Cases - 2008 term

Herring v. United States

Tue, 07 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Coffee County Sheriff's Department

4 County Complex

New Brockton, AL 36351

United States

31° 23' 8.6064" N, 85° 55' 45.7896" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-513

Petitioner

Bennie Dean Herring

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Advocates

Pamela S. Karlan (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

The Coffee County, Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004. Upon searching Herring's vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a gun under the seat of his truck. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. The warrant, still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office, was supposed to have been recalled five months prior, however someone had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Herring filed a motion to suppress the allegedly "illegally obtained" evidence, however the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Herring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could “result in appreciable deterrence” of future police misconduct. In his petition for certiorari, Herring pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way, noting that “as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems, the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply." The Court granted certiorari on February 19, 2008.

Question

Does a court violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant by introducing evidence obtained through a police search based on an arrest warrant that should have been recalled, but was negligently allowed to remain active, at the time of the search?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 5-4 decision with Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., the Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It held that a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police mistakes that lead to unlawful searches are merely the result of isolated negligence and "not systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements." Evidence obtained under these circumstances is admissible and not subject to the exclusionary rule.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Ginsburg argued that an intact exclusionary rule provides a strong incentive for police compliance with respect to the Fourth Amendment and its erosion in this case was not warranted. Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Souter. He argued that the Court should move away from its reliance on analyzing the degree of police culpability when determining whether the exclusionary rule applies, but rather draw a bright line between errors made by record keepers and those made by police officers.

Harbison v. Bell

Mon, 12 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Criminal Court of Hamilton County

600 Market Street

Chattanooga, TN 37402-4808

United States

35° 2' 56.9364" N, 85° 18' 32.3424" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-8521

Petitioner

Edward Jerome Harbison

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ricky Bell, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 23, 2008

Argued

Monday, January 12, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

Advocates

Dana C. Hansen Chavis (argued the cause for the petitioner)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below)

Facts of the Case

Edward Jerome Harbison was convicted in a Tennessee state court of first- degree murder, second-degree burglary, and grand larceny, and was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through the Tennessee courts, a federal district court appointed Mr. Harbison a federal public defender to represent him in filing a federal habeas corpus petition. That petition was denied by the both the federal district court as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. As Tennessee law does not authorize the appointment of state public defenders as counsel in state clemency proceedings, Mr. Harbison's federal public defender requested to represent him in his state clemency proceedings. Both the district court and Sixth Circuit denied the request, holding that federal law does not authorize federal compensation for legal representation in state matters.

Question

1) According to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, is a certificate of appealability required to appeal an order denying a request for federally-funded counsel?

2) Does 18 U.S.C. Section 3599 permit federally-funded habeas counsel to represent a condemned inmate in state clemency proceedings when the state has denied state-funded counsel for that purpose?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Harbison, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. Section 3599 and 28 U.S.C. Section 2254

No and Yes. First, the Supreme Court held that a certificate of appealability (COA) is not required to appeal an order denying a request for federally appointed counsel. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that a COA is only required to appeal final orders in habeas corpus petitions. Here, Mr. Harbison did not require a COA because he merely appealed an order denying his request to expand the authority of his federally appointed counsel. Second, the Supreme Court held that federally appointed counsel may represent their clients in state clemency proceedings and are entitled to compensation for such representation. The Court stated that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. Section 3599 authorized federally appointed counsel to represent their clients in those proceedings "as may become available to the defendant", reasoning that state clemency proceedings met this description.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas each wrote separately concurring in the judgment. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that a COA was not required to appeal an order denying the expansion of a federally appointed counsel's authority. However, he disagreed that 18 U.S.C. Section 3599 authorizes state prisoners' federally funded counsel to pursue state clemency on their clients' behalf.

Philip Morris USA. v. Williams

Wed, 03 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Circuit Court, Multnomah County

1021 Southwest 4th Avenue

Portland, OR 97204

United States

45° 30' 58.3056" N, 122° 40' 40.3896" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1216

Petitioner

Philip Morris USA Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mayola Williams, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jesse D. Williams, Deceased

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 9, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Advocates

Stephen M. Shapiro (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Robert S. Peck (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Mayola Williams sued the tobacco giant, Philip Morris, in Oregon state court following her husband's death from lung cancer in 1997. Ms. Williams claimed that her husband had been convinced by Philip Morris' advertisements and representations that smoking did not pose any significant health risks and had refused to quit smoking despite his family's pleas. She alleged that Philip Morris' fraud and negligence in this regard had caused her husband's death.

At trial, a jury found in favor of Ms. Williams and awarded her $79.5 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $32 million. On appeal, Philip Morris argued that the trial court had committed an error when it failed to give a proposed jury instruction stating, in part, that the jury should not "punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons." The case eventually wound up before the Oregon Supreme Court ("OSC"), which ruled that the proposed jury instruction incorrectly stated the federal requirements of due process of law, and the trial court was therefore correct to exclude it. The OSC found it unnecessary to rule, at that time, on whether the jury instruction was flawed for its description of state-law requirements. Philip Morris sought and was granted certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court reversed the OSC, stating that due process did not necessarily require exclusion of the instruction, and remanded the case so that the OSC could apply the correct standard.

On remand, the OSC stated that the U.S. Supreme Court’s new constitutional standard was only triggered "upon request," which obligated it to determine whether Philip Morris’s request was valid under state law. The OSC held that the proposed instruction misstated Oregon's statutory punitive damages criteria and therefore was not "clear and correct in all respects," as it must be to be considered error. The U.S. Supreme Court, which will now hear the case for the second time after granting Philip Morris' certiorari petition, must determine whether the OSC is permitted to insert these state law issues at such a late stage in the game.

Question

Can a state court, after the U.S. Supreme Court has remanded a case back to it with instructions to apply the correct constitutional standard, raise a state- law procedural bar for the first time?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Philip Morris USA, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Punitive Damages

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

Shinseki v. Sanders

Mon, 08 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

US Department of Veterans Affairs

810 Vermont Avenue Northwest

Washington, DC 20420-0002

United States

38° 54' 2.5236" N, 77° 2' 5.5644" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1209

Petitioner

Eric Shinseki, Secretary of Veteran Affairs

Respondent

Woodrow Sanders

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 16, 2008

Argued

Monday, December 8, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Advocates

Eric D. Miller (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Christopher J. Meade (argued the cause for the respondent Simmons)

Mark R. Lippman (argued the cause for the respondent Sanders)

Facts of the Case

While serving in the United States army in 1944, Woodrow Sanders had a bazooka explode near him, burning the right side of his face. Sanders also claimed that the explosion had damaged his right eye. However subsequent examinations by Veterans' Affairs ("VA") optometrists suggested that the cause of the condition was difficult to determine and was likely due to an infection. When Sanders appeared before the Board of Veterans' Appeals, arguing that the injury was service related and seeking cost-free treatment, the Board denied his claim, finding that the injury was not service related. On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Sanders argued that the VA failed to provide notice as to who was responsible for obtaining the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim, as required by the notice provision of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 ("VCAA"). The Veterans Court affirmed the Board, basing its decision on the fact that Sanders did not suffer any "specific prejudice" due to the VA's failure to notify.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court, finding that the VCAA does not require any showing of prejudice. Any failure to notify as required by the Act creates a presumption of prejudice that need not be alleged or proved by the veteran seeking medical assistance.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit err in presuming a prejudicial error when the VA fails to give notice to claimant as to who is responsible for obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Shinseki, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Review of Veterans Claims

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's framework for evaluating VA notice errors, conflicted with established law that the Veterans Court "take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.". With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the Federal Circuit's framework was too complex, rigid, and its presumption of prejudicial error imposed an unreasonable burden upon the VA. Rather, the Court stated the proper framework for the Veterans Court to apply is the "harmless-error" rule ordinarily applied in civil cases.

Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He disagreed that a veteran claimant bore the burden of persuasion when mounting a claim against the VA. He reasoned prior practice indicated congressional favoritism of veterans and that statutory doubt should be resolved in the veteran's favor. Moreover, he disagreed with the majority in its finding that the Federal Circuit's framework was "complex" and "rigid," rather viewing it as "workable."

Jimenez v. Quarterman

Tue, 04 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-6984

Petitioner

Carlos Jimenez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 17, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, November 4, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, January 13, 2009

Advocates

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Sean D. Jordan (Deputy Solicitor General of Texas, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Carlos Jimenez pled guilty in Texas state court to burglary and violating his probation. Because Jimenez had a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, he was sentenced to 43 years in prison. Jimenez appealed and, in 1996, a state appeals court dismissed Jimenez's petition when a court-appointed lawyer stated that Jimenez had no grounds for appeal. Six years later the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals allowed leave for Jimenez to renew his appeal based on his lawyer's incompetence, however the court affirmed his conviction and sentence.

In 2005, Jimenez filed a habeas corpus petition in a Texas federal court arguing that he had not received adequate legal assistance during his proceedings in the state courts. The district judge dismissed the claim, holding that the one-year statute of limitations, which began running on the date of conviction, had expired. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also denied Jimenez's appeal. Jimenez, in his petition for certiorari, argued that the one-year statute of limitations should actually have begun in 2005, after his final appeal was denied in state court, rather than in 1995 when he was convicted.

Question

When a criminal defendant is unable to obtain timely direct review of his case in state court, should the one-year statute of limitations for appeals begin to run at the date of conviction, as federal law prescribes, or after the delayed direct review is completed?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jimenez, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a unanimous opinion with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the Court, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It held that when a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal and he does so, the conviction is not final. Therefore, the statute of limitations begins to run only after the out-of-time direct appeal is final. The Court remanded Mr. Jimenez's case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee

Tue, 02 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Hyannis West Elementary School

549 West Main Street

Hyannis, MA 02601

United States

41° 38' 58.0488" N, 70° 18' 59.0184" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1125

Petitioner

Lisa Fitzgerald, et vir

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Barnstable School Committee, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 9, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Kay H. Hodge (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In February 2001 Jacqueline Fitzgerald, a kindergarten student, told her parents that an older student on the school bus, on several occasions, bullied her into lifting up her skirt. Jacqueline's mother reported these allegations to the school but its immediate investigation into the matter, including interviewing the supposed perpetrator, the school bus driver, and many students on the bus, did not provide any further proof of the sexual harassment. After Jacqueline told her parents about further instances of mistreatment, the local police department began its own investigation but was unable to find sufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings against the alleged harasser. Jacqueline reported other incidents throughout the year, and each was addressed by the school's principal as it occurred. In April of 2002 the Fitzgeralds brought suit against the school district in federal court alleging violations of both Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 and 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983). Title IX prohibits discrimination by any educational entity receiving federal funding, while Section 1983 protects against the deprivation of any rights guaranteed by the Constitution and federal laws. The district court granted the school district's motion to dismiss both counts and the Fitzgeralds appealed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of both claims. First, discussing the Title IX claim, the court stated that five conditions must be met for a plaintiff to succeed: the student must prove that (1) the institution is a recipient of federal funding, (2) severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment occurred, (3) the harassment denied the student of educational opportunities or benefits, (4) the institution had actual knowledge of the harassment, and (5) the institution's deliberate indifference caused the student to be subjected to the harassment. The First Circuit held that even if the first four factors were met in this case, the school's "prompt" and "diligent" investigation was not clearly unreasonable and therefore did not amount to deliberate indifference. Rather, the school looked into each allegation quickly and thoroughly. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Fitzgeralds' Section 1983 claim, applying the so-called "remedial" exception prohibiting such claims when the allegedly violated federal law is itself specific enough to demonstrate Congress' intention to allow only those remedies referred to in the statute itself. According to the First Circuit, Title IX is one of these remedial statutes and therefore any alleged violations of the statute cannot be litigated under Section 1983.

Question

Is Title IX's implied private remedy sufficiently comprehensive to preclude the use of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to advance sex discrimination claims against federally funded educational institutions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fitzgerald, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. It held that a claim filed under Title IX for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude the use of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to further constitutional claims. The Court reasoned that Title IX was not meant to be the exclusive tool for addressing gender discrimination in schools, or a substitute for actions filed under Section 1983 to enforce constitutional rights.

Locke v. Karass

Mon, 06 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Maine State Employees Association

65 State Street

Augusta, ME 04332-1072

United States

44° 18' 38.5344" N, 69° 46' 43.8384" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-610

Petitioner

Daniel B. Locke, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Edward A. Karass, State Controller, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Argued

Monday, October 6, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Advocates

W. James Young (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeremiah A. Collins (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

After the Maine State Employees Association (a union representing state workers) negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement for certain employees, nonmembers voiced their disapproval with the agreement's requirement that they pay a "service fee" to the union as its exclusive bargaining agent. The service fee included an affiliation fee paid to the Service Employees International Union through a general pooling arrangement, meaning that the nonmembers were contributing funds to an affiliate for litigation not specifically for their own benefit. The nonmembers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine claiming that the service fee violated their First amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the union.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, applying the Court's decision in Lehnert to determine that the nonmember employees' First Amendment rights were not implicated by the service fee. Under the Lehnert test, chargeable activities must (1) "be substantively related to bargaining and ultimately inure to the benefit of local union members, (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding free riders, and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of agency."

Question

Do union requirements that nonmember employees pay a service fee through a pooling arrangement, and used to fund litigation that may not specifically be for the benefit of those nonmembers, violate the First Amendment rights of those nonmember employees?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Karass, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment permits a local union to charge nonmembers for national litigation expenses so long as 1) the subject matter is of a kind that would be chargeable if the litigation were local and 2) the charge is reciprocal in nature (the contributing local union reasonably expects other local unions to contribute similarly). The Court reasoned that the fees paid by nonmembers of the Maine State Employees Association that funded national litigation expenses met this test and therefore did not violate nonmembers' First Amendment rights.

Justice Samuel A. Alito filed a separate concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. Alito noted the Supreme Court did not reach the question of what "reciprocity" means, acknowledging it was not contested by either party.

Haywood v. Drown

Wed, 03 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Attica Correctional Facility

639 Exchange Street Road

Attica, NY 14011-9647

United States

42° 46' 37.7616" N, 78° 15' 44.136" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-10374

Petitioner

Keith Haywood

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Curtis Drown, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 16, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, December 3, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Advocates

Jason E. Murtagh (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara D. Underwood (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Keith Haywood, while incarcerated at the Attica Correctional Facility in Attica, New York, was charged with several misbehavior reports in 2003 and 2004, including assaulting a corrections officer, failing a urinalysis test, and improperly soliciting mail. After being found guilty of these charges, Haywood commenced actions in state court against two of the corrections officers responsible for reviewing the claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), a federal statute protecting civil rights. He asserted that the guilty verdicts had been handed down without sufficient evidence, that the officers had tampered with the urinalysis test, and that they had conspired to fabricate the facts set forth in the misbehavior reports. The defendants moved to dismiss Haywood's claims, basing their argument on a New York law prohibiting civil claims such as Haywood's brought against corrections officers in their official capacities. Haywood responded by arguing that when Congress created Section 1983 it intended the statute to supersede any state laws contradicting it. Because Section 1983 allowed these claims, Haywood argued, the New York law prohibiting them violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of New York (the state's lowest-level court) agreed with the defendants and dismissed Haywood's claim based on the New York law.

The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, finding that the Supremacy Clause permits states to deny enforcement of a federal right in a case where a state court lacks jurisdiction due to a neutral state rule regarding the courts' administration. Because Haywood's claim would be barred if brought under either Section 1983 or an applicable state law, the New York law barring the claim was valid and neutral and did not violate the Supremacy Clause.

Question

Does a state law barring civil claims against corrections officers violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution when it prohibits an inmate from bringing a claim for a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Haywood, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supremacy Clause

Yes. The Supreme Court held that New York's Correction Law Section 24, prohibiting civil claims brought against corrections officers in their official capacities, as applied in Mr. Haywood's case, violated the Supremacy Clause and thus was unconstitutional. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court noted that New York had passed Section 24 after determining most damages suits filed by prisoners against state corrections officers were frivolous. However, the Court reasoned that states may not relieve whole categories of federal claims from their courts merely to avoid congestion.

Justice Clarence Thomas dissented and was joined in part by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, and Samuel A. Alito. He argued that neither the Constitution nor Supreme Court precedent requires that states open their courts to Section 1983 claims. Thus, New York's law was not unconstitutional.

Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs

Wed, 25 Feb 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Leiali'i Parcel 96761

United States

19° 53' 48.3576" N, 155° 34' 58.0152" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1372

Petitioner

State of Hawaii

Respondent

Office of Hawaiian Affairs

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Advocates

Mark J. Bennett (argued the cause for the petitioner)

William M. Jay (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), filed suit against the state of Hawaii to prevent the transfer of "ceded" lands for the purpose of private development. The OHA was established to manage the proceeds from lands ceded by the Kingdom of Hawaii following its overthrow by the United States. The lands were marked to provide for the benefit of native Hawaiians. The OHA argued that "any transfer of ceded lands by the State to third parties would amount to a breach of trust" and would be without consideration of the claims of native Hawaiians to those lands. However, the trial court held that the State did have the power to transfer the lands. The OHA appealed.

The Supreme Court of Hawaii overruled the trial court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue an injunction to prevent the transfer of ceded lands from the public trust. In its reasoning, it cited Ahuna to illustrate that the State as trustee of these lands was under an obligation to administer the trust 'solely in the interest of the beneficiary' (native Hawaiians). Further, it gave great weight to the Apology Resolution passed by the United States Congress in 1993 to mark the 100th Anniversary of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii. This resolution stated that "native Hawaiians (1) 'never directly relinquished their claims to… their national lands to the United States,' and (2) 'are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory.'" Therefore, the court held, it was the responsibility of the State of Hawaii to preserve the ceded lands in the public trust, at least until such land claims were resolved.

Question

Does the symbolic Apology Resolution restrict the State of Hawaii's sovereign authority to transfer publicly held land for private development, at least until claims over such land are resolved?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hawaii, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: The Apology Resolution

No. A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Apology Resolution did not restrict Hawaii's sovereign authority to transfer publicly held land for private development. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the Court, it reasoned that the language of the resolution did not indicate the creation of new substantive rights that could limit the actions of Hawaii.

Kansas v. Ventris

Wed, 21 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1356

Petitioner

State of Kansas

Respondent

Donnie Ventris

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Advocates

Stephen R. McAllister (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Matthew J. Edge (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In January 2003, Donnie Ventris and his girlfriend entered the apartment of Ernest Hicks who was subsequently robbed and killed. Mr. Ventris was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated battery by the District Court of Montgomery County in Kansas. To rebut the testimony of Mr. Ventris at trial, the State relied on the testimony of his former cell mate, Johnnie Doser. The government recruited Mr. Doser to keep his "ear open" and listen for incriminating statements made by Mr. Ventris. Mr. Ventris appealed claiming this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The District Court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the Supreme Court of Kansas.

The court held that "[w]ithout a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the admission of the defendant's uncounseled statements to an undercover informant who is secretly acting as a State agent violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights." It reasoned that the fact finding responsibilities of the trial court do not outweigh individuals' constitutional rights.

