional procedures required by the Bankruptcy Code to discharge student loan debt was not sufficient to set aside the discharge of his student loans, considering Funds had actually been notified of the Chapter 13 plan. It also held that Fund's due process rights were not violated because Fund's had received actual notice of Mr. Espinosa's Chapter 13 plan, even though he had not commenced the adversary proceedings.

Question

1) Does the procedure by which a debtor merely includes the discharge of his student loans in his Chapter 13 plan, which is then mailed to the creditor, sufficient to meet the requirements of due process?

2) Are Chapter 13 plans that discharge student loans void if the debtor fails to prove "undue hardship" in an adversary proceeding?

Conclusion

Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation order is not void. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that because the Bankruptcy Court's order was final, it could only be rendered void if the order was premised on either a jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process. Here, there was neither a jurisdictional error nor a violation of due process. The Court further reasoned that the Bankruptcy Court's failure to find undue hardship was mere legal error and did not rise to the level of a jurisdictional or due process error that would render the order void.

Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International Corp.

jgoldman — Wed, 09 Dec 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

40° 47' 0.366" N, 73° 57' 58.5" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1198

Petitioner

Stolt-Nielsen S.A., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

AnimalFeeds International Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 15, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, December 9, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Advocates

Seth P. Waxman (for the petitioners)

Cornelia T. L. Pillard (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

AnimalFeeds International Corp. on behalf of a class of plaintiffs filed suit in a Pennsylvania federal district court against Stolt-Nielsen among others alleging defendants were engaged in a "global conspiracy to restrain competition in the world market for parcel tanker transportation services." After the case was transferred to the Connecticut federal district court, Stolt-Nielsen filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. During arbitration, AnimalFeeds filed a demand to proceed as a class. A panel was appointed to determine whether the language of the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class and answered in the affirmative. Stolt-Nielsen then petitioned the Connecticut federal district court to vacate the panel's determination, which was granted.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and reinstated the panel's decision. The court held that the arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law when reaching its conclusion that the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class, even though the Award was silent on whether proceeding as a class was permitted. The court reasoned that when parties agree to arbitrate, the question of whether an agreement permits class arbitration is generally left to the arbitrators, not the courts.

Question

Is imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are silent on that issue consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Arbitration Act

No. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not agreed to authorize class arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that in this case the arbitration panel exceeded its powers by imposing its own policy choice instead of identifying and applying a rule derived from the FAA or from maritime or New York law. The Court emphasized that the FAA adopts the basic principle that arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion. Here, there was no consent.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. She argued first that the petition for certiorari in this case was improvidently granted because the Court overturned the ruling of "experienced arbitrators." Moreover, even by reaching the merits of the case, she would have affirmed the Second Circuit and adhered to the "strict limitations" the FAA places on judicial review.

Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection

jgoldman — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Destin, FL

United States

30° 23' 36.7224" N, 86° 29' 44.8188" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1151

Petitioner

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 15, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 17, 2010

Advocates

D. Kent Safriet (for the petitioner)

Scott D. Makar (Solicitor General of Florida, for the respondents)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1961, Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act ("BSPA") to restore and maintain critically eroded beaches within the state. In 2003, under the BSPA, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection filed for an Application for a Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands in order to dredge sand from a shoal to rebuild a beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. ("SBR"), an association of homeowners, subsequently challenged the issuance of the permit and the constitutionality of the BSPA. The Florida court of appeals rescinded the permit, holding that issuance would have resulted in an unconstitutional taking.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida first rephrased the certified question to determine whether the BSPA was "on its face" constitutional. Then, the court held that the BSPA was not unconstitutional, reasoning that it did not deprive land owners of littoral rights without just compensation.

Question

By reversing longstanding holdings that littoral (i.e., on or near the shore) rights are constitutionally protected, did the Florida Supreme Court cause a "judicial taking" proscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. The Supreme Court held 8-0 that the Florida Supreme Court did not take property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Antonin Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, and authored an opinion in which he maintained that there could be no taking unless property owners could show that they had rights to future exposed land and to contact with the water superior to Florida's right to fill in its submerged land. Here, there could be no showing. Scalia drew from Florida-law principles that (1) the state, as owner of submerged land adjacent to beachfront property, has the right to fill that land and (2) the exposure of land previously submerged belongs to the state even if it interrupts the beachfront property owners' contact with the water. Justice Scalia, with a plurality of the Court including Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito, also noted in Parts II and III of the decision that if a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property in violation of the Takings Clause.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding, but disagreed that a plurality should reach the issue of whether or when a judicial decision determining property owners' rights can violate the Takings Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding, but, like Justice Kennedy, counseled that the Court should only address the issues before it.

Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

35° 21' 48.4632" N, 83° 48' 17.5248" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-304

Petitioner

Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 22, 2009

Argued

Monday, November 30, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Advocates

Christopher G. Browning, Jr. (Solicitor General of North Carolina, for the petitioners)

Mark T. Hurt (for the respondents)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, a storm hit parts of western North Carolina causing extensive flooding and erosion. Graham and Cherokee Counties applied for assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program ("EWPP"). Under the program, the counties would perform or hire to perform the necessary cleanup and repair work, paying for 25% of the costs, while the United States Department of Agriculture paid for the rest. During the cleanup, Karen Wilson, a secretary for the Graham Conservation District, raised concerns that she had about the legality of the awarded contracts. She filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court against Graham and Cherokee Counties, among others, under the False Claims Act. She alleged a conspiracy that tainted the execution of the EWPP contracts and rendered the claims for reimbursement false within the meaning of the False Claims Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the information underlying Ms. Wilson's claim was public disclosure and thus barred the court jurisdiction over the case. The court agreed and dismissed.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. It held that the audit reports that underlied Ms. Wilson's claim was not public disclosure for the purpose of the False Claim Act, and thus the district court was not barred from hearing her case.

Question

Does an audit performed by a state or its political subdivisions constitute an administrative report within the meaning of the public disclosure jurisdictional bar of the False Claims Act?

Conclusion

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that the reference to "administrative" reports, audits, and investigations within the FCA encompasses disclosures made in state and local sources as well as federal sources – like at issue in this case. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the FCA's plain language did not limit "administrative" to federal sources, nor did it preclude the inclusion of state sources. Moreover, the Court looked at the legislative history of the FCA and found it inconclusive.

Justice Antonin G. Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He emphasized that the legislative history of a statute is not relevant in analyzing what a statute means. Justice Sonia Sotamayor joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote separately, dissenting. She disagreed with the majority opinion in that it did not give sufficient weight to contextual and historical evidence of Congress' purpose in enacting the FCA. Under her analysis, she would hold that "administrative" refers only to federal sources.

Florida v. Powell

jgoldman — Mon, 07 Dec 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

27° 59' 25.296" N, 82° 18' 6.3828" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1175

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kevin Dewayne Powell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 22, 2009

Argued

Monday, December 7, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Advocates

Joseph W. Jacquot (for the petitioner)

David O'Neil (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Deborah K. Brueckheimer (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Kevin D. Powell was convicted in a Florida state court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Mr. Powell appealed arguing that his Miranda warning was invalid because the written form used by the Tampa police at his arrest did not explicitly indicate that he had a right to an attorney at his questioning. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that informing a defendant that he has the right to “talk with an attorney” is not sufficient to inform him of his right to have counsel present.

Question

1) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over this case even though the Florida Supreme Court used, at least in part, its own Constitution in reaching its decision?

2) Does the failure to provide explicit advice of right to presence of counsel during questioning invalidate Miranda warnings that advise both a) right to talk to a lawyer "before questioning" and b) the right to consult a lawyer "at any time during the questioning?"

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Florida, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that it retained jurisdiction over the case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotamayor, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer as to Part II. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented joined in part by Justice Breyer. The majority recognized that the Florida Supreme Court relied in part on its own state Constitution in addition to Miranda in reaching its decision. However, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that when a state court decision fairly appears to rest on federal law, or is interwoven with federal law, and the adequacy and independence of the state-law ground is unclear from the opinion, as in this case, it is presumed that federal law controlled the state court's decision. Hence, the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court also reversed the Florida Supreme Court, holding that while Miranda requires that a suspect "be warned prior to any questioning" and "that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, "it does not dictate the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. Rather, to determine whether police warnings are satisfactory, the inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably conveyed to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda. Here, Mr. Powell received warnings that satisfied this standard.

In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Supreme Court's power to review the Florida Supreme Court's decision was at best doubtful and that the Florida court had a better view of the case on the merits. Justice Stevens counseled that the Supreme Court should limit applying the presumption that federal law controlled a state court's decision only in truly ambiguous cases. He reasoned that this was not such a case. Justice Stevens further argued that the warnings Mr. Powell received did not reasonably convey to him that he had the right to a lawyer during his interrogation.

United States v. Comstock

jgoldman — Tue, 12 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

FCI-Butner

OLD NC HWY 75

Butner, NC 27509

United States

36° 7' 55.5204" N, 78° 45' 24.0156" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1224

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Graydon Earl Comstock, Jr., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 22, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Decided

Monday, May 17, 2010

Advocates

Elena Kagan (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

G. Alan DuBois (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Convicted sex offenders moved to dismiss petitions requesting their indefinite civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. A North Carolina federal district court dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held that the Protection and Safety Act exceeded the scope of Congress' authority when it enacted a law that could confine a person solely because of "sexual dangerousness," and the government need not even allege that this "dangerousness" violated any federal law.

