Cases - 2007 term

Ali v. Achim

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:56:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1346

Petitioner

Ahmed Ali

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Deborah Achim, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. 1085 (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Decided

Thursday, December 27, 2007

Facts of the Case

A Somalian immigrant fled ethnic strife in his homeland, coming to the United States with his family in 1999. Two years later, he was involved in a fight during which he injured another man with a box cutter. He pleaded no contest to a felony charge of substantial battery with a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to an 11-month prison term as well as seven years of probation. When he was released, immigration authorities began deportation proceedings because of the felony conviction. The immigration court ruled that the man could stay in the U.S. because he faced retribution if he returned to Somalia, but refused to offer additional forms of protection because it deemed his felony offense “particularly serious.” The man appealed, arguing that his crime cannot be considered “particularly serious” because it was not an aggravated felony.

Question

May the government deny certain forms of protection to an immigrant because he has committed a crime that does not rise to the level of an aggravated felony?

Conclusion

The Court dismissed the case under Supreme Court Rule 46 after the government agreed to grant protection to the defendant immigrant. Because the case settled, the Court issued no written opinion.

MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue

Wed, 16 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1413

Petitioner

MeadWestvaco Corporation, Successor in Interest to The Mead Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois Department of Revenue, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Brian F. Barov (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

MeadWestvaco, an Ohio company, sold its lucrative Lexis/Nexis division for a $1 billion profit in 1994. Illinois attempted to claim a portion of that profit when collecting taxes from MeadWestvaco for doing business in the state. Illinois argued that Lexis/Nexis was an “operational” part of Mead’s business and therefore subject to taxation outside Mead’s home state. Mead countered that Lexis/Nexis was merely an “investment,” whose sale was immune from taxation from outside jurisdictions. The trial court found that the division was key to Mead’s operations, and therefore taxable, and the Illinois Appellate Court agreed.

Question

Under the governing Supreme Court precedent, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992), may a parent company use a division as a non-taxable investment when the division is involved in a substantially different business segment but the parent provides cash infusions, investment advice and oversight?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Illinois Department of Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

The Court sent the case back to the state appellate court holding that the court had previously applied the wrong test in defining the relationship between Lexis/Nexis and Meadwestvaco. Writing for seven of his colleagues, Justice Samuel A. Alito said that the appellate court, rather than applying an "operational function" test, should have looked for the existence of "functional integration, centralized management and economies of scale" between the two companies to determine whether or not they were a unitary business for tax purposes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion arguing that the Court should refuse jurisdiction over such state tax cases.

Gonzalez v. United States

Tue, 08 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-11612

Petitioner

Homero Gonzalez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

Decided

Monday, May 12, 2008

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (on behalf of the Respondent)

Brent E. Newton (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Homero Gonzalez was tried with a co-defendant on several drug-related charges. He pled not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, a magistrate judge who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that she would conduct voir dire, and sought consent from the parties. Attorneys for the government and for Gonzalez expressly agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he affirmatively object. He argued on appeal that he had the right to a new trial because he did not give his personal consent for a magistrate to conduct the jury interviews.

Question

May a magistrate judge conduct voir dire if she has received approval from attorneys for both sides, but has not directly sought or received approval from the defendant?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 636

The Court held 8-1 that express consent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial, stating that such "scheduling matters" are among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. Seven Justices formed the majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy with Justice Antonin Scalia concurring in the judgment and Justice Clarence Thomas dissenting.

Danforth v. Minnesota

Wed, 31 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-8273

Petitioner

Stephen Danforth

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Minnesota

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, May 21, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Advocates

Benjamin J. Butler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Patrick C. Diamond (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

At Stephen Danforth's trial for sexual abuse of a six-year-old boy, the victim was found incompetent to testify in court, so his videotaped testimony was shown instead. Danforth was convicted and his appeals were unsuccessful. After Danforth's case became final, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that pre-recorded testimony without the possibility of cross- examination is unconstitutional. Danforth filed a second petition for postconviction relief, seeking to have the Crawford decision applied retroactively to his case. Supreme Court decisions announcing constitutional rules of criminal procedure are applied retroactively only in certain circumstances, which are specified in Teague v. Lane. The state court of appeals declined to retroactively apply Crawford.

On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Danforth raised an alternative argument, claiming that the state court was free to apply a broader standard of retroactivity than the one in Teague. Under Minnesota state retroactivity principles, Danforth argued, the Crawford case met the criteria for retroactive application. In Danforth's interpretation, the Teague standard was mandatory for federal habeas corpus proceedings but not for state postconviction proceedings. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Danforth's arguments, ruling that only U.S. Supreme Court decisions determine the proper standard for retroactive application of constitutional criminal procedure. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Whorton v. Bockting that Crawford does not apply retroactively under Teague, but it agreed to consider Danforth's alternative argument.

Question

When determining whether Supreme Court decisions on constitutional rules of criminal procedure apply retroactively, may state supreme courts use state-law retroactivity standards that are broader than the standard in Teague v. Lane?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Danforth, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the federal case law precedent, including Teague did not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than was required by the precedent. The precedent applied only to federal habeas corpus petitions and had no bearing on state post-conviction proceedings. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice John G. Roberts joined.

United States v. Williams

Tue, 30 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-694

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Williams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, March 26, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 2007

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2008

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Richard J. Diaz (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Michael Williams was convicted in federal district court of "pandering" (promoting) child pornography. The PROTECT Act proscribes the pandering of "any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe" that the material is illegal child pornography. The Act represents Congress's attempt to outlaw sexually explicit images of children - including both images of real children and computer-generated images of realistic virtual children. The Supreme Court struck down Congress's previous effort as overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Council, because the law as written could have outlawed artwork that was neither obscene nor child pornography. Williams argued that the PROTECT Act was similarly overbroad, but the district court held that the government can legitimately outlaw the pandering of material as child pornography, even if the material is not in fact child pornography.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and struck down the PROTECT Act as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Eleventh Circuit was unmoved by the government's argument that prosecuting the promotion of virtual child pornography as real is necessary to combat the child porn market. The Circuit Court held that the Act's prohibition was broad enough to include any "braggart, exaggerator, or outright liar" who claims in a non-commercial context to have child pornography but actually does not. Thus, the Act's pandering provision prohibited protected speech as well as actual child pornography.

Question

Does the PROTECT Act abridge First Amendment freedom of speech by outlawing the pandering of material that is believed to be, or claimed to be, illegal child pornography?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a seven-Justice majority, held that the statute was not overly broad as written. Justice Scalia noted specifically that offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection, and he characterized the speech of an individual claiming to be in possession of child pornography in this category of unprotected speech. He also stated that the law did not violate Due Process because its requirements were clear and could be understood by courts, juries and potential violators. Justice David Souter filed the only dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.

Kimbrough v. United States

Tue, 02 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-6330

Petitioner

Derrick Kimbrough

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 11, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 2007

Decided

Monday, December 10, 2007

Advocates

Michael S. Nachmanoff (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.

Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug- and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.

Question

When imposing a sentence for distributing crack cocaine, may a District Court judge consider the impact of the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio and the Sentencing Commission's view that the ratio leads to exaggerated sentences for crimes involving crack cocaine?
May a District Court judge, in an effort to avoid a sentencing disparity, impose a sentence that is below the range recommended by the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio in the Guidelines?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Kimbrough, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3553

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the Court's 7-2 majority opinion reversing the Fourth Circuit and affirming the sentence handed down by the trial judge. Ginsburg noted that the drug trafficking statute still had some minimum sentencing requirements, and expressed the Court's confidence that district courts could maintain reasonably uniform approaches to cocaine sentencing. She also referred to the Court's assertion in Booker that, by making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, the Court was willing to accept some non-uniformity in sentencing. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito dissented in the opinion.

Irizarry v. United States

Tue, 15 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-7517

Petitioner

Richard Irizarry

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 4, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Advocates

Arthur J. Madden, III (on behalf of Petitioner)

Matthew D. Roberts (on behalf of the Respondent)

Peter B. Rutledge (for amicus curiae, in support of the Judgment below)

Facts of the Case

In 2004, Richard Irizarry pleaded guilty to threatening his ex-wife. The district court sentenced Irizarry to five years, the maximum sentence allowed by law. The court imposed this sentence, which is six months longer than the sentence prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, because it felt Irizarry was likely to continue to threaten his ex-wife.

Irizarry appealed, arguing that the district court violated Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not giving advance notice that it was considering a ground for departure not identified in the presentence report or a prehearing government submission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this claim, stating that the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in U.S. v. Booker had made the guidelines advisory as opposed to mandatory. In imposing a harsher sentence than that suggested by the federal guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, the district judge had merely varied the federal rules, not departed from them.

Question

Is a judge required to give both parties advance notice before imposing a criminal sentence that departs from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the five-justice majority, held that advance warning of a sentence departing from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is unnecessary after Booker, which made the guidelines advisory. If the guidelines were still mandatory, Stevens argued, advance warning might be required. Justice Stephen J. Breyer, joined by three other Justices, dissented.

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity

Mon, 14 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-210

Petitioner

John Bridge

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 4, 2008

Argued

Monday, April 14, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2008

Advocates

Theodore M. Becker (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Eric D. Miller (on behalf of the Respondents)

David W. DeBruin (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Property owners in Cook County, Illinois neglected to pay their tax bills and the county acquired liens on their real estate. John Bridge and Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. mailed competing bids for the real estate liens when they were auctioned off by the county. Property liens are distributed proportionally to the parties seeking the lowest penalty from the original owner. After Bridge and Phoenix tied for the best bid, they were required to mail affidavits to the county stating that they were bidding in their own names and were not related to any other bidders. Subsequently, Phoenix filed suit against Bridge claiming the affidavits he sent were false and hid the fact that he was actually in collusion with other bidders, thereby obtaining more than his fair share of the liens. The district court held Phoenix lacked standing because Bridge had made the false statements to the county, not Phoenix.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Phoenix had suffered injury in fact proximately caused by Bridge. In seeking certiorari, Bridge noted splits between the circuits on the issue of whether a plaintiff must plead and prove reliance on a false statement in a RICO claim. Although Phoenix suggested that proximate cause, not reliance or standing, was the ultimate issue in this case, the Court has decided to frame its review around the reliance issue.

Question

May individuals and companies bring RICO lawsuits against defendants whose false statements directly harmed them, even if the defendants made these statements to a neutral third party?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Phoenix Bond & Indemnity, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Yes, they may. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held in favor of Phoenix, stating that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud does not need to show that it actually relied on the defendant's misrepresentations. Plaintiffs do not lack standing merely because the false statements were made to a third party.

Riley v. Kennedy

Mon, 24 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-77

Appellee

Yvonne Kennedy, et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

Advocates

Pamela S. Karlan (on behalf of the Appellees)

Kevin C. Newsom (on behalf of the Appellant)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the new state law failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama residents, brought this suit in federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against the Governor of Alabama.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that because the local law was the most recent precleared practice put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that should have been precleared before being implemented.

Question

Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, was the State of Alabama required to preclear two Alabama Supreme Court decisions invalidating state and local laws creating a special election for local officials in an action against the Governor of Alabama challenging the legality of those elections?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Riley, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

No. The Court characterized the Alabama law permitting the local elections as a "temporary misapplication of state law" and held that such a law was not in "force or effect" even if actually implemented by state election officials. Because the law never gained force or effect, it did not represent a change from the baseline and therefore Alabama's reinstatement of its prior practice did not require preclearance. The 7-2 opinion was written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with a dissent by Justice John Paul Stevens in which Justice David Souter joined.

Munaf v. Geren

Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1666

Petitioner

Mohammad Munaf, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Geren v. Omar, 07-394

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Advocates

Joseph Margulies (on behalf of Munaf, et al. and Omar, et al.)

Gregory G. Garre (on behalf of Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army, et al.)

Facts of the Case

In 2005, Mohammad Munaf was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping by U.S. military officers acting as part of a multinational force in Iraq. Munaf's sister petitioned on his behalf for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia. Soon after the petition was filed, Munaf was informed that he would be tried in an Iraqi court and transferred to Iraqi custody if convicted. Munaf filed a temporary restraining order attempting to block custody transfer.

After the Iraqi court sentenced him to death and the district court dismissed his case for lack of jurisdiction, Munaf appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit which granted an injunction against the transfer. However, the D.C. Circuit, like the district court, eventually concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over Munaf's claim, basing its decision largely on the Court's ruling in Hirota v. MacArthur 338 U.S. 197 (1948). That decision prohibited Japanese citizens held abroad by U.S. troops from filing habeas petitions to challenge sentences handed down by a military tribunal sitting in Japan but including U.S. military personnel. Petitioner urges the Court to set aside Hirota and its ruling and to base its reasoning on a string of cases reaching the opposite result. The case will be consolidated and heard along with another D.C. case, Geren v. Omar, 07-394, in which the D.C. Circuit allowed a habeas petition by a U.S. citizen held in Iraq because he had not yet been charged or convicted by an Iraqi court.

Question

Do U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions brought on behalf of U.S. citizens detained overseas by American military authorities working as part of a multinational force?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Geren, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes they do. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the habeas corpus statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command even if part of a larger multinational force. The Court pointed specifically to the statute's application to individuals held in custody "under color of the authority of the United States" to hold that actual Government custody is sufficient for jurisdiction in federal courts.

CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries

Wed, 20 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1431

Petitioner

CBOCS West, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hedrick G. Humphries

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Cynthia H. Hyndman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael W. Hawkins (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Hendrick Humphries, an African-American, was an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant owned by CBOCS. After he was fired, Humphries filed a lawsuit claiming discrimination and retaliation under 42 USC Section 1981. Humphries alleged that retaliation took many forms of abuse by his superiors. Section 1981, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, states in part that "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."

Humphries lost his case in federal district court but on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1981 protects against retaliation.

Question

May a worker sue his employer for retaliation under the Civil Rights Act of 1866?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Humphries, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1981)

Yes, Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. The 7-2 decision, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, relied heavily on the concept of stare decisis, or adherence to prior Court decisions, in reaching its conclusion. Justice Breyer maintained that the historical interpretation of Section 1981 by the Court, as well as the legislative history leading up to the enactment of the law, placed a heavy burden on anyone arguing against including retaliation claims within the scope of Section 1981, and the burden was not met in this case. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Antonin Scalia joined.