Question

Are statements obtained in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel admissible for the purposes of impeaching a defendant's testimony?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Kansas, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment

Yes. Mr. Ventris' statements, elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment, were admissible to impeach his inconsistent testimony at trial. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the interests protected by excluding "tainted evidence" are outweighed by the need to assure "integrity of the trial process."

Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He sharply criticized the majority for allowing the State to cut corners in criminal proceedings at the expense of criminal defendants' constitutional guarantees.

United States v. Hayes

Mon, 10 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Home of Randy Edward Hayes Mannington, WV

United States

39° 31' 51.3012" N, 80° 20' 36.3048" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-608

Petitioner

United States

Respondent

Randy Edward Hayes

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 24, 2008

Argued

Monday, November 10, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Advocates

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Troy N. Giatras (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal.

Hayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a "domestic" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction.

Question

Under the Gun Control Act of 1968, does a conviction for misdemeanor battery constitute a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" when the victim was the offender's wife and the predicate offense statute did not designate a "domestic relationship" between aggressor and victim as an element of the crime?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Gun Control Act of 1968

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit holding that the predicate offense statute need not include the existence of a "domestic relationship" as an element of the crime in order to qualify as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as specified by the Gun Control Act of 1968. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, and joined in part by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reasoned that the language of the Gun Control Act suggested that the predicate offense statute need only include "the use of force" as an element of the crime and need not include a "domestic relationship" as an additional element.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts dissented and was joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia. He criticized the majority opinion's use of grammatical rules by which it reached an unsound conclusion. He argued that the rule of lenity should apply as the Gun Control Act was ambiguous and therefore should be interpreted in the defendant's favor.

Bartlett v. Strickland

Tue, 14 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Pender County North Carolina NC 28425

United States

30° 16' 28.2864" N, 81° 43' 58.9728" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-689

Petitioner

Gary Bartlett, Executive Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, et al.

Respondent

Dwight Strickland, et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 17, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Decided

Monday, March 9, 2009

Advocates

Christopher G. Browning, Jr. (North Carolina Solicitor General, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Carl W. Thurman III (argued the cause for the respondents)

Daryl Joseffer (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Dwight Strickland, a commissioner in Pender County, NC, along with several other county commissioners, brought this suit against state officials alleging that their redistricting plan was in violation of the North Carolina Constitution. The state officials argued that the redistricting plan was required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), stating that the minority group in question, comprised of African-American North Carolina citizens, was sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority under the terms of the VRA. The North Carolina Superior Court agreed with the state officials and entered summary judgment in their favor.

The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on appeal, holding that the minority group did not comprise a numerical majority of citizens and, therefore, redistricting was not required by the VRA. Because the redistricting plan did not meet the conditions of the VRA, the court said, it had to comply with certain terms of North Carolina's Constitution setting a minimum county population for redistricting. The court found that the county did not meet this requirement, and declared the plan unlawful.

Question

Is a North Carolina redistricting plan in a county lacking a numerical majority of minority citizens required by the Voting Rights of Act of 1965 and, therefore, exempt from complying with the conditions of the North Carolina Constitution.

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Strickland, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court holding that the VRA does not require state officials to redraw election district lines to allow a racial minority group to feasibly join with crossover voters to elect the minority's candidate choice when the racial minority group would make up less than 50 percent of the voting population in the redrawn district. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the plurality and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court, relying on its decision in Gingles, stated that the VRA allows redistricting only when a geographically compact group of minority voters could form a majority in the redrawn election district. The Court reasoned that this requirement was not satisfied here as the minority group in the redrawn district comprised a mere 39 percent of the voting population.

Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, concurred only in the judgment. He disagreed with the Gingles framework for analyzing vote dilution claims arguing it had no basis in the language of the VRA. Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer. He disagreed with the majority's holding, arguing that a district may be redrawn so long as a cohesive minority population is large enough to elect its chosen candidate when combined with crossover voters. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, encouraging Congress to remedy what she viewed as the Court's misinterpretation of the VRA. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, criticizing the plurality's reliance on a 50 percent threshold as too simplistic because it fails to account for the realities of how people actually vote.

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Communications

Mon, 08 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

AT&T Services, Inc. (California Office)

1150 South Olive Street

Los Angeles, CA 90015

United States

34° 2' 23.7264" N, 118° 15' 42.2136" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-512

Petitioner

Pacific Bell Telephone Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

LinkLine Communications

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 23, 2008

Argued

Monday, December 8, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Advocates

Aaron M. Panner (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Deanne E. Maynard (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Maxwell M. Blecher (argued the cause for the respondents)

Richard M. Brunell (argued the cause for amicus curiae American Antitrust Institute)

Facts of the Case

LinkLine, along with several other internet-service providers (ISPs), sued Pacific Bell, claiming that the company was selling digital subscriber line (DSL) access at "a high wholesale price in relation to the price at which [it was] providing retail services." The ISPs condemned the scheme as price squeezing in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a piece of U.S. antitrust legislation designed to prevent the formation of monopolies. A price squeeze occurs when a company holding a monopoly on the production of certain goods sets its wholesale prices higher than the retail prices it charges directly to consumers, preventing the wholesale customers from competing with it at the retail level. The district court denied Pacific Bell's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim but granted its motion for an interlocutory appeal, allowing the appellate court to determine whether such price squeezing claims are permissible before delivering a final judgment at the trial level.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the ISPs had stated a legitimate price squeezing claim under Section 2. The Ninth Circuit argued that prior Supreme Court precedent had not eliminated the application of traditional antitrust laws to partially regulated industries. While noting that the wholesale market is governed by a separate document, the 1934 FCC Act, the court stated that the retail market remains unregulated and is therefore subject to the antitrust laws. As far as the retail market was concerned then, the ISPs had stated a valid price squeezing claim under Section 2.

Question

In light of prior Court precedent on the issue, is "price squeezing" still a valid claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act when brought against a company acting in a partially regulated industry?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Pacific Bell Telephone Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman Act

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding that a "price squeezing" claim cannot be brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act when the defendant is under no duty to sell inputs to the plaintiff in the first place. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court relying on its decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, reasoned that since there was no duty on the part of AT&T; to deal with its competitors and no support under existing antitrust doctrine that AT&T;'s retail prices were "too low", the plaintiffs' claim was barred under Section 2.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the Court should remand the case to the district court and allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include a "predatory pricing" claim.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

MDC Brooklyn

80 29TH STREET

Brooklyn, NY 11232

United States

40° 39' 36.3312" N, 74° 0' 12.0888" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1015

Petitioner

John Ashcroft, Former Attorney General, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Javaid Iqbal, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 16, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

Decided

Monday, May 18, 2009

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Alexander A. Reinert (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In the aftermath of September 11th, the FBI arrested thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation into the attacks. One of these men, Javaid Iqbal, was classified as being a "high interest" detainee at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal claims that during his detention he was segregated from the rest of the prison population and mistreated in several ways, including confinement to a cell for 23 hours a day where he had blinding light shone on him constantly and air conditioning pumped into the cell even during the winter months. After being released, Iqbal brought a suit against representatives of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and FBI alleging 21 violations of his statutory and constitutional rights based on his treatment while confined. These defendants argued that they should be protected from the suit in their official governmental roles through qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and rejected the qualified immunity defense.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on all counts but one for violation of the right to due process. The Second Circuit noted that the actions taken by the government occurred in the immediate aftermath of September 11th and therefore created a unique context in which Iqbal's claims had to be reviewed. Even with these circumstances, however, the court felt that the qualified immunity defense could protect the government only from the due process claim. The "serious allegations of gross mistreatment" were enough to sustain the remaining counts.

Question

1) Are governmental officers acting in their official capacities protected by the defense of qualified immunity in a claim brought by a former prison inmate, arrested in the immediate aftermath of September 11, alleging gross treatment and violations of his constitutional rights while confined?

2) Are conclusory allegations that high-ranking government officers knew of or condoned allegedly unconstitutional acts by subordinate officials sufficient to state a claim for unlawful discrimination?

Conclusion

Split Vote

Not Answered and No. The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit had jurisdiction to affirm the district court's order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss Mr. Iqbal's claim. However, the Court also held that Mr. Iqbal failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful discrimination. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Mr. Iqbal needed to plead sufficient facts to show that the defendants implemented their policies for the purpose of discrimination. Mr. Iqbal did not do this and thus his complaint was deficient. The Court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether Mr. Iqbal may amend his complaint.

Justice David H. Souter wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He disagreed with the majority's opinion that Mr. Iqbal failed to state a claim. Rather, he argued that since the defendants admitted that they would be liable if they knew their subordinates' conduct was deliberately discriminatory, that Mr. Iqbal did plead sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful discrimination.

Wyeth v. Levine

Mon, 03 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Wyeth Pharmaceuticals

555 East Lancaster Avenue

Radnor, PA 19087-5158

United States

40° 2' 29.094" N, 75° 22' 3.9972" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1249

Petitioner

Wyeth, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Diana Levine

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 18, 2008

Argued

Monday, November 3, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Advocates

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Diana Levine filed this personal injury action against Wyeth, the drug manufacturer, in state court in Vermont. Ms. Levine had intravenously injected Phenergan, a drug made by Wyeth and used to prevent allergies and motion sickness, into her arm, and complications arising from the injection eventually led to the amputation of her arm. Ms. Levine brought this claim asserting that Wyeth had failed to include a warning label describing the possible arterial injuries that could occur from negligent injection of the drug. Wyeth argued that because their warning label had been deemed acceptable by the FDA, a federal agency, any Vermont state regulations making the label insufficient were preempted by the federal approval. The Superior Court of Vermont found in favor of Ms. Levine and denied Wyeth's motion for a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed this ruling on appeal, holding that the FDA requirements merely provide a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation. Therefore, states are free to create more stringent labeling requirements than federal law provides.

Question

Does federal law preempt state law in a personal injury action against a drug manufacturer for failing to include an appropriate warning label where the drug in question met the labeling requirements of the Food and Drug Administration?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Levine, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Preemption

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Vermont holding that federal law did not preempt Ms. Levine's state-law claim that Wyeth's labeling of Phenergan failed to warn of the dangers of its intravenous administration. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court first rejected Wyeth's argument that by unilaterally changing its labeling of Phenergan, it would have violated federal labeling regulations. Rather, the Court asserted that the manufacturer bears ultimate responsibility for the content of its labels at all times. The Court then rejected Wyeth's argument that requiring it to comply with the state-law duty to provide a stronger warning would interfere with Congress' purpose of entrusting the FDA with drug labeling decisions. Rather, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to preempt state-law failure to warn actions when it created the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion noting that the FDA may create regulations that preempt state law tort claims, but such a regulation was not at issue in Ms. Levine's case. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, concurring only in the judgment. He criticized the majority opinion for implicitly endorsing a "far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrine" where the Court invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with federal statutes by extrapolating from evidence not found in the text of the statute itself. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin G. Scalia. He disagreed with the Court's holding that a jury, rather than the FDA is ultimately responsible for regulating warning labels for prescription drugs. He argued this is incompatible with the Court's precedent in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., which established the principles of conflict preemption.

Negusie v. Holder, Attorney General

Fri, 07 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Eritrea Asmara

Eritrea

15° 19' 56.496" N, 38° 55' 34.212" E

Case Basics

Docket No.

07–499

Petitioner

Negusie

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Holder, Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Argued

Friday, November 7, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

Advocates

Andrew J. Pincus (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gregory G. Katsas (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Daniel Negusie, an Eritrean citizen, worked as a prison guard in Eritrea before seeking asylum in the United States. When Negusie tried to come into the country, however, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal. The INS based its decision on evidence that Negusie assisted in the persecution of prison inmates on the basis of a protected ground, specifically, the prisoners' Protestant religious beliefs. Negusie appealed his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that he did not voluntarily assist in the persecution but rather attempted to help the individuals who were being mistreated.

The BIA gave little weight to Negusie's argument that he was trying to help the prisoners, instead focusing on his more prominent involvement in the persecution as an armed guard who oversaw and was complicit in the acts. After the BIA upheld the INS' denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal, Negusie filed a petition to have his case reviewed before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Finding that the evidence from the BIA decision did not compel a conclusion that Negusie was uninvolved in the persecution of inmates, the Fifth Circuit denied his petition.

Question

Can a foreign citizen who is denied asylum due to his involvement in the persecution of others on the basis of a protected ground argue that he was compelled to do so by his military superiors and, on several occasions, actually attempted to help those who were being persecuted?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Negusie, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Nationality Act

Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the BIA and Fifth Circuit erred when they evaluated Mr. Negusie's asylum petition because they presumed it mandatory that an alien's coercion to persecute was immaterial when determining whether the "persecutor bar" applies. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court found that the BIA failed to exercise its discretion when interpreting ambiguous provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and therefore interpreted the INA from a mistaken legal premise. The Court ordered that the BIA interpret the ambiguous provisions of the INA and then review Mr. Negusie's case with respect to its interpretation.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a separate concurring opinion noting that he would not have agreed to remand Mr. Negusie's case had the majority prevented the BIA from reaching the same conclusion once again. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and dissented in part. He criticized the majority for failing to establish a standard for when the "persecutor bar" applies to an alien's asylum petition. Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented, arguing that the INA unambiguously precludes any inquiry into whether the persecutor acted voluntarily or was coerced.

Chambers v. United States

Mon, 10 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Jefferson County IL 62864-1266

United States

38° 19' 2.1756" N, 88° 54' 11.232" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-11206

Petitioner

Deondery Chambers

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, April 21, 2008

Argued

Monday, November 10, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, January 13, 2009

Advocates

Robert N. Hochman (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Matthew D. Roberts (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.

Question

Does a conviction for felonious escape under Illinois law, arising from the defendant's failure to report for imprisonment, qualify as a "crime of violence" for the purposes of the federal Armed Career Criminals Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Chambers, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Armed Career Criminal Act

No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Ruther Bader Ginsburg held that the "failure to report" crime does not satisfy the Armed Career Criminals Act's (ACCA) "crime of violence" definition. The Court reasoned that the "failure to report" crime does not "involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" as it is a crime of inaction and therefore should not be categorized as a "crime of violence".

Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. While agreeing with the Court's analysis, Justice Alito highlighted the difficulty the courts have had in applying the ACCA. He encouraged Congress to amend the ACCA and include a specific list of crimes that appropriately enhance a sentence.

Hedgpeth v. Pulido

Wed, 15 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The Superior Court of San Mateo County

400 County Center

Redwood City, CA 94063

United States

37° 29' 17.1888" N, 122° 13' 51.492" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-544

Petitioner

Anthony Hedgpeth, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Robert Pulido

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, February 25, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, October 15, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

Advocates

Jeremy Friedlander (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

J. Bradley O'Connell (argued the cause for the respondent (appointed by the Court))

Facts of the Case

Michael Pulido was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court for his involvement in the shooting of a gas station attendant during the course of a robbery. He claimed that he was only involved in the robbery after the shooting had taken place. On appeal, Mr. Pulido argued that the jury instructions were in error and allowed a jury to convict him as an accomplice in the robbery and murder, even if he only took part in the robbery. The California Supreme Court refused to overturn the conviction holding that the error was harmless because the jury had specifically found that Mr. Pulido aided the robbery during the murder.

Mr. Pulido sought and was granted habeas relief by a federal district court in California. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that instructing a jury on multiple theories of guilt, one of which was legally improper, was "structural error" entitling Mr. Pulido to automatic relief and exempted the instructions from "harmless-error" review.

Question

Are jury instructions that instruct a jury on multiple theories of guilt, one of which is legally improper, necessarily "structural error" that exempts the instructions from a harmless-error review?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Hedgpeth, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Jury Instructions

No. In a 6-3 per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit inaccurately categorized the type of jury instructions in Mr. Pulido's case as "structural error." It reasoned that one instructional error arising in the context of multiple theories of guilt does not necessarily spoil all the jury's findings, which would entitle the convicted individual to automatic relief. Rather, the Court found that the jury instructions in Mr. Pulido's case should be evaluated by whether they caused a "substantial and injurious effect" upon the jury reaching its verdict. The Court vacated Mr. Pulido's conviction and remanded the case to the court of appeals for proceedings consistent with the decision.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. They found the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit merely misused the term "structural error" in its opinion, while it actually utilized the analytical model advocated by the majority opinion. They reasoned that in the interests of efficiency, the Supreme Court should have affirmed the court of appeals rather than have it repeat largely the same analysis.

Carcieri v. Salazar

Mon, 03 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Narragansett Tribal Parcel Charlestown, RI 02813

United States

41° 23' 7.0008" N, 71° 40' 5.0016" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-526

Petitioner

Donald L. Carcieri, Governor of Rhode Island

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ken L. Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, February 25, 2008

Argued

Monday, November 3, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Deanne E. Maynard (Assistant to the Solicitor General, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1991, the Narragansett Indian Tribe purchased a 31-acre parcel of land in Charlestown, RI to build a housing complex for the elderly. The U.S. Department of the Interior, acting at the tribe's request, moved to take the land into federal trust, thereby placing it largely under federal and tribal control, in 1998. However, Rhode Island officials opposed the move, claiming that the Department of the Interior lacked the proper authority because the Narragansett tribe was not recognized until nearly 50 years after the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act took effect. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island upheld the action, stating that Rhode Island was taking an unnecessarily narrow view of the law.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision and approved of its reasoning. In seeking Supreme Court review to determine whether the time of tribal recognition should be dispositive on this issue, Rhode Island noted that "the future allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction between states and tribes over a potentially unlimited amount of land hangs in the balance."

Question

Does the federal government have the ability to take land into trust for American Indian tribes recognized after the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934?

Conclusion

Decision: votes for Carcieri, vote(s) against
Legal provision: The Indian Reorganization Act

No. The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit holding that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 did not apply to tribes not recognized at the time of the statute's creation. Therefore, the Indian Reorganization Act did not authorize the Secretary of the Interior to act on behalf of the Narrangansett Tribe as trustee. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the statute unambiguously referred only to those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and therefore did not apply to the Narrangansett Tribe.

Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion qualifying his assent to the majority opinion. In part, he argued that the statute was not "unambiguous", but through contextual analysis, the statute referred only to those tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He departed from the majority opinion by arguing that the case should have been remanded for the Narrangansett Tribe to pursue an alternative legal theory. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented arguing that the Narrangansett Tribe was an Indian Tribe under the meaning of the statute, though not specified by name, and therefore the Secretary of the Interior should be allowed to act on its behalf.

Crawford v. Nashville and Davidson County, TN

Wed, 08 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Human Resources

222 Third Avenue

Nashville, TN 37201

United States

36° 15' 41.3208" N, 86° 42' 26.7768" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1595

Petitioner

Vicky Crawford

Respondent

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 18, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 2008

Decided

Monday, January 26, 2009

Advocates

Eric Schnapper (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lisa S. Blatt (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Francis H. Young (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Vicky Crawford, a government employee, took part in an internal investigation regarding sexual harassment claims against another employee. When the investigation concluded, Crawford was fired based on charges of embezzlement and drug use. When these charges were later proven untrue, Crawford filed suit against her employer in federal district court in Tennessee claiming retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act based on her participation in the investigation. The district court directed a verdict for her employer.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Once again finding for the employer, the court stated that Crawford's participation in the investigation did not constitute "opposition" and her activity in that regard was not "protected" as those terms are defined in Title VII, making the Civil Rights Act inapplicable to her claim.