Question

Did Congress have the constitutional authority to enact the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act; U.S. Constitution: Article I, Section 8

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority sufficient to enact the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority, the Court pointed to five considerations that compelled its holding. (1) the Necessary and Proper Clause grants broad authority. (2) The Court recognized that Congress has long delivered mental health care to federal prisoners. (3) Congress had good reason to pass the statute as it has the power to protect nearby communities from the danger prisoners may pose. (4) The Tenth Amendment does not reserve a zone of authority to the states in this context. (5) The Court recognized that the statute was narrow in scope and did not confer on Congress a general police power, which is reserved to the states.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He maintained that authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause is dependent upon the "strength of the chain" from Congressional action and its enumerated power, not on the number of "links in the chain." Justice Samuel A. Alito also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He cautioned that the majority opinion should not be construed as granting an unlimited ability by Congress to extend its power.

Justice Clarence Thomas, joined in part by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress only to enact laws that carry into execution one or more enumerated powers. Here, he argued that the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act did not carry into execution an enumerated power.

Abbott v. Abbott

jgoldman — Tue, 12 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Dripping Springs, TX

United States

30° 11' 24.7452" N, 98° 5' 12.0408" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-645

Petitioner

Timothy Mark Cameron Abbott

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jacquelyn Vaye Abbott

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 29, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Decided

Monday, May 17, 2010

Advocates

Amy Howe (for the petitioner)

Ginger D. Anders (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, and Jacquelyn Abbott, an American citizen, litigated their divorce in the Chilean courts. Mrs. Abbott was awarded custody of their son, while Mr. Abbott was awarded visitation rights. At Mrs. Abbott's request, the Chilean court entered an order prohibiting the child's removal from Chile by either the father or mother without express mutual consent. One year later, Mrs. Abbott moved the child from Chile without Mr. Abbott's consent. Upon location of the child in Texas, Mr. Abbott requested an order in a Texas federal district court that the child be returned to Chile pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court denied the order holding that the child's removal did not constitute a breach of the father's "rights of custody" as defined by the Hague convention.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Chilean court's order and Chilean statute that required father's consent before the child could leave Chile did not give a non-custodial father "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Hague Convention. The court stated that Mr. Abbott merely possessed the rights of "access to the child."

Question

Does a clause that prohibits one parent from removing a child from a country without the other parent's consent confer a "right of custody" within the meaning of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Abbott, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: International Child Abduction Remedies Act

No. The Supreme Court held that a parent has a right of custody under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction when the parent retains a ne exeat right (the right to restrain someone from leaving a country). Here, Mr. Abbott retained such a right. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court first recognized that the Convention applies because the child in question is under 16 and was a habitual resident of Chile. (Chile and the U.S. are signatories to the Convention.) The Court then reasoned that the Convention's text, the U.S. State Department's views, signatory states' court orders, and the Convention's purposes all suggest that Mr. Abbott retained a ne exeat right under Article 49 of the Convention. Because Mr. Abbott possessed direct and regular visitation rights with his child, his ne exeat followed. The Court noted that Mr. Abbott's ne exeat right gave him a right of custody to his child, so long as Ms. Abbott could not find an exception in the Convention precluding the exercise of Mr. Abbott's right to custody.

Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. He argued that Mr. Abbott merely possessed a limited veto power over Ms. Abbott's ability take their son from Chile, not a custody right. He went on to explain that using the Convention's powerful return remedy under these circumstances is contrary to the Convention's "text and purpose."

American Needle Inc. v. National Football League

jgoldman — Wed, 13 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

NFL Properties

United States

40° 45' 23.1876" N, 73° 58' 29.2368" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-661

Petitioner

American Needle, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Football League, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 29, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

Decided

Monday, May 24, 2010

Advocates

Glen D. Nager (for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Gregg H. Levy (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

American Needle Inc. filed suit in an Illinois federal district court against the National Football League ("NFL") and Reebok International Ltd. alleging that the teams' exclusive licensing agreement with Reebok violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. American Needle argued that because individual NFL teams separately own their team logos and trademarks, their collective agreement to authorize NFL Properties to award the exclusive headwear license to Reebok, was in fact a conspiracy to restrict other vendors' ability to obtain licenses for the teams' intellectual property. The district court disagreed and dismissed the case.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that NFL teams were a single entity for purposes of antitrust laws, and thus could not have conspired to restrict trade. Therefore, the court stated that the teams were free to license their intellectual property on an exclusive basis.

Question

1) Are the NFL and its members a single entity for the purposes of antitrust laws?

