http://www.oyez.org/cases/2007/podcast U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en The Oyez Project at Chicago-Kent http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1505/argument When the New York-based federal research laboratory Knolls Atomic Power Lab instituted a downsizing program, it asked supervisors to rank employees based on three factors: performance, flexibility, and the criticality of their skills, and then to add points for years of service in order to determine who would be dismissed. Of the thirty-one employees who were let go, all but one were over the age of forty. Twenty-six of these dismissed employees filed suit against Knolls for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A jury found for the employees and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. However the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment, relying on its 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson to hold that "an employer is not liable under the ADEA so long as the challenged employment action, in relying on specific non-age factors, constitutes a reasonable means to the employer's legitimate goals." On remand, the Second Circuit vacated its previous decision and held that the employees had failed to carry their burden of proving the evaluation system unreasonable. In seeking Supreme Court review, the employees argued that it should be Knolls, not them, who must prove the reasonableness of an action that would otherwise be prohibited. Wed, 23 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56348 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_923/argument Wanda Glenn, a long-time employee of Sears and manager of its women's department, was covered by the company's long-term disability plan. In 2000, Glenn took medical leave from Sears based on an ailing heart condition and submitted a disability claim under her ERISA plan. Metlife, the insurance carrier, approved the claim and told Glenn to seek social security payments which could then be deducted from her Metlife payments. However, after an administrative law judge determined, based in part on information provided by Metlife, that Glenn was disabled and eligible for social security payments, Metlife revised its own opinion and decided Glenn was no longer eligible for disability benefits. Glenn brought suit against Metlife in district court, where Metlife's change of heart was vindicated, however the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. In making its decision, the Sixth Circuit took into account Metlife's dual role as both the entity determining when disability awards should be paid out as well as the entity actually funding those payments, noting the possible conflicts of interest that could arise based on this arrangement. In seeking Supreme Court review, Metlife drew attention to circuit splits on the issue of whether these conflicts should be taken into account in determining the validity of Metlife's decisions on disability. In addition to the conflict of interest argument, Glenn pointed out that Metlife's flip-flop did not take into account certain of Glenn's doctor evaluations and that Metlife's representations to the administrative judge were at odds with its own eventual determination that she was not disabled. Wed, 23 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56324 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_6053/argument When Dwayne Giles was tried in state court for the murder of his ex- girlfriend, he claimed self-defense. Giles stated that he had heard her vow to hurt him and a friend, and that she had previously shot a man and threatened people with knives. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a conversation between Giles' ex-girlfriend and police in which she claimed that he had assaulted her and threatened to kill her. The district court eventually convicted Giles of murder. On appeal, Giles argued that use of the police conversation violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, namely, his deceased ex- girlfriend. The California Supreme Court held that Giles had waived this right because he was the cause of his ex-girlfriend's absence. Although this exclusion was justified under common law rules of "forfeiture by wrongdoing", the Supreme Court had greatly constrained the admissibility of such evidence in its 2004 holding in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford essentially wiped out the admissibility of such out-of-court statements unless the testimony could be subject to cross-examination at trial, an option that would be impossible under these circumstances. This case gives the Court an opportunity to expand on its decision in Crawford and to apply it to a situation where the wrongdoing that kept the witness from appearing in court was not motivated by a desire to prevent the witness' testimony. Tue, 22 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56417 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_320/argument Jack Davis, a wealthy Democratic candidate for Congress from New York’s 26th Congressional District, brought this claim challenging the constitutionality of the so-called ‘Millionaire’s Amendment’ to the 2002 campaign finance law. Davis argued in the district court that the law, which basically raises the contribution cap for individuals running against self-financed candidates, violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection principle implicit in the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected both of these claims, stating first that the law did not implicate the First Amendment because it did not impede Davis’ ability to spend money in support of his message, noting that it actually led to a higher level of speech in the race overall. The district court similarly rejected Davis’ Fifth Amendment claim, reasoning that although Davis may have been held to higher reporting standards than his opponent, his disproportionate wealth meant that the two candidates were not similarly situated and, therefore, the Equal Protection Clause did not apply. The campaign finance law allows direct appeal to the Court, which will consider whether Davis has standing to bring the First Amendment claim before deciding the case on the merits. Tue, 22 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56414 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_552/argument In 1996, the Federal Communications Commission moved to require long-distance carriers to compensate pay-phone companies for so-called coinless phone calls. Last year, the Supreme Court ruled in Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., that pay-phone operators could sue for greater compensation. This case arose when APCC Services brought such a suit against Sprint seeking compensation for coinless long-distance calls. Sprint argued that APCC had no stake in the outcome of the case because, under the terms of the assignment, any compensation from a favorable judgment or settlement would go directly to the pay-phone companies, not "intermediary" companies such as APCC. The district court initially dismissed APCC's suit, but the court eventually reversed itself, concluding that it was sufficient that the assignment transferred legal title to the claim rather than merely transferring power of attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed, concluding that, as a matter of law, the assignment of a legal right to bring a claim gives the assignee a personal stake in the litigation sufficient to confer standing. Mon, 21 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56366 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_474/argument Anup Engquist, a woman of Indian descent, brought this action against the Oregon Department of Agriculture alleging that a co-worker at the Department harassed her and eventually engineered her termination. Although Engquist asserted numerous claims, a jury in the federal district court only found in her favor on her equal protection, substantive due process, and intentional interference with employment claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck those jury verdicts. Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had previously dealt with such "class of one" equal protection claims eight years ago in a case, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, involving a village resident suing the village for unjustified zoning decisions, it refused to apply that short, two-page opinion to Engquist's claim. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Olech opinion may only apply when the government is in the role of regulator and did not clarify whether it would also apply in an employment context such as this one. In seeking Court review, Engquist noted the pervasive splits in the circuits regarding the proper allocation of the Court's decision in Olech, while Oregon claimed that Olech should be construed narrowly so as to avoid a deluge of petty cases against the government. Oregon also pointed out that even if the case were to be heard, Oregon would have qualified immunity and Engquist would necessarily lose. Mon, 21 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56319 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_371/argument Greg Herrick, the owner of one of two F-45s, a rare 1930s vintage airplane, in existence filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking the plans and specifications for the craft from the Federal Aviation Administration. After the FAA refused to turn over the plans as "protected trade secrets," Herrick filed suit against the FAA to recover the plans. The district court found for the FAA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Subsequently, roughly a month later, Brent Taylor, represented by Herrick's attorney, filed another FOIA request seeking the plans. When the request was again denied, Taylor also filed suit in federal court in the District of Columbia. The district court determined that Taylor had been "virtually represented" by Herrick in the first suit and therefore could not pursue the second suit in federal court. This judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In seeking Supreme Court review, Taylor argued the D.C. Circuit's finding that Taylor and Herrick enjoyed a close enough relationship for virtual representation to apply conflicted with several other circuits requiring a much closer nexus to block the second claim. Opposing certiorari, Fairchild Corp. (the airplane manufacturer) arguing on behalf of the FAA, claimed that Taylor had overstated the circuit splits. It also pointed out that, because Taylor and Herrick were collaborating on the plane restoration and were represented by the same attorney, the logical conclusion was that they were attempting to relitigate the same issue. Wed, 16 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56419 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_343/argument A Louisiana court found Patrick Kennedy guilty of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter. Louisiana law allows the district attorney to seek the death penalty for defendants found guilty of raping children under the age of twelve. The prosecutor sought, and the jury awarded, such a sentence; Kennedy appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the death sentence, noting