Question

Does the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act apply to employees fired for participating in an internal investigation of sexual harassment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for , 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

Yes. In a unanimous decision with Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. It held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII extends to people who speak out, not just on their own initiative, but when prompted by an employer's internal investigation. The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of the statute includes people who "oppose" sexually obnoxious behavior by merely disclosing the violation and need not initiate the disclosure.

Justice Samuel A. Alito filed a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Alito noted that, while not addressed in the majority opinion, the plain meaning of "oppose" should not include "silent opposition." He argued it would open the door to plaintiffs who never expressed opposition to their employers, thus raising difficult factual determinations at trial.

Van De Kamp v. Goldstein

Wed, 05 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Los Angeles County District Attorneys Office

210 West Temple Street

Los Angeles, CA 90012-3210

United States

34° 3' 18.2268" N, 118° 14' 35.9052" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-854

Petitioner

John Van de Kamp, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thomas Lee Goldstein

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, April 14, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, November 5, 2008

Decided

Monday, January 26, 2009

Advocates

Timothy T. Coates (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Thomas Lee Goldstein was released on habeas corpus from a California prison in 2004 after serving twenty-four years of a murder sentence. Goldstein then brought suit against the prosecutor and chief deputy from his trial alleging that he had been wrongly convicted. Goldstein argued that he had been prejudiced by the testimony of a jailhouse informant claiming to have heard Goldstein confess to the murder. The informant had stated that he had never, either before or during the trial, received benefits for cooperating with the government; in fact, the informant had worked with the government in the past and was getting reduced sentences in exchange for his testimony. Goldstein's claim alleged that the prosecutor and deputy had failed to fulfill their obligation to ensure that information regarding jailhouse informants was adequately shared among prosecutors. In response, the prosecutors argued that their actions during the trial were immune from suit.

The district court held that the actions were administrative rather than prosecutorial and were therefore not subject to immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, finding that the prosecutor had failed to show the necessary close association with the judicial phase of the trial in order to invoke immunity.

Question

In a suit brought by a plaintiff alleging that he was wrongfully convicted of murder, are federal prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity against charges that they failed to satisfactorily share information regarding the testimony of a jailhouse informant during the course of the trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Van de Kamp, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It reaffirmed its holding in Imbler that officers of the court are immune from liability "for actions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Acknowledging that immunity does not apply when officers of the court engage in administrative tasks, the Court reasoned that in Mr. Goldstein's case, the defendant prosecutors' failure to share information regarding the testimony of a jailhouse informant was predicated on a decision, requiring legal knowledge, made by those prosecutors about what information to share, and was thus not administrative. Rather, the decision not to share the information was intimately connected to their roles as officers of the court and therefore they were not subject to prosecution.

Altria Group v. Good

Mon, 06 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-562

Petitioner

Altria Group, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stephanie Good, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 18, 2008

Argued

Monday, October 6, 2008

Decided

Monday, December 15, 2008

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for the petitioners)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for the respondents)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

A group of cigarette smokers brought this claim against Altria, the cigarette manufacturer, in federal court in Maine. The smokers asserted that Altria's advertisement claiming that its product was "light" and had "lowered tar and nicotine" constituted misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of Altria on the claim.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that the Maine Act was not preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, by a similar federal act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and that Altria's assertions did in fact constitute misrepresentations under the Maine Act.

Question

Does federal preemption of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act hinge on the express or implied nature of the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Good, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Preemption

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) did not expressly or impliedly preempt all claims related to "smoking and health" under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA). Adopting the reasoning it used in Cipollone, the court found that claims based on a common law legal duty ("predicate-duty" approach), like a manufacturer's duty not to misrepresent its products, were not preempted simply because they related to cigarette manufacturers and the labeling of its products.

Justice Clarence Thomas joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. dissented. Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority's adoption of the "predicate-duty" approach from Cipollone arguing it was confusing and unworkable. Rather, he argued that the Court should adopt a clear test that expressly pre-empts any state law claim that "imposes an obligation…because of the effect of smoking upon health."

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum

Wed, 12 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Pioneer Park Pleasant Grove, UT 84062-2899

United States

40° 21' 50.8248" N, 111° 44' 18.744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-665

Petitioner

Pleasant Grove City, Utah et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Summum

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 31, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Advocates

Jay A. Sekulow (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Daryl Joseffer (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Pamela Harris (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the monument did not "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove." Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a preliminary injunction.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted Summum's injunction request. The Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a "public" forum, not a non-public forum as the district court had held. Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The injunction, according to the court, was also not against the public interest.

Question

Does a city's refusal to place a religious organization's monument in a public park violate that organization's First Amendment free speech rights when the park already contains a monument from a different religious group?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Pleasant Grove City, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit holding that the placement of a monument in a public park is a form of government speech and therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since Pleasant Grove City had retained final authority over which monuments were displayed, the monuments represented an expression of the city's viewpoints and thus government speech.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a separate concurring opinion that largely embraced the majority's reasoning. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Agreeing with the Court's reasoning, he also noted that there were likely no violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment on the part of Pleasant Grove City. He argued that displays of the Ten Commandments had been construed by the Court as "having an undeniable historical meaning" and thus did not attempt to establish a religion. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that "government speech" should be considered a rule of thumb and not a rigid category. He stated that sometimes the Court should ask "whether a government's actions burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action's tendency to further a legitimate government objective." Justice Souter also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment, but warning that public monuments should not be considered government speech categorically.

Kansas v. Colorado

Mon, 01 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

105 ORIG

Plaintiff

Kansas

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Respondent

Colorado

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 2008

Decided

Monday, March 9, 2009

Advocates

Steve Six (Attorney General of Kansas, for the plaintiff)

John W. Suthers (Attorney General of Colorado, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

This case represents another chapter in the longstanding dispute between the two states concerning water rights to the Arkansas River. The states had created the Arkansas River Compact in 1943 in order to allocate portions of the river between them. In 1985, Kansas brought suit before the Court alleging that Colorado had breached the agreement. The Court appointed a "Special Master" to investigate the allegations and to make recommendations to the Court. The Special Master submitted his report in 1994, finding that Colorado had indeed violated the Compact.

Since 1994, the Special Master has issued three more reports. These reports have been accompanied by several objections by both states. The Court has dismissed the majority of these objections. The question presently before the Court is whether or not to overrule two of Kansas' objections to the most recent report of the Special Master.

Question

Should expert witness attendance fees available in cases brought before the Supreme Court be the same as those available in the federal district courts?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Colorado, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Yes. The Supreme Court overruled Kansas' objection holding that witness attendance fees that are available in actions brought under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be the same as those brought under actions in the federal district courts. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that there was no good reason not to have a uniform rule for the recovery of expert witness fees among the different levels of federal courts.

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

Wed, 08 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

SOCAL waters

United States

34° 0' 58.4712" N, 121° 10' 45.1164" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1239

Petitioner

Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, June 23, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Richard B. Kendall (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Natural Resources Defense Council along with other environmental groups object to the "SOCAL" exercises, scheduled to take place between February 2007 and January 2009. The groups felt the exercises would cause serious harm to various species of marine mammal present in the southern California waters. The groups sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Navy from carrying out the exercises. The district court granted the injunction, finding that the NRDC had demonstrated probable success on its claim that the Navy had violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) regarding the exercises. The district court also denied the efforts of the Council on Environmental Quality to provide "alternative arrangements" for the Navy to proceed without an EIS. The district court stated that such arrangements require "emergency circumstances" not applicable to the case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court and upheld the decision granting the injunction. The court reviewed the findings under an "abuse of discretion" standard and determined that the district court had not abused its discretion in finding that the environmental groups raised substantial questions as to whether the exercises would have a significant impact on the environment and that these claims were likely to succeed on the merits. Furthermore, the district court had acted properly when it found that allowing long-planned, routine training exercises to meet the "emergency circumstances" exception would create an unacceptably broad definition of that phrase.

Question

Can federal courts grant preliminary injunctions on Naval training exercises based on the possible negative environmental impact of those exercises when the Navy fails to complete an Environmental Impact Statement as required by the National Environmental Policy Act?

What circumstances are necessary to allow the Navy to conduct exercises without an Environmental Impact Statement under the "emergency circumstances" exception of the National Environmental Policy Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Winter, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Environmental Policy Act

No and not specifically determined. The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice John G. Roberts that the standard for properly granting a preliminary injunction is not based on the "possibility" of irreparable harm to marine life, but rather that "irreparable injury is likely" in the absence of such an injunction. Regardless, the Court reasoned that in this case the public interest in conducting naval training exercises outweighed even certain irreparable harm to marine life. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and removed the preliminary injunction against the Navy's training exercises. It further instructed that if a district court finds the Navy must complete an Environmental Impact Statement, it need find alternative ways to persuade the Navy to comply, other than through an injunction.

Justice Stepehen G. Breyer filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While agreeing with much of the majority's reasoning, he advocated keeping in place the court of appeals' modified injunction against naval exercises, at least until Navy's publication of an acceptable Environmental Impact Statement. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg joined by Justice David H. Souter dissented finding that the District Court appropriately used its discretion to order a preliminary injunction against the Navy.

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett

Mon, 01 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-581

Petitioner

14 Penn Plaza LLC, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Steven Pyett, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Argued

Monday, December 1, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

Advocates

Paul Salvatore (argued the cause for the petitioner)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for the respondents)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A group of employees brought this action following a job transfer they believed to be based on age discrimination. The employees filed a grievance with their union, including the age discrimination issues but also asserting that the transfer violated their collective bargaining agreement. The union pursued the employees' collective bargaining claim through Penn Plaza's arbitration system; however, the employees themselves pursued their age discrimination claim in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Penn Plaza argued that the arbitration clause included in the employment contract, stating that all age discrimination claims must be pursued through arbitration, prevented the employees from bringing the claim in federal court. The district court ruled in favor of the employees, holding the arbitration clause unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, relying on its previous decisions holding that arbitration clauses with respect to statutory claims, such as the ADEA, are unenforceable.

Question

Are arbitration clauses in employment contracts -- waiving an employee's right to bring statutory claims in federal court -- enforceable?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment Act, arbitration

Yes. The Supreme Court held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that ,here, the arbitration provision was a "bargained-for exchange" in the collective bargaining agreement and thus should not be interfered with by the courts. The Court went on to state that because the ADEA itself did not mandate such interference, the arbitration provision should be enforced.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He noted that the majority opinion was a departure from Supreme Court precedent with respect to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. He went on to state that it was it was Congress' responsibility to reassess the policy arguments favoring arbitration rather than for the Supreme Court to decide. Justice David H. Souter also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He reemphasized that Supreme Court precedent did not preclude the pursuit of an ADEA claim because of an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement, as in this case.

Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association

Mon, 03 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Idaho Education Association: Region 5

275 South 5th Avenue

Pocatello, ID 83201-6410

United States

42° 51' 54.3312" N, 112° 26' 33.828" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-869

Petitioner

Ben Ysursa, Idaho Secretary of State, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pocatello Education Association, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 31, 2008

Argued

Monday, November 3, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Advocates

Clay Riggs Smith (Deputy Attorney General, Boise, Idaho, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeremiah A. Collins (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The plaintiffs in this case are comprised of labor organizations suing officials of the State of Idaho. The organizations claim that Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA) violates their First Amendment free speech rights by restricting their ability to participate in any activities the VCA defines as "political." The State officials conceded the unconstitutionality of many of the VCA's provisions, however they argued for the validity of prohibiting payroll deductions for "political activities." The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho held the payroll deduction provisions constitutional as applied to the state government but unconstitutional when applied to private and local government employees. The State officials appealed, contending that the provisions should be equally applicable to both groups.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the payroll deduction provisions could not be applied to private and local government employees because the State had provided no "compelling justification" to do so. Furthermore, the court stated that the officials had failed to show that the case should be reviewed under the more relaxed standard for a "non-public" forum.

Question

Do provisions of Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act prohibiting payroll deductions for "political activities" violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when applied to local government employees?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ysursa, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit holding that Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act did not violate the free speech rights of local government employees. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in part, the Court reasoned that Idaho's law did not restrict political speech, but merely declined to promote speech by prohibiting public employees from directly contributing to partisan activities from their government issued paycheck. Using a rational-basis review, it recognized that the state had a reasonable interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety by banning the funding of partisan political activity from the state's payroll. Moreover, the Court held that this governmental interest applied equally to governments at the state and local level.

Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that rather than reverse the court of appeals, the case should have been remanded. Additionally, he argued that rather than apply a rational-basis review as the Court did here, he would utilize an "intermediate scrutiny inquiry" where the statute would be considered in light of whether it imposed a burden upon speech that was disproportionate to other interests the government sought to achieve. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented arguing that the Idaho statue was clearly intended to make it more difficult for government employees to finance speech and therefore was unconstitutional. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also dissented arguing that this case was a poor vehicle for refining the analysis of the First Amendment and therefore should have been denied review.

Ministry of Defense of Iran v. Elahi

Mon, 12 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-615

Petitioner

Ministry of Defense of Iran

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dariush Elahi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 23, 2008

Argued

Monday, January 12, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Advocates

David J. Bederman (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1977, the Iranian Ministry of Defense entered into an agreement with an American defense contractor for the purchase of military equipment to be used by the Iranian Air Force. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the American company breached its contract with Iran and sold the equipment elsewhere. Iran requested arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and received $2.8 million in damages for breach of contract. Iran then reduced the award to a judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.

Dariush Elahi, brought a wrongful death claim against the Iranian government alleging that Iranian agents had assassinated his brother in Paris in 1990. Elahi was awarded over $300 million in damages by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. He attempted to satisfy this judgment in part by attaching the damages Iran had recovered from the previous contract dispute. Iran argued that the previous recovery was immune from attachment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California held that Iran had waived its immunity from attachment by submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICC and the district court in its prior contract dispute.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling but on different grounds. The court held that Elahi could attach the Iranian judgment under Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which allows creditors such as Elahi to attach "the blocked assets of [a] terrorist party." Eschewing the jurisdiction argument relied on by the district court, the Ninth Circuit characterized Iran as a "terrorist party" and held that the contract judgment was a "blocked asset" subject to attachment.

Question

Does the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 allow a judgment creditor in a wrongful death action against the Iranian government to attach damages recovered by Iran in an unrelated contract dispute as the "blocked assets of [a] terrorist party?"

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Ministry of Defense of Iran, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Terrorism Risk Insurance Act and Victims Protection Act

Not answered. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that the assets in question in Mr. Elahi's case were not "blocked" under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 at the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision and therefore could not be attached to satisfy his judgment against Iran. The Court then declined to determine whether a 2005 Executive Order issued by the President blocked the assets, holding that Mr. Elahi had waived his rights to attach. The Court reasoned that when Mr. Elahi accepted payment under a federal statute that offered compensation for those "holding terrorism related judgments against Iran", he relinquished his right to attach those assets.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part, and was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He agreed that the assets in question were not "blocked" at the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision. However, he disagreed that Mr. Elahi had waived his right to attach those assets. He reasoned that the majority departed from the "plain meaning" and "purpose" of the federal statute that awarded compensation to Mr. Elahi when it inhibited his ability to collect the award granted him against Iran for the murder of his brother.

Entergy Corporation v. EPA

Tue, 02 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Ave NW

Washington, DC 20460-0003

United States

38° 53' 37.8204" N, 77° 1' 42.7332" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-588

Petitioner

Entergy Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Riverkeeper, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

PSEG Fossil LLC v. Riverkeeper Inc. et al., 07-589

Utility Water Act Group v. Riverkeeper Inc. et al., 07-597

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, April 14, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

Advocates

Daryl Joseffer (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the EPA, supporting the petitioners)

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Richard J. Lazarus (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Three consolidated cases center around whether or not the EPA surpassed its federal authority by weighing the pros and cons of systems to be used at water intake cooling structures rather than simply employing the most advanced technology available on the market. The claims, brought by environmental groups and corporations, allege that the EPA's cost/benefit analysis violated the Clean Water Act (CWA) by leading to the use of structures that were insufficient to protect aquatic organisms from being harmed or killed as required by the CWA.

Question

Does Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to compare costs with benefits in determining the "best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact" at cooling water intake structures?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Entergy Corporation, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Water Act

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the EPA was permitted to use a cost-benefit analysis in setting national performance standards for cooling water intake structures. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that under 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), the EPA has discretion to determine the extent of adverse environmental impact that should be reduced in setting national performance standards for cooling water intake structures. With this discretion, comes the authority to use a cost-benefit analysis in setting national performance standards.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the majority that the EPA was authorized to use a cost-benefit analysis in making its determinations. However, he noted that the drafting and legislative history of 33 U.S.C. Section 1326(b) indicate it was intended to restrict the use of cost-benefit analysis and consequently he found the EPA's reasoning deficient in employing its cost-benefit analysis. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the plain language of the relevant statute indicates that the EPA was required to set a standard that cooling water intake systems use the "best technology available" and therefore impermissibly used a cost-benefit analysis in setting the new standard.

Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for Dupont Savings and Investment Plan

Tue, 07 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company

12501 Strang Road

La Porte, TX 77571

United States

29° 42' 7.3692" N, 95° 2' 33.9288" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-636

Petitioner

Kari E. Kennedy, et al.

Respondent

Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan, et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 2008

Decided

Monday, January 26, 2009

Advocates

David A. Furlow (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Leondra R. Kruger (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Mark I. Levy (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

William Kennedy designated his wife, Liv, as the sole beneficiary of his Dupont pension and retirement savings plans. The couple subsequently divorced, and as part of the settlement Liv agreed to give up any interests she may have in the plans. However, William never submitted this portion of the settlement prior to his death in 2001, so the pension and retirement savings benefits were paid out to Liv. William's daughter, Keri, the executor of his estate, brought suit against Dupont to recover the benefits. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment for the estate, awarding it the value of the benefits.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that because William had never submitted the portion of the settlement agreement denying the benefits to Liv, they were correctly paid out to her by Dupont.

Question

Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's anti-alienation provision prevent the enforcement of a waiver recognized by federal common law which holds that a spouse’s right to the other spouse's pension benefits is rendered void upon divorce?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Plan Administrator for Dupont Savings and Investment Plan Decision, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security Act

No. In a unanimous decision with Justice David Souter writing for the Court, the Supreme Court held that Liv's waiver of her former husband's pension benefits upon their divorce was not rendered void by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's anti-alienation provision. However, the Court held that Liv was appropriately granted the benefits of her ex-husband's estate because the plan administrator properly disregarded her waiver. It reasoned that the pension plan was clearly laid out and recognized Liv as the beneficiary. The plan had a mechanism in which Liv could have disclaimed her interest, but she did not.