New Jersey v. Delaware

Tue, 27 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

134 ORIG

Petitioner

New Jersey

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Delaware

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 2007

Decided

Monday, March 31, 2008

Advocates

H. Bartow Farr, III (on behalf of the Plaintiff)

David C. Frederick (on behalf of the Defendant)

Facts of the Case

When British Petroleum (BP) wanted to build a natural gas transfer facility on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River, the State of Delaware objected that the pier construction would require the dredging of underwater lands it considered part of its coastal zone. Delaware denied BP a permit for the construction despite the fact that most of the construction would take place on the New Jersey side of the river. New Jersey granted the permit, arguing that a 1905 compact between the States settling a boundary dispute placed the construction site under New Jersey control. New Jersey filed a claim to settle the dispute and the case went directly to the Court under its original jurisdiction to hear disputes between two States.

Question

Does Delaware, under a 1905 compact with New Jersey settling boundary disputes, have the right to refuse to grant a permit for a construction project occurring mainly on New Jersey land but involving underwater land within Delaware's coastal zone?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Delaware, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court held 6-2 that the 1905 compact between the States did not give New Jersey exclusive control over the construction project. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated that Delaware acted within its authority in denying unreasonable uses of the river and soil within the lands it controls under the compact. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in, and Justice Antonin Scalia dissented from, the majority's opinion.Justice Stephen G. Breyer recused himself.

Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture

Mon, 21 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-474

Petitioner

Anup Engquist

Respondent

Oregon Department of Agriculture

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 11, 2008

Argued

Monday, April 21, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2008

Advocates

Neal Kumar Katyal (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Janet A. Metcalf (argued the cause for the respondent)

Lisa S. Blatt (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Anup Engquist, a woman of Indian descent, brought this action against the Oregon Department of Agriculture alleging that a co-worker at the Department harassed her and eventually engineered her termination. Although Engquist asserted numerous claims, a jury in the federal district court only found in her favor on her equal protection, substantive due process, and intentional interference with employment claims.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck those jury verdicts. Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had previously dealt with such "class of one" equal protection claims eight years ago in a case, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, involving a village resident suing the village for unjustified zoning decisions, it refused to apply that short, two-page opinion to Engquist's claim. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Olech opinion may only apply when the government is in the role of regulator and did not clarify whether it would also apply in an employment context such as this one. In seeking Court review, Engquist noted the pervasive splits in the circuits regarding the proper allocation of the Court's decision in Olech, while Oregon claimed that Olech should be construed narrowly so as to avoid a deluge of petty cases against the government. Oregon also pointed out that even if the case were to be heard, Oregon would have qualified immunity and Engquist would necessarily lose.

Question

Does the Court's ruling in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), allow so-called "class of one" equal protection claims against government bodies in the context of employment discrimination?

Conclusion

No, it does not. The Court ruled 6-3 that the "class-of-one" theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. The government enjoys significantly greater leeway in dealing with employees than it does with the public at large in its capacity as a regulator. Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote the majority opinion.Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissent.

Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of New York

Mon, 29 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1265

Petitioner

Klein & Co. Futures, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Board of Trade of the City of New York, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Monday, May 21, 2007

Argued

Monday, October 29, 2007

Advocates

Andrew J. Pincus (on behalf of the Repondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the United States, amicus curiae supporting Petitioner)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In his role as chairman of a settlement committee of the Board of Trade of the City of New York, Norman Eisler allegedly manipulated the daily settlement prices of commodities futures in order to conceal bad investments. During this period Eisler's company purchased futures contracts through its broker, the commodity futures merchant Klein & Co. Futures, Inc., but the alleged price manipulation distorted Klein's appraisal of Eisler's ability to pay. When the scheme unravelled, Eisler's company could not meet its obligations and Klein was forced to absorb the loss.

Klein sued Eisler and the Board of Trade under Section 22 of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), claiming that the Board of Trade failed to enforce rules that would have prevented the manipulation. The CEA requires boards of trade to set rules governing the market, and Section 22 allows private parties to sue for failure to enforce the rules as long as the party was "engaged in any transaction" subject to the board's rules.

The U.S. District Court dismissed Klein's claim for lack of standing to sue, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit interpreted Section 22 as including buyers and sellers of futures contracts but excluding the commodity futures merchants who conduct the actual trades on behalf of their customers. The court ruled that Klein's financial loss was not sufficient to grant it standing, because the loss was suffered in the aftermath of the futures trading and not during the trading itself.

Question

Do futures commission merchants, who buy and sell futures contracts on behalf of others, "engage[] in [...] transaction[s]" subject to the rules of a commodity board of trade and therefore have standing to sue under Section 22 of the Commodities Exchange Act?

Conclusion

None

United States v. Rodriquez

Tue, 15 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1646

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gino Gonzaga Rodriquez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 2008

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2008

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

When Gino Rodriquez was released from prison on supervision, he promptly absconded and was later found with $900 cash, heroin and a gun. Prosecutors argued that Rodriquez was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which applies to those convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm if they have a total of three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Rodriquez had two California burglary convictions. Prosecutors argued that the third required conviction was supplied by Rodriquez’s Washington drug offenses. Although none of the three drug convictions, on their own, was considered “serious,” the second and third were repeat offenses and therefore punishable by ten-year sentences sufficient to qualify as serious under the federal career criminal law.

Question

Does a crime qualify as “serious” for purposes of the federal career criminal law when the underlying offense is not considered grave, but carries a high prison sentence because it was not the first?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

Yes. The Court held 6-3 that although the elements of a particular crime may not be considered "serious," a defendant's prior record will have a considerable bearing on making the determination. A crime's seriousness may be greatly enhanced when its maximum sentence is increased due to the defendant's prior convictions for similar or related crimes.

Metlife v. Glenn

Wed, 23 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-923

Petitioner

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wanda Glenn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. 105 (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 18, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Advocates

Amy L. Posner (for the petitioners)

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the respondent)

Nicole A. Saharsky (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Wanda Glenn, a long-time employee of Sears and manager of its women's department, was covered by the company's long-term disability plan. In 2000, Glenn took medical leave from Sears based on an ailing heart condition and submitted a disability claim under her ERISA plan. Metlife, the insurance carrier, approved the claim and told Glenn to seek social security payments which could then be deducted from her Metlife payments. However, after an administrative law judge determined, based in part on information provided by Metlife, that Glenn was disabled and eligible for social security payments, Metlife revised its own opinion and decided Glenn was no longer eligible for disability benefits.

Glenn brought suit against Metlife in district court, where Metlife's change of heart was vindicated, however the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. In making its decision, the Sixth Circuit took into account Metlife's dual role as both the entity determining when disability awards should be paid out as well as the entity actually funding those payments, noting the possible conflicts of interest that could arise based on this arrangement. In seeking Supreme Court review, Metlife drew attention to circuit splits on the issue of whether these conflicts should be taken into account in determining the validity of Metlife's decisions on disability. In addition to the conflict of interest argument, Glenn pointed out that Metlife's flip-flop did not take into account certain of Glenn's doctor evaluations and that Metlife's representations to the administrative judge were at odds with its own eventual determination that she was not disabled.

Question

Does an insurance carrier, acting both as the entity determining when awards are to be paid and actually funding those awards, have the right to represent to a court that an individual is disabled when the insurance carrier separately determines for other purposes that the individual is in fact not disabled?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Glenn, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

Maybe. The Court, in a 7-2 opinion, relied on its prior ruling in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch to hold that a possible conflict of interest such as MetLife's should be taken into account in determining the legality of a claim denial. The significance and severity of the conflict must be determined by the facts of each individual case. Here, the Court found that the evidence was sufficient to prove that a strong conflict of interest existed. Based on the principle of deference to lower court decisions, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts concurred in part and dissented in part, framing his dissent around his view that conflicts should be taken into account only where there is evidence that the benefits denial was motivated or affected by the administrator’s conflict. Justice Anthony Kennedy also concurred in part and dissented in part, suggesting that the case should be remanded to the Sixth Circuit where it could apply the majority opinion to the facts of the case on its own. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, finding the mere fact that an entity both determines claims and funds those claims insufficient to prove a conflict of interest.

Philippines v. Pimentel

Mon, 17 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1204

Petitioner

Republic of the Philippines, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mariano J. Pimentel, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, December 3, 2007

Argued

Monday, March 17, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Charles A. Rothfeld (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert A. Swift (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The case arises from competing claims to more than $30 million, the rewards of an investment former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos made with Merrill Lynch and subsequently misappropriated. A Philippine agency charged with recovering the funds, several Marcos family creditors, and human rights victims who had already secured a judgment against Marcos' estate each laid claim to the money, prompting Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action to settle all of the claims in one case. The Philippine government, acting in concert with the recovery agency, claimed that it had sovereign immunity from suit and, because it was an indispensable party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), justice required that the case be stayed and brought before a special Philippine court established to return such misappropriated funds to the public treasury. However, the district court continued to adjudicate the case, eventually awarding the assets to the creditors.

The Ninth Circuit upheld the award, noting that the government's claim was barred by the applicable Philippine statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit further held that the "equity and good conscience" requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) did not require the Philippine government's participation in the case. In its petition for certiorari, the Philippine government argued that the award of assets undermined the comity principles of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) by not including the government as an indispensable party.

Question

Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err in approving the award of assets to creditors of former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos when the Philippine government, claiming rightful ownership of the assets, excluded itself from the proceedings based on sovereign immunity?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Philippines, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes it did. The Court's opinion was unanimous in finding that the Philippine government was a required party to the case under Rule 19(b). Such a required party must be joined to the suit if it is "feasible," and the Court ruled that the government's inclusion was feasible in this case. The Court sent the case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss the interpleader action. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter concurred in part and dissented in part.

New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres

Wed, 03 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-766

Petitioner

New York State Board of Elections, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Margarita Lopez Torres, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

Advocates

Andrew J. Rossman (on behalf of Petitioners New York County Democratic Committee et al.)

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. (on behalf of Respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (on behalf of Petitioners New York State Board of Elections, et al.)

Facts of the Case

New York trial court judges are appointed by way of a "district convention system." Under this system, political party members elect delegates, who in turn vote for judicial candidates nominated at party conventions. Margarita Lopez Torres sought appointment to a New York Supreme Court but did not have a political party's endorsement. Lopez Torres claimed that the system unconstitutionally obstructed judicial appointments by making candidates reliant upon political parties. The New York Board of Elections defended the system, arguing that it did not bar voters from participating because they had the opportunity to elect delegates.

A District Court found that the system unnecessarily and excessively restricted elections. It cited the absence of a "single successful challenge to candidates backed by the party leaders." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the system gave political party officials too much power and violated voters' and candidates' First Amendment rights to freedom of association.

Question

Does a state judicial appointment system in which appointments are made by political party delegates elected by party members violate the First Amendment association rights of voters and candidates?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New York State Board of Elections, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court reversed the Second Circuit, finding that the election scheme did not implicate Lopez Torres' rights under the First Amendment. What constituted a "fair shot" at obtaining the nomination, according to the Court, was a reasonable enough question for legislative judgment, which the Court would accept so long as it did not too much infringe upon a party's associational rights. The Court maintained that the First Amendment did not compel any substantive change in New York's practice of electing judicial officials.

District of Columbia v. Heller

Tue, 18 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Metropolitan Police Department

300 Indiana Avenue NW Washington D.C. 20001

Washington 20001

United States

38° 53' 41.3052" N, 77° 0' 56.0736" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-290

Petitioner

District of Columbia, et al.

Respondent

Dick Anthony Heller

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, November 20, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, March 18, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Advocates

Walter E. Dellinger, III (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Paul D. Clement (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Alan Gura (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

For the first time in seventy years, the Court heard a case regarding the central meaning of the Second Amendment and its relation to gun control laws. After the District of Columbia passed legislation barring the registration of handguns, requiring licenses for all pistols, and mandating that all legal firearms must be kept unloaded and disassembled or trigger locked, a group of private gun-owners brought suit claiming the laws violated their Second Amendment right to bear arms. The federal trial court in Washington D.C. refused to grant the plaintiffs relief, holding that the Second Amendment applies only to militias, such as the National Guard, and not to private gun ownership.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed, voting two to one that the Second Amendment does in fact protect private gun owners such as plaintiffs. Petitioners agree with the trial court's decision that the Second Amendment applies only to militias, and further argue that (a) the Second Amendment should not apply to D.C. because it is a federal enclave rather than a state, and (b) that the D.C. legislation merely regulates, rather than prohibits, gun ownership. Respondents, although disagreeing on the merits, have also urged the Court to review the case in order to clearly define the relationship between federal gun control laws and the Second Amendment.

Question

Whether provisions of the D.C. Code generally barring the registration of handguns, prohibiting carrying a pistol without a license, and requiring all lawful firearms to be kept unloaded and either disassembled or trigger locked violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Heller, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 2

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self- defense within the home. The Court based its holding on the text of the Second Amendment, as well as applicable language in state constitutions adopted soon after the Second Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer filed dissenting opinions, each joined by the other as well as Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stevens argued that the Second Amendment only protects the rights of individuals to bear arms as part of a well-regulated state militia, not for other purposes even if they are lawful. Justice Breyer agreed with Stevens' argument but also stated that even if possession were to be allowed for other reasons, any law regulating the use of firearms would have to be "unreasonable or inappropriate" to violate the Second Amendment. In Breyer's view, the D.C. laws at issue in this case were both reasonable and appropriate.

Boulware v. United States

Tue, 08 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1509

Petitioner

Michael H. Boulware

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

Decided

Monday, March 3, 2008

Advocates

John D. Cline (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Deanne E. Maynard (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Michael H. Boulware founded a coffee and bottled water company known as Hawaiian Isles Enterprises. As his company became profitable in 1987, he began transferring money – a total of $4.5 million – from his company to his mistress. Seven years later, in the midst of a divorce, his mistress refused to return the money when asked, contending that it was a gift. A Hawaii court eventually held that the woman had been holding the money in constructive trust for the company’s benefit. Seven years after that, the federal government indicted Boulware for failing to pay taxes on the disputed funds as well as $6 million more that he had received from the company. Boulware argued that under the “return of capital” rule, holding that when unprofitable companies distribute money to shareholders, the money is considered a nontaxable return of capital up to the shareholder’s basis in the stock, he owed no taxes. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument.