2) Is the agreement of NFL teams with Reebok subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, when teams own and control the use of their separate logos and trademarks and, but for their agreement not to, could compete with each other in the licensing and sale of team products?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for American Needle, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Section 1, Sherman Antitrust Act

No. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the National Football League's licensing of intellectual property in this case constitutes concerted action that is not categorically beyond Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act's coverage. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for a unanimous Court, it noted that each NFL team is a substantial, independently owned, and independently managed business, whose objectives are not common. The Court reasoned that while the actions of NFL Properties ("NFLP") are not as easily classified as concerted activity, the NFLP's decisions about licensing are a concerted activity and, thus, are covered by Section 1.

Weyhrauch v. United States

jgoldman — Tue, 08 Dec 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

58° 18' 6.9984" N, 134° 25' 10.9992" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1196

Petitioner

Bruce Weyhrauch

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

561 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 29, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Advocates

Donald B. Ayer (for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Bruce Weyhrauch was charged in the Alaska federal district court in part with a "scheme and artifice to defraud and deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to [his] honest services." Mr. Weyhrauch was a member of the Alaska House of Representatives and allegedly took actions favorable to an Alaska oil company, VECO Corp., in return for future employment. At trial, Mr. Weyhrauch moved to exclude evidence related to the honest services charge. The district court excluded the evidence because it would merely have shown that Alaska could have imposed a duty upon Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, and thus did not prove he had violated any duty imposed by state law.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 established a uniform standard for "honest services" that governs every public official and that the government did not need to prove an independent violation of state law to sustain an honest services fraud conviction. Therefore, the court reasoned that because the district court excluded the evidence needed to prove that state law imposed an affirmative duty on Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, the evidence was admissible.

Question

To convict a state official for depriving the public of its right to the defendant's honest services in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1341 and Section 1346, must the government prove that the defendant violated a disclosure duty imposed by state law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Weyhrauch, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Not answered. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in light of Skilling v. United States.

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer, & Ulrich LPA

jgoldman — Wed, 13 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Carlisle Law Firm

United States

41° 27' 55.6704" N, 81° 30' 14.3568" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1200

Petitioner

Karen L. Jerman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer, & Ulrich LPA et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 29, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

Advocates

Kevin K. Russell (for the petitioner)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

George S. Coakley (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Karen L. Jerman filed suit in an Ohio federal district against the law firm Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). The law firm had sought foreclosure on a property owned by Ms. Jerman and erroneously informed her that the FDCPA stated that the debt in question would be considered valid unless she disputed it in writing. Only later did the law firm discover that Ms. Jerman owed no debt and consequently withdrew its complaint. Before trial, the law firm argued that while it violated the FDCPA, its error was a bona fide error, and thus a complete defense to its actions. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FDCPA error defense applies to mistakes of law. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative history behind the FDCPA did not indicate Congress intended it to apply solely to clerical errors.

Question

Does a debt collector's mistake in law qualify for the FDCPA bona fide error defense?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Jerman, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. The Supreme Court held that the bona fide error defense in the FDCPA does not apply to a violation resulting from a debt collector's mistaken interpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Court reasoned in part that "ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally." Moreover, the Court did not find that Congress intended otherwise.

Justice Antonin G. Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority opinion in that it traced the actions of Congress outside of the FDCPA context to determine that Congress did not intend the bona fide error defense to apply to legal errors. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito, dissented. He disagreed with the majority opinion rejecting the straightforward and reasonable interpretation of the FDCPA that the bona fide error defense applies to legal errors.

Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

jgoldman — Tue, 19 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Granite Rock Company

United States

36° 55' 27.2604" N, 121° 47' 34.2888" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1214

Petitioner

Granite Rock Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

561 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 29, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Advocates

Garry G. Mathiason (for the petitioner)

Robert Bonsall (for the respondent Teamsters Local 287)

Peter D. Nussbaum (for the respondent International Brotherhood of Teamsters)

Facts of the Case

Granite Rock Co. filed suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") in a California federal district court. Granite Rock argued that a Teamsters strike constituted a breach of a no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). The district court dismissed the case, finding that Granite Rock failed to state a claim, and denied Granite Rock's request to compel arbitration in order to determine if the CBA had been ratified.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while Granite Rock's claim against the Teamsters was outside the scope of the LMRA, the dispute should be arbitrated. The court reasoned that both parties consented to arbitration when Teamsters asserted the arbitration clause in its filings and when Granite Rock sued under the contract which included the arbitration clause.

Question

1) Does a federal court have jurisdiction to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement was formed when it is disputed whether any binding contract exists, but no party makes an independent challenge to the arbitration clause?