Bell v. Kelly

Wed, 12 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1223

Petitioner

Edward Nathaniel Bell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Loretta K. Kelly, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, May 12, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Decided

Monday, November 17, 2008

Advocates

Richard P. Bress (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Katherine Burnett (Senior Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Edward Bell was convicted and sentenced to death in a Virginia state court for murdering a police sergeant. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through direct review and state habeas proceedings, Bell filed a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Bell argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, suggesting that his lawyer failed to investigate and present evidence from five witnesses that may have reduced his death sentence to life in prison.

The Supreme Court, in Strickland, has previously stated that a petitioner must show (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice in order to succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance. Based on these principles, the district court dismissed Bell's claim and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Fourth Circuit found that the conclusions of the Virginia state courts were reasonable and that Bell had failed to show that he had suffered actual prejudice. According to the court, the aggravating testimony from the witnesses outweighed any mitigating effects the missing testimony may have had.

Question

Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Strickland, is it reasonable for a court to determine that a defendant did not suffer actual prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when his lawyer failed to introduce witness testimony that may have reduced the defendant's sentence from death to life in prison?

Conclusion

The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidentially granted.

Boyle v. United States

Wed, 14 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Tommy Dono's "Social Club" Brooklyn, NY

United States

40° 38' 3.8148" N, 73° 57' 0.9684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1309

Petitioner

Edmund Boyle

Respondent

United States

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 8, 2009

Advocates

Marc Fernich (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

Edmund Boyle was convicted by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bank burglary, bank burglary conspiracy, and attempted bank burglary. He was sentenced to 151 months imprisonment. Mr. Boyle appealed arguing that the government's case against him was factually contradictory. In his trial, the government charged that the robbery was an act of the Boyle Crew enterprise. However, in a previous case it had charged that the robbery was an act of the New Springfield Boys enterprise. Boyle maintained that this contradiction violated his right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the government's case was not factually contradictory. It reasoned that "[n]othing dictates that a single crime cannot be committed by two enterprises working together, each in furtherance of its own interests." Thus, the trial court did not violate Boyle's Fifth Amendment due process rights.

Question

In order prove the association of enterprises in a criminal activity, does the government need to show connections between the enterprises beyond what is apparent in the criminal activity itself?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

No. The Supreme Court held that, under RICO, the association between criminal enterprises must be shown to have a "structure," but the relevant jury instructions need not spell out the precise elements which need be found. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that a jury need not be instructed to find an "ascertainable structure" in order to find the association of enterprises because such instructions would be redundant as the jury is already tasked with finding the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt from which it may infer a "structure" of criminal association.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that Congress merely intended RICO to apply to "business- like entities," and thus the majority's ruling extended RICO liability far beyond Congress' intent.

United States v. Navajo Nation

Mon, 23 Feb 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Peabody Coal Operation Western, AZ 86033

United States

33° 24' 21.7188" N, 111° 33' 44.2368" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1410

Petitioner

Navajo Nation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Argued

Monday, February 23, 2009

Decided

Monday, April 6, 2009

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1964 the Navajo Nation entered into a contract with Sentry Royalty Company for the mining of coal on its land. The contract called for royalty payments to the Navajo Nation not to exceed 37.5 cents per ton of coal mined. However, the contract allowed for the Secretary of the Interior to adjust the royalty rate to a "reasonable" level after twenty years. At the end of twenty years, the Navajo Nation was being paid the equivalent of 2 percent of the proceeds from the mining operation. As stipulated by the contract, the Navajo Nation entered into discussions with Peabody Coal Company (formerly Sentry Royalty Company) to adjust the royalty rate. After discussions failed, the Navajo Nation asked the Secretary of the Interior to resolve the dispute. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs reached an initial decision to set the royalty rate at 20 percent. This decision was delayed on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior. Unbeknownst to the Navajo Nation, the Secretary had been meeting with executives of the Peabody Coal Company who requested the delay. Facing dire economic circumstances, the Navajo Nation agreed to a royalty rate of 12.5 percent which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

In 1993, the Navajo Nation brought suit against the United States for violations of its statutory and fiduciary duties to the Nation. It sought damages of $600 million. This latest decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit represents the fifth chapter in the long running saga over the original dispute. Its decision comes in the wake of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims holding, on instructions from the Supreme Court, that the Navajo Nation did not provide sufficient evidence to seek damages from the United States.

The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the Navajo Nation marshaled sufficient evidence to show that the United States "controls the leasing of the [Navajo's] coal resources and that the government is responsible for the liabilities arising thereunder." It reasoned that the body of regulations and statutes that governed the Nation's resources were "reasonably amenable" to an interpretation that imposed liability on the part of the government for breach of its duties.

Question

Does the decision by the Supreme Court in Navajo Nation I, foreclose this most recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit?
If the decision was not foreclosed, did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit properly hold that the United States was liable based on its interpretation of statutes that do not address royalty rates in tribal leases?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Indian Mineral Leasing Act

No and No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, the Court held that its decision in Navajo I had not definitively terminated the Nation's claim. In Navajo I it reasoned that the Nation's only avenue to sue the United States was by finding "specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions." The Court reasoned that since only three statutes were analyzed, there might exist a relevant statute that could provide the Nation a basis for its lawsuit. However, the Supreme Court also held that none of the sources of law cited by the Nation provided such a basis and therefore its suit should be dismissed.

Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote a separate concurring opinion. He admitted regretting that his dissenting opinion in Navajo I was not controlling authority, but recognized the Court must abide its precedent.

AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company

140 New Montgomery Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

United States

37° 47' 12.7284" N, 122° 23' 59.4348" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-543

Petitioner

AT&T Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Defendant

Noreen Hulteen, et al.

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 23, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

Decided

Monday, May 18, 2009

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lisa S. Blatt (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Kevin K. Russell (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Four employees sued their employer, AT&T;, alleging that the company's policy for calculating employee pension and retirement benefits discriminated against women who had taken leave time due to pregnancy in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The AT&T; policy considered temporary disability leave as service time for the purposes of calculating retirement benefits except when the leave was taken by pregnant women. The employees argued that the policy violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), which clarified that Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." The main issue in the case was one of timing: although the employees' pregnancy leave was taken before the PDA came into effect, AT&T;'s calculation of benefits took place after. The employees argued that under the Court's decision in Pallas the time of calculation should govern the applicability of the PDA. AT&T; countered that another decision, Landgraf directly opposed Pallas and had created a "sea change" in retroactivity principles such that the PDA should not apply to pregnancy leave taken before it was enacted. The district court sided with the employees and granted summary judgment in their favor.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the lower court, agreeing with AT&T; that Pallas gave impermissible retroactive effect to the PDA. On rehearing, the full court reversed and ruled in favor of the employees, avoiding the retroactivity problem by holding that the PDA applies to the actual calculation of pension and retirement benefits regardless of when the leave itself was taken. Because AT&T; performed this calculation after the PDA had gone into effect, the denial of benefits violated Title VII.

Question

Under the Court's decisions in Pallas and Landgraf, does a company violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by denying retirement benefits to women who took temporary disability leave while pregnant when the leave was taken before the PDA came into effect but the calculation of benefits took place after?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for AT&T, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Civil Rights Act

No. The Supreme Court held that a company does not necessarily violate the PDA or Title VII when it denies retirement benefits to women who take a temporary disability leave while pregnant when the leave was taken before the PDA came into effect. With Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that since AT&T;'s seniority system was not discriminatory at its adoption, its limiting seniority credit for time taken during pregnancy did not constitute unlawful discrimination. Rather, the limitation of seniority credit for pregnant women could only violate the PDA or Title VII if AT&T;'s system had been unlawful at its adoption.

Justice Stevens also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. She argued that AT&T; violated the PDA and Title VII when it did not discontinue reliance upon a benefit calculation system which contained pregnancy-based seniority classifications.

Montejo v. Louisiana

Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Private Residence in St. Tammany Parish 70448-3559

United States

30° 22' 3.882" N, 90° 4' 13.4616" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1529

Petitioner

Jesse Jay Montejo

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

State of Louisiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Advocates

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kathryn W. Landry (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In March 2005, Jesse Montejo was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Lewis Ferrari. At his trial, the prosecution submitted as evidence a letter of apology he wrote to the victim's wife. Montejo wrote the letter at the suggestion of a detective who accompanied him in a search for the murder weapon. Before the search, Mr. Montejo was read his Miranda rights and wrote an explanation for his participation in the search. However, no one in the search party knew, including Mr. Montejo, that he had been appointed an attorney the same morning. Mr. Montejo contended under these circumstances that the Sixth Amendment barred the introduction of this evidence since his attorney was not present when he wrote and submitted the letter of apology.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the letter of apology Mr. Montejo wrote was valid evidence. It found that Mr. Montejo waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It explained that when counsel was appointed Mr. Montejo remained mute and did not acknowledge it. The court reasoned that something beyond "mute acquiescence" is required to trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment.

Question

After the appointment of an attorney, does a defendant need to take additional steps to accept the appointment in order to secure the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Montejo, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment

Not necessarily. The Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Michigan v. Jacksonwhich held that evidence obtained through interrogation after the defendant has invoked his right to counsel was inadmissible. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the Jackson framework was unworkable in jurisdictions that appoint counsel regardless of a defendant's request. Instead, the Court stated that the protections afforded under Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick were sufficient to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights from police badgering that might elicit culpable evidence.

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, also filed a concurring opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and in part by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that the majority correctly concluded that the Louisiana Supreme Court misapplied the Court's holding in Jackson, but disagreed that the Court should have overruled its precedent entirely. Rather, Justice Stevens criticized the Court for misinterpreting the rationale of Jackson and undervaluing the role of stare decisis in its decision making. Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion, highlighting the consistency of his reasoning with respect to stare decisis in several other cases.

Oregon v. Ice

Tue, 14 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Apartment Complex

Marion County

Salem, OR

United States

44° 56' 34.4328" N, 123° 2' 6.3456" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-901

Petitioner

Oregon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thomas Eugene Ice

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 17, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Advocates

Mary H. Williams (Solicitor General of Oregon, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Ernest G. Lannet (appointed by the Court, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Thomas Eugene Ice was convicted in state court in Oregon on two counts of first-degree burglary with intent to commit sexual abuse, as well as two counts of first-degree sexual abuse committed during those burglaries. Over Ice's objection, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences based on its own findings of fact. Ice appealed, raising the question whether the Oregon or U.S. Constitutions require a jury, rather than a judge, to make the factual findings upon which a court decides to prescribe consecutive sentences.

The Oregon Court of Appeals held that the consecutive sentences were not in violation of the State's Constitution because none of the factual issues reviewed by the judge were an "element" of the crime. However, the sentences did violate the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the factual findings were not made by a jury but were used to increase Ice's punishment to more than what the jury had imposed.

Question

Do consecutive sentences imposed upon a criminal defendant based on factual findings made by a judge, rather than jury, violate the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Oregon, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment

No. In a 5-4 decision with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not prevent states from assigning to judges rather than to juries fact finding responsibilities necessary to imposing consecutive sentences on criminal defendants. The Court drew its reasoning from the historical record. Since the nation's founding, judges have served in this capacity. Additionally, the Court reasoned that judges serving in this capacity do not infringe upon the traditional responsibilities of a jury in a criminal trial.

Justice Antonin G. Scalia dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia argued that in Mr. Ice's case, the Court's opinion in Apprendi should control. There, the Court was clear that any fact finding necessary to the enhancement of a criminal sentence must be done by the jury.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations

Tue, 04 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

MGM Grand Garden Arena

3799 Las Vegas Boulevard South

Las Vegas, NV 89109

United States

36° 6' 4.3092" N, 115° 10' 20.7336" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-582

Petitioner

No. 07-582 Title: Federal Communications Commission, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 17, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, November 4, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (Solicitor General, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2002 and 2003, Fox Television Stations broadcast the Billboard Music Awards, an annual program honoring top-selling musicians. During the broadcasts, one musician used an explicative in his acceptance speech, and a presenter used two expletives. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), although it had previously taken the position that such fleeting and isolated expletives did not violate its indecency regime, issued notices of liability to Fox for broadcasting the profane language. The FCC argued that previous decisions referring to "fleeting" expletives were merely staff letters and dicta and did not accurately represent its position on the matter. Fox appealed the FCC sanctions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The Second Circuit held that the FCC's liability order was "arbitrary and capricious" under the governing Administrative Procedure Act because the FCC had completely reversed its position on fleeting expletives without giving a proper justification. The Second Circuit also failed to find any evidence that the expletives were harmful.

Question

Is the FCC's order imposing liability on Fox Television Stations for fleeting expletives spoken during two nationally broadcast awards ceremonies is "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act, based on the FCC's previous acceptance of similar expletives?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for FCC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Administrative Procedure Act

No. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's order was neither "arbitrary" nor "capricious." Justice Antonin G. Scalia announced the judgment of the court in which Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito joined in part, reasoning that the FCC need not prove that its change in policy is "better" than its prior stance. Rather, the FCC need merely prove that its new policy is "permissible" and that there are good reasons for it, as in this case.

Justice Thomas wrote separately, concurring. Justice Kennedy also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that when the FCC changes policy, such that it reverses its own precedent, it should explain why. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that the FCC need explain why it changed its policy and disagreed that the word "indecent" allowed the FCC to punish the broadcast of "any" expletive that has a "sexual or excretory origin." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also dissented. She noted, that while the First Amendment issues surrounding the case were not addressed, they "cast a shadow", and the Court should be mindful that words "unpalatable to some may be commonplace for others." Lastly, Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. He argued that the FCC failed to adequately explain why it changed its policy and thus its order with respect to the Fox Television Stations was "arbitrary" and "capricious."

Burlington Northern v. United States

Tue, 24 Feb 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The Arvin Site Arvin , CA

United States

35° 12' 32.8644" N, 118° 49' 42.3516" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1601

Petitioner

Burlington Northern Rail Road

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Shell Oil v. United States, 07-1607

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Decided

Monday, May 4, 2009

Advocates

Kathleen M. Sullivan (argued the cause for the petitioner in 07-1607)

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for the petitioners in 07-1601)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) cleaned a parcel of contaminated land at considerable expense. They sued the responsible parties for recovery. A federal district court held the responsible parties (Burlington Northern Rail Road, Santa Fe Railway Company, and Shell Oil Company) liable for only a minor portion of the cleanup costs. The EPA and DTSC jointly appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its liability calculations. It reasoned that the recovery statute employed by the EPA and DTSC imposed strict liability on parties merely partly responsible for contamination. It explained that the statute’s intention was to prevent taxpayers from bearing the burden of such cleanup costs.

Question

1) Is Shell Oil Company liable for "arranging" the disposal of hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) when it merely sold and shipped a product that only caused contamination while under the control and ownership of the purchaser?

2) Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err by reversing the district court’s liability calculations under CERCLA?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Burlington Northern, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

No and Yes. The Supreme Court held that Shell was not liable as an "arranger" for the contamination at issue in this case. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Shell did not "intend" that at least a portion of its product be disposed by proscribed methods and thus was not an "arranger." The Court also held that the Ninth Circuit erred by reversing the district court's CERCLA liability calculations. Rather, it reasoned that the district court reasonably apportioned Burlington Railroad's share of liability at the contaminated site in question.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. She argued that Shell should qualify as an "arranger" because it "arranged for disposal… of hazardous substances" at the contaminated site. She also argued that the case should be remanded such that all liable parties could provide input as to the proper liability apportionment formula.

Pearson, et al. v. Callahan

Tue, 14 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The Central Utah Narcotics Task Force

765 S Highway 99

Fillmore, UT 84631-5002

United States

38° 57' 6.1812" N, 112° 20' 32.7696" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-751

Petitioner

Cordell Pearson, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Afton Callahan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 24, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Advocates

Peter Stirba (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioners)

Theodore P. Metzler Jr. (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

This case stems from a search of Utah resident Afton Callahan's home by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. The Task Force, based on evidence that Callahan was a methamphetamine dealer, had sent an informant to his home to make a purchase. After receiving a signal from the informant that the sale had taken place, the Task Force entered the home and conducted a protective sweep of the house without a warrant but after getting Callahan's consent. At trial, Callahan was convicted of possessing and distributing methamphetamines based on evidence discovered during the search, however the Utah Court of Appeals held the evidence inadmissible and reversed Callahan's conviction.

Subsequently, Callahan filed this action in federal court against the Task Force and individual officers alleging that the search violated his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah dismissed his claim, holding in part that the "consent once removed" doctrine applied to the search. Under the doctrine, an undercover officer may summon backup officers into a home after that officer has been invited with consent. However the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that the doctrine does not apply when the officers are summoned by a police informant. Therefore, according to the Tenth Circuit, Callahan had established a violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Question

1)Does a police entry following an informant's signal of probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment under the consent once removed doctrine?

2)Was it clearly established at the time of entry in this case that the consent once removed doctrine violated the Fourth Amendment?

3)Should the Supreme Court's decision in Saucier v. Katz be overturned?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Pearson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

Not addressed, no, and yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that it was not clearly established at the time of police entry that the consent once removed doctrine violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore that the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force was qualifiedly immune in its search of Mr. Callahan's home. The Court also overturned its prior decision in Saucier v. Katz, which prescribed a rigid two-part inquiry into government officials' qualified immunity claims: "1) whether the facts alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right, and 2) if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct." Rather, the Court held that this inquiry should be utilized at the discretion of the lower courts. It reasoned that substantial judicial resources were often expended in determining difficult constitutional claims that ultimately had little to do with the outcome of the case.

United States v. Eurodif S.A.

Tue, 04 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

United States Enrichment Corporation

3930 US Highway 23 South

Piketon, OH 45601

United States

39° 0' 47.934" N, 83° 1' 33.906" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1059

Petitioner

United States

Respondent

Eurodif S. A.

Consolidation

ISEC Inc. V. Eurodif S.A., 07-1078

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, April 21, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, November 4, 2008

Decided

Monday, January 26, 2009

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause for the petitioner in 07-1059)

H. Bartow Farr, III (argued the cause for the petitioners in 07-1078)

Caitlin J. Halligan (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

This case examines the correct application of federal antidumping statutes to so-called "separate work unit" (SWU) contracts for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU). The case, brought by the federal government and the United States Enrichment Corporation, has been consolidated from two cases both alleging that Eurodif, a French corporation, imported LEU in violation of federal antidumping laws. Based on a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit holding that SWU contracts for the production of LEU are contracts for services rather than goods and are therefore immune from the antidumping laws, the U.S. Department of Commerce excluded all LEU entering the country from antidumping regulations if accompanied by a certificate that the uranium was imported under an SWU contract. The Court of International Trade sustained the Commerce Department decision.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the case, saying that it was "unripe" for judicial review. The court held that the issues raised by the government only concerned the application of the Department's decision regarding future importation of LEU; and, therefore, the court did not have a specific factual context in which to review the claim.