Question

Does the return of capital rule apply automatically when a company without earnings or profits distributes money to a shareholder, or must the taxpayer produce contemporaneous evidence that the money was treated as a return of capital when distributed?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Boulware, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

A unanimous Court reversed Boulware's conviction for tax evasion. In an opinion written by Justice David Souter, the Court held that a defendant in a criminal tax case does not need to show a contemporaneous intent to treat diversions as returns of capital to demonstrate no taxes were owed. All that mattered, according to the Court, was whether the corporation had earnings or profits and the taxpayer's basis for his stock. Based on these considerations, the Court determined that there had been no improper action on Boulware's part.

John R. Sand & Gravel Company v. United States

Tue, 06 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1164

Petitioner

John R. Sand & Gravel Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, May 29, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jeffrey K. Haynes (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

John R. Sand & Gravel Company had leased the rights to mine sand and gravel on a piece of Michigan property that also contained an old landfill. After thousands of drums of illegally-buried industrial waste were discovered in the landfill, the EPA started a clean-up operation. In 1994 the EPA erected a security fence around its operations. Although John R. Sand kept mining other parts of the property, the fence blocked certain mining sites. John R. Sand's ability to mine the area was still impeded after the EPA moved the fence in 1998. In 2002 John R. Sand brought suit against the government, arguing that the restrictions on its operations amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking of property. The Tucker Act waives the government's sovereign immunity for such suits, but the Act has a six-year statute of limitations. John R. Sand argued that the issue in its claim originated in 1998 when the EPA moved its fence and for the first time obtained an order granting it unrestrained access to the property. The government countered that the claim actually accrued back in 1994 when the fence first went up, which would make the suit untimely. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the suit was timely, but it also ruled that the government was not liable for a Fifth Amendment taking.

In John R. Sand's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the issue of the statute of limitations was raised again - not by either of the parties, but by a group of corporations who were not parties to the case. Citing its own precedents, the Federal Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was jurisdictional. Jurisdictional requirements determine whether courts can hear a case. They cannot be waived by the parties to the case, and courts can consider jurisdictional issues on the courts' own initiative. The Federal Circuit ruled that John R. Sand's claim accrued no later than 1994. Since the suit fell outside the time limit, the Federal Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and it dismissed the case without considering the merits of the Fifth Amendment claim.

Question

Is the six-year statute of limitations in the Tucker Act a jurisdictional requirement?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 2501

In a seven-member majority opinion written by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court upheld the Federal Circuit ruling that the statute of limitations was "jurisdictional," or a predicate for court authority. Breyer referred to roughly five decades of the Court's case law to determine that the doctrine of stare decisis required it to follow the time limit and dismiss John R. Sand's claim. Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed separate dissenting opinions, each essentially reading the case law in a different light and determining that it had established a more flexible standard for applying statutes of limitation to suits against the government.

Rothgery v. Gillespie County TX

Mon, 17 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-440

Petitioner

Walter A. Rothgery

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gillespie County, Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, December 3, 2007

Argued

Monday, March 17, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2008

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Danielle Spinelli (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Walter Rothgery was arrested in Texas as a felon in possession of a firearm. Rothgery was taken before a judge for processing and, upon learning that seeking legal assistance would delay the proceedings, waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. No prosecutor was present at this hearing. Rothgery posted bail and was released, but was rearrested after a grand jury indictment several months later hiked his bail to a sum he could not afford. Throughout this entire period Rothgery continued to pursue legal counsel and only obtained such counsel approximately one week after the grand jury indictment. Rothgery's attorney produced evidence that Rothgery was in fact not a felon and he was released from custody. Rothgery brought suit against Gillespie County, TX for violating his civil rights by not appointing counsel as required under the Sixth Amendment.

Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit rejected his claim, the Fifth Circuit stating that Rothgery's Sixth Amendment rights were not implicated because no prosecutor was present at the initial hearing. In his petition for certiorari, Rothgery argued that both federal and state case law indicate that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to any hearing where a defendant is advised of his rights and the charges against him, regardless of whether or not a prosecutor is present.

Question

Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that Rothgery's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment was not implicated when he was denied counsel at the time of his initial hearing for being a felon in possession of a firearm but the hearing was conducted without the involvement of a prosecutor?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Rothgery, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In an 8-1 ruling, the Court held that a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judge marks the beginning of the proceedings against him and triggers the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel whether or not a prosecutor is aware of or involved in that appearance. This right to counsel applies whenever a defendant learns of the charges against him and has his liberty subject to restriction. The opinion was penned by Justice David Souter. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the only dissent, arguing that the phrase "criminal prosecution" as used in the Sixth Amendment should not include a defendant's initial appearance in the absence of a prosecutor. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, chose to write a concurring opinion pointing out the validity of Thomas' argument but reasoning that Court precedent required him to agree with the majority. Justice Samuel Alito also filed a concurring opinion, stating that Rothgery's right to counsel certainly arose at the time of his appearance but reserving judgment on whether the County's actions infringed on that right in this case.

Richlin Security Service v. Chertoff

Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1717

Petitioner

Richlin Security Service Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, November 13, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, March 19, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 2, 2008

Advocates

Anthony A. Yang (on behalf of the Respondent)

Brian Wolfman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Richlin Security Service contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guards at Los Angeles International Airport. After discovering that the guards had been misclassified by the federal government and subsequently underpaid for a period of years, Richlin brought a successful suit to recover the lost wages. In seeking reimbursement for fees associated with the proceedings, Richlin sought to recover fees for paralegal services at market rates. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 504, Richlin was entitled to "fees and other expenses incurred in the proceedings." Based on this language, the Board of Review determined that paralegal fees should be billed as a calculable cost to the firm and, therefore, should not be recoverable at market rates.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this decision, noting that the lack of a cap for paralegal fees could entice legal professionals to shift much of the work to them in order to maximize profits. Petitioners note, in urging the Court to grant certiorari, that a previous Court decision, Missouri v. Jenkins 491 U.S. 274 (1989), as well as several Eleventh Circuit decisions have reached the opposite result and have awarded paralegal fees at market rates.

Question

Is a plaintiff who has successfully sued the federal government entitled to reimbursement of paralegal fees at market rates or as an expense compensable at cost to the firm under the Equal Access to Justice Act, which allows for recovery of "fees and other expenses" incurred in the proceedings?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Richlin Security Service, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Access to Justice

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court held that such paralegal fees are recoverable at market rates. Justice Samuel A. Alito stated that because Richlin incurred fees for paralegal services in connection with its case, a straightforward reading of the statute demonstrates that Richlin was entitled to recover fees for the paralegal services it purchased at the market rate. The Court found the government's argument that only "reasonable costs" should be recovered unpersuasive.

Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent

Mon, 25 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1498

Petitioner

Warner-Lambert Co., LLC, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kimberly Kent, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Monday, February 25, 2008

Decided

Monday, March 3, 2008

Advocates

Allison M. Zieve (on behalf of the Respondents)

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Daryl Joseffer (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A group of Michigan residents who were injured after taking Warner- Lambert’s Rezulin diabetes drug sued the company in Michigan state court. The plaintiffs invoked a Michigan tort reform statue immunizing drug makers’ liability for FDA-approved products unless the drug makers made misrepresentations to the agency. The federal district court that eventually heard the case dismissed it, ruling that the Michigan “fraud on the FDA” cause of action was preempted by a federal law that empowered the FDA itself to punish misrepresentations. The appeals court reversed, reasoning that the Michigan law did not provide retribution for misrepresentations themselves, but merely created a window for consumers to bring product liability claims where the product reached the market solely through the manufacturer’s chicanery.

Question

Does a federal law prohibiting fraudulent communications to government agencies preempt a state law permitting plaintiffs to sue for faulty products that would not have reached the market absent the fraud?

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Kent, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was affirmed by an equally divided Court without issuing a written opinion. Chief Justice John G. Roberts took no part in the decision.

Sprint/United Management Company v. Mendelsohn

Mon, 03 Dec 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1221

Petitioner

Sprint/United Management Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ellen Mendelsohn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, June 11, 2007

Argued

Monday, December 3, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Advocates

Dennis E. Egan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Paul W. Cane, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Gregory G. Garre (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

During a company-wide reduction in force, Sprint fired fifty-one-year-old employee Ellen Mendelsohn. Mendelsohn sued, alleging that Sprint had discriminated against her on account of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At the trial, Mendelsohn attempted to present evidence from other Sprint employees who alleged that they were also discriminated against by the company. This type of testimony by employees who are not parties to the case is sometimes called "me, too" testimony. The District Court judge refused to admit the testimony, citing the "same supervisor" rule. Since the other employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn, their testimony was not relevant to the alleged discriminatory intent behind the decision to fire her.

The jury returned a verdict for Sprint, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The Tenth Circuit held that the "same supervisor" rule applies only to discriminatory disciplinary actions and not to suits alleging a company-wide policy of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit held that the "me, too" testimony was relevant because the other employees were similarly situated and fired around the same time, and it held that the testimony was important enough that its exclusion had denied Mendelsohn an opportunity to present her allegation of company-wide discrimination. The ruling conflicted with those of several other Circuit Courts which approved the exclusion of "me, too" testimony.

Question

In employment discrimination cases, must a court admit "me, too" evidence - testimony by other employees who are not parties to the case and who were allegedly discriminated against by persons who had no role in the employment decision being challenged by the plaintiff?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sprint/United Management Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Evidence

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Tenth Circuit, according to the Court, acted incorrectly when it engaged in its own assessment of the relevance and prejudicial effect of the witness testimony. Instead, the Court said, because the district court's basis for ruling on the evidence was unclear, the Tenth Circuit should have remanded the case for clarification before finding that a per se rule of exclusion had been applied. The Court sent the case back to the Tenth Circuit and instructed it to follow this procedure.

Federal Express Corporation v. Holowecki

Tue, 06 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1322

Petitioner

Federal Express Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Paul Holowecki, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, June 4, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

Advocates

David L. Rose (on behalf of the Respondents)

Toby J. Heytens (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting the Respondents)

Connie L. Lensing (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Paul Holowecki and other employees of Federal Express sued the corporation for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A district court judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had met the time limits and filing requirements of the ADEA. The ADEA requires that a plaintiff file a "charge" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 60 days prior to filing suit. Upon receiving the charge of discrimination, the EEOC notifies the employer of the accusation, investigates the matter, and offers to mediate. THE EEOC has an "Intake Questionnaire" form and a "Charge" form, but the EEOC regulations state only that "A charge shall be in writing and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s)." One of the plaintiffs completed an intake questionnaire, but the EEOC did not take the steps it should have taken after the filing of a charge. Holowecki sued over 60 days later, but the judge ruled that the intake questionnaire did not qualify as a charge for purposes of the AEDA.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, allowing Holowecki's suit to go forward. The Second Circuit ruled that the minimal written information required for a charge was contained in the intake questionnaire. The questionnaire also met the ADEA's implicit requirement that the charge be intended to start the process of an ADEA suit. The Second Circuit did not consider it significant that the EEOC did not act on the questionnaire, apparently not believing it to count as a charge. To dismiss a complaint based on the EEOC's inaction would be to hold the plaintiff accountable for the failings of the agency.

Question

Does an intake questionnaire submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission qualify as the charge of discrimination required by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, even if the EEOC did not treat the questionnaire as a charge?

Conclusion

The Court, in a 7-2 opinion, upheld the Second Circuit, stating that the procedure used to file the document was consistent with the design and purpose of the ADEA. In his majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy accepted the EEOC's position that a filing would be considered a "charge" if it could be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee. Kennedy felt that Holowecki's charge met these requirements. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia dissented from the Court's judgment.

Kentucky Retirement Systems, et al. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Wed, 09 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1037

Petitioner

Kentucky Retirement Systems, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Advocates

Robert D. Klausner (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Charles Lickteig is a deputy sheriff in Kentucky. Because he is a hazardous duty worker, he is eligible to retire at age 55. Kentucky Retirement Systems offers a two-tier calculation of so-called "disability retirement benefits." If hazardous duty workers like Lickteig opt to keep working and then become disabled, they receive only their scheduled retirement benefits. In contrast, workers who become disabled before reaching age 55 receive payments that reflect not only their actual years of service but the number of years remaining until they would have reached 55. In effect, if two workers were otherwise identical, the one who retired on disability before 55 would always get benefits equal to or greater than those of the post-55 retiree.

Lickteig decided against retirement at 55. Six years later, he became disabled because of "a deteriorating vertebra, arthritis, nerve damage, and Parkinson's disease," and stopped working. When he applied for disability retirement benefits, he received word that he was eligible only for standard retirement.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued unsuccessfully in federal district court that the two-tier system violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court reheard the case en banc and reversed, holding that the simple act of treating younger disabled retirees better than older ones was sufficient to make out a prima facie ADEA violation.

Question

Is the use of age as a factor in a retirement plan "arbitrary" rendering the plan discriminatory on its face in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kentucky Retirement Systems, et al., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

No. Writing for a slim 5-4 majority, Justice Stephen Breyer held that the Kentucky system does not discriminate against workers who become disabled after becoming eligible for retirement based on age. According to Breyer, the circumstances of the case indicated that differences in treatment were not "actually motivated" by age but rather by pension status. He also noted that the ADEA treats system-wide rules involving pensions more flexibly than individual employment decisions. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that age is in fact the deciding factor in determining disability benefits and that, therefore, the Kentucky plan violates the ADEA.

Allen v. Siebert

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:56:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1680

Petitioner

Richard F. Allen, Commissioner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Daniel Siebert

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided

Monday, November 5, 2007

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Allen, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab.

Wed, 23 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1505

Petitioner

Clifford B. Meacham

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Friday, January 18, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Facts of the Case

When the New York-based federal research laboratory Knolls Atomic Power Lab instituted a downsizing program, it asked supervisors to rank employees based on three factors: performance, flexibility, and the criticality of their skills, and then to add points for years of service in order to determine who would be dismissed. Of the thirty-one employees who were let go, all but one were over the age of forty. Twenty-six of these dismissed employees filed suit against Knolls for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A jury found for the employees and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

However the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment, relying on its 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson to hold that "an employer is not liable under the ADEA so long as the challenged employment action, in relying on specific non-age factors, constitutes a reasonable means to the employer's legitimate goals." On remand, the Second Circuit vacated its previous decision and held that the employees had failed to carry their burden of proving the evaluation system unreasonable. In seeking Supreme Court review, the employees argued that it should be Knolls, not them, who must prove the reasonableness of an action that would otherwise be prohibited.