2) Does the LMRA provide a cause of action against an international union that is not a direct signatory to one of its local's collective bargaining agreements, but causes a strike that breaches the CBA for its own benefit?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Granite Rock, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor Management Relations Act, Section 301(a)

Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that the parties' dispute over the CBA's ratification date was a matter for the district court, not the arbitrator, to resolve. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court noted that the presumption that a dispute is arbitrable should only be applied where it reflects and derives its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion that arbitration is what the parties intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed, is legally enforceable, and is best construed to encompass the dispute. The Court reasoned that the question of when the CBA was formed is for judicial determination because it constitutes a "judicial conclusion" needed to employ the framework for even determining arbitrability. The Court further held that the Ninth Circuit was correct in not recognizing a cause of action under the LMRA. The Court recognized that because Granite Rock had not yet exhausted other avenues of redress under such theories as state- law tort claims, unfair labor practice claims, and federal common-law breach- of-contract claims.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed that the LMRA does not recognize a new common-law cause of action. However, she argued that the arbitration provision in the CBA did cover the dispute in question. She reasoned the correct approach was for the Court to simply determine (1) whether the parties had an agreement to arbitrate and (2) whether the agreement covered the dispute. Here, she answered both inquiries in the affirmative.

Conkright v. Frommert

jgoldman — Wed, 20 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 7' 3.3492" N, 73° 24' 28.4292" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-810

Petitioner

Sally L. Conkright, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Paul J. Frommert, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 29, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

Advocates

Robert A. Long, Jr. (for the petitioners)

Peter K. Stris (for the respondents)

Matthew D. Roberts (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Current and former employees of Xerox Corp. sued the company in a New York federal district court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Plaintiffs had left the employer, been paid a lump sum, and after rehire had alleged Xerox improperly calculated their benefits. Xerox argued that release forms signed by some of the plaintiffs barred their ERISA claims. The district court disagreed and then crafted a remedy to compensate the plaintiffs for their lost benefits.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court crafted an appropriate remedy, but erred in finding that the release forms signed by some plaintiffs were unenforceable. Rather, the court reasoned that the release forms were signed knowingly and voluntarily, making them enforceable.

Question

1) Did the Second Circuit err in instructing the district court that it had no obligation to defer to the ERISA plan administrator's reasonable interpretation of the terms of the plan if the administrator reached its interpretation outside the context of an administrative claim for benefits?

2) Did the Second Circuit err in holding that the district court had "allowable discretion" to adopt any "reasonable" interpretation of the terms of the ERISA plan when the interpretation issue arose in the course of calculating additional benefits due as a result of ERISA violations?

Conclusion

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have applied a deferential standard of review to the Plan Administrator's interpretation of the pension plan. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that its decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch established that when a trust instrument, like the pension plan, gives the trustee the "power to construe disputed or doubtful terms," the trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed "if reasonable." Here, the Second Circuit carved out an exception to the rule holding that a court need not apply a deferential standard when the trustee's previous construction of the same terms was found to violate ERISA. The Second Circuit erred in doing so.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stephens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He noted several mistakes made by Xerox, the district court, and the majority of the Court. With respect to the majority opinion, Justice Breyer disagreed that trust law imposes no such inflexible requirement that a court give deference to a plan administrator, as the majority held in this case.

Briscoe v. Virginia

jgoldman — Mon, 11 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Circuit Court, Alexandria Virginia

520 King Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

United States

38° 48' 15.8364" N, 77° 2' 43.3104" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-11191

Petitioner

Mark A. Briscoe and Sheldon A. Cypress

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, June 29, 2009

Argued

Monday, January 11, 2010

Decided

Monday, January 25, 2010

Advocates

Richard D. Friedman (for the petitioners)

Stephen R. McCullough (Solicitor General, Virginia, for the respondent)

Leondra R. Kruger (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

This appeal is the consolidation of three separate cases that involved defendants' conviction for possession of cocaine in a Virginia state court. On appeal, the defendants argued that the admission into evidence of a certificate of analysis in the absence of testimony at trial from the person who performed the analysis and prepared the certificate, pursuant to Virginia Code Section 19.2-187, violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that the provisions of Section 19.2-187 did not violate a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Moreover, the court held that the defendants in these cases knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their Sixth Amendment rights to confront the forensic analysts when they failed to call them as witnesses at trial.

Question

If a state allows a prosecutor to introduce a certificate of laboratory analysis, without presenting testimony of the analyst who prepared the certificate, does that state avoid violating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by providing the accused the right to call the analyst as his own witness?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Briscoe, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a short per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia, remanding the case for further proceedings in light of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts decided the previous Term.

Kucana v. Holder

jgoldman — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 51' 0.1188" N, 87° 39' 0.1872" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-911

Petitioner

Agron Kucana

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, April 27, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Advocates

Rick M. Schoenfield (for the petitioner)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent in support of the petitioner)

Amanda C. Leiter (for amicus curiae in support of the judgment below (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

Agron Kucana, a citizen of Albania, entered the United States in 1995 and did not leave when his visa expired. Mr. Kucana applied for asylum but failed to appear at his hearing, after which he was ordered removed from the United States. He filed a motion to reopen his case, which was denied. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. After failing to remove himself from the United States, Mr. Kucana once again moved to reopen his case, contending that conditions in Albania had deteriorated to the extent where his life would be in danger upon his return. His motion was denied.