Question

Should 19 U.S.C. Section 1673, which calls for "antidumping" duties on foreign goods, but not services, that sell at less than fair value in the U.S., apply to imported low enriched uranium?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Tariff Act

Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice David H. Souter, the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Department's view of imported low enriched uranium, as the sale of goods rather than services, was permissible. It reasoned that, since 19 U.S.C. Section 1673 did not specify whether it applied to the production of low enriched uranium, it was left to the reasonable interpretation of the Commerce Department to determine. Accordingly, the Court found the Commerce Department interpreted the statute reasonably.

Waddington v. Sarausad

Wed, 15 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-772

Petitioner

Doug Waddington, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center

Respondent

Cesar Sarausad

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 17, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, October 15, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Advocates

William B. Collins (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey L. Fisher (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Cesar Sarausad was arrested in Washington state for his involvement in a drive-by shooting near a school. After he was convicted of second-degree murder and two attempted second-degree murder charges in a jury trial, Sarausad filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court granted Sarausad's motion, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that certain confusing jury instructions related to accomplice liability unconstitutionally relieved the state of its burden of proof.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on the insufficiency of evidence claim but affirmed on the jury instructions claim. The court stated that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction under Jackson v. Virginia. However, the jury instructions were ambiguous on the question of whether Sarausad could be convicted of murder and attempted murder on a theory of accomplice liability without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew an accomplice intended to commit a murder. According to the Ninth Circuit, there was a reasonable chance the jury misapplied these instructions.

Question

1) In reviewing a due process challenge to a jury instruction, must federal courts accept state court findings that instructions were correct?

2) Did the U.S. Court of Appeals err in affirming federal habeas corpus relief when it found a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury misapplied the jury instruction in Mr. Sarausad's case and thereby relieved the state of its burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Waddington, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Not necessarily and yes. In a 6-3 decision with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that a federal court may reject state court conclusions with respect to the appropriateness of a state court jury instruction, so long as the instructions were "not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable." Here, the standard was not met and the Ninth Circuit should have accepted the conclusions of the state courts. Further, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding Mr. Sarausad's jury instructions so ambiguous that his constitutional rights were violated and therefore he was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief.

Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Souter criticized the majority opinion for relying on the fact that the jury instructions in Mr. Sarausad's case incorporated part of a state statute as evidence enough that the instructions were unambiguous. Further, he noted that the jury asked three times for clarification in the instructions. Therefore, Justice Souter argued, it was likely the jury did not grasp what it needed to find in order to convict Mr. Sarausad for accomplice liability.

Arizona v. Johnson

Tue, 09 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

“Sugar Hill” area of Tucson Tucson, AZ 85705

United States

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1122

Petitioner

Arizona

Respondent

Lemon Montrea Johnson

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 23, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, December 9, 2008

Decided

Monday, January 26, 2009

Advocates

Joseph L. Parkhurst (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Toby J. Heytens (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Andrew J. Pincus (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lemon Johnson was riding in the backseat of a car when it was pulled over by the state police in Sugar Hill, Arizona. The officers had scanned the license of the car and found that it had a "mandatory insurance suspension." Although the stop was solely predicated on the suspended license, the officers began to question the car's occupants, including Johnson, about gang activity in the area. Based on certain circumstantial evidence, such as Johnson's possession of a police scanner, the officers asked Johnson to exit the car so that they could question him further. Although Johnson was free to stay in the car, he voluntarily exited and a subsequent search of his person by the officers revealed a handgun and a small amount of marijuana. Based on evidence obtained during this search, Johnson was convicted in Arizona state court of (1) the unlawful possession of a weapon as a prohibited possessor and (2) possession of marijuana. Johnson appealed, arguing that the evidence recovered from the search should have been suppressed because the officers did not have probable cause to search him at the time of his arrest and therefore did so in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.

The Court of Appeals of Arizona agreed with Johnson and reversed his conviction and sentence. The court found that the officers had no reason to believe that Johnson was involved in any criminal activity when he was searched. The officers requested that Johnson step out of the car to discuss gang activity, not because the officers feared that their safety was threatened, thus it was part of a consensual encounter between the officers and Johnson. Therefore, the court said, the officers' subsequent search of Johnson was illegal and unconstitutional.

Question

Do officers violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures when, after making a routine traffic stop, they search an individual who is consensually conversing with those officers?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arizona, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Court of Appeals. It held that Mr. Johnson's encounter with police officers was not consensual and therefore did not violate his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The Court reasoned that lawful traffic stops entail the "temporary seizure of driver and passengers" that continues for the duration of the stop. Officer inquiries into matters unrelated to the stop do not transform the event into a "consensual" encounter whereby the driver or passenger is free to go as he or she pleases. Therefore, the police officers who frisked Mr. Johnson were not constitutionally required to depart the scene without first ensuring that he was not armed and dangerous, so long as they reasonably suspected he was armed and dangerous.

Summers v. Earth Island Institute

Wed, 08 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Sequoia National Forest

United States

36° 34' 31.8036" N, 118° 46' 29.3556" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-463

Petitioner

Priscilla Summers, et al.

Respondent

Earth Island Institute, et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 18, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Matt G. Kenna (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Earth Island Institute, along with several other environmental groups, filed suit against the United States Forest Service in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that certain Forest Service regulations violated the Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA). The ARA requires the Forest Service to establish an administrative appeals process providing an opportunity for notice and comment. Earth Island brought this claim when, in 2003, the Forest Service issued new regulations greatly limiting notice, appeals and public comment on certain categorically excluded activities. The district court found for the plaintiffs and issued a nationwide injunction against the Forest Service.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that if Congress intended to allow the Forest Service to limit notice, appeals and comment for categorically excluded activities (as the regulations did) it would not have enacted the ARA in the first place. In seeking certiorari, the Forest Service argued that the Ninth Circuit had overstepped its bounds in invalidating the regulations and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit because the case was not yet ripe for judicial review.

Question

1) Does Earth Island Institute have standing to challenge regulations of the U.S. Forest Service in the absence of a live dispute over the application of those regulations?

2) Did Earth Island Institute's challenge to U.S. Forest Service regulations remain ripe for review after timber sale to which those regulations were applied was withdrawn and Earth Island's challenge to that sale was dismissed after a settlement was reached between the parties?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Summers, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act

No and not answered. The Supreme Court held that Earth Island lacked standing to challenge regulations of the U.S. Forest Service because Article III of the Constitution limits judicial power to extend only to cases and controversies that imminently threaten injury to persons caused by violation of law. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Earth Island identified no application of the challenged Forest Service regulations that threatened imminent and concrete harm to its members' interests. As testament to this, the Court noted that Earth Island had voluntarily settled a portion of the lawsuit pertaining to any alleged members' interests and that it failed to show any of its members planned to visit sites where the challenged regulations were being applied in a manner that would harm a particular member's interests. Therefore, Earth Island lacked standing to bring its suit in the first place.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, agreeing that a procedural injury must also "impair a separate concrete interest" in order to grant a party standing. Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He disagreed with the majority's findings that Earth Island failed to show it suffered "concrete injury" by the challenged Forest Service regulations.

Puckett v. United States

Wed, 14 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Guaranty Bank

1134 North Buckner Boulevard

Dallas, TX 75218

United States

32° 50' 6.6876" N, 96° 42' 13.9788" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-9712

Petitioner

James Benjamin Puckett

Respondent

United States

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, October 10, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

Advocates

Lars R. Isaacson (appointed by the Court, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lisa H. Schertler (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

In September 2003, James Benjamin Puckett agreed to a plea bargain with the United States on counts of bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to recommend a reduced sentence. However at sentencing, the government reneged arguing that because Mr. Puckett admittedly aided a fellow inmate in another crime while awaiting sentencing, he was no longer eligible for the reduction. The district court agreed. On appeal, Mr. Puckett maintained that the government's breach of agreement disqualified his guilty plea.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Puckett's guilty plea was not disqualified. It recognized that the government breached its plea agreement at sentencing. However, it reasoned that Mr. Puckett failed to prove his substantial rights were affected when the district court was unlikely to have imposed a different sentence, even if the government had recommended a reduction.

Question

Does Rule 52(b) in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the "plain error standard", govern whether a defendant can claim the government breached a plea agreement at the appellate level, when he failed to do so at the trial level?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 52(b)

Yes. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that the "plain error standard" governs claims that are forfeited because they were not raised at trial in determining whether they may be raised at the appellate level. The Court then reaffirmed the four-pronged "plain-error" standard of review: "1) there must be an error or defect that the appellant has not affirmatively waived, 2) it must be clear and obvious, 3) it must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, 4) if the three other prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Here, the Court rejected Mr. Puckett's arguments that he should not be subject to the "plain-error" standard after he failed to raise his claims at the trial level. Moreover, it affirmed his conviction and sentencing, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that Mr. Puckett's "substantial rights" had not been affected.

Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He agreed that the "plain-error" standard was appropriate in Mr. Puckett's case. However, he criticized the majority for interpreting the "plain-error" standard's third prong requirement of affecting the appellant's "substantial rights" to only include his "length of incarceration." Rather, Justice Souter argued that Mr. Puckett's substantial rights were affected when he was convicted without trial and by a plea agreement that was not honored by the government. Therefore, Mr. Puckett was entitled to relief.

Cone v. Bell

Tue, 09 Dec 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Brodnax Jewelry Store

3482 Plaza Ae

Memphis, TN 38111

United States

35° 7' 45.5268" N, 89° 56' 43.7712" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1114

Petitioner

Gary Bradford Cone

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ricky Bell, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 23, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, December 9, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Advocates

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jennifer L. Smith (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

This is the third habeas corpus appeal of petitioner Gary Bradford Cone after his 1982 conviction in a Tennessee state court on several felony counts including first degree murder and robbery by use of deadly force. The jury found that Cone had bludgeoned two elderly people to death while hiding out after a robbery. Cone's initial appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court soon following his conviction fell on deaf ears: the court ruled that although errors had been committed during the trial, each of them had been "harmless" and did not warrant overturning Cone's conviction. He responded by twice filing habeas corpus petitions alleging violations of several constitutional rights, appealing both all the way up to the Court but both times having his case remanded with, in his view, several of his claims still unresolved.

In his third appearance before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Cone raised two main points of contention. First, he claimed that he was entitled to relief because the jury in his trial had weighed invalid aggravating factors during his sentencing hearing, thereby entitling him to a new hearing. This argument was rejected by the Sixth Circuit, which found that the Tennessee Supreme Court had conducted a satisfactory harmless error test on the issue. The court pointed out that habeas petitions should be granted only after finding that a state court ruling has "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law." Because Tennessee had not abridged any federal laws, the Sixth Circuit denied Cone relief on this first issue.

Cone also argued that the Sixth Circuit had erred when, in a previous appeal, it had held that his claims relating to the prosecutor's improper withholding of evidence had been procedurally defaulted. Cone argued that his case met the Court's "exceptional circumstances" test as set out in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski for overruling the procedural default rule and rehearing the issue. The Sixth Circuit once again disagreed, ruling that Cone had failed to show "cause and prejudice" on the part of the prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit denied Cone's habeas appeal on all counts.

Question

1) Is Mr. Cone entitled to federal habeas review of his claim that the state suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland?

2) Is Mr. Cone's federal habeas corpus claim "procedurally defaulted" because it has been presented twice at the state court level?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Cone, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Habeas Corpus

Yes and No. The Supreme Court held that the Tennessee state courts' rejection of Mr. Cone's Brady claim, that the state had suppressed material evidence at his trial, was improperly denied review during post-conviction proceedings and had not been procedurally defaulted. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that Mr. Cone's Brady claim had in fact never been presented at the state court level and thus the Sixth Circuit erred in finding that Mr. Cone's claim had been defaulted for having been raised twice previously. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the documents withheld at Mr. Cone's trial were material to his sentencing and thus entitled him to federal habeas corpus review.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. Justice Samuel A. Alito also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed that Mr. Cone's case was properly remanded for further review. However, he disagreed that Mr. Cone properly preserved and exhausted his Brady claim at the state court level because Mr. Cone never raised that claim at the state court level. Rather, he argued Mr. Cone's claim was either "not exhausted" or was "procedurally defaulted", appropriate for the Sixth Circuit to review, not the federal district court. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, dissented. He argued that Mr. Cone failed to prove that there was a "reasonable probability" that had the withheld evidence been disclosed at trial that his sentencing would have been different, and therefore his claim should not be granted federal habeas corpus review.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts

Mon, 10 Nov 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Kmart Parking Lot

77 Middlesex Ave

Somerville, MA 02145

United States

42° 23' 35.5344" N, 71° 4' 59.4876" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-591

Petitioner

Luis E. Melendez-Diaz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Massachusetts

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, March 17, 2008

Argued

Monday, November 10, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Martha Coakley (Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for the respondent)

Lisa H. Schertler (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Luis Melendez-Diaz was arrested while making a cocaine sale in a parking lot in Massachusetts. At trial, bags of the cocaine alleged to have been distributed by Melendez-Diaz were introduced into evidence along with drug analysis certificates prepared by the lab technician who analyzed the drugs and identified them as cocaine. A jury convicted Melendez-Diaz of distributing and trafficking cocaine in violation of Massachusetts law. Melendez-Diaz appealed, arguing that the State's introduction of the drug analysis certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him under the Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford had held that so-called "testimonial" evidence cannot be introduced at trial unless the defendant has a chance to cross-examine the witness providing the evidence. Melendez-Diaz characterized the lab analysis as testimonial and argued that Crawford required the lab technician to testify on the results. The State argued that Massachusetts had previously held, in Commonwealth v. Verde, that lab reports were not testimonial.

The Massachusetts Court of Appeals rejected Melendez-Diaz's claims in an unpublished opinion, referring to them in a short footnote as "without merit." The Massachusetts Supreme Court also denied his appeal.

Question

Is a state forensic analyst's laboratory report prepared for use in a criminal prosecution "testimonial" evidence subject to the demands of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Washington?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Melendez-Diaz, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment

Yes. The Supreme Court held that a state forensic analyst's lab report that is prepared for use in a criminal prosecution is subject to the demands of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that the lab reports constitute affidavits which fall within the "core class of testimonial statements" covered by the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, when Mr. Melendez- Diaz was not allowed to confront the persons who created the lab reports used in testimony at his trial, his Sixth Amendment right was violated.

Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion, emphasizing that he thought the Confrontation Clause was only implicated by statements made outside the courtroom when they are part of "formalized testimonial materials." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Samuel A. Alito. He criticized the majority for so cavalierly dispensing with the long held rule that scientific analysis could be introduced into evidence without testimony from the analyst who produced it.

Arizona v. Gant

Tue, 07 Oct 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

2524 N. Walnut

Tucson, AZ 85712

United States

32° 15' 11.5632" N, 110° 54' 19.4652" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-542

Petitioner

Arizona

Respondent

Rodney Gant

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, February 25, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Advocates

Joseph T. Maziarz (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Thomas F. Jacobs (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Rodney Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. After the officers handcuffed Gant and placed him in their squad car, they went on to search his vehicle, discovering a handgun and a plastic bag of cocaine. At trial, Gant asked the judge to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The court convicted Gant on two counts of cocaine possession.

The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding the search unconstitutional, and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court stated that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. Because Gant left his vehicle voluntarily, the court explained, the search was not directly linked to the arrest and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. In seeking certiorari, Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard argued that the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's precedent, as well as precedents set forth in various federal and state courts.

Question

Is a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing the defendant and securing the scene a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gant, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

Yes, under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court held that police may search the vehicle of its recent occupant after his arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that "warrantless searches are per se unreasonable" and subject only to a few, very narrow exceptions. Here, Mr. Gant was arrested for a suspended license and the narrow exceptions did not apply to his case.

Justice Scalia wrote separately, concurring. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that the majority improperly overruled its precedent in New York v. Belton which held that "when a policeman has made a lawful arrest… he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Justice Stephen G. Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, where he lamented that the court could not create a new governing rule.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.

jgoldman — Tue, 03 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-22

Petitioner

Hugh Caperton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, November 14, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 8, 2009

Facts of the Case

In October 1998, Hugh Caperton filed suit against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (Massey) for tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. A state trial court in West Virginia rendered judgment against Massey and found it liable for $50 million in damages. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted review. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Caperton motioned for Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself. He argued that since Massey's C.E.O. had donated $3 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign to win a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin's participation would present a "constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety." The motion was denied. In a 3-2 decision with Justice Benjamin voting in the majority, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered it to dismiss the case. After its decision, the court granted Mr. Caperton's motion for rehearing, but once again denied his motion for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. On rehearing, the court maintained in a 3-2 decision that the trial court should be reversed and the case dismissed. It reasoned that a forum selection clause in a contract between the parties made the trial court in West Virginia an improper venue. It also concluded that because the parties had previously adjudicated the dispute in a Virginia state trial court, the doctrine of res judicata did not allow this case to be retried.

Question

Did Justice Brent Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from participation in a case where one of the parties donated $3 million to his election campaign violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Massey, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process Clause, 14th Amendment

Yes. The Supreme Court held that due process required that Justice Brent Benjamin recuse himself from participation in the case in question. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court stated that it need not find that Justice Benjamin was actually biased in his decision making in order to find invalid the decision in which he took part. Rather, it need merely be shown that "under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness," Justice Benjamin's interest posed "a risk of actual bias" and thus he should have recused himself if his participation threatened the adequate implementation of due process. The Court stated that such a risk of bias exists where a judge has a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest," as Justice Benjamin did. Therefore, the Court reasoned, he improperly failed to recuse himself.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts dissented and was joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. He argued that the majority imprudently expanded the standard for which a judge need recuse himself by merely showing a "probability of bias." He raised forty points of uncertainty that arise because of the majority's vague standard. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He argued that the majority performed its duties poorly as a clarifying body by making an area of the law vastly more uncertain.

United States v. Denedo

jgoldman — Wed, 25 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-267

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jacob Denedo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Tuesday, November 25, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 8, 2009

Advocates

Pratik A. Shah (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Matthew S. Freedus (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In July 1998, a United States Navy court-martial tried Jacob Denedo on counts of conspiracy, larceny, and forgery. In exchange for his guilty plea, Mr. Denedo was offered a reduced sentence that included three months of confinement, a demotion, and a bad-conduct discharge. Eight years later, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services began proceedings to deport Mr. Denedo, a Nigerian immigrant and lawful permanent resident of the United States, based on his court-martial conviction. In light of these developments, Mr. Denedo filed a petition with the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief and requested review of his court-martial and a writ of error coram nobis in order to achieve his pre-conviction state. He argued that his counsel at the court-martial was ineffective because he had specifically stated during the proceeding that "his primary concern and objective" was "to avoid the risk of deportation" and was less concerned about the amount of time he spent in prison. At the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, the government motioned to dismiss Mr. Denedo's petition on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court disagreed and found it had jurisdiction as provided by 28 U.S.C. Section 1651 - the All Writs Act. It then denied Mr. Denedo's petition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed that the Court of Criminal Appeals had jurisdiction to review the petition, but remanded the matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for further fact finding in order to determine whether Mr. Denedo's counsel was deficient.