that although the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down capital punishment for rape of an adult woman in Coker v. Georgia, that ruling did not apply when the victim was a child. Rather the Louisiana high court applied a balancing test set out by the Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, first examining whether there is a national consensus on the punishment and then considering whether the court would find the punishment excessive. In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court felt that the adoption of similar laws in five other states, coupled with the unique vulnerability of children, justified imposing the death penalty. In seeking certiorari, Kennedy argued that five states do not constitute a "national consensus" for the purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, that Coker v. Georgia should apply to all rapes regardless of the age of the victim, and that the law was unfair in its application, singling out black child rapists for death at a significantly higher rate than whites. Wed, 16 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56358 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_7517/argument In 2004, Richard Irizarry pleaded guilty to threatening his ex-wife. The district court sentenced Irizarry to five years, the maximum sentence allowed by law. The court imposed this sentence, which is six months longer than the sentence prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, because it felt Irizarry was likely to continue to threaten his ex-wife. Irizarry appealed, arguing that the district court violated Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not giving advance notice that it was considering a ground for departure not identified in the presentence report or a prehearing government submission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this claim, stating that the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in U.S. v. Booker had made the guidelines advisory as opposed to mandatory. In imposing a harsher sentence than that suggested by the federal guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, the district judge had merely varied the federal rules, not departed from them. Tue, 15 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56307 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_330/argument When Michael Greenlaw was convicted of several drug and firearm offenses in federal court, the prosecution argued that he should receive a mandatory minimum sentencing hike because he had been convicted of two counts under the federal gun law. The district judge, in a decision incorrect under the Supreme Court's holding in Deal v. United States, reasoned that the mandatory minimum should not apply because the second offense was not the result of a separate, pre-existing indictment. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit vacated the sentence and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the mandatory minimum. In seeking certiorari, Greenlaw argued that the Eight Circuit had ignored substantial high court precedent holding that an appellate court may not order a higher criminal sentence without a government request to do so. Greenlaw further sought clarification of two related issues: whether the lack of a government appeal deprives the appellate court of authority as a matter of jurisdiction or merely as a custom of practice, and whether such appellate court discretion is allowable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which allows courts to consider plain errors even when the parties do not raise them. The Solicitor General, while agreeing with Greenlaw that the Eighth Circuit erred, urged the Court to grant certiorari and remand the case for further briefing in order to give the appellate court an opportunity to revisit its holding. Tue, 15 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56423 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_411/argument The Long family, members of the Sioux nation, owned a cattle company that had been doing business with the Plains Commerce Bank for seven years when the family patriarch died. Because Plains Commerce was reluctant to grant operating loans to younger generation family members, it struck a deal with the Longs agreeing to provide the operating loans if the Longs deeded their farmland and house to the bank. According to the Longs the bank never followed through on its promise to provide the operating loans, and after the bank attempted to foreclose on the land the Longs brought suit in a local tribal court seeking a temporary restraining order blocking the land transfer as well as charging the bank with tortuous discrimination. The tribal court returned an award of $700,000 for the Longs, after which Plains Commerce filed suit in federal district court claiming that the tribal court had improperly exercised jurisdiction over the case. The district court decided that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In seeking Supreme Court review, Plains Commerce argued that the tribal court should not have had jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit erred in deciding so, because the claim did not fit into one of the exceptions granting such jurisdiction set forth by the Supreme Court in _Montana v. U.S. _ On the other hand, the Longs argued that federal courts whose geographic reach encompasses tribal lands have repeatedly allowed tribal courts to adjudicate civil suits against non-members who voluntarily did business with members. Mon, 14 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56376 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_210/argument Property owners in Cook County, Illinois neglected to pay their tax bills and the county acquired liens on their real estate. John Bridge and Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. mailed competing bids for the real estate liens when they were auctioned off by the county. Property liens are distributed proportionally to the parties seeking the lowest penalty from the original owner. After Bridge and Phoenix tied for the best bid, they were required to mail affidavits to the county stating that they were bidding in their own names and were not related to any other bidders. Subsequently, Phoenix filed suit against Bridge claiming the affidavits he sent were false and hid the fact that he was actually in collusion with other bidders, thereby obtaining more than his fair share of the liens. The district court held Phoenix lacked standing because Bridge had made the false statements to the county, not Phoenix. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Phoenix had suffered injury in fact proximately caused by Bridge. In seeking certiorari, Bridge noted splits between the circuits on the issue of whether a plaintiff must plead and prove reliance on a false statement in a RICO claim. Although Phoenix suggested that proximate cause, not reliance or standing, was the ultimate issue in this case, the Court has decided to frame its review around the reliance issue. Mon, 14 Apr 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56309 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_312/argument In 2003, Piccadilly Cafeterias filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in federal court in Florida asking the bankruptcy court for permission to auction off its assets in order to fund a reorganization plan. Piccadilly sought a tax exemption under 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) which states that certain asset transfers "under a [confirmed Chapter 11] plan may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax." Florida vehemently opposed this exemption and sought to collect $32,000 in taxes from Piccadilly. The bankruptcy court, the district court, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit all found in favor of Piccadilly, holding that 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) allowed courts to exempt from taxes pre-confirmation asset sales that were essential to the completion of a reorganization plan. In urging the Court to grant certiorari, Florida pointed to both Third and Fourth Circuit decisions holding that such pre-confirmation asset sales were subject to state taxation, while Piccadilly Cafeterias contended that these so-called "circuit splits" only involve a small handful of cases and require no resolution by the Court. Wed, 26 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56404 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_208/argument Ahmad Edwards was arrested in Indiana after stealing a pair of shoes and shooting an FBI agent, a store security guard, and a bystander. Edwards was initially found mentally incompetent but, after five years of psychiatric evaluation, was put on trial for attempted murder. After his first trial resulted in a hung jury, Edwards asked to represent himself at his retrial. This request was initially granted by the trial court but was overturned when the court found that, although Edwards was competent to stand trial, he was unable to conduct a coherent defense. This ruling was supported by Edwards' filing of rambling and irrelevant documents during the proceedings. After his conviction on all counts, Edwards appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation had been abrogated by the trial court. The Indiana high court noted that two Supreme Court decisions, Godinez v. Moran 509 U.S. 389 (1993), which held that a defendant is competent to defend himself if he is competent to stand trial, and Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which held that a defendant need only be "literate, competent, and understanding" to represent himself, argued in favor of Edwards' right to self-representation while another, Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California 528 U.S. 152 (2000), holding that the modern availability of lawyers undercuts the need for self- representation, argued against it. The Indiana Supreme Court eventually held that Godinez and Faretta required it to overturn the trial court's decision. Wed, 26 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56425 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_455/argument In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "Millennium Bomber," was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent. Ressam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such "in relation to" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits. Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56354 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1666/argument In 2005, Mohammad Munaf was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping by U.S. military officers acting as part of a multinational force in Iraq. Munaf's sister petitioned on his behalf for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia. Soon after the petition was filed, Munaf was informed that he would be tried in an Iraqi court and transferred to Iraqi custody if convicted. Munaf filed a temporary restraining order attempting to block custody transfer. After the Iraqi court sentenced him to death and the district court dismissed his case for lack of jurisdiction, Munaf appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit which granted an injunction against the transfer. However, the D.C. Circuit, like the district court, eventually concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over Munaf's claim, basing its decision largely on the Court's ruling in Hirota v. MacArthur 338 U.S. 197 (1948). That decision prohibited Japanese citizens held abroad by U.S. troops from filing habeas petitions to challenge sentences handed down by a military tribunal sitting in Japan but including U.S. military personnel. Petitioner urges the Court to set aside Hirota and its ruling and to base its reasoning on a string of cases reaching the opposite result. The case will be consolidated and heard along with another D.C. case, Geren v. Omar, 07-394, in which the D.C. Circuit allowed a habeas petition by a U.S. citizen held in Iraq because he had not yet been charged or convicted by an Iraqi court. Tue, 25 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56313 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_308/argument In 2000, the IRS announced it was admitting the unconstitutionality of a 1978 coal export tax. In response, Clintwood Elkhorn Mining brought suit to recover funds paid, plus interest, under the unconstitutional tax scheme between the years 1994 and 1999. Clintwood sought recovery under the Export Clause of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C Section 1491, which applies a six-year statute of limitations to claims and makes no mention of interest payments. The government argued that such claims must be brought under the Tax Code, which allows interest but applies a three-year statute of limitations. Both the Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit allowed the Tucker Act claims, but the circuit court overruled the federal claims court's decision denying interest payments. In urging the Court to review both conclusions, the government contended that the Federal Circuit's ruling was at odds with other circuit decisions prohibiting Tucker Act claims under similar circumstances. Mon, 24 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56364 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_11429/argument When Keith Burgess pleaded guilty to a drug distribution charge in 2003, the government requested that his statutory minimum sentence be increased from ten to twenty years. The government based this request on 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A), which requires such a sentencing hike for defendants with prior felony drug convictions. The statute defined "felony drug offense" as any felony under any provision of the statute or any other federal law. Burgess argued that this definition conflicts with 21 U.S.C. Section 802(13) which requires that a felony drug offense be punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. Therefore, any enhancement of his sentence must be barred unless both statutory definitions are fulfilled. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Burgess' argument, the D.C. Circuit reached the opposite conclusion based on similar facts in 2004. Mon, 24 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56372 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_77/argument In 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the new state law failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama residents, brought this suit in federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against the Governor of Alabama. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that because the local law was the most recent precleared practice put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that should have been precleared before being implemented. Mon, 24 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56311 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_939/argument After the California legislature passed laws prohibiting the use of state funds to "assist, promote, or deter union organizing," a group of California companies brought suit claiming the state laws were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 7. The Act provides that companies' anti-labor speech can only be considered evidence of unfair labor practice if it threatens or coerces workers. The California companies argued that the state laws infringe upon their "safe harbor" for anti-labor speech embodied in the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after entering two panel decisions holding the California law preempted, issued a split en banc opinion holding that it was not. The Second Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The Court's decision in this case will affect roughly a dozen other states currently considering adopting legislation substantially similar to the California law. Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56427 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1717/argument Richlin Security Service contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guards at Los Angeles International Airport. After discovering that the guards had been misclassified by the federal government and subsequently underpaid for a period of years, Richlin brought a successful suit to recover the lost wages. In seeking reimbursement for fees associated with the proceedings, Richlin sought to recover fees for paralegal services at market rates. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 504, Richlin was entitled to "fees and other expenses incurred in the proceedings." Based on this language, the Board of Review determined that paralegal fees should be billed as a calculable cost to the firm and, therefore, should not be recoverable at market rates. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this decision, noting that the lack of a cap for paralegal fees could entice legal professionals to shift much of the work to them in order to maximize profits. Petitioners note, in urging the Court to grant certiorari, that a previous Court decision, Missouri v. Jenkins 491 U.S. 274 (1989), as well as several Eleventh Circuit decisions have reached the opposite result and have awarded paralegal fees at market rates. Wed, 19 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56338 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_290/argument For the first time in seventy years, the Court heard a case regarding the central meaning of the Second Amendment and its relation to gun control laws. After the District of Columbia passed legislation barring the registration of handguns, requiring licenses for all pistols, and mandating that all legal firearms must be kept unloaded and disassembled or trigger locked, a group of private gun-owners brought suit claiming the laws violated their Second Amendment right to bear arms. The federal trial court in Washington D.C. refused to grant the plaintiffs relief, holding that the Second Amendment applies only to militias, such as the National Guard, and not to private gun ownership. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed, voting two to one that the Second Amendment does in fact protect private gun owners such as plaintiffs. Petitioners agree with the trial court's decision that the Second Amendment applies only to militias, and further argue that (a) the Second Amendment should not apply to D.C. because it is a federal enclave rather than a state, and (b) that the D.C. legislation merely regulates, rather than prohibits, gun ownership. Respondents, although disagreeing on the merits, have also urged the Court to review the case in order to clearly define the relationship between federal gun control laws and the Second Amendment. Tue, 18 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56330 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1204/argument The case arises from competing claims to more than $30 million, the rewards of an investment former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos made with Merrill Lynch and subsequently misappropriated. A Philippine agency charged with recovering the funds, several Marcos family creditors, and human rights victims who had already secured a judgment against Marcos' estate each laid claim to the money, prompting Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action to settle all of the claims in one case. The Philippine government, acting in concert with the recovery agency, claimed that it had sovereign immunity from suit and, because it was an indispensable party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), justice required that the case be stayed and brought before a special Philippine court established to return such misappropriated funds to the public treasury. However, the district court continued to adjudicate the case, eventually awarding the assets to the creditors. The Ninth Circuit upheld the award, noting that the government's claim was barred by the applicable Philippine statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit further held that the "equity and good conscience" requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) did not require the Philippine government's participation in the case. In its petition for certiorari, the Philippine government argued that the award of assets undermined the comity principles of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) by not including the government as an indispensable party. Mon, 17 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56326 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_440/argument Walter Rothgery was arrested in Texas as a felon in possession of a firearm. Rothgery was taken before a judge for processing and, upon learning that seeking legal assistance would delay the proceedings, waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. No prosecutor was present at this hearing. Rothgery posted bail and was released, but was rearrested after a grand jury indictment several months later hiked his bail to a sum he could not afford. Throughout this entire period Rothgery continued to pursue legal counsel and only obtained such counsel approximately one week after the grand jury indictment. Rothgery's attorney produced evidence that Rothgery was in fact not a felon and he was released from custody. Rothgery brought suit against Gillespie County, TX for violating his civil rights by not appointing counsel as required under the Sixth Amendment. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit rejected his claim, the Fifth Circuit stating that Rothgery's Sixth Amendment rights were not implicated because no prosecutor was present at the initial hearing. In his petition for certiorari, Rothgery argued that both federal and state case law indicate that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to any hearing where a defendant is advised of his rights and the charges against him, regardless of whether or not a prosecutor is present. Mon, 17 Mar 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56336 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_219/argument The Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground in Alaska’s Prince William Sound in 1989 while under the command of Joseph Hazelwood, a relapsed alcoholic. Exxon knew that Hazelwood had resumed drinking but did not relieve him of his post, and the ship eventually spilled 11 million gallons of oil into the ecologically sensitive sound. The jury calculated compensatory damages at $287 million, and then awarded $5 billion in punitive damages. The punitive award has been reviewed three times by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ultimately settled on a $2.5 billion figure. In a dissent from the full court’s denial of rehearing in the third review of the award, Judge Alex Kozinski posited that any award, no matter its size, violated the maritime law rule that a ship owner need not pay for the reckless actions of an employee. Wed, 27 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56429 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_214/argument Two workers involved in the manufacture of electrical supplies for the Navy’s billion-dollar guided missile destroyers brought a whistleblower case alleging that subcontractors performed faulty work. The two charged that the companies employed unqualified workers, installed leaky gearboxes and used defective temperature gauges. After a five-week trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the companies, concluding that the False Claims Act under which the suits were brought requires that defendants “present” the fraudulent claims to the government. Because the subcontractors actually invoiced the general contractor and not the government, the court ruled that the presentment requirement had not been met. The appeals court reversed, holding that the Act should be liberally construed to discourage private companies from defrauding the government. Tue, 26 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56388 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1498/argument A group of Michigan residents who were injured after taking Warner- Lambert’s Rezulin diabetes drug sued the company in Michigan state court. The plaintiffs invoked a Michigan tort reform statue immunizing drug makers’ liability for FDA-approved products unless the drug makers made misrepresentations to the agency. The federal district court that eventually heard the case dismissed it, ruling that the Michigan “fraud on the FDA” cause of action was preempted by a federal law that empowered the FDA itself to punish misrepresentations. The appeals court reversed, reasoning that the Michigan law did not provide retribution for misrepresentations themselves, but merely created a window for consumers to bring product liability claims where the product reached the market solely through the manufacturer’s chicanery. Mon, 25 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56340 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1456/argument Humberto Fidel Regaldo Cuellar was apprehended in 2004 driving a Volkwagen Beetle crawling 30 miles below the speed limit on a main artery through Texas to Mexico. When police pulled Cuellar over, they discovered that he had logged about 1,000 miles in the past two days stopping in major cities along the way for just hours each time. When questioned, Cuellar acted nervously; he later turned over a large roll of cash that smelled like marijuana. When police examined the car, they found drill marks suggesting tampering with the gas tank, as well as mud splashings and animal hair typical of efforts to conceal the existence of contraband. Police found $83,000 in cash in a secret compartment beneath the floorboard. Cuellar was convicted of money laundering, but the appeals court overturned the conviction. The court ruled that the federal money laundering statute required the government to prove that Cuellar was attempting to portray the money he carried as legitimate wealth, rather than merely showing that he tried to hide it. Mon, 25 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56362 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1431/argument Hendrick Humphries, an African-American, was an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant owned by CBOCS. After he was fired, Humphries filed a lawsuit claiming discrimination and retaliation under 42 USC Section 1981. Humphries alleged that retaliation took many forms of abuse by his superiors. Section 1981, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, states in part that "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." Humphries lost his case in federal district court but on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1981 protects against retaliation. Wed, 20 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56315 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1321/argument Myrna Gómez-Pérez worked as a clerk for the United States Postal Service (USPS) in Puerto Rico. Gómez alleged that she was subject to retaliatory treatment after filing an age discrimination complaint against her supervisors under section 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A federal district court granted summary judgment to the USPS on the ground that the United States had not waived sovereign immunity as to retaliation claims under the ADEA. Gómez appealed to the United States Court of Appeals in the First Circuit. It held that the USPS and Potter have waived sovereign immunity with respect to ADEA suits, but that Section 15 of the ADEA does not provide a cause of action for retaliation by federal employers. Tue, 19 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56392 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1457/argument The California Legislature deregulated the power industry in 1996, establishing a so-called “spot market” in which utilities purchased electricity on the day it was needed. Four years later, during an exceptionally hot summer, wholesale electricity prices skyrocketed. In response, several utilities on the Western power grid determined that they could no longer afford the spot market, and instead negotiated less expensive but still inflated long-term contracts with power suppliers. Once the crisis passed, the utilities asked the government to let them change the contracts to reflect newly lowered electricity prices. The government refused, citing a longstanding Supreme Court doctrine presuming that utilities’ contracts are reasonable. The Ninth Circuit ultimately ordered the government to permit the changes. Tue, 19 Feb 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56380 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_937/argument LG Electronics owned patents for a group of products, including microprocessor chips used in personal computers. It licensed the patents to Intel, but in a well-publicized separate agreement excluded from the license any Intel customer that integrated the chip with non-Intel components. One purchaser disregarded the agreement and used the chips in computers made for Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Gateway. LG Electronics sued those who passed the chips down the line of commerce to companies that had not purchased licenses. Wed, 16 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56374 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1413/argument MeadWestvaco, an Ohio company, sold its lucrative Lexis/Nexis division for a $1 billion profit in 1994. Illinois attempted to claim a portion of that profit when collecting taxes from MeadWestvaco for doing business in the state. Illinois argued that Lexis/Nexis was an “operational” part of Mead’s business and therefore subject to taxation outside Mead’s home state. Mead countered that Lexis/Nexis was merely an “investment,” whose sale was immune from taxation from outside jurisdictions. The trial court found that the division was key to Mead’s operations, and therefore taxable, and the Illinois Appellate Court agreed. Wed, 16 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56297 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_11543/argument In 2004, New Mexico resident Larry Begay was arrested after brandishing and unsuccessfully shooting a rifle while begging his sister for money. Begay pleaded guilty to possessing the rifle. Prior to the firearm arrest, Begay had been convicted twelve times of driving while intoxicated. Under New Mexico law, each DWI conviction after the first three were considered felonies. The court concluded that the DWI convictions were violent felonies, triggering the federal career criminal law’s 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. A deeply divided court of appeals panel affirmed the decision to treat the DWIs as violent felonies. Tue, 15 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56412 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1646/argument When Gino Rodriquez was released from prison on supervision, he promptly absconded and was later found with $900 cash, heroin and a gun. Prosecutors argued that Rodriquez was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which applies to those convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm if they have a total of three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Rodriquez had two California burglary convictions. Prosecutors argued that the third required conviction was supplied by Rodriquez’s Washington drug offenses. Although none of the three drug convictions, on their own, was considered “serious,” the second and third were repeat offenses and therefore punishable by ten-year sentences sufficient to qualify as serious under the federal career criminal law. Tue, 15 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56322 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1463/argument In 2005, the former manager for Alex Ferrer, television’s Judge Alex, sued him to recover alleged unpaid commissions. The management contract at issue specifically called for all such disputes to be arbitrated out of court. Judge Alex responded by filing a complaint with California’s labor commissioner charging that the management contract was illegal because the manager had actually been serving as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of California law. The commissioner, who has exclusive jurisdiction over talent agency disputes, said that he lacked authority to stop the arbitration. When Judge Alex filed suit in state court, the court stopped the arbitration. Mon, 14 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56433 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1082/argument Virginia police stopped David Lee Moore after receiving a radio call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. State law specified the procedure for punishing that infraction: issuance of a citation and summons to appear in court. The officers instead decided to arrest Moore. After reading Moore his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. At trial court, Moore's attorney sought to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and Moore was convicted. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the introduction of the cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional. Mon, 14 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56406 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_21/argument In 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. At trial, the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law’s requirements. The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. However, the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates. Wed, 09 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56390 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1037/argument Charles Lickteig is a deputy sheriff in Kentucky. Because he is a hazardous duty worker, he is eligible to retire at age 55. Kentucky Retirement Systems offers a two-tier calculation of so-called "disability retirement benefits." If hazardous duty workers like Lickteig opt to keep working and then become disabled, they receive only their scheduled retirement benefits. In contrast, workers who become disabled before reaching age 55 receive payments that reflect not only their actual years of service but the number of years remaining until they would have reached 55. In effect, if two workers were otherwise identical, the one who retired on disability before 55 would always get benefits equal to or greater than those of the post-55 retiree. Lickteig decided against retirement at 55. Six years later, he became disabled because of "a deteriorating vertebra, arthritis, nerve damage, and Parkinson's disease," and stopped working. When he applied for disability retirement benefits, he received word that he was eligible only for standard retirement. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued unsuccessfully in federal district court that the two-tier system violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court reheard the case en banc and reversed, holding that the simple act of treating younger disabled retirees better than older ones was sufficient to make out a prima facie ADEA violation. Wed, 09 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56346 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_11612/argument Homero Gonzalez was tried with a co-defendant on several drug-related charges. He pled not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, a magistrate judge who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that she would conduct voir dire, and sought consent from the parties. Attorneys for the government and for Gonzalez expressly agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he affirmatively object. He argued on appeal that he had the right to a new trial because he did not give his personal consent for a magistrate to conduct the jury interviews. Tue, 08 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56299 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1509/argument Michael H. Boulware founded a coffee and bottled water company known as Hawaiian Isles Enterprises. As his company became profitable in 1987, he began transferring money – a total of $4.5 million – from his company to his mistress. Seven years later, in the midst of a divorce, his mistress refused to return the money when asked, contending that it was a gift. A Hawaii court eventually held that the woman had been holding the money in constructive trust for the company’s benefit. Seven years after that, the federal government indicted Boulware for failing to pay taxes on the disputed funds as well as $6 million more that he had received from the company. Boulware argued that under the “return of capital” rule, holding that when unprofitable companies distribute money to shareholders, the money is considered a nontaxable return of capital up to the shareholder’s basis in the stock, he owed no taxes. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. Tue, 08 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56332 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1181/argument Samson Dada, a Nigerian citizen, entered the United States in 1998 and overstayed his temporary visa. Dada married a U.S. citizen which made him eligible for permanent residence under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Dada’s wife failed to provide the required documentation. In 2004 the government found Dada removable. An immigration judge granted Dada’s request for voluntary departure. Before the window to leave the country closed, Dada filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In so doing, he asked that the voluntary departure order be withdrawn, to avoid the 10-year bar on future re-entry that accompanies a failure to leave the country within the allotted time. The Bureau of Immigration Affairs denied the request. Dada appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It upheld the denial. Because Dada’s voluntary departure period had expired, the appeals court found Dada subject to the 10-year bar on future re- entry. Mon, 07 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56408 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_5439/argument Two Kentucky inmates challenged the state's four-drug lethal injection protocol. The lethal injection method calls for the administration of four drugs: Valium, which relaxes the convict, Sodium Pentathol, which knocks the convict unconscious, Pavulon, which stops his breathing, and potassium chloride, which essentially puts the convict into cardiac arrest and ultimately causes death. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the death penalty system did not amount to unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment. Mon, 07 Jan 2008 13:00:00 +0000 56402 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1195/argument In 2002 Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerian natives were seized by Bosnian police when U.S. intelligence officers suspected their involvement in a plot to attack the U.S. embassy there. The U.S. government classified the men as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is located on land that the U.S. leases from Cuba. Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging violations of the Constitution's Due Process Clause, various statutes and treaties, the common law, and international law. The District Court judge granted the government's motion to have all of the claims dismissed on the ground that Boumediene, as an alien detained at an overseas military base, had no right to a habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal but the Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush, which held that the habeas statute extends to non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo. In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The Act eliminates federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated (according to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the MCA did not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the government on both points. It cited language in the MCA applying the law to "all cases, without exception" that pertain to aspects of detention. One of the purposes of the MCA, according to the Circuit Court, was to overrule the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which had allowed petitions like Boumediene's to go forward. The D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause only protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789, and that the writ would not have been understood in 1789 to apply to an overseas military base leased from a foreign government. Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens outside of the United States, the court held, and the leased military base in Cuba does not qualify as inside the geographic borders of the U.S. In a rare reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after initially denying review three months earlier. Wed, 05 Dec 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56384 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_10119/argument In capital murder trial of Allen Snyder, an African-American, the prosecution used peremptory (automatic) challenges to dismiss five African-American prospective jurors. This resulted in Snyder being tried by an all-white jury, which found him guilty and approved the death penalty. The defense argued that the prosecution's striking of the black jurors was racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, according to the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky. As part of its case for the prosecution's alleged discriminatory intent, the defense cited two of the prosecutor's statements comparing the case to the O.J. Simpson murder trial. After having indirectly referred to the Simpson trial before jury selection, the prosecutor had invoked the case again during the sentencing phase, comparing aspects of Snyder's case to Simpson's and noting that the latter defendant "got away with it." The trial court applied the Batson framework and denied the defense's challenges. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court, ruling that the trial judge had not acted unreasonably when he accepted the prosecution's race-neutral justifications for the dismissals of the black jurors. The court ruled that the O.J. Simpson references were harmless comparisons made in the course of a rebuttal, and it noted that the prosecution had not mentioned Simpson's or Snyder's race. When the Supreme Court instructed the state court to reconsider the case in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, which requires that courts consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating discriminatory intent, the court affirmed the trial court a second time. Tue, 04 Dec 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56378 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_179/argument During Charles Riegel's angioplasty, his surgeon used an Evergreen Balloon Catheter to dilate his coronary artery. The catheter burst, causing extreme complications. Riegel sued the manufacturer, Medtronic, for negligence in the design, manufacture, and labeling of the device. Medtronic argued that Riegel could not bring these state-law negligence claims because they were preempted by Section 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The MDA establishes a federal regulatory process for ensuring the safety of medical devices, and it provides that no state may set requirements that differ from or add to the federal ones. The District Court dismissed Riegel's claims as preempted by the MDA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the suits based on medical devices like the Evergreen Balloon Catheter are preempted by the MDA. The catheter had been through the exceptionally rigorous "premarket approval" (PMA) process, by which federal regulators ensured that it met federal requirements. To allow state common-law suits for PMA-approved devices, the court ruled, would be to add a state requirement to the regulatory process despite the MDA's preemption clause. Tue, 04 Dec 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56421 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1221/argument During a company-wide reduction in force, Sprint fired fifty-one-year-old employee Ellen Mendelsohn. Mendelsohn sued, alleging that Sprint had discriminated against her on account of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At the trial, Mendelsohn attempted to present evidence from other Sprint employees who alleged that they were also discriminated against by the company. This type of testimony by employees who are not parties to the case is sometimes called "me, too" testimony. The District Court judge refused to admit the testimony, citing the "same supervisor" rule. Since the other employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn, their testimony was not relevant to the alleged discriminatory intent behind the decision to fire her. The jury returned a verdict for Sprint, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The