On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, he argued that the BIA "abused its discretion" in denying his claim when it failed to consider an affidavit testifying to the dangerous conditions existing in Albania. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. It found that the BIA's decision not to reopen Mr. Kucana's case was "discretionary." 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that "no court has jurisdiction to review" any decision that is under the discretion of the BIA. Therefore, the court reasoned that Mr. Kucana's claim was not reviewable by a federal court of appeals.

Question

Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bar judicial review for both administrative decisions made discretionary by statute and those made discretionary by regulation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kucana, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. The Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)'s proscription of judicial review applies only to determinations made discretionary by statute, not to determinations declared discretionary by the Attorney General himself through regulation. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotamayor, the Court reasoned that policy, the statute's language, and its history all indicate that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar judicial review for administrative decisions made discretionary by regulation. At the heart of the Court's concern was preserving the separation of powers and avoiding a scenario where an Executive Branch order could preclude Judicial Branch review over a matter.

Justice Samuel A. Alito filed a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. He agreed that the Seventh Circuit had jurisdiction to review the denial of Mr. Kucana's petition to reopen his removal proceeding. However, Justice Alito argued for a narrower holding. He stated that while some regulations issued by the Attorney General may be unreviewable, the regulation at issue in this case did not have that effect.

Schwab v. Reilly

jgoldman — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 24' 32.2884" N, 75° 39' 44.6832" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-538

Petitioner

William G. Schwab

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nadejda Reilly

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Granted

Monday, April 27, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 17, 2010

Advocates

Craig Goldblatt (for the petitioner)

Jeffrey B. Wall (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In April 2005, Nadejda Reilly filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Pursuant to standard practice, she listed equipment related to her catering business as "exempt" from the bankruptcy proceedings and valued the equipment at over $10,000. Creditor William Schwab independently had Ms. Reilly's business equipment appraised at over $17,000. He then sought a motion for the Bankruptcy Court to sell Ms. Reilly's equipment and turn over the proceeds, less the value of her exemption. Ms. Reilly countered that the business equipment had become fully exempt when Mr. Schwab failed to timely object when she listed the equipment as exempt. The Bankruptcy Court agreed and denied Mr. Schwab's motion to sell off Ms. Schwab's equipment. A federal district court in Pennsylvania affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court affirmed, holding that Mr. Schwab's failure to file a timely objection to Ms. Reilly's exemption barred him from moving to sell the property.

Question

1) When a debtor claims an item "exempt" from bankruptcy proceedings, is the exemption limited to the value claimed by the debtor, or regardless of the value claimed, does the exempted item become "fully exempt" after the creditor fails to make a timely objection to the exemption?

2) Does a creditor who wishes to sell a debtor's "exempted" item need to timely object to its exempt status in order to move for its sale, even if its real value exceeds the value claimed by the debtor?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Schwab, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 4003(b)

No. No. The Supreme Court held that a creditor is not required to object to a debtor's exemptions in order to preserve his right to claim any value in the item exceeding the value listed as exempt. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the bankruptcy code only requires a timely objection to an asset's categorization as exempt and does not apply to objections about the asset's value.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. She argued that the failure to object to the debtor's valuation of an exempt asset should prevent the creditor's later challenge to the valuation because the asset's valuation is critical in determining whether the debtor will be allowed to keep the property.

NRG Power Marketing v. Maine Public Utilities Commission

jgoldman — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Maine Public Utilities Commission

101 Second St

Hallowell, ME 04347

United States

44° 17' 10.5576" N, 69° 47' 28.0824" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-674

Petitioner

NRG Power Marketing LLC et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maine Public Utilities Commission et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, April 27, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

Advocates

Jeffrey A. Lamken (for the petitioners NRG Power Marketing LLC et al.)

Eric D. Miller (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for respondent FERC in support of the petitioners)

Richard Blumenthal (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Maine Public Utilities Commission along with the attorneys general of Connecticut and Massachusetts filed for petitions of review of orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC approved a settlement and redesigned New England's "capacity" electricity market, which Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts were subject to, even though they were not parties to the settlement. FERC denied their request for rehearing.

On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts argued that FERC erred in finding that "transition payments" under the settlement should be reviewed under the "public interest" standard as dictated by Mobile-Sierra rather than the "just and reasonable" standard. The District of Columbia Circuit agreed holding that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine should not apply to non-parties to the settlement agreement. It reasoned that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is premised on the existence of a "voluntary contract" between the parties. Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts never entered a voluntary agreement with FERC and therefore the standard was inappropriate.