Question

Does the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1651, the All Writs Act, to consider a writ of error coram nobis sought by a former service member?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Denedo, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: All Writs Act

Yes. The Supreme Court held that Article I courts, like the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), retain jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to consider coram nobis petitions that allege a prior judgment of conviction was fundamentally flawed. With Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since Mr. Denedo's coram nobis petition was simply a further step in his criminal appeal, the NMCCA retained jurisdiction to issue the writ, as the petition challenged the validity of the court's original ruling.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts dissented, oined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. Roberts disagreed with the majority that Article I courts have jurisdiction to consider coram nobis petitions. Rather, he argued that military courts are severely restricted in their jurisdiction, which cannot extend beyond the precise limits granted them by Congress.

Nken v. Holder

jgoldman — Wed, 21 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

University of Yaoundé

BP 337

Yaoundé

Cameroon

3° 52' 56.3484" N, 11° 31' 3.8352" E

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-681

Petitioner

Jean Marc Nken

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric Holder, Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Tuesday, November 25, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

Advocates

Lindsay C. Harrison (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denied Jean Marc Nken's petition to reopen his case regarding his deportation. He appealed arguing that the Board abused its discretion in denying his motion and should have used its sua sponte power to reopen his proceedings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discretion. It also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Mr. Nken's claim that the Board failed to use its sua sponte power in order to reopen his case. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Mr. Nken's motion for a stay of his removal until further proceeding by the Court.

Question

Is the decision of a court of appeals to stay an alien's removal pending consideration of the alien's petition for review governed by the standard set forth in section 242(g)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(f)(2), or instead is it governed by the traditional test?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Nken, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Nationality Act

The Supreme Court held that the traditional factors govern a court of appeals' authority to stay an alien's removal pending judicial review. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court elucidated the four factors that govern stays. First, there must be more than a mere possibility that relief will be granted. Second, irreparable injury must be more than a mere possibility. The third and fourth factors, which respectively determine whether the stay will injure the other party and where the public interest lies, merge when the Government is the opposing party, as in this case. Consequently, the Court vacated the order in Mr. Nken's case and remanded it to the Fourth Circuit for review in light of its decision.

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a separate concurring opinion. He emphasized that stays are an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted lightly. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. He argued that the majority decision nullified statutory provisions adopted by Congress in 1996 that stated immigration removal orders were "self-executing" and "not dependent upon judicial enforcement."

Moore v. United States

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:58:29 +0000

Location

Private Residence on Blairs Ferry Road

Blairs Ferry Road NE

Cedar Rapids, IA 52402

United States

41° 58' 40.368" N, 91° 39' 56.2428" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-10689

Petitioner

James Eric Moore

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Facts of the Case

A federal district court convicted James Eric Moore of possessing cocaine base (crack cocaine) with intent to distribute and sentenced him to 188 months in prison and 6 years of supervised release. Mr. Moore appealed arguing the district court improperly sentenced him when it failed to consider the disparate treatment of crack cocaine and powder cocaine in the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded with instructions for the court of appeals to consider Mr. Moore's case in light of its opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, where it held a judge "may consider the disparity between the Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses." The court of appeals affirmed once again. It reasoned that the district court was aware it had such discretion, but chose not to exercise it in Mr. Moore's case.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit err when it presumed the district court was aware of its discretion to consider the disparity between the United States Sentencing Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses when sentencing Mr. Moore?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Moore, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: United States Sentencing Guidelines

Yes. In a per curiam opinion without argument, the Supreme Court held that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit erred in presuming the district court knew it had, but chose not to exercise, discretion to consider the disparity between the United States Sentencing Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses when sentencing Mr. Moore. It found the district court was not aware of this power. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to resentence Mr. Moore based on this opinion.

Flores-Figueroa v. United States

jgoldman — Wed, 25 Feb 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

L & M Steel Services

3660 Morton Drive

East Moline, IL 61244-1918

United States

41° 31' 21.4752" N, 90° 24' 3.6504" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-108

Petitioner

Ignacio Carlos Flores-Figueroa

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, October 20, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Decided

Monday, May 4, 2009

Advocates

Kevin K. Russell (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Toby J. Heytens (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Ignacio Flores-Figueroa was convicted on two counts of aggravated identity theft in a federal district court and sentenced to 75 months imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that his conviction was in error because the government did not prove he knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court’s decision. It held the government need not prove Mr. Flores-Figueroa knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person.

Question

In order to prove aggravated identity theft, does the government need to prove the defendant knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Flores-Figueroa, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Aggravated Identity Theft Statute

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government needs to prove that the defendant "knew" that the identification he possessed belonged to another person. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that ordinary grammar indicates that "knowingly" should be read to apply to all subsequently listed elements of the crime in the relevant statute.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion and concurred in the judgment. He was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Scalia argued that the Court should distinguish between those cases where it should infer a mens rea requirement when Congress has not addressed it within the statute, and those cases when Congress has intentionally limited the mens rea requirement to particular elements of the relevant crime. Justice Samuel A. Alito also wrote separately, concurring and concurring in the judgment. He noted his concern that the majority opinion may be read as a rigid rule of statutory construction where the mens rea requirement of a federal criminal statute will always apply to every element of the relevant crime.

Coeur Alaska v. S.E. Alaska Conservation Council

jgoldman — Mon, 12 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Lower Slate Lake

United States

59° 2' 25.998" N, 135° 48' 54.8424" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-984

Petitioner

Coeur Alaska, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

07-990, Alaska, Petitioner v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, June 27, 2008

Argued

Monday, January 12, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 22, 2009

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the federal respondents, in support of the petitioners)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Thomas S. Waldo (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) granted permits to allow Coeur Alaska, Inc. to discharge processed wastewater from its gold mine into a lake in Alaska. The South East Alaska Conservation council sued to prevent the discharge. It argued that granting the permits exceeded the authority of the USACE. The federal district court in Alaska held that the permits were valid.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to void the permits. The court held that the USACE improperly interpreted the Clean Water Act when granting the permits. It explained that the characteristics of the wastewater discharge did not come under the USACE's scope of authority, but were of a nature that was explicitly prohibited by the Clean Water Act.

Question

Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err in invalidating the United States Army Corps of Engineers' longstanding interpretation of the Clean Water Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Coeur Alaska, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Water Act

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) and not the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had authority to grant permits allowing Coeur Alaska Inc. to discharge processed wastewater into a lake in Alaska. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and joined in part by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, the Court stated that both the USACE and EPA agreed on a common definition of "fill material," which described the discharge planned by Coeur at its mining site in Alaska. Further, since the USACE had exclusive rights to grant permits relating to the discharge of fill material, the Court reasoned that it was clear that USACE had authority to grant Coeur a permit to discharge its waste at its mining site.

Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion, attempting to assuage concerns that the Court's decision will be seen as a loophole for polluters, so long as they dump enough pollutant into a lake for it to be considered "fill material." Justice Scalia also wrote separately concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburt dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter. She argued that the relevant inquiry should have stopped at the determination that Coeur failed to meet EPA performance standards by discharging its wastewater in an Alaska lake.

Knowles v. Mirzayance

jgoldman — Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The Ookhtens Residence Los Angeles, CA

United States

34° 3' 8.0424" N, 118° 14' 37.266" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1315

Petitioner

Michael A. Knowles, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alexandre Mirzayance

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, June 27, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Advocates

Steven E. Mercer (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Charles M. Sevilla (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Alexandre Mirzayance was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court. He was subsequently denied post-conviction relief by the trial court and the California Court of Appeals. Mr. Mirzayance then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. He maintained that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel because at trial, his attorney advised him to abandon his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). The federal district court denied Mr. Mirzayance's petition, but was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ordered an evidentiary hearing limited to determining whether "there were tactical reasons for abandoning the defense."

At the hearing, the Magistrate Judge found that Mr. Mirzayance's counsel had "nothing to lose" by going forward with the NGI plea and thus found his performance ineffective. The federal district court accepted this finding and granted Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's advice to withdraw his NGI plea was unreasonable because there was "reasonable probability" the jury would find Mr. Mirzayance insane. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, and remanded the case for consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin. On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision stating that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's failure to pursue the NGI defense constituted ineffective counsel because it "secured no tactical advantage."

Question

1) Did the Ninth Circuit exceed it authority by granting habeas corpus relief without considering whether state court adjudication of Mr. Mirzayance's claim was "unreasonable" under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)?

2) May a federal appellate court substitute factual findings of the district court without determining whether the district court's findings were "clearly erroneous?"

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Knowles, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Habeas Corpus

Yes and not answered. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the California Court of Appeals' decision to deny Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief was not "an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit reached an erroneous result because it applied an improper standard of review when it found Mr. Mirzayance's counsel ineffective for abandoning the NGI plea because there was "nothing to lose" in pursuing it. Rather, the Court stated that in order to find counsel ineffective, the defendant must show both "deficient performance" and "prejudice." The Court reasoned that Mr. Mirzayance's counsel was not deficient when he abandoned an NGI plea that had "almost no chance of success." Therefore, the California Court of Appeals was not "unreasonable" in denying Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief.

Corley v. United States

jgoldman — Wed, 21 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Norsco Federal Credit Union

1001 Sterigere Street

Norristown, PA 19401

United States

40° 7' 53.7312" N, 75° 20' 38.562" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-10441

Petitioner

Johnnie Corley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Decided

Monday, April 6, 2009

Advocates

David L. McColgin (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

In September 2004, Johnnie Corley was convicted on counts of armed bank robbery and the use and carrying of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress his oral and written confessions. The federal district court dismissed the motion. After his conviction, Mr. Corley appealed arguing his motion was improperly dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.

The court recognized that federal statutes require federal officials to bring persons they arrest before judicial officers without unnecessary delay. Confessions received after such delays and before the arrested person is presented before a federal magistrate should be suppressed. Mr. Corley's confessions fell under these guidelines. However, the court reasoned that the voluntariness of a confession was an overriding factor in determining admissibility. Mr. Corley voluntarily confessed. Therefore, his confessions were admissible.

Question

Does 18 U.S.C. Section 3501 supplant Supreme Court precedent and make admissible voluntary confessions that are taken more than six hours after arrest and before that person has been presented before judicial officers?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Corley, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. Section 3501

No. With Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court held that its decisions in McNabb and Mallory were not supplanted by 18 U.S.C. Section 3501. Therefore, confessions made during periods of detention that violate the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure remain generally inadmissible -- even voluntary ones.

Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia and Clarence Thomas. He argued that 18 U.S.C. Section 3501 is unambiguous in stating, "[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States…a confession…shall be admissible in evidence if it is given voluntarily." Therefore, Mr. Corley's voluntary confession should not be suppressed.

Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.

jgoldman — Tue, 24 Feb 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

HIF BIO, INC.

1650 Quail Street

Upland, CA 91784

United States

34° 7' 28.6572" N, 117° 37' 24.6072" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1437

Petitioner

Carlsbad Technology, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

HIF Bio, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Decided

Monday, May 4, 2009

Advocates

Glenn W. Rhodes (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Theodore S. Allison (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The purported inventors of an anti-cancer agent, Jong-Wan park and Yang-Sook Chun through HIF Bio Inc., sued Carlsbad Technology, Inc. in a California court for various claims regarding ownership of the invention. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. After dismissing the federal claim, it declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state claims and remanded the case back to state court.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the remand order. It reasoned that when the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims in the case, it necessarily found that the claims lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Question

Is a federal district court order to remand a case to state court properly understood as stripped of any federal claims when the district court declines supplemental jurisdiction and is thus barred from federal appellate review?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Carlsbad Technology, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supplemental Jurisdiction

No. The Supreme Court held that a district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim is not a dismissal for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction for which federal appellate review is barred. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that, in this case, the district court merely exercised its discretion to dismiss a state-law claim for which it had supplemental jurisdiction, and therefore its decision was not based upon lack of jurisdiction, which would have precluded federal appellate court review.

Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined by Justice David H. Souter, all wrote separate concurring opinions. Each highlighted the mess the Supreme Court's holdings have left this area of law and suggested statutory revision to clarify the law.

Rivera v. Illinois

jgoldman — Mon, 23 Feb 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Circuit Court of Cook County - Criminal Division

2600 South California Avenue

Chicago, IL 60608

United States

41° 50' 40.7868" N, 87° 41' 42.7236" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-9995

Petitioner

Michael Rivera

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Argued

Monday, February 23, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Advocates

James K. Leven (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael A. Scodro (argued the cause for the respondent)

Matthew D. Roberts (argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1998, Michael Rivera was convicted in an Illinois court on two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to 85 years in prison. Before the trial, Mr. Rivera's attorney moved to dismiss a potential juror. The judge did not allow it deeming the motion discriminatory towards the juror. On appeal after his conviction, Mr. Rivera argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the pre-trial motion and thus his conviction should be reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to specify how the motion was discriminatory. After the trial court found that gender discrimination was at issue, the Illinois Supreme Court continued its review.

It held that Mr. Rivera was improperly denied his pre-trial motion to dismiss the juror. It reasoned that there was no evidence Mr. Rivera’s attorney aimed to dismiss the juror because of her gender. However, it also found that this was harmless error. It explained that there was no evidence that indicated Mr. Rivera was tried before a biased jury because of the improperly dismissed motion. Thus, Mr. Rivera's conviction should stand.

Question

Does an error in dismissing a defendant's pre-trial motion to dismiss a juror require automatic reversal of conviction because it denies the defendant's right to an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Illinois, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment

No. A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require the automatic reversal of a conviction because of the trial court's good-faith error in denying the defendant's preemptory challenge to a juror, provided that all the jurors are qualified and unbiased. In her opinion for the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reasoned that since there is no constitutional right to preemptory challenges, the mistaken denial of a preemptory challenge does not on its own violate the Constitution. Rather, states are free to decide as a matter of law whether the mistaken denial of a preemptory challenge is reversible error. In this case, the Court agreed that the Illinois Supreme Court acted within its powers in determining the mistaken denial of Mr. Rivera's preemptory challenge was mere harmless error.

Vermont v. Brillon

jgoldman — Tue, 13 Jan 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

The Vermont Supreme Court

109 State Street

Montpelier, VT 05609-0701

United States

44° 15' 40.7556" N, 72° 34' 46.5204" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-88

Petitioner

Vermont

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Brillon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 2009

Decided

Monday, March 9, 2009

Advocates

Christina Rainville (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Leondra R. Kruger (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

William A. Nelson (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In June 2004 after 3 years awaiting trial, Michael Brillon was convicted in a Vermont court for felony domestic assault. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him for lack of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Vermont agreed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to set aside Mr. Brillon's conviction and dismiss the charges against him.

The court held that Mr. Brillon was not prosecuted within a time frame that satisfied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. It reasoned that the state was not relieved of its duty to provide Mr. Brillon with a speedy trial merely because the public defenders assigned him were mostly responsible for the delay. Rather, it considered the office of the public defender an arm of the state.

Question

1) Are delays that violate a defendant's right to speedy trial, caused largely by the defendant's assigned counsel, properly attributed to the state because it finances the office of the public defender?

2) Should a defendant represented by publicly financed counsel be considered more prejudiced against when counsel is responsible for delays that infringe defendant’s right to speedy trial than a defendant who retains private counsel?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Vermont, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sixth Amendment

No and No. The Supreme Court held that the Vermont Supreme Court erred when it categorized assigned counsel as a state actor in the criminal justice system and that it was not justified in treating Mr. Brillon's speedy-trial claims differently than if he had retained private counsel. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that delay caused by a defendant's counsel is ordinarily charged against the defendant, as it should have been in this case.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented. He criticized the Court for granting certiorari here. However, as certiorari was granted, he would have affirmed the Vermont Supreme Court reasoning that it had authority to supervise the appointment of public defenders and therefore could determine when a defendant's delayed trial date should be properly attributed to them.

Yeager v. United States

jgoldman — Mon, 23 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Enron Broadband Services

210 South West Morrison Street

Portland, OR 97204

United States

45° 31' 5.0088" N, 122° 40' 29.6004" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-67

Petitioner

F. Scott Yeager

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, November 14, 2008

Argued

Monday, March 23, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Advocates

Samuel J. Buffone (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

In July 2005, a jury in a federal district court acquitted F. Scott Yeager of conspiracy, wire fraud, and security fraud, but hung on 20 counts of insider trading and 99 counts of money laundering in relation to his involvement with Enron Broadband Services. The district court declared a mistrial on the counts the jury hung on. Thereafter, the United States again indicted Mr. Yeager on a portion of the mistried counts. On interlocutory appeal, Mr. Yeager argued that in acquitting him of securities fraud, the jury "necessarily found that he did not have insider information", and therefore collateral estopple prevents the government from retrying him for insider trading and money laundering.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that collateral estoppel does not bar retrial in Mr. Yeager's case. It recognized that Mr. Yeager had the burden of proving the jury necessarily found that he was not guilty of insider trading. He did not, as a jury that found him not guilty of insider trading and "acting rationally" would have acquitted him of insider trading and money laundering. The court reasoned that because it was unclear the jury's rationale for its decisions, Mr. Yeager's mistried counts did not prevent his retrial on those counts.

Question

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar retrial when a jury acquits a defendant on some counts, but fails to reach a verdict on other counts whose essential elements must have been decided in the defendant's favor by a rational jury?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Yeager, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Double Jeopardy Clause

Yes. The Supreme Court held that apparent inconsistencies between a jury's verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure to return a verdict on other counts does not affect an acquittal's preclusive force. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court stated that in Mr. Yeager's case, "if the possession of insider information was a critical issue of ultimate fact in all of the charges [against him], a jury that decided that issue in his favor protects him from prosecution for any charges for which that [fact] is an essential element."

Justice Antonin G. Scalia dissented and was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito. He disagreed with the majority holding, arguing that it was a departure from not only the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but the Court's own precedent. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. While acknowledging his disagreement with the majority holding, he argued that in light of the decision, the courts should rigorously apply the doctrine of issue preclusion. Based on this, an acquittal on one charge only precludes indictment for a second charge if a "rational jury" could not have acquitted on the precedent charge without finding in the defendant's favor on the factual element necessary to convict on the second charge. Justice Kennedy also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. While agreeing with much of the majority holding, he noted the validity of Justice Alito's concerns with the decision.

Abuelhawa v. United States

jgoldman — Wed, 04 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Skyline Grill

3823 S George Mason Dr

Falls Church, VA 22041

United States

38° 50' 28.4892" N, 77° 7' 13.6452" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-192

Petitioner

Salman Khade Abuelhawa

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, November 14, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 2009

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (for petitioner)

Eric D. Miller (for respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2007, a federal district court convicted Salman Khade Abuelhawa in part for unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally using a communications facility (a telephone) in committing, causing, and facilitating a felony (distribution of cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 843(b). Mr. Abuelhawa appealed arguing that Section 843(b) does not apply because he purchased cocaine for personal use, which is not a felony.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Mr. Abuelhawa’s conviction. It reasoned that Mr. Abuelhawa's use of a cell phone facilitated cocaine distribution because his telephone call made the distribution of cocaine "easier" for his dealer, which is a felony, thus Section 843(b) properly applies.