Question

Under the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, must the employer or the employee prove the reasonableness of adverse employment decisions occurring as part of a claim for age discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Meacham, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

Yes. Writing for a 7-1 majority on the issue of burden of proof, Justice David Souter stated that the text and structure of the ADEA indicated that it is the employer, not the employee, who must bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion for the use of "reasonable factors other than age" in the decision to terminate employment. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the judgment, suggesting that the Congress left the determination of these issues in the hands of the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. In his brief dissent, Thomas noted his belief that "disparate-impact claims" such as this one, which allege a discriminatory result rather than discriminatory intent, should not be allowed under the ADEA. Justice Stephen Breyer took no part in the decision because he is a significant shareholder in Knolls' parent company.

Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Tue, 27 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1286

Petitioner

Michael J. Knight, Trustee of the William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

Advocates

Eric D. Miller (on behalf of the Respondent)

Peter J. Rubin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Trustee Michael J. Knight hired a firm to provide investment-management advice to the William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust. The Trust deducted all of the fees paid for the investment-advice service from its tax return, but the IRS rejected the deduction. A provision in 26 U.S.C. 67(e) allows trusts to fully deduct certain administrative costs, but the IRS maintained that fees for investment-advice services fall outside the statute's scope. The tax court agreed with the IRS and ruled the fees nondeductible. Federal Courts of Appeals had come to opposite conclusions on the question.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the tax court. The court cited Section 67(e)'s requirement that a trust's fees are only fully deductible when they "would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust." The provision was meant to exempt special administrative expenses that are incurred by trusts. Therefore, the court ruled, costs that could possibly be incurred by individual taxpayers as well as trusts were never deductible in full. Since an individual could pay for investment-advice services, and since the individual's payment would not be fully deductable, Section 67(e) did not exempt a trust's payment for the same services.

Question

Does 26 U.S.C. 67(e) allow trusts and estates to fully deduct the cost of investment management and advisory services on their income tax returns?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling, holding that if an expense incurred by a trust is the type that would also be incurred by an individual taxpayer, the expense is subject to the same limits on deduction applied to individual expenses. Roberts reasoned that the tax statute at issue required a court to decide whether an individual customarily would spend money on the type of service at issue; if so, the expense would not be fully deductible by a trust. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc.

Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-856

Petitioner

James LaRue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Monday, June 18, 2007

Argued

Monday, November 26, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting Petitioner)

Peter K. Stris (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Thomas P. Gies (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

James LaRue participated in a 401(k) retirement savings plan administered by his employer, the management consulting firm DeWolff, Boberg & Associates. Employee benefit plans are regulated under a federal law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). LaRue sought to exercise his option to make certain changes in his investment plan, but DeWolff neglected to make the changes. LaRue claimed that DeWolff's omission had cost him $150,000, and he sued the firm for breach of fiduciary duty, seeking to recover the money. In response, DeWolff argued that ERISA does not provide for the type of individual monetary award sought by LaRue.

Section 502(a)(2) allows plan participants to sue plan administrators for breach of fiduciary duty in order to "make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach." DeWolff argued that LaRue's suit was not of the type contemplated by the text of ERISA because LaRue sued to recover losses caused to his own personal retirement plan rather than suing to vindicate the interests of the plan as a whole. LaRue also invoked Section 502(a)(3), which allows plan participants to sue to obtain "other appropriate equitable relief."

The U.S. District Court held that LaRue was not entitled to relief under ERISA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Fourth Circuit ruled that Section 502(a)(2) was concerned with protecting entire plans from misuse of plan assets and not with providing recovery for losses suffered by individual accounts. The court also rejected LaRue's Section 502(a)(3) claim. It ruled that the phrase "equitable relief" rarely includes relief in the form of a monetary award and only when the money has been unjustly possessed by the defendant.

Question

Does Section 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 allow an employee pension plan participant to sue the plan manager for losses caused by breach of fiduciary duties in administering the plan, even when the losses affected only the participant's personal account?
Does a suit brought by a plan participant against the plan manager for breach of fiduciary duty qualify as a suit for "equitable relief" for the purposes of Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for LaRue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

None

United States v. Ressam

Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-455

Petitioner

Ahmed Ressam

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2008

Advocates

Gen. Michael B. Mukasey (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Thomas W. Hillier, II (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "Millennium Bomber," was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent.

Ressam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such "in relation to" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits.

Question

Does 18 U.S.C. Section 844(h)(2), which prohibits carrying explosives "during the commission of any felony", apply to a defendant convicted of lying to a customs agent because the explosives were not carried "in relation to" the underlying felony?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

Yes. The Court determined 8-1 that because Ressam was in possession of the explosives at the time he made the false statement to the customs agent he was therefore carrying them during the commission of that felony. Justice John Paul Stevens, in his majority opinion, refused to over-analyze the language of the statute and applied the word "during" in its most obvious sense. Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, reading the statute to mean that the explosives must have facilitated or aided the false statements and suggesting that merely possessing the weapons at the time of the statements would not suffice for a conviction.

Watson v. United States

Tue, 09 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-571

Petitioner

Michael A. Watson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Monday, February 26, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 2007

Decided

Monday, December 10, 2007

Advocates

Karl J. Koch (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Deanne E. Maynard (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi- automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who "uses or carries" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs "uses" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that "use" means "active employment" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use.

On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of "use."

Question

Does the receipt of an unloaded firearm as payment for drugs constitute "use" of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense for purposes of federal law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Watson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

None

Kennedy v. Louisiana

Wed, 16 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-343

Petitioner

Patrick Kennedy

Respondent

State of Louisiana

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 4, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Advocates

R. Ted Cruz (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, in support of the Respondent)

Juliet L. Clark (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jeffrey L. Fisher (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Louisiana court found Patrick Kennedy guilty of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter. Louisiana law allows the district attorney to seek the death penalty for defendants found guilty of raping children under the age of twelve. The prosecutor sought, and the jury awarded, such a sentence; Kennedy appealed.

The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the death sentence, noting that although the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down capital punishment for rape of an adult woman in Coker v. Georgia, that ruling did not apply when the victim was a child. Rather the Louisiana high court applied a balancing test set out by the Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, first examining whether there is a national consensus on the punishment and then considering whether the court would find the punishment excessive. In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court felt that the adoption of similar laws in five other states, coupled with the unique vulnerability of children, justified imposing the death penalty.

In seeking certiorari, Kennedy argued that five states do not constitute a "national consensus" for the purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, that Coker v. Georgia should apply to all rapes regardless of the age of the victim, and that the law was unfair in its application, singling out black child rapists for death at a significantly higher rate than whites.

Question

Do states violate the Eight Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment by imposing the death sentence for the crime of child rape?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kennedy, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes. In a 5-4 decision the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars states from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the child's death. Applying the death penalty in such a case would be an exercise of "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of a national consensus on the issue. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, dissented. In his view, no national consensus existed prohibiting the death penalty in this case, and he vehemently opposed the majority's application of a "blanket rule" barring the death penalty in child rape cases regardless of the facts of the case, including the age of the child, the sadistic nature of the crime, and the number of times the child has been raped.

Medellin v. Texas

Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-984

Petitioner

Jose Ernesto Medellin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, April 30, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

Advocates

R. Ted Cruz (on behalf of the Respondent)

Paul D. Clement (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioner)

Donald Francis Donovan (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post-conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a crime the right to contact his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court (see Medellin v. Dretke), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that the U.S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals (including Medellin) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez-Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law-making power not allocated to him by the Constitution.

Question

Did the President act within his constitutional and statutory foreign affairs authority when he determined that states must comply with the U.S. treaty obligation under the Vienna Convention by enforcing a decision of the International Court of Justice?
Does the Constitution require state courts to honor the treaty obligation of the U.S. by enforcing a decision of the International Court of Justice?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Texas, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Treaty

The Court upheld the rulings of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in a 6-3 opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. The Court held that the signed Protocol of the Vienna Convention did not make the treaty self- executing and, therefore, the treaty is not binding upon state courts until it is enacted into law by Congress. Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts characterized the presidential memorandum as an attempt by the executive branch to enforce a non-self executing treaty without the necessary Congressional action, giving it no binding authority on state courts. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the opinion and Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, authored a dissent.

Cuellar v. United States

Mon, 25 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1456

Petitioner

Humberto Fidel Regaldo Cuellar

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 2, 2008

Advocates

Jerry V. Beard (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lisa H. Schertler (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Humberto Fidel Regaldo Cuellar was apprehended in 2004 driving a Volkwagen Beetle crawling 30 miles below the speed limit on a main artery through Texas to Mexico. When police pulled Cuellar over, they discovered that he had logged about 1,000 miles in the past two days stopping in major cities along the way for just hours each time. When questioned, Cuellar acted nervously; he later turned over a large roll of cash that smelled like marijuana. When police examined the car, they found drill marks suggesting tampering with the gas tank, as well as mud splashings and animal hair typical of efforts to conceal the existence of contraband. Police found $83,000 in cash in a secret compartment beneath the floorboard. Cuellar was convicted of money laundering, but the appeals court overturned the conviction. The court ruled that the federal money laundering statute required the government to prove that Cuellar was attempting to portray the money he carried as legitimate wealth, rather than merely showing that he tried to hide it.

Question

Does the federal money laundering statute require the government to prove that the defendant was trying to portray ill-gotten gains as legitimate wealth, or must prosecutors show only that the defendant was attempting to conceal criminal proceeds?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cuellar, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1956

Neither. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court answered this question by taking the middle ground, holding that the statute contains no "legitimate wealth" requirement but also holding that mere proof that the defendant was attempting to conceal the money is not enough to uphold a conviction. In reversing Cuellar's conviction, the Court relied on the language of the statute providing that the transportation's purpose must have been to conceal not just the money itself but its nature, location, source, ownership, or control. The Court found that prosecutors had failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining

Mon, 24 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-308

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Company, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, December 3, 2007

Argued

Monday, March 24, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (on behalf of the Respondents)

William M. Jay (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 2000, the IRS announced it was admitting the unconstitutionality of a 1978 coal export tax. In response, Clintwood Elkhorn Mining brought suit to recover funds paid, plus interest, under the unconstitutional tax scheme between the years 1994 and 1999. Clintwood sought recovery under the Export Clause of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C Section 1491, which applies a six-year statute of limitations to claims and makes no mention of interest payments. The government argued that such claims must be brought under the Tax Code, which allows interest but applies a three-year statute of limitations.

Both the Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit allowed the Tucker Act claims, but the circuit court overruled the federal claims court's decision denying interest payments. In urging the Court to review both conclusions, the government contended that the Federal Circuit's ruling was at odds with other circuit decisions prohibiting Tucker Act claims under similar circumstances.

Question

Whether the claims of taxpayers seeking refunds for unconstitutionally levied taxes under the Export Clause of the Tucker Act, which applies a six-year statute of limitations, are preempted by the United States Tax Code's three- year statute of limitations for such claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Court refused to pay Clintwood refunds for the unconstitutionally levied taxes. The Court stated that the remedy for taxes imposed in violation of the Export Clause is the same as for any other unlawful tax: filing a timely administrative refund claim. Until taxpayers exhaust this avenue, they are prohibited from bringing a direct suit against the government.

Sprint Communications v. APCC Services Inc.

Mon, 21 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-552

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 4, 2008

Argued

Monday, April 21, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2008

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1996, the Federal Communications Commission moved to require long-distance carriers to compensate pay-phone companies for so-called coinless phone calls. Last year, the Supreme Court ruled in Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., that pay-phone operators could sue for greater compensation. This case arose when APCC Services brought such a suit against Sprint seeking compensation for coinless long-distance calls. Sprint argued that APCC had no stake in the outcome of the case because, under the terms of the assignment, any compensation from a favorable judgment or settlement would go directly to the pay-phone companies, not "intermediary" companies such as APCC.

The district court initially dismissed APCC's suit, but the court eventually reversed itself, concluding that it was sufficient that the assignment transferred legal title to the claim rather than merely transferring power of attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed, concluding that, as a matter of law, the assignment of a legal right to bring a claim gives the assignee a personal stake in the litigation sufficient to confer standing.

Question

Do third-party companies hired by pay-phone operators to collect compensation for coinless long-distance calls have standing to sue telecommunication companies over the amount of the fees?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for APCC Services Inc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

Yes. In a close 5-4 ruling, the Court held that third-party companies like APCC have standing to pursue legal claims that have been assigned to them, even when they must then pass along any proceeds from the litigation to the pay-phone operators who hired them. The Court based its ruling on the "history and precedent" of assignees brining legal claims on behalf of others, and found that Sprint had not made any convincing arguments for departing from that history in this case. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, filed a dissenting opinion. Roberts referred to the historical precedent relied on by the majority as "at best, equivocal." Because APCC was required to pass the proceeds from the lawsuit onto the pay-phone operators, it had "nothing to gain" from the suit. Roberts therefore argued that the case should be dismissed.

Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

Mon, 29 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-9130

Petitioner

Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, May 29, 2007

Argued

Monday, October 29, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Advocates

Kannon K. Shanmugam (on behalf of the Respondents)

Jean-Claude Andre (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Before his transfer to a new prison, prisoner Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali temporarily left his two bags of possessions with a police officer. When the bags arrived, Ali noticed that several items were missing. He filed an administrative tort claim with the Bureau of Prisons seeking to recover the items. After the claim was denied, he brought his case to U.S. District Court. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the government had immunity from the lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA establishes a general waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the government, but it also makes several exceptions to the waiver. One exception is for "[a]ny claim arising in respect of [...] the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer." Ali argued that in context the phrase "other law enforcement officer" referred only to officers working in customs and related activities, but the court applied the exception to any detention of goods by any law enforcement officer.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ali's claim. It ruled that the phrase "any other law enforcement officer" in the FTCA was not merely a supplementary catch-all relating to the government's immunity in tax collection and customs situations. Rather, it was itself a broad grant of sovereign immunity covering any instance of detention of goods by law enforcement officers.

Question

In the detention of goods exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act, is the phrase "other law enforcement officer" limited to officers acting in a tax, excise, or customs capacity?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Federal Bureau of Prisons, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Tort Claims, or Alien Tort Statute

The Court agreed with the 11th Circuit and, in a 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, held that the use of the word "any" should be given its normal interpretation, encompassing all federal officers whether or not they were involved in enforcing customs or excise laws. Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Samuel A. Alito, along with Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., joined in the opinion.

Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented in the judgment, arguing that if Congress intended to include officials other than customs or excise officials it would have listed them in the law. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, jointed by Justice Stevens, suggesting that the context of the statute made clear that Congress intended it only to refer to federal officials likely to deal with property loss or damage, a group that, according to Breyer, did not include police officers.

Logan v. United States

Tue, 30 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-6911

Petitioner

James D. Logan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, February 20, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Advocates

Richard A. Coad (on behalf of Petitioner)

Daryl Joseffer (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.

A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.

Question

Are convictions that do not result in loss of civil rights excluded from the three convictions necessary to activate the Armed Career Criminal Act's sentence enhancement?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 921

The Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, affirmed the Seventh Circuit and held that the ACCA amendment should be read literally and should apply only when civil rights had been rescinded and later restored. Although Ginsburg admitted the amendment might result in disparate treatment of criminals under the Act, she declined to offer a clarifying interpretation of the ACCA, stating that it was unclear what subset of criminals Congress intended to treat leniently by using the "civil rights restored" language.

Burgess v. United States

Mon, 24 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-11429

Petitioner

Keith Lavon Burgess

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2007

Argued

Monday, March 24, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

Advocates

Nicole A. Saharsky (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jeffrey L. Fisher (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

When Keith Burgess pleaded guilty to a drug distribution charge in 2003, the government requested that his statutory minimum sentence be increased from ten to twenty years. The government based this request on 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A), which requires such a sentencing hike for defendants with prior felony drug convictions. The statute defined "felony drug offense" as any felony under any provision of the statute or any other federal law. Burgess argued that this definition conflicts with 21 U.S.C. Section 802(13) which requires that a felony drug offense be punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. Therefore, any enhancement of his sentence must be barred unless both statutory definitions are fulfilled. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Burgess' argument, the D.C. Circuit reached the opposite conclusion based on similar facts in 2004.

Question

Did the Fourth Circuit err in determining that Burgess' sentencing hike for a drug distribution charge was sufficiently mandated by 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A), which requires such a hike for individuals with prior felony drug convictions regardless of length of imprisonment, when another federal statute, 21 U.S.C. Section 802, requires that a felony drug offense be "punishable by imprisonment for more than a year"?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 841

The Court upheld the sentencing hike, stating that the definition of a felony drug offense in 12 U.S.C. 841 as punishable by imprisonment for more than one year was controlling regardless of whether South Carolina classified the offense as a felony or a misdemeanor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that the definition of "felony drug offense" in the statute does not incorporate any other definition of "felony" under federal or state law.

Quanta Computer, Inc., et al. v. LG Electronics, Inc.

Wed, 16 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-937

Petitioner

Quanta Computer, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

LG Electronics, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2008

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Respondent)

Thomas G. Hungar (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

LG Electronics owned patents for a group of products, including microprocessor chips used in personal computers. It licensed the patents to Intel, but in a well-publicized separate agreement excluded from the license any Intel customer that integrated the chip with non-Intel components. One purchaser disregarded the agreement and used the chips in computers made for Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Gateway. LG Electronics sued those who passed the chips down the line of commerce to companies that had not purchased licenses.

Question

May a patent holder seek royalties from companies other than its direct purchaser as the patented product is integrated into larger components during the manufacturing process?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Quanta Computer, Inc., et al., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court concluded unanimously that it could not. Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas relied on the theory of "patent exhaustion," which provides that a patented item's initial authorized sale terminates all patent rights to that item, denying LGE royalties from companies down the line of commerce.

Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle

Mon, 14 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-411

Petitioner

Plains Commerce Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Long Family Land & Cattle

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 4, 2008

Argued

Monday, April 14, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Advocates

Paul A. Banker (on behalf of the Petitioner)

David C. Frederick (on behalf of the Respondents)

Curtis E. Gannon (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Long family, members of the Sioux nation, owned a cattle company that had been doing business with the Plains Commerce Bank for seven years when the family patriarch died. Because Plains Commerce was reluctant to grant operating loans to younger generation family members, it struck a deal with the Longs agreeing to provide the operating loans if the Longs deeded their farmland and house to the bank. According to the Longs the bank never followed through on its promise to provide the operating loans, and after the bank attempted to foreclose on the land the Longs brought suit in a local tribal court seeking a temporary restraining order blocking the land transfer as well as charging the bank with tortuous discrimination. The tribal court returned an award of $700,000 for the Longs, after which Plains Commerce filed suit in federal district court claiming that the tribal court had improperly exercised jurisdiction over the case.

The district court decided that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In seeking Supreme Court review, Plains Commerce argued that the tribal court should not have had jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit erred in deciding so, because the claim did not fit into one of the exceptions granting such jurisdiction set forth by the Supreme Court in _Montana v. U.S. _ On the other hand, the Longs argued that federal courts whose geographic reach encompasses tribal lands have repeatedly allowed tribal courts to adjudicate civil suits against non-members who voluntarily did business with members.

Question

Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Montana v. U.S. _ and _Nevada v. Hicks, do tribal courts have jurisdiction to hear claims based on civil suits against non-members who voluntarily did business with members?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Plains Commerce Bank, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Generally yes, but not in cases such as this one where the conflict arises over the sale of a piece of land. On this issue, the Court held unanimously that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning non- Indian banks' sales of their own lands. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts stated that although tribal courts have jurisdiction to regulate conduct occurring on tribal lands, that jurisdiction is lost once title to the land passes into the hands of non-Indians. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer, wrote an opinion concurring and dissenting in part, agreeing that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction to disturb the bank's land sale but suggesting that certain damages for discrimination, awarded based on the bank's mistreatment of the Longs due to their Indian heritage, should not have been overturned.

Snyder v. Louisiana

Tue, 04 Dec 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-10119

Petitioner

Allen Snyder

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Louisiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, March 19, 2008

Advocates

Terry M. Boudreaux (on behalf of the Respondent)

Stephen B. Bright (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In capital murder trial of Allen Snyder, an African-American, the prosecution used peremptory (automatic) challenges to dismiss five African-American prospective jurors. This resulted in Snyder being tried by an all-white jury, which found him guilty and approved the death penalty. The defense argued that the prosecution's striking of the black jurors was racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, according to the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky. As part of its case for the prosecution's alleged discriminatory intent, the defense cited two of the prosecutor's statements comparing the case to the O.J. Simpson murder trial. After having indirectly referred to the Simpson trial before jury selection, the prosecutor had invoked the case again during the sentencing phase, comparing aspects of Snyder's case to Simpson's and noting that the latter defendant "got away with it." The trial court applied the Batson framework and denied the defense's challenges.

On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court, ruling that the trial judge had not acted unreasonably when he accepted the prosecution's race-neutral justifications for the dismissals of the black jurors. The court ruled that the O.J. Simpson references were harmless comparisons made in the course of a rebuttal, and it noted that the prosecution had not mentioned Simpson's or Snyder's race. When the Supreme Court instructed the state court to reconsider the case in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, which requires that courts consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating discriminatory intent, the court affirmed the trial court a second time.

Question

Did the state's dismissal by peremptory challenge of all of the black potential jurors, combined with the prosecution's comparisons of the case to the O.J. Simpson trial, amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Snyder, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

The Court reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court in a 7-2 majority opinion written by Justice Samuel A. Alito. Alito concluded that the trial judge had acted improperly in allowing the peremptory strikes of the black jurors, pointing out that the reasons given by the prosecution for striking the jurors applied equally well to the white jurors the prosecution chose to keep. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that Batson does not require the exacting scrutiny imposed on the trial judge by the majority.

Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington

Tue, 19 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1457

Petitioner

Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Calpine Energy Services, L.P., et al. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington, et al., No. 06-1462

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of Respondent Ferc, in support of the Petitioners)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Christopher J. Wright (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The California Legislature deregulated the power industry in 1996, establishing a so-called “spot market” in which utilities purchased electricity on the day it was needed. Four years later, during an exceptionally hot summer, wholesale electricity prices skyrocketed. In response, several utilities on the Western power grid determined that they could no longer afford the spot market, and instead negotiated less expensive but still inflated long-term contracts with power suppliers. Once the crisis passed, the utilities asked the government to let them change the contracts to reflect newly lowered electricity prices. The government refused, citing a longstanding Supreme Court doctrine presuming that utilities’ contracts are reasonable. The Ninth Circuit ultimately ordered the government to permit the changes.

Question

May the government permit utility companies to renegotiate long-term contracts with wholesale energy suppliers and, if so, what circumstances justify renegotiation?

Conclusion

Renegotiation is allowed only if the contract poses "serious harm to the public interest." In this case, the Court decided 5-2 (Justices John G. Roberts and Stephen Breyer took no part in the decision) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had failed to make sufficient factual findings in order to determine whether such serious harm could in fact occur. Therefore, the Court sent the case back down to the Ninth Circuit in order to provide an opportunity to revisit these factual findings. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion stating that she believed the Court should have waited to hear the case until all the facts had been uncovered. However, because the case was heard when it was, she felt obliged to agree with the majority's reasoning. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented, arguing that Congress, not the courts, should set the standards regarding the reasonableness of public contracts.

United States v. Santos and Diaz

Wed, 03 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1005

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Efrain Santos and Benedicto Diaz

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, April 23, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, October 3, 2007

Decided

Monday, June 2, 2008

Advocates

Todd G. Vare (on behalf of Respondents)

Matthew D. Roberts (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

For his role in running an illegal lottery or "bolita," Efrain Santos was convicted on charges of illegal gambling and money laundering. Santos had used income from the lottery to pay both the winners and the couriers and collectors who worked for the gambling operation. The money laundering charges were based on 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which criminalizes the use of the "proceeds" of an illegal activity to promote or conceal that activity. However, federal courts disagreed on the meaning of "proceeds." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled that the proceeds used in money laundering can be any of the gross income obtained from the illegal activity, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had jurisdiction over Santos's case, had recently ruled that only net income (gross revenues minus expenses) used to promote or conceal illegal activities can be the basis of a money laundering conviction. Because Santos had only used gross revenues to promote his lottery, the District Court reversed the convictions.

The government argued on appeal that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation would put too great a burden on prosecutions, because the bookkeeping of criminal operations is often purposefully incomplete or misleading in order to obscure the distinction between gross and net income. The narrow interpretation would also restrict money laundering prosecutions to criminal enterprises that are actually profitable. Santos countered that the government's broad interpretation would result in overlapping convictions for a wide variety of offenders charged with both money laundering and the underlying crime. He argued that the government's interpretation strayed too far from the traditional understanding of money laundering, which focuses on the subsequent disguising of profits obtained from a criminal venture. The Seventh Circuit ruled for Santos and affirmed its original ruling.

Question

In the federal money laundering statute 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which makes it a crime to use the proceeds of an illegal activity to promote the activity or conceal the proceeds, does the word "proceeds" refer to the gross income received from the illegal activity or to the net income (profits, or gross income minus expenses)?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Santos and Diaz, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1956

Splitting 5 to 4, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, answering that "proceeds" refers to "net income" or profits and not to "gross income." Because the statute nowhere defines the term "proceeds", the plurality applied the so-called rule of lenity which requires such ambiguous statutes to be interpreted in favor of defendants. Justice Antonin Scalia announced the judgment and wrote a plurality opinion for himself and three other justices. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer.

Boumediene v. Bush

Wed, 05 Dec 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Location

U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay Guantanamo Bay

United States

20° 1' 16.194" N, 75° 6' 49.2192" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1195

Petitioner

Lakhdar Boumediene, et al.

Respondent

George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al.

Consolidation

Khaled A. F. Al Odah, Next Friend of Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah, et al. v. United States, et al., No. 06-1196

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, June 29, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, December 5, 2007

Decided

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (on behalf of the Respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 2002 Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerian natives were seized by Bosnian police when U.S. intelligence officers suspected their involvement in a plot to attack the U.S. embassy there. The U.S. government classified the men as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is located on land that the U.S. leases from Cuba. Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging violations of the Constitution's Due Process Clause, various statutes and treaties, the common law, and international law. The District Court judge granted the government's motion to have all of the claims dismissed on the ground that Boumediene, as an alien detained at an overseas military base, had no right to a habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal but the Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush, which held that the habeas statute extends to non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo.

In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The Act eliminates federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated (according to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the MCA did not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the government on both points. It cited language in the MCA applying the law to "all cases, without exception" that pertain to aspects of detention. One of the purposes of the MCA, according to the Circuit Court, was to overrule the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which had allowed petitions like Boumediene's to go forward. The D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause only protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789, and that the writ would not have been understood in 1789 to apply to an overseas military base leased from a foreign government. Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens outside of the United States, the court held, and the leased military base in Cuba does not qualify as inside the geographic borders of the U.S. In a rare reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after initially denying review three months earlier.

Question

Should the Military Commissions Act of 2006 be interpreted to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by foreign citizens detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?
If so, is the Military Commissions Act of 2006 a violation of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution?
Are the detainees at Guantanamo Bay entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law and of the Geneva Conventions?
Can the detainees challenge the adequacy of judicial review provisions of the MCA before they have sought to invoke that review?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Boumediene, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 9, Paragraph 2: Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

A five-justice majority answered yes to each of these questions. The opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, stated that if the MCA is considered valid its legislative history requires that the detainees' cases be dismissed. However, the Court went on to state that because the procedures laid out in the Detainee Treatment Act are not adequate substitutes for the habeas writ, the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. The detainees were not barred from seeking habeas or invoking the Suspension Clause merely because they had been designated as enemy combatants or held at Guantanamo Bay. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling and found in favor of the detainees. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions.

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association

Wed, 28 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-457

Petitioner

G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General of Maine

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, October 2, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (on behalf of the Respondents)

Paul Stern (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (on behalf of United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In an effort to address the problem of tobacco use by minors, the Maine legislature passed the Tobacco Delivery Law, which imposes requirements on air and motor carriers that transport tobacco products. One provision of the law requires tobacco retailers to only use carriers that verify the age of each tobacco purchaser, and another provision requires that carriers ensure that no tobacco is shipped to unlicensed retailers. The New Hampshire Motor Transport Association sued, arguing that the state law was preempted by a federal law, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). The preemption provision of the FAAAA prohibits state from enacting laws "related to" the prices, routes, or services of air and motor carriers. The Association argued that the Tobacco Delivery Law placed such a burden on the delivery procedures of carriers that significantly affected their prices and services. The state countered that the FAAAA was only meant to preempt traditional economic regulation by states, and therefore laws enacted pursuant to the state's police power - the power of a state to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens - were permissible. The U.S. District Court ruled that the law was preempted by the FAAAA.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court. The First Circuit held that a police power exception to the general rule of preemption would be far too broad and was not intended by Congress. Maine could validly ban all unlicensed tobacco products within its borders, but the FAAAA prohibited the state from implementing this goal by imposing requirements on carriers that significantly alter their delivery procedures.