Question

Does the Mobile-Sierra doctrine's public interest standard apply to non- parties to a FERC settlement?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for NRG Power Marketing, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to the extent that it rejected the application of Mobile-Sierra to non-contracting parties. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, Samuel A. Alito, and Sonia Sotamayor, the Court held that Mobile-Sierra controls the FERC as well as challenges to contract rates brought by contracting and non- contracting parties. The Court reasoned that Mobile-Sierra is not an exception to the just-and-reasonable standard, but rather an application of that standard to the context of rates set by contract.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He argued in part that this case was clearly outside the context of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. He further argued that the majority's decision imposes "a special burden" on non-contracting parties attempting to exercise their rights to object to unreasonable rates. He reasoned that such a rule was a "quantum leap" from the origins of the Supreme Court's rate setting jurisprudence.

South Carolina v. North Carolina

jgoldman — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

35° 13' 37.5132" N, 80° 50' 35.2572" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

138 ORIG

Plaintiff

South Carolina

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

North Carolina

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Monday, October 1, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Advocates

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for the plaintiff)

Eric D. Miller (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae)

H. Christopher Bartolomucci (argued the cause for the intervenors)

Christopher G. Browning, Jr. (argued the cause for the defendant)

Facts of the Case

This case originates in the Supreme Court. South Carolina seeks an equitable apportionment of the Catawba River, which starts in North Carolina and flows into South Carolina. The Special Master recommends that the Supreme Court (1) permit the City of Charlotte, N.C., the Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke Energy Carolinas LLC to intervene as defendants, and (2) deny South Carolina’s motion for clarification of the Special Master’s order.

Question

Can the City of Charlotte, NC, the Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke Energy Carolinas LLC, which are non-state entities, be allowed to intervene as defendants in a case originating in the Supreme Court about a water dispute between two states?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for , 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes and no. The Supreme Court held that the Catawba River Water Supply Project and Duke Energy met the standards for intervention, but Charlotte did not. "Charlotte has not carried its burden of showing a sufficient interest for intervention in this action," Justice Samuel J. Alito wrote for the 5-4 majority. "Its interest is solely as a user of North Carolina's share of the Catawba River's water."

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor. The dissent agreed with the majority’s denial of Charlotte’s motion and its rejection of the more permissive intervention standard adopted by the special master, but would not have permitted the Catawba Project and Duke Energy to intervene either.

Lewis v. Chicago

jgoldman — Mon, 22 Feb 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

41° 51' 0.1188" N, 87° 39' 0.1872" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-974

Petitioner

Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Chicago

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Argued

Monday, February 22, 2010

Decided

Monday, May 24, 2010

Advocates

John A. Payton (for the petitioners)

Neal Kumar Katyal (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioners)

Benna Ruth Solomon (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

African-American applicants for firefighter jobs in Chicago, IL sued the city under Title VII alleging the written test used for hiring had a disparate impact. After administering the test, the city graded the scores and placed applicants in three categories: "well qualified," "qualified," and "not qualified." Because the city had only 600 positions to fill among 1,782 "well qualified" applicants, "qualified" applicants were unlikely to get job offers. The class of plaintiffs in this suit allege that the test disparately categorized them as "qualified." An Illinois federal district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ suit was untimely and dismissed. The court stated that the 300 day limit for filing such a claim began when the plaintiffs learned that they had been placed in the "qualified" category and that the city would be hiring those in the "well qualified" category. The court reasoned that because there was no fresh act of discrimination, the time for filing a Title VII claim began when the discriminatory decision was made and not when it was executed.

Question

When an employer adopts an employment practice that discriminates in violation of Title VII's disparate impact provision, must the plaintiff file a claim within 300 days after the announcement of the practice, or within 300 days after the employer executes the practice?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lewis, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964: Title VII

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may file his Title VII disparate impact claim within 300 days after the employer executes the allegedly unlawful practice so long so as he alleges each of the elements of a disparate impact claim. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the principle inquiry in this case is not when the firefighters' claims accrued, but whether the claims stated a Title VII violation. The Court concluded that the firefighters successfully stated a Title VII violation within the claim-filing period when they alleged that the city caused a disparate impact on African-Americans each time it used its hiring list.

Carr v. United States

jgoldman — Wed, 24 Feb 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

38° 53' 42.4032" N, 77° 2' 10.9176" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1301

Petitioner

Thomas Carr

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (for the petitioner)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

An Indiana federal district court convicted Thomas Carr of violating the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act. The Act imposes penalties on anyone who is a convicted sex offender, and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly fails to register as a sex offender, unless he proves that "uncontrollable circumstances" prevented him from doing so. On appeal, Carr argued that he did not violate the act because he traveled before the Act was passed. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act does not require that the defendant's travel postdate its enactment, and, consequently, affirmed the district court.

Question

1) Can a person be prosecuted under the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act when the defendant's offense and interstate travel both predate the Act's enactment?