Question

Does the use of a telephone to buy cocaine for personal use "facilitate" the commission of a felony (the seller's distribution of cocaine) and violate 21 U.S.C. Section 843(b)?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Abuelhawa, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Controlled Substances Act

No. With Justice David H. Souter writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it held that using a telephone to make a misdemeanor drug purchase does not "facilitate" felony drug distribution. The Court concentrated on the "plain meaning" of the statute in order to reach its conclusion.

Dean v. United States

jgoldman — Wed, 04 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

AmSouth Bank

1400 Turner Mccall Boulevard Southwest

Rome, GA 30161

United States

34° 15' 6.48" N, 85° 9' 49.68" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-5274

Petitioner

Christopher Michael Dean

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009)

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, November 14, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Decided

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Advocates

Scott J. Forster (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Deanne E. Maynard (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A federal district court convicted both Christopher Michael Dean and Ricardo Curtis Lopez in part for the discharge of a pistol during an armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), a sentencing enhancement statute. They appealed arguing that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) only applies to the intentional discharge of a firearm.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not have an intent requirement. It explained, “The mere discharge of a firearm during any crime of violence… even accidental, is subject to the sentencing enhancement”, requiring ten additional years imprisonment.

Question

Does 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) require proof that the discharge of a firearm was intentional?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not require proof of intent to discharge a firearm in order enhance a sentence. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the grammatical structure of the statute demonstrates that there is no intent requirement in order to enhance the convicted person's sentence.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that criminal liability should not attach in cases where an accident causes no harm, as in Mr. Dean's case. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also dissented. He argued that 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) was sufficiently ambiguous that it should be viewed in favor of Mr. Dean, such that the statute provides "fair warning" to criminal behavior.

Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend

jgoldman — Mon, 02 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Weeks Marine Inc

2652 Blanding Blvd

Jacksonville, FL 32210

United States

30° 16' 28.2864" N, 81° 43' 58.9728" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-214

Petitioner

Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Edgar L. Townsend

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, November 3, 2008

Argued

Monday, March 2, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Advocates

David W. McCreadie (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Rod Sullivan (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In July 2005, Edgar Townsend was allegedly injured while working aboard the tug boat Thomas. His employer, Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. sought declaratory judgment in a federal district court to determine its obligations toward him. Mr. Townsend counterclaimed. In part, he alleged arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries, and sought punitive damages. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. motioned to dismiss the request for punitive damages. The district court denied the motion, but allowed for interlocutory appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed. The court held it was bound by its prior decision in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc. There, it concluded a seaman may recover punitive damages when an employer arbitrarily and willfully refuses to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries. It reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. did not apply. In that case, the Court held that recovery for "non-pecuniary loss in the wrongful death of a seaman was not available under general maritime law". The court of appeals reasoned that Miles was not "clearly on point" to the facts in Mr. Townsend's case.

Question

May a seaman seek punitive damages when his employer arbitrarily and willfully refuses to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Townsend , 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Jones Act and general maritime law

Yes. The Supreme Court held that punitive damages remain available for the willful and and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure obligation. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since punitive damages have long been accepted under general maritime law and neither Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. or the Jones Act altered this understanding, punitive damages remain available.

Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, and Anthony M. Kennedy. He argued that under Miles courts should be reluctant to award relief under general maritime law that is not available under a statutory claim. Thus, punitive damages should not be available to Mr. Townshend.

District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne

jgoldman — Mon, 02 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Earthquake Park Anchorage, AK 99503

United States

61° 13' 5.0016" N, 149° 54' 1.0008" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-6

Petitioner

District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William G. Osborne

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, November 3, 2008

Argued

Monday, March 2, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Advocates

Kenneth M. Rosenstein (Assistant Attorney General of Alaska, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Neal Kumar Katyal (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Peter Neufeld (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In March 1994, William Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault in an Alaska state court. After his conviction, Mr. Osborne sought access to biological evidence that was used to convict him. He intended to use DNA testing that was not available at the time of the trial to prove he was not the source. The District Attorney's Office (D.A.O.) in Anchorage denied access. Mr. Osborne subsequently filed suit in a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the D.A.O. alleging that his 14th Amendment due process rights had been violated when he was denied post- conviction access to potentially exculpatory evidence.

The district court granted the D.A.O.'s motion to dismiss and Mr. Osborne appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Mr. Osborne. The D.A.O. appealed arguing that Mr. Osborne need show the disclosure of evidence would "affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent" in order to gain access. Further, it argued that an oral confession given by Mr. Osborne after his conviction precluded him from pursuing post- conviction relief.

The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court. It held that Mr. Osborne had a limited due process right of access to the biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing. The court dismissed the D.A.O.'s arguments. It reasoned that Mr. Osborne need merely show that favorable DNA results would afford a "reasonable probability" that he could prevail in an action for post-conviction relief. Further, it found that Mr. Osborne's oral confession did not foreclose his pursuit of post-conviction relief, as exculpating evidence would raise serious questions about the validity of his confession.

Question

1) May 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be used to obtain post-conviction access to evidence when there is no pending claim for which that evidence could be utilized?

2) Does the 14th Amendment's due process clause afford the plaintiff the right to obtain post-conviction access to evidence when plaintiff's intended claim is foreclosed by evidence obtained through confession?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process Clause

Maybe and no. The Supreme Court held that even assuming that Mr. Osborne could pursue his claims using § 1983, he had no constitutional right to obtain post-conviction access to the state's DNA evidence used against him at trial. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court deferred to the legislative branch in establishing rules by which convicts can obtain DNA evidence to pursue postconviction relief. It recognized that while the Alaska legislature had yet to establish such procedures, its court system was making progress. Moreover, the Court held that Mr. Osborne's due process rights were not violated, reasoning that Alaska's postconviction relief procedures were adequate.

Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Thomas. He agreed with the majority's opinion, but also stated that Mr. Osborne's claim failed for two other reasons. First, he argued that § 1983 was an inappropriate mechanism for pursuing a federal constitutional right claim when the claim had not been exhausted at the state court level. Second, he argued that Mr. Osborne's claim should be rejected because a defendant who chooses not to have DNA testing done at the trial level for tactical reasons should not have access to such testing in pursuing postconviction relief. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice David H. Souter. He strongly disagreed with the majority holding that prevented Mr. Osborne from having access to evidence that could conclusively prove his guilt or innocence, and thus could ensure justice had been achieved. Justice Souter also dissented. He argued that Alaska had failed to provide sufficiently effective postconviction relief procedures to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and thus Mr. Osborne should have had access to the DNA evidence he sought.

Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle

jgoldman — Tue, 03 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-146

Petitioner

Arthur Andersen LLP, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wayne Carlisle, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, November 7, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

Decided

Monday, May 4, 2009

Advocates

M. Miller Baker (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Paul M. De Marco (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

After Wayne Carlisle and his partners (Carlisle) sold their construction equipment business, they hired multiple consultants in order to set up a tax shelter for the proceeds. The IRS later determined the tax shelter was illegal, but offered amnesty under certain conditions. Carlisle was never informed of these developments and was ultimately required to pay taxes and penalties that exceeded $25 million. Carlisle filed suit in a federal district court against nine parties alleging fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty.

Before trial, one of the defendants motioned to stay the proceedings pending arbitration with Carlisle per a written agreement with Carlisle. Stay was granted. The remaining defendants motioned seeking their own stay arguing that allowing one party to arbitrate with Carlisle and not allowing the rest would be contradictory. The district court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied it had jurisdiction to review the matter. The parties then appealed the denial of jurisdiction. They argued that Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies and makes available a stay of proceedings in order to arbitrate when there is a written agreement that directs litigated issues into arbitration. Section 16(a)(1) of the FAA then grants appellate jurisdiction over Section 3 motions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Section 16(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction in this case. The court recognized that the appellants were not signatories to the arbitration agreement with Carlisle. Thus, it reasoned there was no written agreement that could direct litigated issues into arbitration. Since the appellants' motion to stay was not rooted in Section 3, Section 16(a)(1) did not grant appellate jurisdiction.

Question

1) Does Section 16(a)(1) of the Federal Arbitration Act confer appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a motion to stay proceedings under Section 3 of the FAA when appellants are non-signatories to the arbitration agreement?

2) Does Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act allow a federal district court to stay proceedings when non-signatories to an arbitration agreement can attempt to enforce the arbitration agreement under contract and agency law?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Arthur Andersen, LLP, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Arbitration Act

Yes and Yes. The Supreme Court held that a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal from a motion to stay proceedings under Section 16(a)(1) of the Federal Arbitration Act, regardless of whether the petitioner is in fact eligible for a stay. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Section 16 clearly and unambiguously views the underlying merits of the claim irrelevant, but rather looks to the category of order appealed from. In this case, an appeal from a motion to stay proceedings automatically granted the Sixth Circuit jurisdiction. The Court also held that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that Section 3 of the FAA categorically prevents a non- signatory to an arbitration agreement from pursuing a stay in proceedings. Rather, "whenever the relevant state law would make a contract to arbitrate a particular dispute enforceable by a non-signatory," that person may pursue and obtain a stay under Section 3. Therefore, the Court remanded to the Sixth Circuit to determine whether relevant state law allows the non-signatories to enforce their agreement under state contract law and thus are allowed to pursue a stay in proceedings.

Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice John Paul Stevens. He argued that "longstanding congressional policy" limits the ability of parties to obtain interlocutory appeals. Accordingly, appeals from a denial of a motion to stay proceedings should not be available to those parties who have not even signed the relevant arbitration agreement.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.

jgoldman — Tue, 31 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

FBL Financial Services

5400 University Avenue

West Des Moines, IA 50266-5997

United States

41° 35' 52.4328" N, 93° 46' 49.9872" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-441

Petitioner

Jack Gross

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

FBL Financial Services, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, December 5, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Advocates

Eric Schnapper (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lisa S. Blatt (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In April 2004, Jack Gross sued FBL Financial Services, Inc. (FBL) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) alleging he was demoted because of his age. A federal district court in Iowa found in his favor and awarded him $46, 945.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The court held that the jury instruction in Mr. Gross' case was improper. It reasoned that since Mr. Gross never submitted direct evidence that age was a motivating factor in his demotion, he was not entitled to a jury instruction that put the burden of persuasion upon FBL to show that it would have demoted him regardless of his age.

Question

Does a plaintiff need to submit direct evidence of discrimination in a suit filed under the ADEA in order to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gross, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment Act

No. The Supreme Court held that in an ADEA discrimination claim the burden of persuasion does not shift to the defendant employer to prove that it would have taken the action regardless of the plaintiff's age, even when evidence is introduced showing that age was one motivating factor in its decision. Rather, the Court held that the plaintiff must prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" that age was the "but-for" cause of the defendant's action. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned from the ADEA's plain text and Congressional intent that the Title VII burden shifting framework did not apply to the ADEA.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that both the Court and Congress had previously rejected the "but for" standard of causation in ADEA claims and then criticized the majority for "unnecessary lawmaking." Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. He criticized the majority for adopting a standard that was inappropriate for determining mental processes like motive, a necessary element in a ADEA discrimination claim.

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey

jgoldman — Mon, 30 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Johns-Manville Corporation

717 17th Street

Denver, CO 80202-3330

United States

39° 44' 48.3468" N, 104° 59' 28.104" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-295

Petitioner

The Travelers Indemnity Company, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pearlie Bailey, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Common Law Settlement Counsel v. Bailey, No. 08-307

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, December 12, 2008

Argued

Monday, March 30, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Advocates

Barry R. Ostrager (for the petitioners)

Samuel Issacharoff (for respondents Cascino Asbestos Claimants)

Jacob C. Cohn (for respondent Chub Indemnity Insurance Company)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, a federal bankruptcy court granted Travelers Indemnity Co.'s (Travelers) motion to settle with three separate classes of plaintiffs in asbestos related litigation (on behalf of its insuree Johns-Manville Corp.) and enjoin non-settling parties from future litigation with Travelers for alleged misconduct unrelated to the settlement. The orders were subsequently affirmed by a New York federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Over ten years later, the Second Circuit vacated the orders, stating that state-law actions ("Direct Actions") against Travelers that alleged wrongdoing while it acted as Johns-Manville Corp.'s insurer were not barred by the 1986 order. The court held that the federal bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to prevent such lawsuits.

Question

Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit err in holding that bankruptcy courts do not have the power to enter orders that extend beyond matters directly related to the execution of a debtor's estate?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Travelers Indemnity, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit erred in holding that federal bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction to enter orders beyond matters directly related to the execution of a debtor's estate. With Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court recognized that the unambiguous terms of the 1986 orders barred Direct Actions against Travelers and the orders' finality stood in the way of challenging their enforceability. It reasoned that the federal bankruptcy court's 1986 orders had become final on direct review 20 years previously, and thus the Second Circuit improperly ruled on an issue that was not reviewable.

Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He criticized the majority for improperly interpreting the meaning of the 1986 orders.

Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez

jgoldman — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Port of Valdez

412 Ferry Terminal Way

Valdez, AK 99686

United States

48° 30' 11.5596" N, 122° 40' 46.1748" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-310

Petitioner

Polar Tankers, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Valdez, Alaska

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, December 12, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 15, 2009

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1999, the city of Valdez, Alaska imposed a property tax on large vessels that used its port. Vessels subject to taxation elsewhere were held to an apportionment formula based on the number of days spent there. In response, Polar Tankers Inc. filed suit in an Alaska trial court arguing that the apportionment provision was unconstitutional. The trial court in part agreed, ruling that the apportionment method violated the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, but did not violate the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed in part. The court held that the tax apportionment formula used by the city of Alaska was fair and non- duplicative. Therefore, it did not violate the Due Process, Commerce, or Tonnage Clauses in the Constitution.

Question

1) Does a municipal property tax that falls exclusively on large vessels and uses an apportionment method for out of state vessels violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution?

2) Does it violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?

3) Does it violate the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Polar Tankers, Inc, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Tonnage Clause

Not answered, not answered, yes. The Supreme Court held that the Valdez, Alaska property tax that fell exclusively on large vessels and that used an apportionment method for out of state vessels violated the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined in part by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reiterated that the Tonnage Clause need be interpreted in light of its purpose of restraining states from enacting taxes that injure the interests of other states. Here, the Court reasoned that the Valdez tax that targeted ships not residing in Alaska did just this, and therefore was unconstitutional. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the Tonnage Clause would not have applied to the City of Valdez had it imposed similar taxes upon other businesses. However, the Court found little evidence that Valdez did so, and therefore the tax was not excluded from the scope of the Tonnage Clause.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the City of Valdez's tax was unconstitutional, but disagreed with the majority that an unconstitutional tax could become permissible when bundled with other similar taxes on other businesses and properties. Justice Alito also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice David H. Souter, dissented. He argued that the Tonnage Clause merely limits states from charging ships for "the privilege of arriving and departing from a port." He reasoned that the City of Valdez tax did not do so and therefore the tax was not unconstitutional.

Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:58:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-368

Petitioner

Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Pucciarelli, United States Navy Commander, Consolidated Naval Brig

Respondent Type

Respondent

Granted

Friday, December 5, 2008

Facts of the Case

In December, 2001, Ali Saleh Hahlah Al-Marri, a Qatari citizen and permanent resident of the United States, was arrested at his home in Peoria, IL for his alleged involvement in the September 11 attacks. In February 2002, he was charged with the possession of unauthorized or counterfeit credit card numbers and with the intent to defraud. In January 2003, he was additionally charged with making a false statement to the FBI, making a false statement on a bank application, and using another person's identification for the purpose of influencing the action of a federally insured financial institution. Mr. Al- Marri pleaded not guilty to all counts. Just before trial, the government moved to dismiss its criminal charges against him and by order of the President designated Mr. Al-Marri an "enemy combatant". Thereafter, he has been held without charge in military custody.

Mr. Al-Marri was denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the federal district court in South Carolina. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered that his military detention cease. The court subsequently vacated this judgment and reconsidered the case en banc. It held in a 5-4 decision that if the government's allegations about Mr. Al-Marri are true then Congress by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) has provided the President the power to detain him as an enemy combatant. But, in another 5-4 vote, it held that assuming the President is empowered to detain Mr. Al Marri as an enemy combatant, he was not afforded sufficient due process to challenge his detention. It remanded the case to the district court for further fact finding.

Question

1) Does the Authorization for Use of Military Force empower the President to indefinitely detain lawful residents of the United States without criminal charge or trial based on government assertions that the detainee conspired with Al-Quaeda to engage in terrorist activities?

2) Does the Constitution allow the indefinite detention of lawful residents of the United States without criminal charge or trial?

Ricci v. DeStefano

jgoldman — Wed, 22 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1428

Petitioner

Frank Ricci et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John DiStefano et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 29, 2009

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae)

Christopher J. Meade (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

White and Hispanic candidates for promotion in the New Haven, CT fire department sued various city officials in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut when the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) failed to certify two exams needed for the plaintiffs' promotion to Lieutenant and Captain. The CSB did not certify because the results of the test would have promoted a disproportionate number of white candidates in comparison to minority candidates. The plaintiffs argued that their rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, and the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause were violated. The federal district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that the CSB, by refusing to certify the results of the promotional exam, was trying to fulfill its obligations under the rules utilized by the plaintiffs in their argument and therefore was protected in its actions.

Question

1) Can a municipality reject results from an otherwise valid civil service exam when the results unintentionally prevent the promotion of minority candidates?

2) Does 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e permit federal courts to relieve municipalities from having to comply with local laws that require strict compliance with race-blind merit selection procedures?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ricci, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Maybe; fact dependent. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that by discarding the exams, the City of New Haven violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. Before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the purpose of avoiding a "disparate impact" on a protected trait (race, color, religion, national origin), the employer must have a "strong basis in evidence" that it will be subject to "disparate impact liability" if it fails to take the discriminatory action. Here, the Court reasoned that New Haven failed to prove it had a "strong basis in evidence" that failing to discard the results of the exam would have subjected it to liability, as the exams were job-related, consistent with business necessity, and there was no evidence that an equally-valid, less-discriminatory alternative was available.

Justice Scalia wrote separately, concurring. He noted that the Court avoided answering whether the "disparate impact" provision of Title VII was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Alito also wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. He criticized the dissent for omitting key information in reaching its alternate conclusion.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer. She argued that the City of New Haven had good cause to believe it would be vulnerable to a Title VII lawsuit if it certified the exams. Moreover, she criticized the majority for ignoring "substantial flaws" in the exam.