Question

Does the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 preempt a state law that uses the state's police power to require that air and motor carriers take steps to ensure that tobacco is not sold to minors?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 14501

The Court affirmed both lower courts, holding that the FAAAA preempted the state laws. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court asserted that the state laws were directly connected with motor carrier services and therefore had a significant and adverse impact on the congressional goal of precluding state regulation in lieu of competitive market forces. The Court further stated that the FAAAA did not allow any exceptions for police powers or public health concerns of the State.

Allison Engine Co. v. Sanders

Tue, 26 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-214

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2008

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

James B. Helmer, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Two workers involved in the manufacture of electrical supplies for the Navy’s billion-dollar guided missile destroyers brought a whistleblower case alleging that subcontractors performed faulty work. The two charged that the companies employed unqualified workers, installed leaky gearboxes and used defective temperature gauges. After a five-week trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the companies, concluding that the False Claims Act under which the suits were brought requires that defendants “present” the fraudulent claims to the government. Because the subcontractors actually invoiced the general contractor and not the government, the court ruled that the presentment requirement had not been met. The appeals court reversed, holding that the Act should be liberally construed to discourage private companies from defrauding the government.

Question

Must whistleblower claimants prove that a private company directly presented a fraudulent bill to the government in order to prevail in a False Claims Act case?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Allison Engine Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal False Claims

Yes. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Samuel A. Alito made clear that a plaintiff must prove more than that the false statement's use resulted in payment or approval or that Government money was used to pay the claim. Instead, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intended the false statement to be "material" to the Government's decision to pay or approve the false claim.

Crawford v. Marion County Election Board

Wed, 09 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-21

Petitioner

William Crawford, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Marion County Election Board, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Indiana Democratic Party, et al. v. Todd Rokita, Indiana Secretary of State, et al., No. 07-25

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 2008

Decided

Monday, April 28, 2008

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Paul M. Smith (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Thomas M. Fisher (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. At trial, the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law’s requirements. The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. However, the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates.

Question

Does a law that requires voters to present either a state or federal photo identification unduly burden citizens’ right to vote?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Marion County Election Board, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

By a vote of 6 to 3, the Court upheld the law, concluding that the photo I.D. requirement was closely related to Indiana's legitimate state interests in preventing voter fraud. The slight burden the law imposed on voters' rights did not outweigh these interests, which the Court characterized as "neutral and nondiscriminatory." Although there was no majority opinion, the Court's decision included concurring opinions written by Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.

Gomez-Perez v. Potter

Tue, 19 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1321

Petitioner

Myrna Gomez-Perez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John E. Potter, Postmaster General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Myrna Gómez-Pérez worked as a clerk for the United States Postal Service (USPS) in Puerto Rico. Gómez alleged that she was subject to retaliatory treatment after filing an age discrimination complaint against her supervisors under section 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A federal district court granted summary judgment to the USPS on the ground that the United States had not waived sovereign immunity as to retaliation claims under the ADEA.

Gómez appealed to the United States Court of Appeals in the First Circuit. It held that the USPS and Potter have waived sovereign immunity with respect to ADEA suits, but that Section 15 of the ADEA does not provide a cause of action for retaliation by federal employers.

Question

Does the ADEA prohibit retaliation against federal employees?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Gomez-Perez, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

Yes, the ADEA prohibits retaliation against federal employees. Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. relied on prior Court rulings holding that retaliation is covered by similar language in other antidiscrimination statutes. Noting the similarity between these statutes and the ADEA, Alito concluded that Congress had intended to include a retaliation prohibition in the ADEA. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions each joined in part by Justice Antonin Scalia.

New York City Board of Education v. Tom F.

Mon, 01 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-637

Petitioner

Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tom F., on Behalf of Gilbert F., a Minor Child

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, February 26, 2007

Argued

Monday, October 1, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, October 10, 2007

Advocates

Leonard J. Koerner (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul G. Gardephe (on behalf of Respondent)

Gregory G. Garre (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) guarantees students with disabilities a "free appropriate public education." Tom Freston enrolled his son Gilbert in a private school for students with special needs, because the New York City school district was unable to establish an adequate "individualized education program." The school district reimbursed Freston for the private school tuition. After two years the school district offered to place Gilbert in another public school, but Freston chose to keep his son in private school and again sought tuition reimbursement from the district.

A U.S. district court ruled that the school district was not required by the IDEA to reimburse Freston, because Gilbert had never been enrolled in public school. The relevant section of the IDEA authorizes tuition reimbursement to the parents of a disabled child "who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency," but it does not explicitly state that parents of children who have never received public education are not entitled to reimbursement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court. By comparing the disputed section of the IDEA with other sections of the statute, the Second Circuit reasoned that the IDEA was not meant to deny reimbursement to students who have never been enrolled in public school. To rule otherwise, the Circuit Court held, would be to require parents like Freston to enroll children in inadequate public schools in order to be eligible for tuition reimbursement.

Question

Does the Individuals with Disabilities Act provide for public tuition reimbursement for private school when a child has not previously received special education from a public school?

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Tom F., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education of the Handicapped, Education for All Handicapped Children, or Individuals with Disabilities Education Acts, or related statutes, as amended; also see ADA

The Court's role in the case proved to be anticlimactic. Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in consideration of the case, leaving the eight remaining Justices to split evenly 4-4, affirming the judgment of the Second Circuit. This result leaves open the issue of reimbursements for private school placements under the IDEA when parents reject a public school placement and the child has not received special education services in the public school.

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia State Board of Equalization

Mon, 05 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1287

Petitioner

CSX Transportation, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Georgia State Board of Equalization, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Tuesday, May 29, 2007

Argued

Monday, November 5, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Advocates

Warren R. Calvert (on behalf of the Respondents)

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Tax Injunction Act establishes a general rule that federal courts will not interfere with matters of state taxation, but the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) provides an exception for railroads. In an effort to prevent state tax discrimination against railroads, Section 306 of the 4-R Act requires that the ratio of the assessed value to the true market value of railroad property not exceed by more than five percent the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction. This calculation requires that states determine the "true market value" of the railroads' property - a valuation that can be subjective. Using a new valuation methodology, the Georgia State Board of Equalization appraised the property of the railroad company CSX Transportation, Inc. at $8.2 billion. CSX filed a complaint under the 4-R Act, noting that the old appraisal methodology would have valued the property at only $6 billion. Despite CSX's argument that the 4-R Act allows railroads to challenge state valuation methods, the district court ruled that the only the state's methodology could be considered.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that in the absence of a clear statement in the 4-R Act, principles of federalism weighed against interpreting the Act to give railroads additional power to challenge the taxing authority of the states in federal court. The Circuit Court stood by the general principle that federal courts should not interfere with state taxation policies. Since the 4-R Act did not allow challenges to the state's choice of valuation method, CSX could not bring its arguments that Georgia's methodology was faulty.

Question

Does the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 require a federal district court determining the "true market value" of railroad property to accept the valuation method chosen by the State?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for CSX Transportation, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 11501

The Court reversed the 11th Circuit in a unanimous decision. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. stated that courts cannot blindly accept the states' market valuations without potentially endorsing the type of discriminatory tax practices that the 4-R Act was designed to thwart. The Court also rejected Georgia's state sovereignty argument, holding that tax valuation methods are technical tools utilized by state employees, not expressions of state policy.

Wright v. Van Patten

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:56:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-212

Petitioner

Randall Wright, Sheriff

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joseph L. Van Patten

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Decided

Monday, January 7, 2008

Facts of the Case

When Joseph Van Patten pled no contest to a charge of first-degree reckless homicide in a Wisconsin state court, his lawyer was not at his side during the hearing. Rather, the lawyer was linked to the courtroom by speakerphone. After the court imposed the maximum penalty of 25 years on Van Patten, he retained new counsel and moved in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to have his plea withdrawn. Van Patten claimed that his lawyer's failure to appear in person and the decision to conduct the plea hearing via speakerphone violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

The Wisconsin appellate court, applying the Court's 1984 ruling in Strickland, concluded that Van Patten's counsel's representation was not "deficient or prejudicial" and denied the motion. Van Patten then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. The district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Van Patten's claim should have been analyzed under the Court's 1984 decision in Cronic, not Strickland, and came out in Van Patten's favor. The case came to the Court for a resolution of this conflicting case law.

Question

Does a lawyer's representation of his client via speakerphone at a plea hearing for first-degree reckless homicide constitute a violation of that client's Sixth Amendment right to counsel?

Conclusion

Unfortunately for Van Patten, the Court felt that there was no concrete prohibition of representation by speakerphone in the federal case law and therefore determined that "no clearly established law contrary to the state court's conclusion justifies collateral relief." Therefore, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision granting Van Patten relief and remanded the case to the lower courts for further proceedings. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the otherwise unanimous decision, applying an "objectively unreasonable" standard to the Wisconsin trial court's determination and finding that it passed the test.

Gall v. United States

Tue, 02 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-7949

Petitioner

Brian Michael Gall

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2007)

Granted

Monday, June 11, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 2007

Decided

Monday, December 10, 2007

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jeffrey T. Green (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

While a student at the University of Iowa, Brian Gall was involved in a drug ring distributing ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine, MDMA). He voluntarily left the drug conspiracy and moved to Arizona where he started his own business and led a crime-free life. When federal agents tracked him down, he turned himself in and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The government argued for a sentence of 30 months in prison, which was the minimum sentence in the range recommended for the offense by the federal sentencing guidelines. Taking into account the mitigating circumstances in Gall's case, the judge instead decided to depart from the guidelines and impose a sentence of 36 months of probation. (The Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the sentencing guidelines to be merely advisory, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit held that while the guidelines are not mandatory, sentences that fall outside of the recommended sentencing range must overcome a presumption of unreasonableness. Sentences varying from the guidelines must be justified based on the circumstances of the case, and larger variances from the guidelines require correspondingly more compelling justifications. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court had erred by using Gall's youth as a mitigating factor, by overweighing his rehabilitation, and by underweighing the seriousness of the crime. Since the "extraordinary variance" was not justified by a finding of extraordinary circumstances, the Eighth Circuit ordered a new sentence.

Question

May Courts of Appeals apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences that fall outside the range in the federal sentencing guidelines, so that district courts must justify below-guidelines sentences with a finding of extraordinary circumstances?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Gall, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3553

The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 ruling, reversed the appellate court and held that, under Booker, federal courts have the authority to set any reasonable sentence as long as they explain their reasoning. The Court made clear that Booker had removed the Guidelines from their earlier status as the primary determinate of a defendant's punishment, reaffirming the Guidelines' advisory status. The opinion was penned by Justice Stevens, with Justices David Souter and Antonin Scalia filing opinions concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito were the sole dissenters.

Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis

Mon, 05 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-666

Petitioner

Department of Revenue of Kentucky, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

George W. Davis, et ux.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, May 21, 2007

Argued

Monday, November 5, 2007

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2008

Advocates

G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

C. Christopher Trower (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

When calculating gross income for tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Code exempts from taxation the interest earned on any state or local bond. However, Kentucky law requires that interest income earned on bonds issued by other states be taxed as part of an individual's adjusted gross income. George and Catherine Davis filed a class action complaint arguing that Kentucky's policy of taxing out-of-state bonds was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause - the doctrine that the Commerce Clause forbids states from interfering with interstate commerce. The state trial court ruled in favor of the Kentucky Department of Revenue and declared the tax policy constitutional.

On appeal, the Davises stressed Kentucky's market discrimination against other states as a factor indicating that the policy was unconstitutional. In response, the Department of Revenue cited a similar policy that was upheld by state courts in Ohio. The Department also invoked the "market participant doctrine," which stands for the idea that only the state's actions as a regulator are subject to the dormant Commerce Clause. Actions undertaken as a market participant, such as the issuance of bonds, are not. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and struck down the tax policy. The Court of Appeals held that the tax discrimination rather than the bond issuance was at issue, and the taxation was indisputably undertaken in the state's capacity as a regulator. The court concluded that the Commerce Clause was incompatible with such a discriminatory state policy.

Question

Does a state violate the dormant Commerce Clause by providing an income tax exemption for interest on bonds issued by the state, while denying the exemption to interest on bonds issued by other states?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Department of Revenue of Kentucky, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

No. The Court held 7-2 that Kentucky's differential tax scheme does not offend the Commerce Clause. No single opinion commanded a majority. Bond proceeds are a "quintessentially public function," the Court noted, and are therefore likely motivated by legitimate state objectives other than simple economic protectionism. These objectives outweigh any negative effect the tax may have on interstate commerce.

Baze and Bowling v. Rees

Mon, 07 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-5439

Petitioner

Ralph Baze and Thomas C. Bowling

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John D. Rees, Commissioner, Kentucky Department of Corrections, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Monday, January 7, 2008

Decided

Monday, April 14, 2008

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. ()

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. ()

Gregory G. Garre ()

Facts of the Case

Two Kentucky inmates challenged the state's four-drug lethal injection protocol. The lethal injection method calls for the administration of four drugs: Valium, which relaxes the convict, Sodium Pentathol, which knocks the convict unconscious, Pavulon, which stops his breathing, and potassium chloride, which essentially puts the convict into cardiac arrest and ultimately causes death. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the death penalty system did not amount to unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.

Question

Is the use of a four-drug lethal injection process to carry out death sentences a violation of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Rees, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In a 7-2 decision with four concurrences and a dissent, the Court held that Kentucky's lethal injection scheme did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Noting that the inmates had conceded the "humane nature" of the procedure when performed correctly, the divided Court inmates had failed to prove that incorrect administration of the drugs would amount to cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Court also suggested that a state may violate the ban on cruel and unusual punishment if it continues to use a method without sufficient justification in the face of superior alternative procedures. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. announced the judgment and issued an opinion joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion supporting the judgment but for the first time stated his opposition to the death penalty. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a separate concurring opinion in support of the judgment. Justice Alito also issued a separate concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented.

Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.