2) Does the ex post fact clause preclude prosecution under the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act when the defendant's offense and interstate travel both predate the Act's enactment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Carr, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)

No. Not answered The Supreme Court held that the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act does not apply to sex offenders whose interstate travel occurred before the statute's effective date. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the plain language and legislative history of the statute suggest that it does not apply to conduct that predates its enactment.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He disagreed that the majority referred to the legislative history of the statute to reach its conclusion. Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He argued that the majority's reasoning is faulty and that its conclusion leads to anomaly – where the statute treats differently similarly situated sex offenders.

Astrue v. Ratliff

jgoldman — Mon, 22 Feb 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1322

Petitioner

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Catherine G. Ratliff

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Argued

Monday, February 22, 2010

Decided

Monday, June 14, 2010

Advocates

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioner)

James D. Leach (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

An attorney that successfully represented two claimants in suits to receive benefits from the Social Security Administration moved for award of fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act in the South Dakota federal district court. The district court granted the motion but offset the attorney's award to pay off debts her clients owed the federal government. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that attorney's fees cannot be used to satisfy a clients' pre-existing debt to the United States. The court reasoned that fees awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act belong to the prevailing party's attorney and not to the prevailing party.

Question

Is the "award of fees and other expenses" under the Equal Access to Justice Act payable to the prevailing party rather than the prevailing party's attorney, and, therefore, may be used to satisfy that party's pre-existing debt to the United States?

Berghuis v. Smith

jgoldman — Wed, 20 Jan 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

17th Circuit Court

United States

42° 58' 0.9264" N, 85° 40' 12.2664" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1402

Petitioner

Mary Berghuis, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Diapolis Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

559 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Advocates

B. Eric Restuccia (for the petitioner)

James Sterling Lawrence (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Michigan state court convicted Diapolis Smith of second degree murder and felony possession of a firearm and sentenced him to life in prison. After exhausting his remedies in the Michigan state courts, Smith petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Smith argued that he was denied an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law in concluding that county jury selection "worked no systematic exclusion." The Court reasoned the state trial court's policy of excusing potential jurors for whom jury duty would constitute hardship based on child care concerns or transportation issues, when viewed together with another policy that assigned prospective jurors from the county's only large city, established a prima facie case of systematic under-representation of African- American jurors.

Question

Did the Sixth Circuit err in holding that the Michigan Supreme Court failed to apply clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent for evaluating whether the jury was comprised of a fair cross-section of the community?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Berghuis, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment: Jury Trial

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision "involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it reasoned that Duren v. Missouri did not establish that Mr. Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. While the Duren defendant established an absolute disparity, comparative disparity, and standard deviation of underrepresentation of women, that case did not specify the method courts must use to measure underrepresentation. Here, Mr. Smith did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the trial court's policies had any significant effect on the underrepresentation of African-American jurors in the area.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, concurring. He challenged the Court to reconsider that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to a jury that represents "a fair cross section" of the community. Instead, he proposed that the right stems more from an "amalgamation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause."

Berghuis v. Thompkins

jgoldman — Mon, 01 Mar 2010 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States

42° 28' 24.1284" N, 83° 13' 18.7428" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1470

Petitioner

Mary Berghuis, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Van Chester Thompkins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010 )

Opinion

560 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Argued

Monday, March 1, 2010

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

Advocates

B. Eric Restuccia (Solicitor General, Lansing Michigan, for the petitioner)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Michigan state court convicted Van Chester Thompkins of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and several firearms related charges. After exhausting his remedies in Michigan state court, Thompkins petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition.

On appeal, Thompkins argued that his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and that he was denied effective counsel at trial. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court's finding that Thompkins waived his Fifth Amendment right was unreasonable because Thompkins refused to sign an acknowledgement that he had been informed of his Miranda rights and rarely made eye contact with the officer throughout the three hour interview. The Sixth Circuit also held that the Michigan Supreme Court improperly determined that Thompkins was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction related to his separately tried co-defendant's testimony.

Question

1) Did the Sixth Circuit improperly expand the Miranda rule when it held that defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated?

2) Did the Sixth Circuit fail to give the state court deference when it granted habeas corpus relief with respect to defendant's ineffective counsel argument when there was substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Berghuis, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Miranda warnings

Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that the state court's decision to reject Mr. Thompkins' Miranda claim was correct. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Mr. Thompkins failed to invoke his Miranda rights to remain silent and to counsel because he failed to do so "unambiguously." Moreover, the Court reasoned that Mr. Thompkins waived his Miranda right to remain silent when he "knowingly and voluntarily" made a statement to the police. The Court further held that, even if Mr. Thompkins' counsel was ineffective, he cannot show he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance – a prerequisite to establishing that his Sixth Amendment right was violated.

Justice Sonia Sotamayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. She reprimanded the majority for retreating from the broad protections afforded by Miranda, stating that now a criminal suspect waives his rights simply by uttering a "few one-word responses."