Horne v. Flores

jgoldman — Mon, 20 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Nogales Unified School District

310 West Plum Street

Nogales, AZ 85621

United States

31° 20' 23.5536" N, 110° 56' 28.3164" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-289

Petitioner

Thomas C. Horne, Superintendent, Arizona Public Instruction

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Miriam Flores et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives v. Flores, No. 08-294

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2009

Argued

Monday, April 20, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Advocates

Kenneth W. Starr (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for the respondents)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction and members of the Arizona state legislature moved for relief from judgments of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In January 2000, the court had cited the state for civil contempt for failing to adequately fund English Language Learner programs, in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act and subsequently rejected proposed legislation as inadequate to resolve the programs' deficiencies. The superintendent and representatives argued that increases in state funding, changes in the management of the school district involved, and passage of the No Child Left Behind Act sufficiently altered the foundations of the district court's original ruling and therefore relief was warranted. The federal district court of Arizona denied the motion.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that since Arizona never appealed or complied with the district court's original order that it was fair to require compliance.

Question

Did the lower courts err in their analysis under Rule 60(b)(5) regarding Arizona's contention that changes in education law, including increased state funding, changes in the management of the school district involved, and passage of the No Child Left Behind Act had so altered the foundations of prior court rulings that relief from such judgments was warranted?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Horne, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Educational Opportunities Act and Rule 60(b)(5)

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in their analysis under Rule 60(b)(5). With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court criticized the lower courts for implementing a Rule 60(b)(5) standard that was too strict. It remanded the case for the federal district court to examine four factual and legal areas that may warrant relief for Arizona from its court orders: 1) the impact of a new ELL learning program, 2) the impact of No Child Left Behind, 3) the impact of structural and managerial changes in its school system, and 4) the impact of an increased state general education fund.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He disagreed with the Court's reasoning, arguing that the lower courts fairly considered every change in the circumstances that Arizona called to the courts' attention.

Republic of Iraq v. Beaty

jgoldman — Mon, 20 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-1090

Petitioner

Republic of Iraq

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jordan Beaty et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Iraq v. Simon, No. 08-539

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2009

Argued

Monday, April 20, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 8, 2009

Advocates

Jonathan S. Franklin (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioners)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, plaintiffs sued the Republic of Iraq in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging they had been tortured and taken hostage during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The plaintiffs relied on 28 U.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7), an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allowed for lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism. Iraq moved to dismiss arguing that Section 1605(f) provides a limitations period of ten years for any action filed under Section 1605(a)(7). The district court agreed and dismissed the suit.

After the plaintiffs' appeal, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which revised Section 1605(a)(7) granting the President authority to waive the exception to the FSIA with respect to Iraq, which he did. Iraq subsequently contended that because of the revision, the case should be dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court. It held that the district court had jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed on time and not barred by the President's waiver.

Question

Do American courts have jurisdiction over lawsuits filed prior to the revision of 28 U.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7) against the Republic of Iraq when the alleged misdeeds occurred under the regime of Saddam Hussein?

Forest Grove School District v. T.A.

jgoldman — Tue, 28 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Forest Grove High School

1401 Nichols Lane

Forest Grove, OR 97116-3299

United States

45° 32' 7.0908" N, 123° 7' 7.068" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-305

Petitioner

Forest Grove School District

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

T. A.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 16, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 22, 2009

Advocates

Gary Feinerman (argued the cause for the petitioner)

David B. Salmons (argued the cause for the respondent)

Eric D. Miller (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, T.A., a former student in the Forest Grove School District, sought to be evaluated for suspected learning disabilities. In 2004, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the State of Oregon determined that T.A. was disabled and eligible for special education under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As T.A. was no longer enrolled in the Forest Grove School District, but attending private school, the hearing officer ordered the school district to reimburse T.A. for the private school tuition ($5,200 per month), determining it had failed to offer him a free and appropriate public education.

The school district appealed the order in an Oregon federal district court arguing that reimbursement was not appropriate because T.A. unilaterally withdrew from school, never received special education services while enrolled, and withdrew for reasons unrelated to his learning disability. The district court invalidated the order. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the order. It reasoned that IDEA provided the courts broad discretion in order to achieve "equitable relief" for disabled students, including reimbursement for private school tuition.

Question

Under IDEA, can a federal district court order a school district to reimburse its former student for his tuition at a private school when the student unilaterally withdrew from school, never received special education services while enrolled, and withdrew for reasons unrelated to his learning disability?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for T.A., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Yes. The Supreme Court held that IDEA authorizes reimbursement for private special-education services when a public school fails to provide free appropriate public education (FAPE) and the private school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special education services through the public school. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court relied on its decisions in Burlington v. Deptartment of Ed. of Mass. and Florence County School Dist. 4 v. Carter to reach its conclusion. There, the Court had found that courts had the power to reimburse parents for private school tuition when a school district fails to provide FAPE and a private school placement is appropriate.

Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia and Clarence Thomas. He argued that the 1997 Congressional amendments to IDEA limited reimbursement for private school tuition when the public school had provided FAPE and the student's withdrawal was unilateral, and then criticized the majority for not recognizing such limitations.

Cuomo v. Clearing House Association

jgoldman — Tue, 28 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

New York Attorney General's Office

120 Broadway

New York, NY 10271-0332

United States

40° 42' 30.5424" N, 74° 0' 38.9952" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-453

Petitioner

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 16, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 29, 2009

Advocates

Barbara D. Underwood (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent Office of the Comptroller General of the Currency)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for the respondent The Clearing House Association)

Facts of the Case

In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated banks turn over certain non-public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association (CHA), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his investigation. The CHA argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal agency charged with overseeing national banks, was appropriately responsible for regulating the banks' compliance with activities that fall under the National Bank Act (NBA) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General argued that the Federal Housing Act (FHA) provided an exception to the OCC's sole stewardship of the NBA and therefore authorized his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction and stopped the Attorney General's investigation.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but used the decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different arguments, to do so. Here, the court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since the Attorney General had not yet filed any lawsuits against the banks under investigation, the issue of whether the FHA provided an exception to the enforcement of the NBA was not ripe for adjudication.

Question

Are state officials precluded from regulating and enforcing banking activities governed by the National Bank Act and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's regulations?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Clearing House Association, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Bank Act

No. The Supreme Court held that the OCC's interpretation of the NBA that precluded state officials from regulating and enforcing banking activities was not reasonable. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court distinguished between a state's "visitorial powers" – its supervisory powers – and its enforcement powers. The Court stated that the NBA only prevented a state from exercising its visitorial powers over banks. Therefore, the Court reasoned that a state was not precluded from exercising its ordinary powers to enforce state laws.

Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. He was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito. Justice Thomas argued that because the definition of "visitorial powers" was ambiguous, the courts should have deferred to the OCC's interpretation of the term in the NBA.

Safford Unified School District v. Redding

jgoldman — Tue, 21 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Safford Middle School

612 W 11th Street

Safford, AZ 85546-2998

United States

32° 49' 39.7092" N, 109° 42' 50.1588" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-479

Petitioner

Safford Unified School District #1, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

April Redding

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 16, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Advocates

Matthew W. Wright (argued the cause for the petitioners)

David O'Neil (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae)

Adam B. Wolf (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Savana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy. Ms. Redding subsequently filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of Arizona. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances.

Question

1) Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit school officials from strip searching students suspected of possessing drugs in violation of school policy?

2) Are school officials individually liable for damages in a lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C Section 1983?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Redding, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

Sometimes, fact dependent. No. The Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. With David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and in part by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reiterated that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her underwear. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right.

Justice Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and was joined by Justice Ginsburg. He agreed that the strip search was unconstitutional, but disagreed that the school administrators retained immunity. He stated that "[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude." Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate concurring opinion, largely agreeing with Justice Stevens point of dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the school administrators were qualifiedly immune to prosecution. However, he argued that the judiciary should not meddle with decisions school administrators make that are in the interest of keeping their schools safe.

Nijhawan v. Holder

jgoldman — Mon, 27 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Allied Deals, Inc.

153 E 53rd St

New York, NY 10022

United States

40° 45' 30.384" N, 73° 58' 13.5948" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-495

Petitioner

Manoj Nijhawan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric Holder

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 16, 2009

Argued

Monday, April 27, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 15, 2009

Advocates

Thomas E. Moseley (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Curtis E. Gannon (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Manoj Nijhawan was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. He was found responsible for having caused over $600 million in damages and sentenced to 41 months imprisonment. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Mr. Nijhawan had committed an "aggravated felony" and was subject to deportation because his offense involved fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Mr. Nijhawan argued that 1) his offense did not involve fraud or deceit as those terms are used in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and 2) that his conviction did not establish that loss to his victims exceeded $10,000. The court of appeals affirmed the BIA's findings and refuted Mr. Nijhawan's arguments. It held that Mr. Nijhawan's offenses constituted fraud or deceit as understood by the INA and that his conviction did establish that the loss to his victims exceeded $10,000, even though the jury did not determine that amount.

Question

When a person is convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud and held responsible for having caused more than $10,000 in damages, but the sum is not established by a jury, does this satisfy the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to deport an alien for having committed an "offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss of victims exceeds $10,000?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Holder, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Nationality Act

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the $10,000 threshold stated by the Immigration and Nationality Act refers merely to the particular circumstances in which an offense is committed, and does not require that the statute used to convict the potential deportee contain $10,000 in damages as an element of the crime. Here, the Court reasoned that the statute used to convict Mr. Nijhawan for conspiracy did not require that he cause a minimum of $10,000 in damages; but regardless, the jury's computation of damages at his sentencing was sufficient to meet the requirements of the INA to trigger his deportation.

Bobby v. Bies

jgoldman — Mon, 27 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

2100 W 8th St

Cincinnati, OH 45204

United States

39° 6' 19.98" N, 84° 33' 4.752" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-598

Petitioner

David Bobby, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Bies

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 16, 2009

Argued

Monday, April 27, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 1, 2009

Advocates

Benjamin C. Mizer (argued the cause for the petitioner)

John H. Blume (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Michael Bies was convicted of kidnapping, rape, and murder and sentenced to death by an Ohio court. In his appeals to the Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Ohio, Mr. Bies argued that he was mentally retarded and this fact should mitigate his sentence. Both courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, but agreed that he was mentally retarded. While Mr. Bies proceeded with his post-conviction appeals, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Atkins stating that "death is not a suitable punishment for mentally retarded people." He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district court relying on Atkins. In response, the state claimed that Mr. Bies was not mentally retarded. Mr. Bies argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the state from relitigating the fact of his mental retardation. The district court agreed and granted Mr. Bies' petition for habeas corpus relief and ordered that he be resentenced.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that the state was prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause from relitigating the Supreme Court of Ohio's determination that Mr. Bies was mentally retarded.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit err when it applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to prevent the relitigation of the Mr. Bies's mental retardation even though the Supreme Court of Ohio did not actually determine the issue on appeal?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bobby, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Eighth Amendment

Yes. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it held that the Ohio courts were not precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause from conducting a rehearing with respect to Mr. Bies' mental retardation. The Court reasoned that Ohio did not twice put Mr. Bies in jeopardy of conviction because he was never acquitted at trial. Rather, the Court stated that the Ohio courts merely attempted to discern the nature of Mr. Bies mental capacities in order determine whether his death sentence should be mitigated when weighed against other factors.

U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. New York

jgoldman — Tue, 21 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

New York City Government

136 West 20th Street

New York, NY 10011-3666

United States

40° 44' 30.102" N, 73° 59' 44.8656" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-660

Petitioner

United States, ex rel. Irwin Eisenstein,

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of New York, New York, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 16, 2009

Argued

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 8, 2009

Advocates

Gideon A. Schor (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Paul T. Rephen (argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey B. Wall (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae pro hac vice)

Facts of the Case

Employees of the city of New York filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that it was unlawful for the city, as a condition of employment, to require non-resident employees to pay a fee equivalent to the income taxes paid by resident-employees. The district court dismissed the case for failing to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It reasoned that actions brought by private parties under the FCA must be appealed within 30 days of judgment and not 60 days as when the United States is a party to the lawsuit. Here, the employees of the city of New York appealed 54 days after judgment and thus their appeal was untimely.

Question

For an action filed under the False Claims Act, does the 30-day or 60-day time limit apply for filing an appeal when the United States is not a party in the lawsuit?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New York, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: False Claims Act and Federal Civil Procedure

With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it held that the 30-day limit applies for filing a claim under the False Claims Act when the United States is not a party to the lawsuit. Therefore, the Court found that the private parties who brought suit against New York filed in an untimely manner and their suit should be dismissed.

Nelson v. United States

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:58:33 +0000

Location

Private Residence on Snider Street Westover, WV 26501

United States

37° 18' 42.012" N, 77° 9' 1.008" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-5657

Petitioner

Lawrence W. Nelson, aka Zikee

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

555 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, January 26, 2009

Decided

Monday, January 26, 2009

Facts of the Case

Lawrence Nelson was convicted in a federal district court of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine and sentenced to 360 months in prison. On appeal, Mr. Nelson argued that the district court erred in presuming the United States Sentencing Guidelines were reasonable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed his sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, vacated Mr. Nelson's sentence, and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit in consideration of its decision in Rita v. United States. On remand, the Fourth Circuit once again affirmed Mr. Nelson's sentence, reasoning that the district court did not treat the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit err in rejecting the petitioner's argument that the district court impermissibly applied a presumption of reasonableness to the United States Sentencing Guidelines at his sentencing?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nelson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit erred in rejecting the petitioner's argument and reaffirmed its position in Rita that a sentencing court cannot presume that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are reasonable. Rather, that presumption is a prerogative of an appellate court. Mr. Nelson's case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

jgoldman — Tue, 24 Mar 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Citizens United Headquarters

1006 Pennsylvania Ave SE Washington DC 20003

Washington, DC 20003

United States

38° 52' 58.8" N, 76° 59' 31.2" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-205

Appellant

Citizens United

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Federal Election Commission

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Friday, November 14, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Reargued:

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Decided

Thursday, January 21, 2010

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for the appellant)

Floyd Abrams (on behalf of Senator Mitch McConnell, as amicus curiae, in support of the appellant)

Elena Kagan (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellee)

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of Senators John McCain et al. as amici curiae in support of the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president.

In an attempt to regulate "big money" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to "electioneering communications." Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support.

Citizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances.

The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause," but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim.

Question

1) Did the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell resolve all constitutional as-applied challenges to the BCRA when it upheld the disclosure requirements of the statute as constitutional?

2) Do the BCRA's disclosure requirements impose an unconstitutional burden when applied to electioneering requirements because they are protected "political speech" and not subject to regulation as "campaign speech"?

3) If a communication lacks a clear plea to vote for or against a particular candidate, is it subject to regulation under the BCRA?

4) Should a feature length documentary about a candidate for political office be treated like the advertisements at issue in McConnell and therefore be subject to regulation under the BCRA?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Citizens United, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. No. Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC. (In the prior cases, the Court had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.) By a 5-to-4 vote along ideological lines, the majority held that under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito, and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotamayor. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. The majority also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to The Movie were constitutional, reasoning that disclosure is justified by a "governmental interest" in providing the "electorate with information" about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and it upheld the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions.

In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, emphasized the care with which the Court handles constitutional issues and its attempts to avoid constitutional issues when at all possible. Here, the Court had no narrower grounds upon which to rule, except to handle the First Amendment issues embodied within the case. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas in part, criticizing Justice Stevens' understanding of the Framer's view towards corporations. Justice Stevens argued that corporations are not members of society and that there are compelling governmental interests to curb corporations' ability to spend money during local and national elections.

Northwest Austin Municipal v. Holder

jgoldman — Wed, 29 Apr 2009 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Northwest Austin Municipality Utility District 1

2601 Forest Creek Drive

Round Rock, TX 78665-1232

United States

30° 30' 29.4408" N, 97° 37' 57.7632" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-322

Appellant

Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

557 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2009

Argued

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 22, 2009

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (argued the cause for the appellant)

Neal Kumar Katyal (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellee Holder)

Debo P. Adegbile (argued the cause for the intervenor-appellee)

Facts of the Case

Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One ("Northwest") sought a declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and alternatively argued that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Section 5 prohibits "covered jurisdictions" – states and political subdivisions with histories of racial discrimination in voting – from changing their voting procedures without permission from either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The district court held that Northwest was not eligible for exemption from Section 5 reasoning that it did not qualify as a "political subdivision" as defined in the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, the court rejected Northwest's argument that Congress' 2006 extension of Section 5 for another 25 years made the provision unconstitutional. Rather, the court held that given the documentation of contemporary racial discrimination in "covered jurisdictions", Congress acted rationally in extending the provision, rendering Section 5 constitutional.

Question

1) Does Section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") permit any "political subunit" of a "covered state" from seeking exemption from Section 5 of the VRA when it permits "political subdivisions" within "covered states" from seeking such exemptions?

2) Was the 2006 extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a valid exercise of congressional power when the Congressional Record indicated no persistent patter of "covered states" attempting to evade the enforcement of the VRA?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Northwest Austin Municipal, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act

Yes. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the VRA permits all political subdivisions, including the district, to seek to bailout from the preclearance requirements of the VRA. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and in part by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reasoned that the language of the VRA did not constrict the availability of a bailout for political subunits like Northwest Municipal. Moreover, the Court reasoned that considering that only 17 of 12,000 jurisdictions covered by the VRA had bailed out suggested that Congress had never intended for it to be so difficult to bailout.

Justice Thomas wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He criticized the Court for not addressing the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA. He argued that he thought it did in fact exceed Congress' power to enforce the 15th Amendment, rendering it unconstitutional.

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Hensley

jgoldman — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:58:33 +0000

Location

Railroad Shops Corbin, KY

United States

36° 56' 55.3164" N, 84° 5' 48.7536" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-1034

Petitioner

CSX Transportation, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thurston Hensley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Opinion

556 U.S. ___ (2009)

Granted

Monday, June 1, 2009

Decided

Monday, June 1, 2009

Advocates

Evan Mark Tager (Attorney for Petitoner)

Facts of the Case

Thurston Hensley sued his longtime employer CSX Transportation Inc. (CSX) under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)in a Tennessee state court alleging that the railroad had negligently caused him to contract asbestosis. He sought pain and suffering damages for, among other things, his fear of developing lung cancer. Despite the objections of CSX, the trial court refused to provide a jury instruction as to the standard for awarding "fear of cancer" damages. Subsequently, the jury awarded Mr. Hensley $5 million in damages. On appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, CSX argued that the trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's decision in Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers where the Court established a standard for finding "fear of cancer" damages. The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the trial court. In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, CSX argued that the Tennessee Court of Appeals misapplied the Court's decision in Ayers and that the jury should have been instructed that Mr. Hensley needed to prove that his fear of cancer was "genuine and serious" in order to collect damages.

Question

Did the Tennessee Court of Appeals misread and misapply the Supreme Court's decision in Ayers such that a jury instruction should have been provided as to the standard for finding "fear of cancer" damages when CSX requested it?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for CSX Transportation, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Employers' Liability Act

Yes. In a per curiam opinion the Court reversed the Tennessee Court of Appeals, holding that a court must provide the standard for finding "fear of cancer" damages when requested by the defendant. The Court remanded Mr. Hensley's case to the Tennessee state courts for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that based on his reading of Ayers, the Court improperly attempted to play the role of error corrector, when that decision explicated that the jury should be provided discretion when making damages calculations.