Wed, 26 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-312

Petitioner

Florida Department of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2008

Advocates

G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Scott D. Makar (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, Piccadilly Cafeterias filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in federal court in Florida asking the bankruptcy court for permission to auction off its assets in order to fund a reorganization plan. Piccadilly sought a tax exemption under 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) which states that certain asset transfers "under a [confirmed Chapter 11] plan may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax." Florida vehemently opposed this exemption and sought to collect $32,000 in taxes from Piccadilly.

The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit all found in favor of Piccadilly, holding that 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) allowed courts to exempt from taxes pre-confirmation asset sales that were essential to the completion of a reorganization plan. In urging the Court to grant certiorari, Florida pointed to both Third and Fourth Circuit decisions holding that such pre-confirmation asset sales were subject to state taxation, while Piccadilly Cafeterias contended that these so-called "circuit splits" only involve a small handful of cases and require no resolution by the Court.

Question

Does 11 U.S.C. Section 1146(c), a provision of the Bankruptcy Code stating that certain asset transfers "under a [confirmed Chapter 11] plan may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax," prohibit states from imposing taxes on pre-confirmation asset sales that are essential to the completion of a reorganization plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Florida Department of Revenue, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

No. The Court held 7-2 that the plain meaning of the statute indicates that it only applies to confirmed asset sales, not "pre-confirmation" sales. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas noted Congress' use of the phrase "plan confirmed" in Sec. 1146(c), as well as the statute's placement in a sub- chapter titled "Postconfirmation Matters," to hold that the tax exemption should only be applied after a plan has been confirmed. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, interpreting this same language to mean that the tax break should apply to asset sales that are subsequently confirmed, even if they were not confirmed at the time the sales were made.

Virginia v. Moore

Mon, 14 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1082

Petitioner

Virginia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

David Lee Moore

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Monday, January 14, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Thomas C. Goldstein (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Virginia police stopped David Lee Moore after receiving a radio call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. State law specified the procedure for punishing that infraction: issuance of a citation and summons to appear in court. The officers instead decided to arrest Moore. After reading Moore his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

At trial court, Moore's attorney sought to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and Moore was convicted. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the introduction of the cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment require the suppression of evidence obtained incident to an arrest when the arrest violates a

provision of state law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Virginia, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

The Court held unanimously that the search did not violate Moore's constitutional rights. Writing for an eight justice majority (with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurring), Justice Antonin Scalia stated that the existence of probable cause gives an arresting officer the right to perform a reasonable search of the accused to ensure the officer's safety and to safeguard evidence. States may impose stricter search and seizure requirements, Scalia wrote, but "when states go above the Fourth Amendment minimum, the Constitution’s protections concerning search and seizure remain the same."

Dada v. Mukasey

Mon, 07 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1181

Petitioner

Samson Taiwo Dada

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Peter D. Keisler, Acting Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Monday, January 7, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2008

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Respondent)

Christopher J. Meade (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Samson Dada, a Nigerian citizen, entered the United States in 1998 and overstayed his temporary visa. Dada married a U.S. citizen which made him eligible for permanent residence under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Dada’s wife failed to provide the required documentation. In 2004 the government found Dada removable. An immigration judge granted Dada’s request for voluntary departure. Before the window to leave the country closed, Dada filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In so doing, he asked that the voluntary departure order be withdrawn, to avoid the 10-year bar on future re-entry that accompanies a failure to leave the country within the allotted time. The Bureau of Immigration Affairs denied the request.

Dada appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It upheld the denial. Because Dada’s voluntary departure period had expired, the appeals court found Dada subject to the 10-year bar on future re- entry.

Question

When an illegal resident agrees to voluntarily depart the United States and then files a motion to reopen removal proceedings, does the filing suspend the time period by which the illegal resident must depart the United States under the voluntary departure order?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Dada, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

No. Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by four other Justices, stated that an alien has two options in such a case: he may abide by the terms of the voluntary departure and leave the country on time, maintaining the re-entry perks, or withdraw the voluntary departure request and remain in the country to pursue the motion to reopen. If the alien chooses the second option, he may become subject to deportation proceedings. While the Court acknowledged that the opinion still leaves a difficult decision for aliens, it prevents them from reaping the benefits of the voluntary departure option while evading its terms to pursue continuing legal action against the government. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, arguing that once an alien agrees to depart voluntarily he should have no right to withdraw that agreement. Justice Samuel A. Alito also filed a separate dissent suggesting that it should be within the discretion of the Board of Immigration Appeals, not the Court, to permit or deny the withdrawal of an alien's voluntary departure agreement.

Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.

Tue, 09 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-43

Petitioner

Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, March 26, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 2008

Advocates

Stephen M. Shapiro (on behalf of the Respondents)

Thomas G. Hungar (for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondents)

Stanley M. Grossman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Stoneridge Investment Partners alleged that the cable company Charter Communications had fraudulently inflated the price of its stock. The alleged scheme involved a "sham transaction" in which Charter gave its equipment vendor, Scientific-Atlanta, above-normal payments for T.V. set-top boxes and the vendor then gave back the extra payments as advertising fees. Charter then fraudulently accounted the returned payments as revenue. Stoneridge sued both Charter and Scientific-Atlanta under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but the district court threw out the claim against Scientific- Atlanta. The court ruled that Stoneridge's claim against the vendor was only a claim for aiding and abetting fraud.

The Supreme Court had ruled in Central Bank of Denver v. First International Bank of Denver that Section 10(b) punishes only deceptive conduct itself, not aiding and abetting such conduct. However, the Court that secondary actors such as banks, lawyers, and accountants can be considered violators of Section 10(b) if they engage in deceptive conduct along with the primary actor. On appeal, Stoneridge argued that Scientific-Atlanta qualified as a primary violator of Section 10(b). Scientific-Atlanta countered that it had not participated in Charter's fraudulent accounting practices, and, in contrast to Charter, it had made no false public statements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for Scientific Atlanta. The Circuit Court held that the vendor could at most be accused of aiding and abetting Charter's deception, and such claims are not allowed under Section 10(b) according to the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank.

Question

Are claims for deceptive conduct under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 barred by the Court's decision in Central Bank v. First International Bank when the defendant engaged in fraudulent transactions designed to inflate a corporation's financial statements, but made no public statements concerning those transactions?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

The Court held that, under Central Bank and Section 10(b), securities fraud plaintiffs cannot sue "aiders and abettors" like Scientific-Atlanta. The Court noted Congress' subsequent failure to create a right of private action against aiders and abettors in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act for support of its position that no such right should be allowed in the present case. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, reading Central Bank as allowing the claim against Scientific-Atlanta because, in this case, it had actually undertaken plainly deceptive acts.

Begay v. United States

Tue, 15 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-11543

Petitioner

Larry Begay

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

Advocates

Margaret A. Katze (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Leondra R. Kruger (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 2004, New Mexico resident Larry Begay was arrested after brandishing and unsuccessfully shooting a rifle while begging his sister for money. Begay pleaded guilty to possessing the rifle. Prior to the firearm arrest, Begay had been convicted twelve times of driving while intoxicated. Under New Mexico law, each DWI conviction after the first three were considered felonies. The court concluded that the DWI convictions were violent felonies, triggering the federal career criminal law’s 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. A deeply divided court of appeals panel affirmed the decision to treat the DWIs as violent felonies.

Question

Does driving while intoxicated qualify as a violent felony for purposes of the federal career criminal law?

Conclusion

In a 6-3 vote, the Court held that Begay's DWI convictions did not qualify as "violent felonies" because they were too different from the violent felony examples provided by Congress in the Armed Career Criminal Act (such as burglary, arson and extortion). Therefore, Begay should not have been subject to the mandatory sentencing hike. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the majority opinion with Justice Antonin Scalia concurring and Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and David Souter, dissenting

Davis v. Federal Election Commission

Tue, 22 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-320

Petitioner

Federal Election Commission

Respondent

Jack Davis

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Argued

Tuesday, April 22, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Advocates

Andrew D. Herman (argued the cause for the appellant)

Paul D. Clement (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Jack Davis, a wealthy Democratic candidate for Congress from New York’s 26th Congressional District, brought this claim challenging the constitutionality of the so-called ‘Millionaire’s Amendment’ to the 2002 campaign finance law. Davis argued in the district court that the law, which basically raises the contribution cap for individuals running against self-financed candidates, violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection principle implicit in the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected both of these claims, stating first that the law did not implicate the First Amendment because it did not impede Davis’ ability to spend money in support of his message, noting that it actually led to a higher level of speech in the race overall. The district court similarly rejected Davis’ Fifth Amendment claim, reasoning that although Davis may have been held to higher reporting standards than his opponent, his disproportionate wealth meant that the two candidates were not similarly situated and, therefore, the Equal Protection Clause did not apply. The campaign finance law allows direct appeal to the Court, which will consider whether Davis has standing to bring the First Amendment claim before deciding the case on the merits.

Question

Does the Millionaire’s Amendment to the 2002 campaign finance law, which raises the contribution limit for those running against a self-financed candidate, violate free speech clause of the First Amendment and the equal protection principle of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Davis, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 2 U.S.C. 441

Yes. Although all nine Justices agreed that Davis had standing to argue his case before the Court, only a 5-4 majority held that the contribution limits violated the First Amendment. In his majority opinion, Justice Samuel Alito noted that the Court had never upheld the constitutionality of a law imposing different contribution limits for candidates competing against one another. Because the Court found the laws in violation of the First Amendment, it did not reach the question of whether the Fifth Amendment was also violated. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreeing with the majority that Davis had standing but citing the reasoning of the district court to argue that the contribution cap did not violated the First or Fifth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreeing with Justice Stevens's argument but basing it on slightly different grounds.

Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party

Mon, 01 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-713

Petitioner

Washington State Grange

Respondent

Washington State Republican Party, et al.

Consolidation

Washington, et al. v. Washington State Republican Party, et al., No. 06-730

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, February 26, 2007

Argued

Monday, October 1, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, March 18, 2008

Advocates

Robert M. McKenna (on behalf of the Petitioners)

John J. White, Jr. (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The State of Washington reconstructed its primary election system according to Initiative 872, which was passed into law by a majority general vote in 2004. The initiative was endorsed by the Washington State Grange and created a new "modified blanket primary" system where each candidate on the ballot could affiliate with the party of his choosing regardless of whether the party approved of his candidacy. Political parties claimed that this system violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association, arguing that control over which candidates to endorse constituted an essential function of association. The Grange argued that the primary was nonpartisan.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a District Court decision, ruling that since "party designation is a powerful, partisan message that voters may rely upon in casting a vote," Initiative 872 "constitutes a severe burden upon the parties' associational rights." (The case was consolidated with Washington v. Washington State Republican Party for argument before the Supreme Court.)

Question

Does Washington's "modified blanket primary" system violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of association by denying political parties control over which candidates to endorse?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Washington State Grange, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

In a 7-2 opinion, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and held the party affiliation provision constitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas explained that the state law never referred to the candidates as nominees of any particular party. Rather, the nominees were simply asserting which party they preferred to be associated with, and the Court found no convincing evidence that this association would lead voters to believe that the particular party actually endorsed the nominee. Chief Justice John G. Roberts concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy.

Arave v. Hoffman

Sat, 27 Apr 2013 07:56:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-110

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maxwell Hoffman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Decided

Monday, January 7, 2008

Facts of the Case

Maxwell Hoffman was charged with first-degree murder after he and another man severely injured a drug informant, fatally pelted her with boulders, and left her for dead. Hoffman’s assigned lawyer, who had never handled a capital case, advised him to reject a plea bargain deal in which he would be spared Idaho’s death penalty in exchange for a guilty plea. The attorney told Hoffman that because a federal appeals court had recently stricken Arizona’s identical death scheme, the Idaho law would soon be defunct and therefore could not be applied to him. Hoffman agreed to go to trial, where he was convicted and sentenced to death. However, despite the attorney’s prediction, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the death sentence. Hoffman eventually filed a habeas corpus petition alleging, among other things, that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel by advising him to go to trial based on a faulty legal prediction. The Ninth Circuit agreed and ordered that Hoffman be freed unless the state renewed its plea bargain offer.

Question

Has an attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel if he advises a client to turn down a guilty plea based on erroneous legal analysis, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arave, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

After the Court granted certiorari, Hoffman filed a motion to vacate the Ninth Circuit's decision and dismiss the case, abandoning his claim for ineffective assistance during plea bargaining. Hoffman no longer sought the relief ordered by the Ninth Circuit and instead wished to proceed with the resentencing ordered by the district court. The Court, in a per curiam opinion, granted Hoffman's motion and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit with the instructions that the district court should dismiss the ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining claim with prejudice.

Giles v. California

Tue, 22 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-6053

Petitioner

Dwayne Giles

Respondent

State of California

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 11, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, April 22, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Advocates

Marilyn G. Burkhardt (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Donald E. De Nicola (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

When Dwayne Giles was tried in state court for the murder of his ex- girlfriend, he claimed self-defense. Giles stated that he had heard her vow to hurt him and a friend, and that she had previously shot a man and threatened people with knives. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a conversation between Giles' ex-girlfriend and police in which she claimed that he had assaulted her and threatened to kill her. The district court eventually convicted Giles of murder.

On appeal, Giles argued that use of the police conversation violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, namely, his deceased ex- girlfriend. The California Supreme Court held that Giles had waived this right because he was the cause of his ex-girlfriend's absence. Although this exclusion was justified under common law rules of "forfeiture by wrongdoing", the Supreme Court had greatly constrained the admissibility of such evidence in its 2004 holding in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford essentially wiped out the admissibility of such out-of-court statements unless the testimony could be subject to cross-examination at trial, an option that would be impossible under these circumstances. This case gives the Court an opportunity to expand on its decision in Crawford and to apply it to a situation where the wrongdoing that kept the witness from appearing in court was not motivated by a desire to prevent the witness' testimony.

Question

Are a criminal defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment violated when the common law "forfeiture by wrongdoing" doctrine is applied to allow out-of-court statements made by a witness, absent due to the defendant's own conduct, into evidence without giving defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the absent witness?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Giles, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Confront and Cross-Examine, Compulsory Process

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception only applies to situations where the defendant causes the witness' absence with the intention of preventing that witness from testifying at trial. Without this intention, any act by the defendant making the witness unavailable does not waive that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witness, and therefore any out-of-court statements made by the witness are inadmissible as evidence. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion stressing his belief that statements such as those made by the witness in this case should not implicate the Confrontation Clause at all because the police questioning was not a "formalized dialogue." Justice Samuel Alito also wrote a concurring opinion suggesting that the witness' statements, in his view, did not fall within the Confrontation Clause but noting that neither party had made this argument before the Court. Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred in all parts of the majority opinion except one section denouncing the dissenting argument. Justice Souter stated that he did not find the dissent as wrongheaded as the majority suggested.