Tenth Circuit held that the "same supervisor" rule applies only to discriminatory disciplinary actions and not to suits alleging a company-wide policy of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit held that the "me, too" testimony was relevant because the other employees were similarly situated and fired around the same time, and it held that the testimony was important enough that its exclusion had denied Mendelsohn an opportunity to present her allegation of company-wide discrimination. The ruling conflicted with those of several other Circuit Courts which approved the exclusion of "me, too" testimony. Mon, 03 Dec 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56342 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_457/argument In an effort to address the problem of tobacco use by minors, the Maine legislature passed the Tobacco Delivery Law, which imposes requirements on air and motor carriers that transport tobacco products. One provision of the law requires tobacco retailers to only use carriers that verify the age of each tobacco purchaser, and another provision requires that carriers ensure that no tobacco is shipped to unlicensed retailers. The New Hampshire Motor Transport Association sued, arguing that the state law was preempted by a federal law, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). The preemption provision of the FAAAA prohibits state from enacting laws "related to" the prices, routes, or services of air and motor carriers. The Association argued that the Tobacco Delivery Law placed such a burden on the delivery procedures of carriers that significantly affected their prices and services. The state countered that the FAAAA was only meant to preempt traditional economic regulation by states, and therefore laws enacted pursuant to the state's police power - the power of a state to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens - were permissible. The U.S. District Court ruled that the law was preempted by the FAAAA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court. The First Circuit held that a police power exception to the general rule of preemption would be far too broad and was not intended by Congress. Maine could validly ban all unlicensed tobacco products within its borders, but the FAAAA prohibited the state from implementing this goal by imposing requirements on carriers that significantly alter their delivery procedures. Wed, 28 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56386 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1286/argument Trustee Michael J. Knight hired a firm to provide investment-management advice to the William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust. The Trust deducted all of the fees paid for the investment-advice service from its tax return, but the IRS rejected the deduction. A provision in 26 U.S.C. 67(e) allows trusts to fully deduct certain administrative costs, but the IRS maintained that fees for investment-advice services fall outside the statute's scope. The tax court agreed with the IRS and ruled the fees nondeductible. Federal Courts of Appeals had come to opposite conclusions on the question. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the tax court. The court cited Section 67(e)'s requirement that a trust's fees are only fully deductible when they "would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust." The provision was meant to exempt special administrative expenses that are incurred by trusts. Therefore, the court ruled, costs that could possibly be incurred by individual taxpayers as well as trusts were never deductible in full. Since an individual could pay for investment-advice services, and since the individual's payment would not be fully deductable, Section 67(e) did not exempt a trust's payment for the same services. Tue, 27 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56350 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_134_orig/argument When British Petroleum (BP) wanted to build a natural gas transfer facility on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River, the State of Delaware objected that the pier construction would require the dredging of underwater lands it considered part of its coastal zone. Delaware denied BP a permit for the construction despite the fact that most of the construction would take place on the New Jersey side of the river. New Jersey granted the permit, arguing that a 1905 compact between the States settling a boundary dispute placed the construction site under New Jersey control. New Jersey filed a claim to settle the dispute and the case went directly to the Court under its original jurisdiction to hear disputes between two States. Tue, 27 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56317 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_856/argument James LaRue participated in a 401(k) retirement savings plan administered by his employer, the management consulting firm DeWolff, Boberg & Associates. Employee benefit plans are regulated under a federal law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). LaRue sought to exercise his option to make certain changes in his investment plan, but DeWolff neglected to make the changes. LaRue claimed that DeWolff's omission had cost him $150,000, and he sued the firm for breach of fiduciary duty, seeking to recover the money. In response, DeWolff argued that ERISA does not provide for the type of individual monetary award sought by LaRue. Section 502(a)(2) allows plan participants to sue plan administrators for breach of fiduciary duty in order to "make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach." DeWolff argued that LaRue's suit was not of the type contemplated by the text of ERISA because LaRue sued to recover losses caused to his own personal retirement plan rather than suing to vindicate the interests of the plan as a whole. LaRue also invoked Section 502(a)(3), which allows plan participants to sue to obtain "other appropriate equitable relief." The U.S. District Court held that LaRue was not entitled to relief under ERISA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Fourth Circuit ruled that Section 502(a)(2) was concerned with protecting entire plans from misuse of plan assets and not with providing recovery for losses suffered by individual accounts. The court also rejected LaRue's Section 502(a)(3) claim. It ruled that the phrase "equitable relief" rarely includes relief in the form of a monetary award and only when the money has been unjustly possessed by the defendant. Mon, 26 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56352 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_989/argument Toy manufacturer Mattel was sued by its landlord Hall Street Associates in a dispute over a property lease. After the litigation went to federal court both parties agreed to resolve the case by arbitration according to the procedures outlined in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Atypically, the parties' arbitration agreement stipulated that the District Court could override the arbitrator's decision if "the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous." This provision of the agreement granted the federal courts a much broader role in supervising the arbitration than is specifically granted in the FAA. The Act explicitly mentions only a narrow set of circumstances under which courts can override an arbitration award, such as corruption, partiality, or misbehavior on the part of the arbitrator. The arbitrator heard the parties' arguments and handed down a decision in favor of Mattel. Hall sought review from the District Court, and that court found that the arbitrator's decision contained legally erroneous conclusions. Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled for Hall Street, and the District Court affirmed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the original arbitration award favoring Mattel must stand. Even if the arbitrator did make legal errors, it was not the place of the courts to review the soundness of the arbitrator's decision. The Ninth Circuit viewed the FAA's list of circumstances meriting judicial review as an exclusive list. As far as the original arbitration agreement expanded the scope of judicial review of the arbitration, the agreement could not be enforced. Wed, 07 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56431 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1164/argument John R. Sand & Gravel Company had leased the rights to mine sand and gravel on a piece of Michigan property that also contained an old landfill. After thousands of drums of illegally-buried industrial waste were discovered in the landfill, the EPA started a clean-up operation. In 1994 the EPA erected a security fence around its operations. Although John R. Sand kept mining other parts of the property, the fence blocked certain mining sites. John R. Sand's ability to mine the area was still impeded after the EPA moved the fence in 1998. In 2002 John R. Sand brought suit against the government, arguing that the restrictions on its operations amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking of property. The Tucker Act waives the government's sovereign immunity for such suits, but the Act has a six-year statute of limitations. John R. Sand argued that the issue in its claim originated in 1998 when the EPA moved its fence and for the first time obtained an order granting it unrestrained access to the property. The government countered that the claim actually accrued back in 1994 when the fence first went up, which would make the suit untimely. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the suit was timely, but it also ruled that the government was not liable for a Fifth Amendment taking. In John R. Sand's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the issue of the statute of limitations was raised again - not by either of the parties, but by a group of corporations who were not parties to the case. Citing its own precedents, the Federal Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was jurisdictional. Jurisdictional requirements determine whether courts can hear a case. They cannot be waived by the parties to the case, and courts can consider jurisdictional issues on the courts' own initiative. The Federal Circuit ruled that John R. Sand's claim accrued no later than 1994. Since the suit fell outside the time limit, the Federal Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and it dismissed the case without considering the merits of the Fifth Amendment claim. Tue, 06 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56334 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1322/argument Paul Holowecki and other employees of Federal Express sued the corporation for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A district court judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had met the time limits and filing requirements of the ADEA. The ADEA requires that a plaintiff file a "charge" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 60 days prior to filing suit. Upon receiving the charge of discrimination, the EEOC notifies the employer of the accusation, investigates the matter, and offers to mediate. THE EEOC has an "Intake Questionnaire" form and a "Charge" form, but the EEOC regulations state only that "A charge shall be in writing and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s)." One of the plaintiffs completed an intake questionnaire, but the EEOC did not take the steps it should have taken after the filing of a charge. Holowecki sued over 60 days later, but the judge ruled that the intake questionnaire did not qualify as a charge for purposes of the AEDA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, allowing Holowecki's suit to go forward. The Second Circuit ruled that the minimal written information required for a charge was contained in the intake questionnaire. The questionnaire also met the ADEA's implicit requirement that the charge be intended to start the process of an ADEA suit. The Second Circuit did not consider it significant that the EEOC did not act on the questionnaire, apparently not believing it to count as a charge. To dismiss a complaint based on the EEOC's inaction would be to hold the plaintiff accountable for the failings of the agency. Tue, 06 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56344 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_666/argument When calculating gross income for tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Code exempts from taxation the interest earned on any state or local bond. However, Kentucky law requires that interest income earned on bonds issued by other states be taxed as part of an individual's adjusted gross income. George and Catherine Davis filed a class action complaint arguing that Kentucky's policy of taxing out-of-state bonds was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause - the doctrine that the Commerce Clause forbids states from interfering with interstate commerce. The state trial court ruled in favor of the Kentucky Department of Revenue and declared the tax policy constitutional. On appeal, the Davises stressed Kentucky's market discrimination against other states as a factor indicating that the policy was unconstitutional. In response, the Department of Revenue cited a similar policy that was upheld by state courts in Ohio. The Department also invoked the "market participant doctrine," which stands for the idea that only the state's actions as a regulator are subject to the dormant Commerce Clause. Actions undertaken as a market participant, such as the issuance of bonds, are not. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and struck down the tax policy. The Court of Appeals held that the tax discrimination rather than the bond issuance was at issue, and the taxation was indisputably undertaken in the state's capacity as a regulator. The court concluded that the Commerce Clause was incompatible with such a discriminatory state policy. Mon, 05 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56400 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1287/argument The Tax Injunction Act establishes a general rule that federal courts will not interfere with matters of state taxation, but the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) provides an exception for railroads. In an effort to prevent state tax discrimination against railroads, Section 306 of the 4-R Act requires that the ratio of the assessed value to the true market value of railroad property not exceed by more than five percent the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction. This calculation requires that states determine the "true market value" of the railroads' property - a valuation that can be subjective. Using a new valuation methodology, the Georgia State Board of Equalization appraised the property of the railroad company CSX Transportation, Inc. at $8.2 billion. CSX filed a complaint under the 4-R Act, noting that the old appraisal methodology would have valued the property at only $6 billion. Despite CSX's argument that the 4-R Act allows railroads to challenge state valuation methods, the district court ruled that the only the state's methodology could be considered. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that in the absence of a clear statement in the 4-R Act, principles of federalism weighed against interpreting the Act to give railroads additional power to challenge the taxing authority of the states in federal court. The Circuit Court stood by the general principle that federal courts should not interfere with state taxation policies. Since the 4-R Act did not allow challenges to the state's choice of valuation method, CSX could not bring its arguments that Georgia's methodology was faulty. Mon, 05 Nov 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56396 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_8273/argument At Stephen Danforth's trial for sexual abuse of a six-year-old boy, the victim was found incompetent to testify in court, so his videotaped testimony was shown instead. Danforth was convicted and his appeals were unsuccessful. After Danforth's case became final, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that pre-recorded testimony without the possibility of cross- examination is unconstitutional. Danforth filed a second petition for postconviction relief, seeking to have the Crawford decision applied retroactively to his case. Supreme Court decisions announcing constitutional rules of criminal procedure are applied retroactively only in certain circumstances, which are specified in Teague v. Lane. The state court of appeals declined to retroactively apply Crawford. On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Danforth raised an alternative argument, claiming that the state court was free to apply a broader standard of retroactivity than the one in Teague. Under Minnesota state retroactivity principles, Danforth argued, the Crawford case met the criteria for retroactive application. In Danforth's interpretation, the Teague standard was mandatory for federal habeas corpus proceedings but not for state postconviction proceedings. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Danforth's arguments, ruling that only U.S. Supreme Court decisions determine the proper standard for retroactive application of constitutional criminal procedure. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Whorton v. Bockting that Crawford does not apply retroactively under Teague, but it agreed to consider Danforth's alternative argument. Wed, 31 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56301 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_6911/argument Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well. A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA. Tue, 30 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56370 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_694/argument Michael Williams was convicted in federal district court of "pandering" (promoting) child pornography. The PROTECT Act proscribes the pandering of "any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe" that the material is illegal child pornography. The Act represents Congress's attempt to outlaw sexually explicit images of children - including both images of real children and computer-generated images of realistic virtual children. The Supreme Court struck down Congress's previous effort as overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Council, because the law as written could have outlawed artwork that was neither obscene nor child pornography. Williams argued that the PROTECT Act was similarly overbroad, but the district court held that the government can legitimately outlaw the pandering of material as child pornography, even if the material is not in fact child pornography. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and struck down the PROTECT Act as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Eleventh Circuit was unmoved by the government's argument that prosecuting the promotion of virtual child pornography as real is necessary to combat the child porn market. The Circuit Court held that the Act's prohibition was broad enough to include any "braggart, exaggerator, or outright liar" who claims in a non-commercial context to have child pornography but actually does not. Thus, the Act's pandering provision prohibited protected speech as well as actual child pornography. Tue, 30 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56303 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_9130/argument Before his transfer to a new prison, prisoner Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali temporarily left his two bags of possessions with a police officer. When the bags arrived, Ali noticed that several items were missing. He filed an administrative tort claim with the Bureau of Prisons seeking to recover the items. After the claim was denied, he brought his case to U.S. District Court. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the government had immunity from the lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA establishes a general waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the government, but it also makes several exceptions to the waiver. One exception is for "[a]ny claim arising in respect of [...] the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer." Ali argued that in context the phrase "other law enforcement officer" referred only to officers working in customs and related activities, but the court applied the exception to any detention of goods by any law enforcement officer. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ali's claim. It ruled that the phrase "any other law enforcement officer" in the FTCA was not merely a supplementary catch-all relating to the government's immunity in tax collection and customs situations. Rather, it was itself a broad grant of sovereign immunity covering any instance of detention of goods by law enforcement officers. Mon, 29 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56368 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1265/argument In his role as chairman of a settlement committee of the Board of Trade of the City of New York, Norman Eisler allegedly manipulated the daily settlement prices of commodities futures in order to conceal bad investments. During this period Eisler's company purchased futures contracts through its broker, the commodity futures merchant Klein & Co. Futures, Inc., but the alleged price manipulation distorted Klein's appraisal of Eisler's ability to pay. When the scheme unravelled, Eisler's company could not meet its obligations and Klein was forced to absorb the loss. Klein sued Eisler and the Board of Trade under Section 22 of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), claiming that the Board of Trade failed to enforce rules that would have prevented the manipulation. The CEA requires boards of trade to set rules governing the market, and Section 22 allows private parties to sue for failure to enforce the rules as long as the party was "engaged in any transaction" subject to the board's rules. The U.S. District Court dismissed Klein's claim for lack of standing to sue, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit interpreted Section 22 as including buyers and sellers of futures contracts but excluding the commodity futures merchants who conduct the actual trades on behalf of their customers. The court ruled that Klein's financial loss was not sufficient to grant it standing, because the loss was suffered in the aftermath of the futures trading and not during the trading itself. Mon, 29 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56321 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_984/argument Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post-conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a crime the right to contact his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court (see Medellin v. Dretke), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that the U.S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals (including Medellin) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez-Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law-making power not allocated to him by the Constitution. Wed, 10 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56360 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_571/argument Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi- automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who "uses or carries" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs "uses" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that "use" means "active employment" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use. On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of "use." Tue, 09 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56356 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_43/argument Stoneridge Investment Partners alleged that the cable company Charter Communications had fraudulently inflated the price of its stock. The alleged scheme involved a "sham transaction" in which Charter gave its equipment vendor, Scientific-Atlanta, above-normal payments for T.V. set-top boxes and the vendor then gave back the extra payments as advertising fees. Charter then fraudulently accounted the returned payments as revenue. Stoneridge sued both Charter and Scientific-Atlanta under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but the district court threw out the claim against Scientific- Atlanta. The court ruled that Stoneridge's claim against the vendor was only a claim for aiding and abetting fraud. The Supreme Court had ruled in Central Bank of Denver v. First International Bank of Denver that Section 10(b) punishes only deceptive conduct itself, not aiding and abetting such conduct. However, the Court that secondary actors such as banks, lawyers, and accountants can be considered violators of Section 10(b) if they engage in deceptive conduct along with the primary actor. On appeal, Stoneridge argued that Scientific-Atlanta qualified as a primary violator of Section 10(b). Scientific-Atlanta countered that it had not participated in Charter's fraudulent accounting practices, and, in contrast to Charter, it had made no false public statements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for Scientific Atlanta. The Circuit Court held that the vendor could at most be accused of aiding and abetting Charter's deception, and such claims are not allowed under Section 10(b) according to the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank. Tue, 09 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56410 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_766/argument New York trial court judges are appointed by way of a "district convention system." Under this system, political party members elect delegates, who in turn vote for judicial candidates nominated at party conventions. Margarita Lopez Torres sought appointment to a New York Supreme Court but did not have a political party's endorsement. Lopez Torres claimed that the system unconstitutionally obstructed judicial appointments by making candidates reliant upon political parties. The New York Board of Elections defended the system, arguing that it did not bar voters from participating because they had the opportunity to elect delegates. A District Court found that the system unnecessarily and excessively restricted elections. It cited the absence of a "single successful challenge to candidates backed by the party leaders." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the system gave political party officials too much power and violated voters' and candidates' First Amendment rights to freedom of association. Wed, 03 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56328 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_1005/argument For his role in running an illegal lottery or "bolita," Efrain Santos was convicted on charges of illegal gambling and money laundering. Santos had used income from the lottery to pay both the winners and the couriers and collectors who worked for the gambling operation. The money laundering charges were based on 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which criminalizes the use of the "proceeds" of an illegal activity to promote or conceal that activity. However, federal courts disagreed on the meaning of "proceeds." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled that the proceeds used in money laundering can be any of the gross income obtained from the illegal activity, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had jurisdiction over Santos's case, had recently ruled that only net income (gross revenues minus expenses) used to promote or conceal illegal activities can be the basis of a money laundering conviction. Because Santos had only used gross revenues to promote his lottery, the District Court reversed the convictions. The government argued on appeal that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation would put too great a burden on prosecutions, because the bookkeeping of criminal operations is often purposefully incomplete or misleading in order to obscure the distinction between gross and net income. The narrow interpretation would also restrict money laundering prosecutions to criminal enterprises that are actually profitable. Santos countered that the government's broad interpretation would result in overlapping convictions for a wide variety of offenders charged with both money laundering and the underlying crime. He argued that the government's interpretation strayed too far from the traditional understanding of money laundering, which focuses on the subsequent disguising of profits obtained from a criminal venture. The Seventh Circuit ruled for Santos and affirmed its original ruling. Wed, 03 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56382 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_6330/argument In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers. Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug- and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio. Tue, 02 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56305 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_7949/argument While a student at the University of Iowa, Brian Gall was involved in a drug ring distributing ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine, MDMA). He voluntarily left the drug conspiracy and moved to Arizona where he started his own business and led a crime-free life. When federal agents tracked him down, he turned himself in and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The government argued for a sentence of 30 months in prison, which was the minimum sentence in the range recommended for the offense by the federal sentencing guidelines. Taking into account the mitigating circumstances in Gall's case, the judge instead decided to depart from the guidelines and impose a sentence of 36 months of probation. (The Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the sentencing guidelines to be merely advisory, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit held that while the guidelines are not mandatory, sentences that fall outside of the recommended sentencing range must overcome a presumption of unreasonableness. Sentences varying from the guidelines must be justified based on the circumstances of the case, and larger variances from the guidelines require correspondingly more compelling justifications. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court had erred by using Gall's youth as a mitigating factor, by overweighing his rehabilitation, and by underweighing the seriousness of the crime. Since the "extraordinary variance" was not justified by a finding of extraordinary circumstances, the Eighth Circuit ordered a new sentence. Tue, 02 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56398 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_637/argument The Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) guarantees students with disabilities a "free appropriate public education." Tom Freston enrolled his son Gilbert in a private school for students with special needs, because the New York City school district was unable to establish an adequate "individualized education program." The school district reimbursed Freston for the private school tuition. After two years the school district offered to place Gilbert in another public school, but Freston chose to keep his son in private school and again sought tuition reimbursement from the district. A U.S. district court ruled that the school district was not required by the IDEA to reimburse Freston, because Gilbert had never been enrolled in public school. The relevant section of the IDEA authorizes tuition reimbursement to the parents of a disabled child "who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency," but it does not explicitly state that parents of children who have never received public education are not entitled to reimbursement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court. By comparing the disputed section of the IDEA with other sections of the statute, the Second Circuit reasoned that the IDEA was not meant to deny reimbursement to students who have never been enrolled in public school. To rule otherwise, the Circuit Court held, would be to require parents like Freston to enroll children in inadequate public schools in order to be eligible for tuition reimbursement. Mon, 01 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56394 at http://www.oyez.org http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_713/argument The State of Washington reconstructed its primary election system according to Initiative 872, which was passed into law by a majority general vote in 2004. The initiative was endorsed by the Washington State Grange and created a new "modified blanket primary" system where each candidate on the ballot could affiliate with the party of his choosing regardless of whether the party approved of his candidacy. Political parties claimed that this system violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association, arguing that control over which candidates to endorse constituted an essential function of association. The Grange argued that the primary was nonpartisan. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a District Court decision, ruling that since "party designation is a powerful, partisan message that voters may rely upon in casting a vote," Initiative 872 "constitutes a severe burden upon the parties' associational rights." (The case was consolidated with Washington v. Washington State Republican Party for argument before the Supreme Court.) Mon, 01 Oct 2007 13:00:00 +0000 56416 at http://www.oyez.org