The dissent, written by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Anthony Kennedy, argued that a defendant loses his right to confrontation when he makes a witness unavailable due to his own wrongdoing, even if he did not act with the specific intention of preventing her from testifying at trial.

Taylor v. Sturgell

Wed, 16 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-371

Petitioner

Brent Taylor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

553 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 11, 2008

Argued

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Advocates

Adina H. Rosenbaum (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Catherine E. Stetson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Greg Herrick, the owner of one of two F-45s, a rare 1930s vintage airplane, in existence filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking the plans and specifications for the craft from the Federal Aviation Administration. After the FAA refused to turn over the plans as "protected trade secrets," Herrick filed suit against the FAA to recover the plans. The district court found for the FAA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Subsequently, roughly a month later, Brent Taylor, represented by Herrick's attorney, filed another FOIA request seeking the plans. When the request was again denied, Taylor also filed suit in federal court in the District of Columbia.

The district court determined that Taylor had been "virtually represented" by Herrick in the first suit and therefore could not pursue the second suit in federal court. This judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In seeking Supreme Court review, Taylor argued the D.C. Circuit's finding that Taylor and Herrick enjoyed a close enough relationship for virtual representation to apply conflicted with several other circuits requiring a much closer nexus to block the second claim. Opposing certiorari, Fairchild Corp. (the airplane manufacturer) arguing on behalf of the FAA, claimed that Taylor had overstated the circuit splits. It also pointed out that, because Taylor and Herrick were collaborating on the plane restoration and were represented by the same attorney, the logical conclusion was that they were attempting to relitigate the same issue.

Question

Does the dismissal of a claim based on a Freedom of Information Act request preclude a second individual, based on the concept of "virtual representation," from bringing a similar claim when both claims involve the same project and the parties to each suit are represented by the same attorney?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Taylor, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that such "nonparty preclusion" runs up against the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court." Virtual representation should only be applied rarely and under certain exceptions to the general rule, none of which the Court found applicable in this case. The D.C. Circuit's decision was vacated and the case sent back to the district court for a new trial.

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.

Tue, 04 Dec 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-179

Petitioner

Charles R. Riegel, et ux.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Medtronic, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Monday, June 25, 2007

Argued

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Advocates

Allison M. Zieve (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

During Charles Riegel's angioplasty, his surgeon used an Evergreen Balloon Catheter to dilate his coronary artery. The catheter burst, causing extreme complications. Riegel sued the manufacturer, Medtronic, for negligence in the design, manufacture, and labeling of the device. Medtronic argued that Riegel could not bring these state-law negligence claims because they were preempted by Section 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The MDA establishes a federal regulatory process for ensuring the safety of medical devices, and it provides that no state may set requirements that differ from or add to the federal ones. The District Court dismissed Riegel's claims as preempted by the MDA.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the suits based on medical devices like the Evergreen Balloon Catheter are preempted by the MDA. The catheter had been through the exceptionally rigorous "premarket approval" (PMA) process, by which federal regulators ensured that it met federal requirements. To allow state common-law suits for PMA-approved devices, the court ruled, would be to add a state requirement to the regulatory process despite the MDA's preemption clause.

Question

Does Section 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempt state-law claims seeking damages for injuries caused by medical devices that received premarket approval from the Food and Drug Administration.

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Medtronic, Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 360

The Court, in an 8-1 decision, affirmed the Second Circuit and granted summary judgment in favor of Medtronic. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, noted that the MDA pre-empted state common law claims for defective devices such as this one. Riegel's negligence and strict liability claims relating to the safety and effectiveness of the catheter were based on New York's requirements and were therefore "different from, or in addition to" the federal requirements. Only Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented.

Greenlaw v. United States

Tue, 15 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-330

Petitioner

Michael Greenlaw, aka Mikey

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, January 4, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2008

Advocates

Deanne E. Maynard (on behalf of the Respondent)

Amy Howe (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Jay T. Jorgensen (as amicus curiae, in support of the Judgment below)

Facts of the Case

When Michael Greenlaw was convicted of several drug and firearm offenses in federal court, the prosecution argued that he should receive a mandatory minimum sentencing hike because he had been convicted of two counts under the federal gun law. The district judge, in a decision incorrect under the Supreme Court's holding in Deal v. United States, reasoned that the mandatory minimum should not apply because the second offense was not the result of a separate, pre-existing indictment.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit vacated the sentence and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the mandatory minimum. In seeking certiorari, Greenlaw argued that the Eight Circuit had ignored substantial high court precedent holding that an appellate court may not order a higher criminal sentence without a government request to do so. Greenlaw further sought clarification of two related issues: whether the lack of a government appeal deprives the appellate court of authority as a matter of jurisdiction or merely as a custom of practice, and whether such appellate court discretion is allowable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which allows courts to consider plain errors even when the parties do not raise them. The Solicitor General, while agreeing with Greenlaw that the Eighth Circuit erred, urged the Court to grant certiorari and remand the case for further briefing in order to give the appellate court an opportunity to revisit its holding.

Question

Do federal appellate courts have the authority to hike a criminal defendant's sentence in the absence of a government request to do so?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Greenlaw, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court stated that the Eighth Circuit could not order the district court to increase Greenlaw's sentence without a request from the government to do so. The Court pointed to several of its precedents for the rule that a remedy in favor the appellee, in this case the government, can only be justified if the appellee brings a cross-appeal. Because the government did not cross-appeal in this case, the Eight Circuit overstepped its bounds by ordering the sentencing hike. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens and in part by Justice Stephen Breyer, dissented, arguing that the cross-appeal rule was merely a rule of practice for the appellate courts, not a limitation on their power. Although Breyer joined parts of the dissent, he ultimately sided with the majority in a concurring opinion, recognizing that the cross-appeal rule is merely one of practice but finding no grounds on which to make an exception to that rule in this case.

Indiana v. Edwards

Wed, 26 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Location

Marion County Superior Court: Criminal Division

200 E. Washington St. #T-1221 # T-1221" IN

Indianapolis, IN I46204

United States

39° 46' 1.2" N, 86° 9' 10.8" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-208

Petitioner

Indiana

Respondent

Ahmad Edwards

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Friday, December 7, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Advocates

Mark T. Stancil (on behalf of the Respondent)

Thomas M. Fisher (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Ahmad Edwards was arrested in Indiana after stealing a pair of shoes and shooting an FBI agent, a store security guard, and a bystander. Edwards was initially found mentally incompetent but, after five years of psychiatric evaluation, was put on trial for attempted murder. After his first trial resulted in a hung jury, Edwards asked to represent himself at his retrial. This request was initially granted by the trial court but was overturned when the court found that, although Edwards was competent to stand trial, he was unable to conduct a coherent defense. This ruling was supported by Edwards' filing of rambling and irrelevant documents during the proceedings.

After his conviction on all counts, Edwards appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation had been abrogated by the trial court. The Indiana high court noted that two Supreme Court decisions, Godinez v. Moran 509 U.S. 389 (1993), which held that a defendant is competent to defend himself if he is competent to stand trial, and Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which held that a defendant need only be "literate, competent, and understanding" to represent himself, argued in favor of Edwards' right to self-representation while another, Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California 528 U.S. 152 (2000), holding that the modern availability of lawyers undercuts the need for self- representation, argued against it. The Indiana Supreme Court eventually held that Godinez and Faretta required it to overturn the trial court's decision.

Question

Does the Court's prior ruling that a criminal defendant need only be "literate, competent, and understanding" to represent himself at trial set an appropriate standard for defining that defendant's mental competence to invoke his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation when he is otherwise unable to conduct a coherent defense?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Indiana, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not forbid states from insisting upon representation for those competent to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. The Court noted that Faretta only affirmed the right to self representation when the individual "voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so," and therefore does not apply when that individual's mental competency is called into question. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, stating that in his view the Constitution does not permit a state to substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant’s right to make his own case before the jury, even if the defendant does have questionable mental competence.

Chamber of Commerce v. Brown

Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-939

Petitioner

Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Granted

Tuesday, November 20, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, March 19, 2008

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Advocates

Thomas G. Hungar (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Michael H. Gottesman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Willis J. Goldsmith (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After the California legislature passed laws prohibiting the use of state funds to "assist, promote, or deter union organizing," a group of California companies brought suit claiming the state laws were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 7. The Act provides that companies' anti-labor speech can only be considered evidence of unfair labor practice if it threatens or coerces workers. The California companies argued that the state laws infringe upon their "safe harbor" for anti-labor speech embodied in the Act.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after entering two panel decisions holding the California law preempted, issued a split en banc opinion holding that it was not. The Second Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The Court's decision in this case will affect roughly a dozen other states currently considering adopting legislation substantially similar to the California law.

Question

Does the National Labor Relations Act, which states that companies' anti-labor speech can only be considered unfair labor practice if it threatens or coerces workers, preempt state laws prohibiting the use of state funds to "assist, promote, or deter union organizing," even if the public funds are transparently segregated?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Chamber of Commerce, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held the California laws preempted by the National Labor Relations Act because the state laws regulated within "a zone protected and reserved for market freedom." Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, viewed the Act as showing a "congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management." Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the California laws dealt with funding, not regulation, and did not impermissibly discourage labor-related speech. Employers are still free under the laws to spend their own money on such speech.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker

Wed, 27 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

07-219

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

554 U.S. ___ (2008)

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (on behalf of the Respondents)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground in Alaska’s Prince William Sound in 1989 while under the command of Joseph Hazelwood, a relapsed alcoholic. Exxon knew that Hazelwood had resumed drinking but did not relieve him of his post, and the ship eventually spilled 11 million gallons of oil into the ecologically sensitive sound. The jury calculated compensatory damages at $287 million, and then awarded $5 billion in punitive damages. The punitive award has been reviewed three times by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ultimately settled on a $2.5 billion figure. In a dissent from the full court’s denial of rehearing in the third review of the award, Judge Alex Kozinski posited that any award, no matter its size, violated the maritime law rule that a ship owner need not pay for the reckless actions of an employee.

Question

Does maritime law permit judges to award punitive damages for employee misdeeds and does maritime law allow judge-made remedies when Congress has not authorized them?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Exxon Shipping Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

Maybe and yes. With Justice Samuel Alito taking no part in the decision because he owns Exxon stock, the Court split evenly 4-4 on the issue of whether judges may award punitive damages against a company for employee misdeeds. Therefore, the Court left the Ninth Circuit's ruling that they can undisturbed, but noted that this affirmation could not be used as precedent because it merely reflected an even split in the Court. On the second issue, a 5-4 majority held that judges are free to create remedies in maritime cases where Congress has not legislated in the area. However, this freedom can be lost if Congress passes legislation restraining such judicial activism. Justice David Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court's application of punitive damages precedent but arguing that those prior holdings were in error. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that Congress, not the courts, should be the sole body entrusted with determining the permissibility of punitive damages. Justice Stephen Breyer also concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the punitive damages in this case should have been reduced.

Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.

Wed, 07 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-989

Petitioner

Hall Street Associates, L.L.C.

Respondent

Mattel, Inc.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, May 29, 2007

Argued

Wednesday, November 7, 2007

Decided

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Beth S. Brinkmann (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Toy manufacturer Mattel was sued by its landlord Hall Street Associates in a dispute over a property lease. After the litigation went to federal court both parties agreed to resolve the case by arbitration according to the procedures outlined in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Atypically, the parties' arbitration agreement stipulated that the District Court could override the arbitrator's decision if "the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous." This provision of the agreement granted the federal courts a much broader role in supervising the arbitration than is specifically granted in the FAA. The Act explicitly mentions only a narrow set of circumstances under which courts can override an arbitration award, such as corruption, partiality, or misbehavior on the part of the arbitrator.

The arbitrator heard the parties' arguments and handed down a decision in favor of Mattel. Hall sought review from the District Court, and that court found that the arbitrator's decision contained legally erroneous conclusions. Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled for Hall Street, and the District Court affirmed.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the original arbitration award favoring Mattel must stand. Even if the arbitrator did make legal errors, it was not the place of the courts to review the soundness of the arbitrator's decision. The Ninth Circuit viewed the FAA's list of circumstances meriting judicial review as an exclusive list. As far as the original arbitration agreement expanded the scope of judicial review of the arbitration, the agreement could not be enforced.

Question

Can a federal court enforce an arbitration agreement that provides for more expansive judicial review of an arbitration award than the narrow standard of review provided for in the Federal Arbitration Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Mattel, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 9

In a 6-3 opinion, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling and held that the provisions of the FAA are exclusive and cannot be expanded through contractual agreement. Writing for the majority, Justice David Souter pointed to words such as "must" and "unless" in the FAA as evidence that its provisions were intended to be mandatory and incapable of modification by the parties. Therefore, the Court upheld the arbitrator's award in favor of Mattel.

Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the FAA's central purpose-ensuring the enforcement of arbitration agreements-made judicial review necessary in this case. Justice Stephen Breyer also filed a separate dissent.

Preston v. Ferrer

Mon, 14 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

06-1463

Petitioner

Arnold M. Preston

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alex E. Ferrer

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

552 U.S. ___ (2008)

Granted

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Argued

Monday, January 14, 2008

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Advocates

G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Joseph D. Schleimer (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 2005, the former manager for Alex Ferrer, television’s Judge Alex, sued him to recover alleged unpaid commissions. The management contract at issue specifically called for all such disputes to be arbitrated out of court. Judge Alex responded by filing a complaint with California’s labor commissioner charging that the management contract was illegal because the manager had actually been serving as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of California law. The commissioner, who has exclusive jurisdiction over talent agency disputes, said that he lacked authority to stop the arbitration. When Judge Alex filed suit in state court, the court stopped the arbitration.

Question

Must a contract dispute to go arbitration pursuant to the document’s arbitration clause when an administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction over the disputed issue?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Preston, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

The Court disagreed with the California Labor Commissioner's assessment and allowed the arbitration to continue. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for an 8-1 majority, stated that the California law granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Commission was superseded by the Federal Arbitration Act because the parties to this case had agreed to arbitrate any contractual disputes. Therefore, it was the function of an arbitrator, not the Labor Commission, to determine the legality of the management contract. Justice Clarence Thomas issued the sole dissent.